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HISTORY

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:

EMBRACING THE

OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON MENTAL SCIENCE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.

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AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE; ESSAY ON MORAL GOOD AND EVIL;
ESSAY ON LOGIC, &c.

VOLUME III.

LONDON:

TRELAWNEY WM. SAUNDERS, 6 CHARING CROSS.

OXFORD: J. H. PARKER. CAMBRIDGE: MACMILLAN & CO.
EDINBURGH: MACLACHLAN, STEWART, & CO. DUBLIN: HODGES & SMITH.
PARIS: LADRANGE. LEIPZIG: T. O. WEIGEL. FLORENCE: M. MOLINI.
BRUSSELS: HAUTMAN & CO. NEW YORK: JOHN WILEY.

1848.

C. F. HODGSON,
PRINTER,
GOUGH SQUARE, FLEET STREET, LONDON.

FROM THE TIME OF LOCKE
TO THE TERMINATION OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.



CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE.
RICHARD CUMBERLAND—Lord Shaftesbury—William Wol- laston—William King—Dr. Butler.....	1

CHAPTER II.

Stillingfleet—Thomas Burnet—Henry Lee—Henry Dodwell —John Turner—John Broughton—J. A. Lowde—Ben- jamin Hampton—William Assheton—Robert Bragge— Conyers Place—Richard Bruthogge—William Coward— Alethinos Philopsephos—Malcolm Fleming	14
---	----

CHAPTER III.

Anthony Collins	34
-----------------------	----

CHAPTER IV.

Dr. Samuel Clarke	46
-------------------------	----

CHAPTER V.

Bayle	53
-------------	----

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE PROGRESS OF METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION IN
THE LOW COUNTRIES AND IN GERMANY, FROM THE

<u>TIME OF DESCARTES TO HEMSTERHUIS.—David Goriæus</u> —Christian Lupus—Henry Regius, or Du Roi—Martin Schoockius—Wolff—Crousaz—Andrew Rudiger—Syrbius —Joh. Fr. Buddæus—Gottsched—Martin Knutzen— Crucius—Waleh—Augustus Fr. Müller—Sam. Chris. Holl- man—Rensch—G. J. S'Gravesande—Meyer—Gotthold Ephraim Lessing—Baumgarten—Elie Luzac—Reimarus— Plouquet—Moses Mendelsohn—John Godfrey Von Herder —Francis Hemsterhuis	60
--	----

CHAPTER VII.

Bishop Berkeley—Arthur Collier	100
--------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

<u>Peter Browne—David Hume</u>	<u>124</u>
--------------------------------------	------------

CHAPTER IX.

<u>Encyclopédie Française</u>	<u>140</u>
-------------------------------------	------------

CHAPTER X.

<u>Father Buffier—Abbé Condillac</u>	<u>148</u>
--	------------

CHAPTER XI.

<u>J. J. Rousseau—Dumarsais—Vauvenargues—Le Cat—Anne</u> <u>Robert Jacques Turgot—D'Alembert</u>	<u>165</u>
---	------------

CHAPTER XII.

<u>THE MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF FREDERIC THE GREAT,</u> <u>KING OF PRUSSIA, AND THE BERLIN ACADEMY.—Formey</u> <u>—Beguelin—M. De Beausobre—Merian—Maupertuis—</u> <u>Davies—J. B. Boyer, Marquis d'Argens</u>	<u>178</u>
---	------------

CHAPTER XIII.

Dr. Reid	187
----------------	-----

CHAPTER XIV.THE STATE OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—Vico—Muratori—Genovesi—Francesco Vincislao Barkovich—Giacomo Stellini—Boscovich—J. G. de Soria—Pacciolati—Verney—Gre-gorio Bressari—J. B. Scarella—Fernando de Zavalos—Baldinotti—Appiano Buonafede—Mazzarelli—Arteaga—Pietro Tamburini Bresciano—Claudio Fromond—Giamma-ria Ortes—Francesco Antonio Grimaldi—Vincenzo Micheli—Andrea Spagni..... 209CHAPTER XV.Dr. Watts—Dr. Hutcheson—James Harris—Abraham Tucker—John Horne Tooke..... 243CHAPTER XVI.Denis Diderot—Cochet—Abbé Batteaux—Voltaire—Helve-tius—Baron D'Holbach..... 254CHAPTER XVII.THE MENTAL THEORIES OF VIBRATIONS, AND THE ASSO-CIATION OF IDEAS.—Dr. Hartley—Charles Bonnet—Jo-seph Priestley—Erasmus Darwin—Belsham..... 272CHAPTER XVIII.Dr. Richard Price—James Oswald—Dr. James Beattie—LordKaimes—Adam Ferguson—Lord Monboddo..... 311CHAPTER XIX.Emmanuel Kant..... 326

CHAPTER XX.

<u>ON METAPHYSICAL WRITERS IN GERMANY WHO IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED AND FOLLOWED KANT, TILL THE TERMINATION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—Paul Mako—John James Brucker—John Henry Lambert—K. L. Reinhold—Joh. Heinr. Abicht—Tennemann—Buhle—D. Tiedemann—J. G. C. Kiesewetter—Salomon Maimon—Gottlob Ernest Schulze—Fred. Henry Jacobi—J. G. Hamann—Frederic Novalis—Jacob Sigismond Beck—Irwing—E. Platner—Eberhard—T. N. Tetens—C. Garve—J. G. H. Feder—C. Meiners—J. H. Campe—C. W. Snell—F. W. Snell—J. C. G. Schaumann—F. G. Born—C. F. Schmidt Phiseldeck—J. Neeb—L. H. Jacob—J. H. Tieftrunk—C. F. Hungar—K. G. Fürstenau—J. C. Hoffbauer—T. G. E. Maass—H. Kunhardt—G. Hufeland—Th. Schmalz—A. Feuerbach—K. S. Zachariä—K. H. Groos—T. H. G. Heusinger—F. J. Niethammer—F. H. C. Schwarz—K. P. Moritz</u>	<u>359</u>
---	------------

CHAPTER XXI.

<u>METAPHYSICAL AUTHORS OF FRANCE DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—Saint Martin—M. Fabre—Volney—Condorcet—Cabanis—Gérat—Destutt-Tracy</u>	<u>401</u>
--	------------

CHAPTER XXII.

<u>On the Chief Metaphysical Writers who have Treated of the Sublime and Beautiful; and on the Principles which Guide our Judgment in all matters of Taste and Sentiment.....</u>	<u>419</u>
<u>Concluding Remarks</u>	<u>513</u>
<u>NOTES and ILLUSTRATIONS</u>	<u>519</u>

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

ETC. ETC.

CHAPTER I.

CUMBERLAND, SHAFTESBURY, WOLLASTON, KING,
AND BUTLER.

THESE English writers belong to the class of theoretical moralists, rather than metaphysicians; and as such have generally been considered. Their several writings exercised a considerable influence over the current of philosophical thought in their own country, during the latter part of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century. They were never, however, much read or consulted on the Continent; being of rather too controversial a cast, to render them palatable in that quarter.

All these abstract moral speculations rested on a system of metaphysical knowledge. That system was, in all its leading features, of a *common sense* character. Its fundamental principles were, that man was constituted of two elements, mind and

body ; that the former was of a real, spiritual, and immortal nature ; that it had innate powers of reflection, and notions of right and wrong, good and evil, irrespective of the influence of the senses, or the conventional rules and maxims of legislative enactments ; that men had a constant and firm belief in the stability of the laws of nature, as developed in the movements of matter and the active principles of the mind ; and that every thing we see around us is regulated by Infinite wisdom, and for given ends and purposes, of which, in our present state, we have only a very limited knowledge. These propositions lie at the root of all the writings of these authors ; and their illustrations from the constitution of the universe, and of human nature, are characterized by great logical skill and ability.

RICHARD CUMBERLAND.

This author was Bishop of Peterborough, and the treatise which contains his metaphysical opinions, is entitled "De Legibus Naturæ," and was published in 1672.

In the second chapter the author unfolds his views as to "Human Nature and Right Reason." The first principle in man's mental constitution is *sensation*. This holds a prominent and important station in the intellectual economy. It is solely from external objects acting upon our senses, that we are enabled to form ideas or notions of them. The Bishop divides the mind into two faculties, the *understanding* and the *will* ; the former compre-

hending *apprehension, comparing, judging, reasoning, a methodical disposition*, and the power of *recollecting* all these things. To the *will* he refers the power of choosing and refusing, as well as the various moral affections and passions of our nature.

The author maintains that the laws of Nature are supported by the same degree of evidence as mathematical propositions are. He says, "That the motion of a point does not more certainly produce a line, or the addition of numbers a sum, than that benevolence produces a good effect, to the person to whom we wish well, proportioned to the power and affection of the agent in the given circumstances. It is also certain, that *keeping faith, gratitude, natural affection, &c.*, are either *parts* or *modes* of a most effectual benevolence towards all, accommodated to particular circumstances; and that they most certainly produce their good effects after the same manner, as it is certain that addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, are parts or modes of calculation, and that a right line, circle, parabola, and other curves, do express the various effects which geometry produces by the motion of a point."

"Moral propositions in general derive their truths from the testimonies of the *senses*, which outwardly and by *internal* manifestations, indicate the truth of the proposition, as being in conformity with nature. Reason takes cognizance of all external impressions, and moulds them to her purposes. The *inward nature of our mind*, and its *active powers*, by which it determines the volun-

tary motions of our bodies in pursuit of apparent good, the mind itself perceives, partly by *reflecting* upon itself, partly by the aid of the *senses* observing the effects consequent upon the command of our will.”*

Bishop Cumberland enters largely into the question of the immateriality of the thinking principle. He maintains that material bodies can never possess the power of thought. In all matter the parts bear a similar relation to the whole. The magnitudes of every *body* is the sum of the *magnitudes* of its several *parts*. The motion of every *body* is the sum of the *motion* of its several *parts*. The same is universally true of every simple *quality* residing in any system. *Consciousness* is neither a mere abstract name, nor a power of exciting or occasioning different modes in a foreign substance, but a real quality, truly and properly inherent in the subject itself, *the thinking substance*.†

LORD SHAFTESBURY. 2

The chief work of Shaftesbury, the most elegant and witty author of his time, is his “Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times;” which was first published in 1711. This treatise contains nearly all his own metaphysical opinions, as well as his criticisms on the philosophy of other distinguished authors.

Lord Shaftesbury was a decided enemy to the

* Chap. 1. p. 43.

† Appendix, p. 10.

mental theories of Hobbes and Locke. He says, "All those called *free writers* now-a-days, have espoused those principles which Mr. Hobbes set on foot in this last age." Again: "Mr. Locke, as much as I honour him an account of other writings (on Government, Policy, Trade, Coin, Education, Toleration, &c.) and as well as I know him, and can answer for his sincerity as a most zealous Christian and believer, did however go in the self-same track; and is followed by the Tindals, and all the other free authors of our time."*

"'Twas Mr. Locke that struck the home blow; for Mr. Hobbes's character, and base slavish principles of government, took off the poison of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw off all *order and virtue* out of the world, and made the very ideas of those (which are the same with those of God) *unnatural* and without foundation in our minds. *Innate* is a word he poorly plays upon; the right word, though less used, is *connatural*. For what has *birth* or progress of the fœtus out of the womb to do in this case?—the question is not about the *time* the ideas entered, or the moment that one body came out of the other; but whether the constitution of man be such, that, being adult and grown up, at such a time, sooner or later, (no matter when) the idea or sense of *order, administration*, and a God, will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him."†

* Characteristics, Advice to Authors, Vol. 1.

† Ibid., Vol. 1. p. 286.

Sometimes Shaftesbury is full of humour, and delights to sport a little ridicule and banter at the expence of Locke's philosophy. Listen to the following. "In reality, how specious a study, how solemn an amusement is raised from what we call *Philosophical Speculations!* the *Formation of Ideas!* their *Compositions, Agreements, and Disagreements!* What can have a better appearance, or bid fairer for *genuine and true philosophy?* Come on then. Let me philosophize in this manner; if this be indeed the way I am to grow *wise*. Let me examine my *ideas* of *space* and *substance*. Let me look well into *matter* and its *modes*; if this be looking into *myself*; if this be to improve my understanding, and enlarge my *mind*. Let me observe with diligence what passes *here*; what connection and consistency, what agreement or disagreement, I find *within*. Whether, according to my present *ideas*, that which I approve this hour, I am like to approve as well the next. And in case it be otherwise with me, how or after what manner, I shall relieve myself; how *ascertain* my *ideas*, and keep my opinion, liking, and esteem of things, *the same*. If this remains unsolved; if I am still the same mystery to myself as ever; to what purpose is all this reasoning and acuteness? Wherefore do I admire my philosopher, or study to become such a one myself?

"*To-day* things have succeeded well with me; consequently my ideas are raised. It is a fine world! All is glorious! Every thing delightful and entertaining! Mankind, conversation, company,

society! what can be more desirable! *To-morrow* comes *disappointment, crosses, disgrace*. And what follows? O miserable mankind! wretched state! who would live out of solitude? who would act or write for such a world? Philosopher! where are thy *ideas*? where is *truth, certainty, evidence*, so much talked of? It is here surely that they are to be maintained, if anywhere. It is here I am to preserve some *just distinctions*, and *adequate ideas*; which if I cannot do a jot the more by what such a philosophy can teach me, the philosophy is in this respect imposing and delusive. For whatever its other virtues are, it relates not to *me-myself*, it concerns not the *man*, nor any otherwise affects the *mind*, than by the conceit of knowledge, and the assurance raised from a supposed improvement, which is in reality none at all.”*

In the “*Moralists, a Rhapsody*,” the noble author enters very fully into the philosophical opinions generally entertained, both by ancient and modern speculators, on the nature of matter, and on an immaterial substance. The arguments are sprightly and full of wit.†

WILLIAM WOLLASTON.

This author’s work, “*The Religion of Nature Delineated*,” was published in 1722, and was uncommonly popular, but is now comparatively neglected.

The system of Wollaston is grounded on a sim-

* *Characteristics*, vol. 1. p. 300.

† *Ibid.* vol. 2, pp. 352, 353, 354.

ple metaphysical principle, *that truth in every thing is to be in conformity with the constituted order of nature.* This axiom is demonstrated in the following manner.

Every act of a rational being, must be the act of one capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting, from the innate powers of his own will. All propositions are true which express things as they really are; or truth is the agreement between those words and signs by which things are expressed, and the things themselves. Truth may be denied or affirmed by deeds or actions as well as in words. "If," says the author, "A. should enter into a compact with B., by which he *promises* and engages never to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing, in this case it must be granted that his act interferes with his promise, and is contrary to it." Again, "Designedly to treat things as being what they are not, is the greatest *possible* absurdity; it is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for straight, &c.; it is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and to study to deny the existence of anything; for nothing can be true, nothing does exist, if *things are not what they are.* To deny things to be what they are, is a transgression of the great *law of our nature*, the law of reason; for truth cannot be opposed but reason must be violated.

"What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many omissions or neglects to act; that is, by these also true propositions may be denied to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong, for the same

reasons with those assigned under the former proposition."

WILLIAM KING.

This author was a native of Ireland, and became Archbishop of Dublin. His work, "*De Origine Mali*," was published in 1702.

The "*origin of evil*" has ever been a subtle and perplexing question to the metaphysician and the moralist. We find it among the records and fragments of the earliest philosophy; and up to the present hour it seems as far removed from a satisfactory solution, as it was at the first moment it was moulded into a philosophical interrogatory.

The first four chapters of the work are devoted to,

1st, The existence of a Deity, and that God must, from the nature of our conceptions of his attributes, be invested with the most absolute freedom of action. Natural evil, the Archbishop affirms, is inevitably involved in every act of creation; for all created existences must be imperfect in their very natures, and placed at an infinite distance from the perfections of Him by whom they are called into being.

2nd. A perfect equality in the capacities and functions of created beings, and consequently of their susceptibility to pain and pleasure, is impossible even in idea; for such an equality would prove destructive of all those notions we entertain of the subordination and wisdom so requisite for the government of the universe, and which we consider as necessary attributes of Divine Intelligence.

3rd. It is perfectly in accordance with Divine wisdom, to create beings of various degrees of perfection, for even mere matter is itself raised in the scale of existence by being created. The Archbishop illustrates his meaning on this point in the following terms, "There are infinite degrees of perfection between a being *absolutely perfect* and *nothing*. Of which, if existence be conceived as the first, every thing will be so many degrees distant from nothing, as there are *perfections* found in it joined with existence. In this scale, then, God will be the top; and nothing, the *bottom*; and how much farther any thing is distant from nothing, it is so much the more perfect, and approaches nearer to God. How much any thing can resemble God in perfection, or how nearly approach to him, we know not; but we are certain that there is always an infinite distance between them. It must have been determined, therefore, by the will of God, where he would stop; since there is nothing but His own will to bound his power. Now it is to be believed that the present system of the world was the very best that could be, with regard to the mind of God in forming it. It might have been better perhaps, in some particulars, but not without some new and probably greater inconveniences, which must have spoiled the beauty, either of the whole or of some chief part.

"From hence it appears also, that all beings cannot have equal perfections. For the world must necessarily be composed of various *parts*, and these *parts* of *others*, and so on. But a part must needs come short, both of the *divine perfection* and

the perfection of the *whole*. For it is nothing with regard to all the perfections which it has not, whether these be divine or created; and since one part is not another, nor the whole, it is plain that every part wants the perfections not only of the whole, but of other parts also. And that the whole is more perfect than a part, is evident from hence, that it necessarily includes the multiplied perfection of every part; and besides, the parts, when joined together and connected, acquire a new and peculiar perfection, whereby they answer their proper ends, which they could not do asunder; they defend themselves much better, and assist each other."

4th. The Archbishop endeavours to show that the evils which are conceived to arise from matter and motion, such as generation and corruption, are not to be considered as militating, in the smallest degree against Divine wisdom.

And 5th. It is every way consistent with the Deity's benevolence to create some spirits or thinking substances, which may be dependent upon matter and motion, possessing various organs, sensations, affections, and passions, the exercise of any one or all of which being necessary to the motions of the body or bodies to which these substances may respectively be connected.

It is in these four chapters that the author endeavours to account for all kinds of natural evil, such as physical imperfection, famine, pestilence, and death, by inducing us to look at them not in their individual natures, but in relation to the

constitution of the universe at large. He constantly keeps the proposition before the eye of the reader, "That not one of the evils or inconveniences of our system could possibly have been prevented without a greater."

DR. BUTLER.

Dr. Butler published his famous "Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature," in 1736. This treatise has long maintained a high character in England, although we meet with few traces of it among Continental writers.

The leading principle which pervades all the speculations of Butler is, that there is a more exact correspondence between the natural world and the constitution of man, than is commonly imagined. We perceive that his inward frame displays a striking agreement with his bodily form ; and both harmonize with the physical arrangements of the universe. Our various passions, feelings, and emotions, are peculiarly adapted to our condition. When we submit our constitution to examination, and pay attention to what our consciousness indicates, we recognise a remarkable fitness between the external senses, and various bodies and elements around us. We see a complicated system of organs and instruments suited to accomplish certain fixed ends or purposes. The eye is made to see, the palate to taste, and the ear to hear ; and when we look at the in-

timations which we have of external things, in and through these varied channels, and compare them with the mere hidden and internal faculties of the soul, we perceive a radical conformity to a high principle of order and system. Human nature is not a simple or uniform element, but a combination of many things, which blend and harmonize for a definite end. The body is an aggregate of different senses, organs, and functions; and our intellectual nature is compounded of a number of instincts, judgments, passions, emotions, and propensities. Over all these numerous parts and offices of thought and feeling there presides a ruling power; a power which is uniform in its nature and influence among all classes of men, and whose especial province it is to exercise a controlling authority over all these faculties—and this power is the act of *reflection*. It goes under various other designations, but of its existence and influence we can entertain no doubt whatever. It is our constant guide, monitor, and judge. Butler observes, "That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensities; so also are we. But, in addition to these, we have a capacity of *reflecting* upon actions and characters, and making them objects of our thought."

CHAPTER II.



STILLINGFLEET, BURNET, LEE, DODWELL, TURNER, BROUGHTON, LOWDE, HAMPTON, ASSHETON, BRAGGE, PLACE, BRUTHOGGE, COWARD, PHILOPSYCHOS, AND FLEMING.

THE metaphysical writings of Hobbes and Locke were viewed with some degree of suspicion and alarm by many learned and pious persons in England. It was imagined that such speculations contained the seeds of infidelity in religion, and general scepticism as to the fundamental principles of human knowledge. These impressions naturally give rise to controversy. The writers named above are some of the best known of those who took a part either for or against the doctrines of the new philosophy. Some of these controversial writings are of a trite and superficial character; but there are others of them which display considerable learning and ingenuity. They are all in some measure historically entitled to notice, inasmuch as they show the interest which was felt in England, on the introduction of the mental philosophy of

Hobbes and Locke, and also as pointing out those very puzzling and intricate questions, which, even at the present moment, are commonly urged, both here and on the Continent, as objectionable and defective portions of this sensational system of speculation.

STILLINGFLEET.

Stillingfleet was Bishop of Worcester, and entered very fully and warmly into Mr. Locke's doctrines unfolded in the "Essay on the Human Understanding;" and Locke in return seems to have paid great attention to all his Lordship's strictures. His *Letters* were first published in 1697.

The Bishop conceived that there were several positions laid down by Locke, which were open to serious objection on the score of religion. The principal of these were, that in Mr. Locke's account of the nature and province of *reason*, he appeared to countenance the doctrine, that this faculty was competent to solve all really sound and important theological principles, without the aid of faith. On this point the learned prelate maintains, in opposition to what he conceives is Mr. Locke's opinion, that we cannot have such clear and distinct ideas, by mere *sensation* and *reflection*, as are necessary for guiding our judgments in matters of doctrinal divinity. The words *substance*, *incorporeal*, *existence*, *spirit*, *space*, and many others, were, in the Bishop's opinion, used by Mr. Locke in a vague and unsatisfactory manner, and tended

to throw a cloudy haziness over many of the established articles of the Christian creed. The author of the "Essay" had thrown out a hint in his work, that *matter* might be endowed by the Creator with a *power of thinking*, and this the Bishop thought an unphilosophical and dangerous tenet. He says, "And although we think the separate state of the soul after death is sufficiently revealed in Scripture, yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it, if the soul be nothing but *life*, or a *material substance*, which must be dissolved when life is ended. For if the soul be a *material substance*, it must be made up as others are, of the *cohesion of solid and separate parts*, how minute and invisible soever they be. And what is it which should keep them together, when life is gone? So that it is no easy matter to give an account, how the soul should be capable of *immortality*, unless it be an *immaterial substance*; and then we know the solution of the texture of bodies cannot reach the soul, being of a different nature."*

The learned Bishop presses Locke rather severely relative to *universals*. The Nominalist theory is considered inadequate to account for our general conceptions on many important topics. Stillingfleet says, "And the reasons I go upon are these: in the first place, we are agreed, that there is a supreme, immaterial, most perfect Being; whose essential attributes do not depend upon our *arbitrary ideas*; nor any *names or signs of honour* we

* Letter 1st, p. 57.

give Him, nor upon the mere *enlarging the ideas* of our own perfections; or such as we account to be so in ourselves; for we attribute those to God which we are not capable of, as *eternity*, or necessary existence, immutability, &c. Herein we take up no *complex ideas* from several individuals; but we form a true idea of a Divine essence from such attributes as are essential to an infinitely perfect Being, which being Infinite, is thereby *incomprehensible* by us.

“ In the next place, we look upon this Supreme Being as the wise Creator of all things, who has ordered the several sorts and ranks of beings in the world according to his own eternal wisdom: and hath given all such properties as himself thought fit, whereby they are really and essentially distinguished from one another; as appears by mankind, and brutes, and plants. And no man, that ever employs his own thoughts, can think that these are distinguished from each other only by an act of our minds.

“ Among these it is evident there are some things wherein they agree, and some wherein they differ. They all agree in being real, created beings, and having a sort of life belonging to them. But they differ, that some have sense, which others have not; and some have reason and understanding, which others want. And all this is so plain and evident, that one might question, whether those had understanding or not, who could think the difference of these from each other was not in their

natures, but only depended on their several *names* that we call them by.

“Among the individuals of the same kind, there is an agreement in the same essential properties; as all men in being *rational creatures*; and there is a real difference from each other in the several accidents that belong to them, as to time, place, qualities, relations, &c. And no man in his senses can call this in question. For his most plain and *simple ideas* will inform him of it.

“The question now is, whether that wherein they do all agree, be a mere *universal name* and abstract idea or not?

“It is certain, that what God created is no mere *name* or *idea*. It is certain, that God created not only *individuals*, but the several kinds, with the *differences* which they have of each other. It is certain, that these *differences* do not lie in mere *names* or *ideas*. How comes it then not to be certain that there is a real common essence or nature in the individuals of the same kind?

“But it comes not to us in the way of ideas. If it be so, the ways of ideas are two different ways; and I shall never forsake one for the other, unless I could see better *reason* for it, and even then I should not; but adhere to reason still.”*

* pp. 109, 110, 111.

THOMAS BURNET.

Dr. Burnet is well known in the literary and political history of his times. He wrote three letters to Mr. Locke relative to speculative matters contained in his Essay.

"Your general principle," says Burnet, "of picking up all our knowledge from our five senses, I confess does not sit easily in my thoughts, though you join *reflection* to help it. I think the illiterate part of mankind, (which is far the greatest) must have more compendious ways to know their duty, than by long and obscure deductions."

HENRY LEE.

This author was educated at Cambridge, and became Rector of Tichmarch, in Northamptonshire. His treatise against Locke is entitled, "Anti-Scepticism; or Notes upon each Chapter of Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding." The work was published in 1702.

It is impossible to give here anything like even an outline of this publication. It is a folio volume of nearly four hundred pages, and is by far the most elaborate critique upon Mr. Locke's system which has ever appeared, either in this country or elsewhere.

Lee thought there was abundant evidence to show that we had *innate ideas*. He says, "I conceive there are some thoughts or perceptions, and

general propositions too, so far innate or natural, that the minds of men are not left perfectly at liberty, or in a state of indifferency, to have those perceptions, or form those thoughts, and their judgments concerning the truth or falsehood of those propositions; and that is all which I conceive is commonly meant by the word *innate*. And in that sense it may be rationally asserted that there are innate thoughts and principles also.”*

Mr. Lee denies that we have any *simple ideas*, such as Locke has described. He affirms they are all more or less complex. “I must confess,” says he, “that I could never yet form any such ideas as he calls simple; suppose of *existence, thinking, motion, rest, figure, pleasure, pain, &c.*, without the subjects or substances of which they are the attributes, actions, modes, or qualities.”

On the fundamental principle of Locke’s system, the origin of our knowledge from sensation and reflection, Mr. Lee thinks *sensation* one clear and legitimate source of our ideas, but he is not so well satisfied with the ordinary account we have of the faculty of *reflection*. He maintains that it never can stand for more than simple *consciousness*, and that this cannot be a fruitful principle from which ideas can be generated in the mind. On the limited nature of *sensation* the author has the following observations: “...because our senses do or can give no *true* account or near it, so much of corporeal substances, or of any of their modes; but we must

* Anti-Scepticism, Preface.

be forced to resort to our *reason*, which is a distinct faculty from sensation, to arrive at any such knowledge; especially as to any *general* knowledge, which is the main use for which our rational faculties were bestowed upon us.”*

Mr. Lee differs from Loeke on the nature of our ideas of substance, space, motion, and the formation of general propositions. On all these points there is much that is both ingenious and solid in the *Anti-Scepticism*. There is, besides, a spirit of mild and dispassionate candour running through the whole work, which is alike creditable to the author and pleasing to the reader.

HENRY DODWELL.

Dodwell was a native of Dublin, and one of the most voluminous writers and remarkable literary characters of the day. His metaphysical writings are the following:—“A Letter concerning the Immortality of the Soul, against Mr. Henry Layton’s Hypothesis,” 1702; “An Epistolary Discourse, proving that the soul is a principle naturally mortal, but immortalized actually by the pleasure of God to punishment and reward, by its union with the Divine Baptismal Spirit; wherein is proved, that none have the power of giving this Divine Immortalizing Spirit since the Apostles, but only the Bishops,” 1706; “Scripture Account of Eternal Rewards and Punishments, without an Im-

* *Anti-Scepticism*, p. 41.

mortality necessarily resulting from the nature of Souls themselves, that are concerned in these Rewards and Punishments ; shewing particularly, 1st, How much of this account was discovered by the best of philosophers ; 2nd, How far the accounts of those philosophers were corrected and improved by the Hellenistical Jews, assisted by the Revelations of the Old Testament ; 3rd, How far the discoveries forementioned were improved by the Revelations of the Gospel. Wherein the Testimonies also of Irenæus and Tertullian are occasionally considered," 1708 ; "An Explanation of a Famous Passage in Justin Martyr, concerning the Immortality of Human Souls ; with an Appendix consisting of a Letter to Mr. J. Norris, &c. and an Expostulation relating to the late insults of Mr. Clarke and Mr. Chishull," 1708.

The principal point in Dodwell's Works interesting to the student of mental philosophy, relates to the immateriality of the thinking principle. Almost all his arguments are shallow and inconclusive ; his facts inaccurately stated ; and his deductions illogically drawn from his premises. The best portion of his works is that which treats of the opinions of the ancient philosophers on the soul, and on its prospects after death. "His Letter on the Immortality of the Soul," gave rise to the controversy between Anthony Collins and Dr. Samuel Clarke, on the same subject.*

* See Brokesby's *Life and Writings of Dodwell*, 2 vols. 1715.

It is necessary to make a few observations, explanatory of the nature of Mr. Dodwell's Work on the Soul; for readers in general are apt to imagine that he maintains that it totally and for ever perished at the dissolution of the body. This is not the scope of his arguments. The author affirms that the soul is naturally mortal, and would perish of itself, *were it not upheld by the extraordinary power of the Deity*. Dodwell states, in substance, that the souls of men are made immortal solely by the *Spirit of God*; and that they are endowed with living principle, in order that they may be subjected to rewards and punishments in another state of existence. He says the soul does "not depend on our gross organic bodies, nor perishes upon its dissolution from these bodies." And he further alleges that "Souls do not so depend on any other created being, but that they may still continue in their duration, whatsoever other created influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their continuance."

The principle which runs through the whole of Dodwell's Essay is, that immortality depends upon *the will* of the Deity; and he contends that this act of the Divine will, does not differ from the commonly received doctrine of the soul's being invested with the power of immortality, inasmuch as this immortality was conferred on us by the creative fiat of the Almighty. "For," says the author, "what difference is there between affirming concerning *angels*, that it is in the power and pleasure of God to annihilate them when he thinks fit; and

concerning *human souls*, that they do not so depend on any other created beings, but that they may still continue in their duration, whatsoever other created influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased to continue that ordinary providence which is essentially necessary for their preservation."*

Dodwell's notions of the abstract nature of the soul, are vague and contradictory. He thinks it is divided into two parts, the *rational* and *sensitive*; that these are not only *distinct*, but *separable*. On this part of the subject he speaks very incoherently.†

JOHN TURNER.

Mr. Turner was Vicar of Greenwich, and entered warmly into the controversy with Dodwell. His tract, entitled "Justice done to Human Souls, in a short View of Mr. Dodwell's late Book," was printed in 1706.

Turner maintains that Dodwell's views are dangerous, inasmuch as they are calculated to leave an erroneous impression on the mind of the reader, from the phrase, *the soul being mortal*. The author shows, that the common view we take of the immateriality and immortality of the thinking principle, is more consonant with all our elementary or primary notions of a Deity, a superintending Providence, and with the existence and scope of the Sacred Writings, than an opposite theory, which

* Section 5.

† See pp. 51. 91. 218. 220.

stamps mortality upon it, and makes the sentient principle entirely dependent upon a constant Divine interference. Mr. Turner enters fully into the notions which many of the Grecian philosophers entertained on the nature of the soul, as well as those maintained by the most distinguished Fathers of the Church. We quote here the following observations from the author: "We know but little or nothing at all of Beings, but by their powers and properties. What we call matter, or body, as it is the object of our senses, and appears with extension and divisibility, so it universally seems to us to be corruptible, and without life. What gives life and motion to this corruptible matter, we call a *soul*; and as it is the principle of life and internal motion to that which appeared void of both before, we justly believe it to be somewhat distinct and separable from the body which it animates. What has such an internal principle of life in itself distinct from the body, we justly conclude capable of existing without the body, and in a state of separation from it. And what may thus survive the body, and exist in a state of separation from it, has not without reason been thought immortal; because reason alone can give us no further grounds of its dissolution. And these are conclusions, that in all ages have been thought of so much force, that I do not know whether any ever pretended to dispute a future state after death, but only those who at the same time wholly denied the existence of any spirit at all distinct from our bodies.*"

* p. 23.

JOHN BROUGHTON.

Mr. Broughton was private chaplain to the Duke of Marlborough, and the author of "Psychologia; or an account of the Nature of the Rational Soul;" published in London, 1704.

This is an interesting and readable volume. The chief object of the author is to demonstrate that our *reason* is the grand attribute of our nature, but that it is distinct from matter, and that it is the sole cause of that *spontaneity* of action on which all intelligence and moral responsibility rest.

J. A. LOWDE.

This author published, in 1694, a volume entitled, "A Discourse concerning the nature of Man." The object of it is to combat the opinions of Hobbes, Locke, and other writers, on some particular points connected both with metaphysics and politics. It is divided into eight chapters; the first relates to self-knowledge; the second proves that man is a being compounded of a body and an immaterial soul; the third treats of our ideas of truth and goodness; the fourth on the being of a God; the fifth on the state of nature; the sixth shows that religion is the only and sure foundation of civil government; the seventh treats of moral virtue; and the eighth contains some strictures upon Mr. Hobbes's ideas of his *Kingdom of Darkness*.

The volume contains many excellent observations on mental philosophy.

BENJAMIN HAMPTON.

This author was a barrister, and his work, published in 1711, is entitled, "The Existence of the Human Soul after Death, proved from Scripture, Reason, and Philosophy."

The principal object of the author is to combat some opinions, promulgated by Hobbes, Locke, and Coward, as to the materiality of the thinking principle in man. The author says, "Mr. Locke, in his Essay, confessed, that though we do not know but that it was in the power of God to have given understanding to matter, yet he was most inclinable to believe, that the human soul is a spiritual and immortal substance; and yet while it is clogged with the body, does not always think, as in sound sleep and deep amusements. Now Dr. Coward concludes, that since what we call the human soul does not always think, it is not a spiritual immortal substance, but only understanding given to matter, which has no existence after death; and so he proposes what he wills, and concludes what he pleases. I answer, that when it does not think, it does not understand, and then how can it be said to be *understanding*? For to say that it is understanding, is no better than a flat contradiction. He allows that this understanding has existence till it takes its leave of the body, till the resurrection; I answer, that it has no more existence when it leaves the body but one minute, than it would have if it left it for ten thousand years; and it cannot be

denied but it has left the body, when a body is without it that ever had it. Now since he affirms that a man does not always think, which is no more than to say that he does not always understand; then it follows, that this understanding often leaves the body before its long separation, and if it has existence, as he allows, pray where is it? or what sort of thing can it be, that is so often in the head, and so often out of it? When it is out, I would fain know if it be not a mere delusion altogether?" "You may observe a great many signs and tokens of the abdication of this understanding. Now granting that men do not always think, is it not more difficult to conceive, that understanding, which is a faculty that cannot belong to material substance, is yet given to matter? that it flies in and out of the head; that when it is in the head it is something, and when it is out it is nothing?..... than to conceive that the human soul is an immaterial spiritual substance, endowed with such natural essential faculties as other finite spiritual substances are, because when the organs are rightly disposed, it exerts such faculties of wonderful potency; though since God has, during the union of the soul and body, made such organs the instruments for exercising its faculties, will any man say that a single atom thinks? and then if one atom cannot think, it is certain that a composition of them cannot think; for thought is the operation of an active indivisible being, and not a compound of things."*

* pp. 26-28.

WILLIAM ASSHETON.

This author was a Doctor of Divinity, Rector of Beckenham in Kent, and Chaplain to the Duke of Ormond. His work, published in London in 1703, is entitled "A Vindication of the Immortality of the Soul, and a Future State." It is only a small treatise of one hundred and fifty pages.

There is not much philosophy in the work, but is piously and sensibly written. The object of the author was to attempt to check the current of infidelity of his day, particularly on the subject of the soul's immortality. This doctrine he considered as the key-stone to all rational opinions on religion. The author states what he means by the soul, and its immaterial nature, and then shows that the arguments are extremely powerful for its living hereafter, from considerations derived from the great work of creation, from a general and particular providence, from the powerful impulses and inclinations of man's nature, and its visible susceptibility of infinite perfection. All these arguments are again confirmed, by the unequivocal and positive declarations of the Sacred Writings.

ROBERT BRAGGE.

Mr. Bragge was a clergyman, and his work is entitled "A Brief Essay concerning the Soul of Man; shewing what, and how noble a Being it is." The tract was published in London, in 1725.

The work is directed principally against the material notions of Mr. Hobbes and other authors. As a specimen of the style and sentiments of the Rev. Author, we shall insert here the following observations. "That a separate soul should be able to *act* without the *organs* of the *body*, seems plain from the following considerations. It now needs no bodily eye to view the vast stores laid up in the *memory*, nor the numberless pictures hung up in the *fancy*. Neither doth it need a bodily ear to listen to the dictates of *reason*; nor to the voice of conscience, whether excusing or condemning. Neither needs it any *hand* to direct the motion of the *animal spirits*. No hand is wanting to push them into this, they easily go where the will is pleased to send them. If the *will*, therefore, thus commands its thousands in this state of *union*, how large and extensive may its empire be in a freer state of *separation*. I see no reason why separate spirits may not be able to move matter, and be influenced by its motions; just as the soul of man moves the animal spirits, and is affected thereby.As for matter, wherein its essence consists, *sub judice lis est*; how its parts are joined together, and how far divisible, and also how bodies are moved, are as yet great depths. All, therefore, that I shall say of it is, that I am inclined to think the whole we certainly know of matter is only the several different ways in which our minds, by the senses, are thereby affected."*

* pp. 24. 25.

CONYERS PLACE.

Mr. Place was a clergyman, and his work is entitled "An Essay Towards a Vindication of the Visible Creation," and was published in 1729.

This author's opinions are that the mind, besides sensation, has a higher faculty, one which *inwardly reflects*, and through which it obtains all its most important and abstract conceptions. He says, "That there is not only in our human souls, but likewise in all animal souls whatever, two distinct forms and modes of knowledge and conscious perception, having each to themselves their proper objective matter, is, I think, very plainly to be perceived, and that beside that knowledge which we may call *organical* or systematic, that relates to the constitution, and that is founded upon the five senses, and consists of the ideas or notices of things sent in to it, through them from without, the soul has within itself, beside, another sort of knowledge and consciousness, and of another set of objects, which it is impossible for it to come by that way, or receive the notices of by its senses, or any of its ministerial faculties, outward or inward; but which is what I call *substantial*, immediately wrought in itself by the substance, from the *competency* of the object to it, antecedently to all notices from without, upon which all its animal knowledge is superstructed, as its foundation; the object of which antecedent knowledge though universally admitted to be known, and that cannot but

be so, yet cannot that knowledge possibly derive itself from the senses: as on the other hand, the objects of sense and of the things without, that relate to the interests of the animal constitution, and preservation of the union, cannot fall under that way of cognizance."*

RICHARD BRUTHOGGE.

This author wrote an Essay on the nature of *Reason*, in 1699, the object of it being to prove, that, from the Mosaic account, the *spirit of life*, therein mentioned, is the original of all energy and power which are manifested in creation; and that a portion of this spirit acts in particular bodies in which it is seated, in accordance with the peculiar capacities, dispositions, and qualities of those bodies. The author compares the universe to an organ, animal bodies to the pipes, and the Mosaic spirit to the air requisite for creating the necessary sounds in the instrument. The ideas of the author are very fanciful, and mystical withal.

WILLIAM COWARD.

Mr. Coward rendered himself very obnoxious in his day by the publication of his work, in 1704, entitled "The Grand Essay, or a Vindication of Reason and Religion against Impostors of Philosophy."

The object of this Author is to prove that the

* p. 82.

doctrine of an *immaterial substance* is a philosophic imposture; that all matter is created with a self-moving principle; and that matter and motion must be the foundations of all thought.

ALETHINOS PHILOPSYCHOS.

I am not aware of the real name of the author of the work published under this signature. The name of the treatise is "Ψυχολογία; or Serious Thoughts on Second Thoughts."

This work, which displays considerable learning and ability, is directed against Dr. Coward's publication. Its object is to demonstrate, from Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, the dictates of reason, and the history of philosophy, that the soul is immaterial, and consequently immortal. The third and fourth sections of the work are the most readable and philosophical in their tone and sentiments.

MALCOLM FLEMING.

Mr. Fleming was of the medical profession, and the author of "A New Critical Examination of an Important Passage in Mr. Locke's Essay." This tract bears the date of 1751.

The author expresses his doubts of the soundness of many of Mr. Locke's remarks on *Substance*, *Spirit*, *Essence*, and the like; and *feels particularly* dissatisfied with that portion of the Essay which speaks of the possibility of thought being communicated to matter.

CHAPTER III.

ANTHONY COLLINS.

ANTHONY Collins is principally known in metaphysical history by his zealous and able exposition of the doctrine of *Philosophical Necessity*. The development of this system is contained in his publication entitled "A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty," which appeared in 1715. This work was translated into French by the Rev. Mr. D., and printed in the first volume of Desmaizeaux's "Recueil de Diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie, la Religion Naturelle, &c. par MM. Leibnitz, Clarke, Newton, &c. Amsterdam, 1720."

Of the plan and scope of this "Philosophical Inquiry," the Author gives us the following account.

"Too much care cannot be taken to prevent being misunderstood and prejudiced in handling questions of such nice speculation as those of Liberty and Necessity; and, therefore, though I might in justice expect to be read before any judg-

ment be passed on me, I think it proper to premise the following observations.

"First, though I deny *liberty* in a certain meaning of that word, yet I contend for *liberty* as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases.

"Secondly, when I affirm *necessity*, I contend only for *moral necessity*; meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity, as in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which, for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, and mechanical necessity.

"Thirdly, I have undertaken to show the notions I advance are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundation of, morality and laws, and of rewards and punishments in society; and that the notions I explode are subversive of them."

The distinct propositions which Collins attempts to demonstrate throughout his "Inquiry," are, That man cannot be a free-agent, 1st, from the experience of the ordinary affairs of life; 2nd, from the innate impossibility of liberty; 3rd, from our elementary and ordinary notions of the Divine prescience; 4th, from the doctrine of rewards and punishments, both human and Divine; and 5th, from the nature of morality itself.

As a specimen of Collins's reasoning on the human will, we shall quote the following passages.

"A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is, because all his actions have a beginning.

For whatever has a beginning must have a cause ; and every cause is a necessary cause.

“ If anything can have a beginning, which has no cause, then nothing can produce something. And if nothing can produce something, then the world might have had a beginning without a cause ; which is an absurdity not only charged on atheists, but is a real absurdity in itself. * * * Liberty, therefore, or a power to act or not to act, to do this or another thing, under the same causes, is an *impossibility and atheistical*.

“ And as Liberty stands and can only be grounded on the absurd principles of Epicurean Atheism ; so the Epicurean Atheists, who were the most popular and most numerous sect of the Atheists of antiquity, were the great assertors of liberty ; as, on the other side, the Stoics, who were the most popular and numerous sect among the religionaries of antiquity, were the great assertors of *fate and necessity*.”

We shall make a few general observations on this doctrine, connected as it is with the name of Mr. Collins. He is properly enough considered as the father of the system of necessary connexion, as it is expounded both in England and among Continental writers. As we shall have frequent occasion to indulge in remarks upon the question in subsequent portions of this historical sketch, we shall merely at the present moment make a few general observations on the principal topics which Collins affirms afford him unanswerable

arguments, for the philosophical conclusions to which he arrives at the termination of his "Inquiry." What he states is, that the freedom of the will is contrary to the ordinary affairs of life, the notions we entertain of a Deity, the doctrine of rewards and punishments, and to the nature of morality generally.

The doctrine of philosophical necessity is one of the most important connected with the science of the human mind ; it is also one of the most abstruse and perplexing. The difficulties which surround it on every side are not of yesterday ; we find them stated in the earliest records of mental speculation, and in nearly the same form as they present themselves at the present moment. The real origin of the controversy must be sought for in *the constitution of the mind itself*. It is vain and delusive to attempt to remove the difficulties of the question, to produce harmony and concord, by instituting verbal criticisms on the chief terms employed on both sides of the question. These are manifestly inadequate to accomplish the intended purpose. It is with *ideas*, and not *words*, we have here to contend. The mind of man is so constituted, that to every event he sees or experiences he attributes a cause. When he begins to speculate on any thing, no matter whether relating to mind or matter, he finds that he cannot satisfactorily account for phenomena by *simply looking at one thing preceding another* ; and, therefore, he is compelled, from the very construction and frame of his inward principle of thought, *to invest something*

with free, unfettered, spontaneous action, in the most absolute sense in which these terms can be used. This throws immediately light upon all his movements and actions, as a rational and intelligent creature. While he is travelling from one cause to another he is in a state of absolute and impenetrable darkness; but the moment he gives life and vitality to some mental principle, the scales directly, as it were by magic, drop from his eyes; he sees himself invested with new attributes of existence; and, being brought within the sphere of humanity around him, he perceives all the multifarious and interesting relations which spring out of the union with other minds, under a new aspect. Both principles, that of cause and effect, and that of spontaneity, are necessary to man's existence; or rather they form the two grand radical trunks, so to speak, of his intellectual, moral, and religious nature. But there is this great difference between them. Cause and effect are, in themselves, mere negations; they are lifeless, material, devoid of all thought, unsatisfactory in the most absolute sense; can lead to nothing having the slightest appearance of knowledge or science; but the moment you bring causation in contact with mental spontaneity, a new order of things arises. We obtain a novel class of ideas. We mould causes and effects into things which we call elements of knowledge, and these we take with us as lights for our future progress in life. With causation alone we were like men groping their way in a dark subterranean cavern, where every thing around us was unknown

and unperceived; but when the rays of the sun broke through the gloom, the existence, forms, proportions, and uses of what surrounded us, were clearly seen and recognised by the mind. The one is the lifeless body, with all its wonderful apparatus of bones, muscles, vessels, and nerves, perfect and entire; and the other is the living principle or spirit, which animates the whole physical structure, and preserves and guides the human form, and confers wisdom and intelligence upon it!

The importance of the doctrine of philosophical necessity is not limited to human nature, considered in reference to this world's affairs. It looks beyond them. The same living, active, spiritual, and mental energy, with which we invest all that we call knowledge and virtue, we likewise apply to the Divine nature, and to the Divine government of the universe. Religion, in every shape and form, is the recognition of the same principle of spontaneous action. The Deity must be free in all his actions, and man must be free in all his. These two separate applications of the same living energy, constitute the corner-stone of all duty and obligation, relatively both to God and man. There is no separating them for a moment. They must stand or fall together. The same arguments which may militate against the one, must be destructive to the other. The whole history of philosophy and theology loudly and unequivocally declares the truth of this position.

It must be owned, however, that the doctrine of necessary connexion is not susceptible of a refutation

from abstract arguments. This arises from its very nature; or perhaps, to speak more correctly, from the constitution of mind itself. Both the principles or theories of liberty and necessity, spring out of the resources of the intellect, and are coeval with its first movements in the human frame. But when we come into detail; when we leave the high *à priori* arguments; when we test the two systems by the every-day movements, feelings, opinions, and actions of mankind, we find a great preponderance of evidence in favour of the scheme of free-will. And there is this striking and marked difference between it and necessity, that the theory of liberty is more directly and indissolubly connected with all our duties, interests, and very existence, as rational beings, than the opposite system. Men may despise or reject the doctrine of necessity without the slightest danger, but they cannot trample upon free-will with the same moral impunity.

In common life we are every moment referring to the actual freedom of man. We weigh, consider, and estimate every thing by it. It enters into every transaction, and is used as a test of the value of all human services, sacrifices, and duties. There is nothing to interest us, nothing that we can either love or hate, unless freedom be present. This is so obvious a matter, that it would only be wasting the reader's time to dwell further upon it.

Every argument against human liberty applies with a twofold force against the existence of a Deity. The principles of natural and revealed re-

ligion rest upon this ground, that such and such things contain or express the *will* of God to man. Natural religion is the manifestation of that *will* in the arrangement and constitution of the universe around us ; and Revealed religion informs us of the purposes of that *will* by direct testimony from God himself. Here is a *law* on the one side, and a *law-giver* on the other: These are only intelligible upon the supposition, that the Creator was free *to make* the law, and that the creature was free *to obey* it. Upon any other grounds the whole becomes a nullity. The freedom of action in the lawgiver is the foundation on which the obligatory nature of the law rests. That freedom springs from *Himself*; and is totally and entirely separated from all extrinsic influence. If any thing like *necessity*, or *chance*, or *fate*, or *accident*, be in any manner or in any degree mixed up or blended with its exercise, the law becomes immediately deprived of its sacredness and obligatory character, and sinks at once into a mere piece of blind fatality.

An intelligent writer on this subject observes : "The Divine will is the cause of good in the creatures whereon they depend, as almost every one acknowledges ; for created beings have all that they have from the will of God ; nor can there be any thing else than what he willed. It is plain, then, that all these are conformable and consonant to his will, either efficient or permissive, and that their original goodness is founded in this consistency.. And since all things proceed from one and the same will, which cannot be contrary to itself, as it is re-

strained within its proper bounds by Infinite wisdom, it is also certain that all things are consistent with each other, and that every thing contributes as much as possible to the preservation of itself and the whole system. All the goodness then of the creatures, is owing to the Divine will, and dependent on it ; for we cannot apprehend how they could be either good or evil in themselves, since they were nothing at all, antecedent to the act of the Divine will.”*

The doctrine of rewards and punishments, both human and Divine, rests upon the same grounds. Man must be considered the sole cause of his own actions. “But as the principal reason why man is reputed the *author of his own actions*, is because he *voluntarily* undertakes them, we must always suppose in the *will* the same degree of *spontaneity*, at least in those actions that fall under the cognizance of a *human tribunal*; for where a man is entirely debarred of choice, and what he does is utterly against his consent, there the action is not to be imputed to him, but to the person who imposed such a necessity upon him, and to which he, the *immediate agent*, is, in spite of himself, forced to lend his limbs and assistance.†”

This is the law of all countries, and in all ages of the world, and ever must be to the end of time. Why do we drag an individual from his home and his friends, and hang him upon a gibbet? Why, because he has done something which he had the

* Archbishop King's *Origin of Evil*, p. 186.

† Puffendorf, vol. 1, p. 43.

full power *within himself* not to do. Upon any other principle it is impossible to justify a transaction of this kind. The law—and all our feelings and judgments support that law—declares it knows and cares nothing about what may be said in reference to *motives*, or to a man's being placed in such circumstances that he could not act otherwise. All these speculations avail nothing; punishment is inflicted because the crime committed was a purely voluntary act, and owed its existence to the individual himself. The punishments of the Divine law proceed upon the same principle.

Free-will is a necessary ingredient in every scheme or code of morality. In no system of moral philosophy, nor in any rule of duty, can it be dispensed with for a single moment. All man's moral responsibility rests upon it. The blame or praise which he incurs, is always meted out in strict conformity to the measure of freedom involved in certain actions. Take that away, and morality is only another word for every thing that is absurd and incomprehensible.*

The following remarks from Mr. Stewart, on Collins's views of necessity and Clarke's examination of them, are worthy of being transcribed.

"In this view of the subject, and, indeed, in the very selection of his premises, it is remarkable

* I refer the reader who may feel an interest in the important question of Liberty and Necessity, to my "Essay on Moral Good and Evil," Second Edition, 1847, published by Saunders, 6 Charing Cross. The question is there viewed in connexion with law, morals, and religion, at considerable length.

how completely Collins has anticipated Dr. Jonathan Edwards, the most celebrated, and indisputably the ablest champion of the scheme of necessity who has since appeared. The coincidence is so perfect, that the outline given by the former, of the plan of his work, might have served with equal propriety as a preface to that of the latter.

“From the whole tenor of the ‘Philosophical Inquiry,’ it is evident, that Collins (one of the most obnoxious writers of his day to divines of all denominations) was not less solicitous than his successor Edwards to reconcile his metaphysical notions with man’s accountableness and moral agency. The remarks accordingly of Clarke, upon Collins’s work, are equally applicable to that of Edwards. It is to be regretted that they seem never to have fallen into the hands of this very acute and honest reasoner. As for Collins, it is a remarkable circumstance, that he attempted no reply to this tract of Clarke’s, although he lived twelve years after its publication. The reasonings contained in it, together with those on the same subject in his correspondence with Leibnitz, and in his ‘Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,’ form, in my humble opinion, the most important as well as powerful of all his metaphysical arguments. The adversaries with whom he had to contend were, both of them, eminently distinguished by ingenuity and subtilty; and he seems to have put forth to the utmost his logical strength, in contending with such antagonists. ‘The liberty or moral agency of man (says his friend Bishop Hoadly)

was a darling point for him. He excelled always, and showed a superiority to all, whenever it came into private discourse or public debates. But he never more excelled than when he was pressed with the strength Leibnitz was master of; which made him exert all his talents to set it once again in a clear light, to guard it against the evil of metaphysical obscurities, and to give the finishing stroke to a subject which must ever be the foundation of morality in man, and is the ground of the accountableness of intelligent creatures for all their actions.' " *

Mr. Collins's "Essay concerning the right use of Reason in Propositions," is a sensible little work. He defines Reason to be "that faculty, whereby it perceives the truth, falsehood, probability or improbability of propositions."

The true criterion of truth is the *perception* of the mind. Collins maintains there can be no other foundation of certainty. †

* * See Note A. at the end of the Volume.

* Dissertation, p. 148.

† This Essay was attacked in "A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Benjamin Pratt," by William Carroll, published in 1707, wherein it is affirmed that it leads directly to Atheism.

CHAPTER IV.

DR. SAMUEL CLARKE.

THE controversial writings of Dr. Clarke, on metaphysical subjects, fully entitle him to a particular notice in this work. His zeal in defence of sound principles of philosophy and religion led him to engage in controversies with Leibnitz and Collins.

The Doctor is distinguished in metaphysical history by his famous demonstration, *à priori*, of the existence of a Deity. This disquisition took its rise from a passage in the *Scholium* attached to Sir Isaac Newton's "Principia" in these words, "Æternus est et infinitus omnipotens et omnisciens! id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum..... Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit." This proposition is stated

by Dr. Clarke in the following language. "God is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, he endures from everlasting to everlasting, and is present from infinity to infinity. He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinite. He is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures always, and is present everywhere; and by existing always and everywhere, constitutes duration and space."

Upon this foundation Dr. Clarke endeavoured to rear his *à priori* argument for the existence of a Deity. The substance of his doctrine is briefly this. The mind of man is so framed, that it is forcibly led to a firm belief, that *space* and *time* are two things whose annihilation it is impossible to conceive. *Immensity* and *eternity* do not possess a *real* substantive existence, they are but mere *attributes* of matter. The great and eternal Being to whom these attributes of immensity and eternity belong, must also necessarily exist. The existence of a Deity is, in Dr. Clarke's opinion, clearly demonstrable, from these general ideas of *time* and *space*, which form, as it were, a constituent part of the mind of man, and which, under no conceivable circumstances, seem susceptible of any elementary modification or change whatever.

This line of argument has, for many years past, been considered among the learned and philosophical, as very defective; and it has, consequently, been generally abandoned by metaphysicians and theologians for the arguments *à posteriori* in favour of the existence of a First Cause. Indeed Dr. Clarke

candidly owns the weakness of his argument ; for in his 8th Proposition, on "*The Being and Attributes of God*," he affirms that the First Cause must be intelligent, but admits that the proposition is not susceptible of a strict *à priori* demonstration. His language on this point is, "Now, that the self-existent Being is not such a blind and unintelligent necessity, but in the most proper sense an understanding and really active Being, cannot indeed be demonstrated *à priori* ; because, (through the imperfections of our faculties) we know not wherein intelligence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary connection of it with self-existence, as we can that of eternity, infinity, unity, &c."*

The celebrated dispute carried on between Leibnitz and Clarke, related to the necessary existence of Time and Space. The former maintained that Space is merely the order of things co-existing, and Time nothing but the *successive* order of events. Dr. Clarke, on the other side, affirmed that both Space and Time were infinite, immutable, and indestructible. Both disputants showed great knowledge and talent in the discussion, but threw little light on our perceptions or ideas of these two things. On the Continent, victory has generally been proclaimed in favour of Leibnitz.†

The following beautiful and profound observa-

* Demonstration of the Attributes, p 52.

† See D'Alembert, "*Mélanges, &c.*" § 14 ; and Bailly's "*Eloge de Leibnitz.*"

tions on Clarke's Demonstration, are from the pen of the late Professor Stewart, and are fully entitled to an attentive consideration. They place the great question in an interesting point of view.

"But although the argument, as stated by Clarke, does not carry complete satisfaction to my mind, I think it must be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own existence. Nay farther, I think that these conceptions are very intimately connected with the fundamental principles of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, from the evidences of design everywhere manifested around us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful *cause*, we are unavoidably led to apply to this *cause* our conceptions of *immensity* and *eternity*, and to conceive Him as filling the infinite extent of both with his presence and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea of God those awful impressions which are naturally produced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still more by the idea of endless duration. Nor is this all. It is from the immensity of space that the notion of infinity is originally derived; and it is hence that we transfer the expression, by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. When we speak, therefore, of *infinite* power, wisdom, and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from space, are at least greatly aided by this analogy; so that the conceptions of

Immensity and Eternity, if they do not of themselves *demonstrate* the existence of God, yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature and attributes."

In Rousseau's "Emilius," the following passage occurs, in reference to Dr. Clarke's system. "Then in reviewing in my mind all the various opinions which had, alternately, hurried me along from my birth, I saw, that, though none of them were so evident as to produce immediate or absolute conviction, yet they all possessed divers degrees of probability; and that the internal assent I gave or refused to them was in varied proportions. Upon first thought, comparing all these different ideas in silent thought, I found that the first and the most common, was also the most simple and reasonable; and that to obtain perfect acquiescence, it only needed to be last proposed. Imagine all our ancient and modern philosophers, having forthwith espoused all their fantastie theories of forces, of chance, of fate, of necessity, of atoms, of the *animus mundi*, of living matter, of materialism of all kinds; and after them all, the illustrious Clarke announcing and demonstrating to the world at last, the existence of a Universal Creator and Dispenser of all things. With what universal admiration, with what unanimous applause, ought not this new discovery to be received; so grand, so consoling, so sublime, so well calculated to elevate the soul, and to form a solid foundation for virtue; and, at the same time, so striking, so luminous, so perspicuous, and, as it appears to me, presenting

fewer incomprehensible things to human reason, and fewer absurdities, than are to be found in any other system! I say to myself, insolvable difficulties are to be found in all systems, because the mind of man is too limited to remove them. They prove nothing, however, against a preference, but only in reference to their direct proofs.”*

Dr. Clarke had, in some way which does not appear, incurred the displeasure of Mr. Pope, who took several opportunities of throwing a sarcasm at him. There is one in allusion to this *à priori* demonstration, which has been often noticed by philosophers and theologians.

“Let others creep by timid steps and slow,
On plain experience lay foundations low,
By common sense to common knowledge bred,
And last to Nature’s cause through Nature led;
We nobly take the high *priori* road,
And reason downwards till we doubt of God.”

The metaphysical discussions which Dr. Clarke entered into with Leibnitz and others, on the liberty of the human will, and other topics, are well entitled to a careful perusal. The reader will find a vast fund of subtile and dexterous argument.†

* Vol. 3.

† Dr. Clarke’s work on the “Being and Attributes of the Deity,” produced an extended controversy in his day. It was noticed by Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, in his Notes on Archbishop King’s “Origin of Evil.” This gave rise to another piece, entitled, “A Defence of Dr. Clarke’s Demonstration.” Bishop Law again took up the

pen to defend his positions, in a "Postscript" to Dr. King's work. "A second Defence of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration" appeared. Then came a pamphlet called "Dr. Clarke's Notion of Space examined." A Mr. John Jackson published an Essay, "The Existence and Unity of God, from his Nature and Attributes; being a Vindication of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration."

CHAPTER V.

BAYLE.

BAYLE's Dictionary exercised a great and beneficial influence over the interests of philosophy in general, and the study of the human mind in particular, in the eighteenth century. For many years it formed a sort of rallying point for all discussions founded on human nature. History, biography, morals, politics, religion, and metaphysics; everything was jumbled together, without order or system; yet everything possessed an interest and charm, from the peculiar manner in which it was treated.

We cannot tell what Bayle's real opinions were on the Philosophy of the Mind; or whether he had any settled ones at all. He was accused of having a decided leaning towards the Manichean theory, but this accusation has been amply rebutted by Le Clerc, in his publication entitled "*Parrhasiana, ou Pensées Diverses.*" This want of settled opinions on the nature of mind, did not arise in Bayle from

any defect of his understanding ; for he possessed talents sufficient to make himself master of any branch of knowledge, and even to signalise himself in the career of discovery. He was not a mere eritie, but a profound and subtile philosopher. Dr. Warburton, in his "Divine Legation of Moses," observes that he was "a writer whose strength and clearness of reasoning can only be equalled by the gaiety, easiness, and delicacy of his wit ; who pervading human nature with a glance, struck into the province of paradox, as an exercise for the restless vigour of his mind ; who with a soul superior to the sharpest attacks of fortune, and a heart practised to the best philosophy, had yet not enough of real greatness to overcome that last foible of superior geniuses, the temptation of honour, which the academical exercise of his wit is supposed to bring to its professors."

A great deal of the desultory and rambling nature of his mental disquisitions took its rise from the peculiar situation of life of the Author ; which checked the cultivation with assiduity and care, of those qualities and powers of mind, which are requisite for the exposition of speculative theories and systems. Every thing he composed and wrote was for the day and the occasion. Gibbon, the historian, notices this, by remarking that, "The inequalities of Bayle's voluminous works are explained, by his alternately writing for himself, for the bookseller, and for posterity."

The scepticism of Bayle has often been a topic of animadversion and criticism. He says of himself,

"My talent is to excite doubts ; but they are only doubts." The qualification contained in the latter part of the declaration is very signifieant. Voltaire remarks that "Bayle is the first of dialecticians and philosophical sceptics."

His greatest enemies must allow that there is not a single line in his works against the Christian religion ; but his best friends must also confess, that in his controversial writings, there is scarcely a single line which does not lead the reader to form doubts, and sometimes to bring him to the brink of incredulity. That Bayle was fond of exciting doubts in the minds of his readers, is abundantly evident from his own statement. In a letter to his friend Minutoli, he says, "In truth it ought not to be thought strange, that so many persons should have inclined to Pyrrhonism ; for of all things in the world it is the most convenient. You may dispute with impunity against every body you meet, without any dread of that vexatious argument *ad hominem*. You are never afraid of a retort ; for as you announce no opinion of your own, you are always ready to abandon those of others to the attacks of Sophists of every description. In a word, you may dispute and jest on all subjects without incurring any danger from the *lex talionis*."*

* " Le Scepticisme de Bayle n'est point un système qui se produise de lui-même, qui soit combiné d'avance, qui aille au-devant des doctrines par une prévention toute formée, pour leur opposer une condamnation anticipée. Il ne se montre jamais que comme le résultat d'un examen. C'était l'habitude d'un esprit analytique qui n'admettait rien sans

We should, however, form an erroneous estimate of Bayle's character as a metaphysician, were we to be solely guided by these accounts of his predilections for Scepticism. In all his intellectual movements we perceive a strong and deep undercurrent of common sense and sound judgment. These qualifications enabled him to detect and expose sophistry, whenever he was placed in a situation which compelled him to put forth his strength. A very pointed instance of this occurs in his Dictionary, under the article "Chrysippus," which we shall here quote, as it forms a very fair specimen of that kind of logical tact which Bayle could use with such striking effect, when he was prompted to use it either to gratify his own fancy, or to silence an enemy.

"What is it, said some of the ancient sophists, which constitutes what we call little, much, long, broad, small, or great? Do three grains of corn make a heap? The answer must be; No. Do four grains make a heap? You must make the same answer as before. They continued their interrogatories from one grain to another, without end; and if you should happen at last to answer, 'Here is a heap,' they pretended your answer was absurd, inasmuch as it supposed that one single grain makes the difference between what is a heap, and what is not. I might prove, by the same

contrôle, qui cherchait dans le sujet un côté négligé par son auteur, et qui se trouvait rarement satisfait de cette vérification. Il avait puisé cette disposition dans la lecture assidue de Montaigne." (De Gerando, *Histoire Comparée*, Vol. 7. p. 190.)

method, that a great drinker is never drunk. Will one drop of wine fuddle him? No. Two drops then? By no means; neither three nor four. I might thus continue my interrogations from one drop to another; and if, at the end of the nine hundred and ninety-ninth drop, you answered, He is not fuddled, and at the thousandth, He is, I should be entitled to infer that one single drop of wine makes the difference between being drunk and being sober, which is absurd. If the interrogations went on from bottle to bottle, you could easily mark the difference in question. But he who attacks you with a *sorites*, is at liberty to choose his own weapons; and, by making use of the smallest conceivable increments, renders it impossible for you to name a precise point which fixes a sensible limit between being drunk and being sober; between what is little and what is great; between what is enough and what is too much. A man of the world would laugh at these sophistical quibbles, and would appeal to *common sense*; to that degree of knowledge which, in common life, is sufficient to enable us to establish such distinctions. But to this tribunal a professed dialcetician was not permitted to resort; he was obliged to answer in form; and if unable to find a solution according to the rules of art, his defeat was unavoidable. Even at this day, an Irish tutor, who should harass a Professor of Salamanca with similar subtilities, and should receive no other answer except this, *common sense, and the general consent of mankind, sufficiently show your inferences*

are false, would gain the victory; his antagonist having declined to defend himself with those logical weapons with which the assault had been made."

We find the most valuable and important of Bayle's metaphysical speculations, in his collected works. It is here that we have his settled thoughts and deliberate opinions on difficult questions. Descartes was a favourite with him, although he did not implicitly adopt his whole system. But he thought with him that there were many important principles of thought, which only the mind itself seemed to have the power of creating, and which could never come through the channels of the external senses. This opinion led him to deny the truth of the Scholastic maxim, "that there was nothing in the understanding which had not previously been in the senses."*

Bayle seemed to have great pleasure in viewing the mind ontologically. He often dwells upon the nature of Being, and on the high *à priori* arguments which are commonly used to prove its existence and modes of operation. He did not, however, indulge in theories of any kind. This was not his humour. He confines himself to definitions and systematic propositions; and reasons upon them with great clearness, candour, and earnestness. In these discussions he often refers to the opinions of the ancients, of whose systems he had an accurate knowledge.†

* *Thèses Philosophiques*, p. 132.

† *Système de Philosophie*, pp. 220, 468.

The observations and discussions of Bayle on the existence of a Deity, are well worthy of notice; they are both acute and solid. He speaks highly of Descartes' reasoning on this subject.*

* * See Note B. at the end of the Volume.

* *Thèses Philosophiques*, p. 98.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE PROGRESS OF METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION
IN THE LOW COUNTRIES AND IN GERMANY, FROM
THE TIME OF DESCARTES TO HEMSTERHUIS.

THE speculations of Descartes exercised a powerful influence over the philosophic mind of the Low Countries and of Germany, during nearly the whole of the eighteenth century. The brilliancy of his talents, and his profound acquirements in physical and mathematical science, opened to him every seminary of learning on the Continent, and conferred upon him almost despotic sway, until the appearance of Kant, who gave a new impetus to mental speculations throughout the whole of the Northern States of Europe.

The Low Countries were, however, particularly the theatre of Descartes' greatest triumph. Here he had for a long period no rival. His system was embraced in nearly all its totality; and it seemed to the learned so sound, so firmly knit together, and adorned with so much of the eloquence of real

genius, that it could never be invaded or superseded. True, in some localities, such as the University of Louvain, the learned Professors in the chairs of Philosophy ventured occasionally to throw out hints, that the system was not altogether perfect, and that modifications might be made which would cause it to square better with some principles of theological doctrine. But these dissentients were too few in number and insignificant in influence, to make a serious inroad upon the fame and power of Descartes.

When Leibnitz, however, appeared, Cartesianism felt, for the first time, the influence of rivalry. He was, like Descartes himself, a man of splendid mind, and decidedly more ambitious than his master. His great aim was to comprehend the whole mass of human knowledge, to mould it into a regular system, and to reduce it to a few primary elements. This gigantic undertaking called forth all the intellectual resources of his fruitful intellect, and he succeeded in riveting the attention of Europe upon his labours, though they did not prove successful for the accomplishment of his original enterprise. He always appeared as a disciple of Descartes; though the many modifications he made in his system tended ultimately to weaken the solidity of the fabric; while yet, at the same time, he extended its renown to more distant lands, and made it familiarly known in seminaries of learning where it had previously been scarcely heard of by name. The labours of these two great men, in the cause of mental philosophy, were henceforth united;

and they laid the foundation of that colossal system of speculation, which engrosses so intensely the thinking minds of the northern parts of Europe, and which is now made the basis of many other important branches of academical and popular knowledge.

When the speculations of Descartes first appeared, Germany was in a very low state as to philosophical information. The Professors in her Universities had little else than some dry and meagre scraps of metaphysics, gathered from abridgments of the ancients, or the huge compilations of the Schoolmen. Every thing was dull, formal, and unattractive. There were no writings in their own vernacular tongue; no instrument by which the speculative powers of the nation at large could be excited; nor was there the least intellectual fervour felt towards any advancement whatever in the science of mind. A death-like torpor reigned every where. This spell was however broken by Descartes, and still more strikingly by Leibnitz and Wolff, both of whom may be considered as the real parents of the present system of metaphysical speculation throughout the whole of Germany and other neighbouring kingdoms. Their ardour and genius infused a spirit of inquiry among all the thinking part of the nation, who, when once aroused from the slumber of ages, entered into speculation with such energy and enthusiasm, and with such surprising results, as to call forth the admiration of many, and the astonishment of all beholders. The growth of the metaphysical mind of Germany has

been rapid beyond all precedent. It was at first like the grain of mustard seed; and now its branches and foliage shelter innumerable hosts of philosophical creations, of every varied nature and plumage.*

DAVID GORLÆUS.

This philosopher was a native of Utrecht; and his work published at Leyden in 1620, entitled, "*Exercitationes Philosophicæ, quibus Philosophia Theoretica fere universa discutitur, et plurima ac præcipua Peripateticorum dogmata evertuntur,*" is that which contains his metaphysical disquisitions. He discusses Aristotle's system with great severity, and attempts to point out the pernicious and deadening influence it has exerted upon real knowledge and learning.

CHRISTIAN LUPUS.

Lupus was a Professor of philosophy at Cologne, and afterwards of theology at the University of

* The progress in speculative opinions in Germany has not been more rapid and remarkable, within the last hundred years, than the progress of the nation in some other branches of literature. "The Germans have no dramatic work anterior to the sixteenth century. *Der Krieg aus Würzburg,*" by Wolfram von Eschenbach, is only a sorry poem in the form of a dialogue. Neighbouring countries were greatly in advance of them, at this period. "*Esmorée, son of the King of Sicily,*" and the "*Duke of Brunswick,*" are dramatic productions, in the Flemish language, which date as far back as the thirteenth century. There are incontestable evidences of a copious and interesting literature in Belgium, even in the twelfth century. Germany was at this period, as to light and imaginative writing, in almost complete darkness. She has, however, made ample amends for her former sluggishness.

Louvain. He was a man of great erudition, and his work, entitled "*Prodidagmata Philosophica*," which was published in 1640, is considered an acute and profound treatise.

Lupus treats of the internal operations of the mind upon the materials which are offered to its notice, and shows that without the power of inward reflection there could be no such thing as science or general truth.*

On the nature and operation of *reason*, the reader will find some excellent observations in this author's work on the treatment of Logical Truth.†

HENRY REGIUS, OR DU ROI.

Regius was one of Descartes' most zealous disciples; and in his capacity of Professor at Utrecht, made Cartesianism as extensively known as he possibly could. His chief work on mind is, "*Explicatio Mentis Humanæ*," which was published in 1659.

MARTIN SCHOOCKIUS.

This was an industrious and skilful author, and wrote a great number of works on many useful branches of study. He is known as a metaphysician by a work entitled, "*Admiranda Methodus Novæ Philosophiæ*." This treatise is written in opposition to the theory of Descartes, and points out many errors and inconsistencies in his system.

* *Opera Omnia*, Venice, 1729, Vol. 12. p. 87.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 202. 285.

WOLFF.

J. Christian Wolff was one of the most zealous and learned disciples of Leibnitz, and expounded his doctrines, during a long life, at great length and with considerable popularity. The publications of Wolff are very numerous, amounting to *forty-five* volumes quarto, five of which are devoted to a treatise on Ethics. The complexion of Wolff's mind differed considerably from that of his master Leibnitz. It was of a matter of fact, a commonplace, kind; presenting the outward appearances of great order and method to his huge mass of materials; and thereby enabling him to give a popular and decidedly practical application to his views in all his academical instructions. But Wolff was, after all, only a zealous and indefatigable compiler; and possessed but a small share of that intellectual brilliancy for which his master was so highly celebrated. Michaelis however mentions, in his "Dissertation on the influence of opinions on Language," that "Were all Baron Wolff's other merits disputed, there is one which must incontestably be allowed him, his having added a new degree of perfection to the German tongue, by applying it to philosophy."

Wolff was a rigid Necessitarian, and followed out Leibnitz's views on this point to their utmost extent. There is an anecdote told by Euler, in his "Letters to a German Princess," respecting Wolff's public discussions on this puzzling doc-

trine. He had in a series of lectures been explaining the System of Pre-established Harmony to the students of the University at Halle, and the circumstance came to the ears of the King of Prussia, who inquired more particularly into the nature of this system. One of his waggish courtiers told him, that according to this doctrine his Majesty's soldiers were nothing but *pure machines*; that if they deserted, they could not help this movement, and were not by any means proper objects of punishment for making it. The whimsical monarch flew into a violent rage at this announcement, and ordered Wolff to quit Halle within twenty-four hours, on pain of severe chastisement. The philosopher sought refuge in the city of Marburg. He had before been obliged to leave the University on account of a discourse he delivered on the morality of the Chinese, in which he compared the system of Confucius with the Christian system of morals. His remarks gave great umbrage to all the Clergy.

Wolff was the Author of a System of Logic. This branch of knowledge was expounded upon the principles of his master Leibnitz's system. Wolff called Logic *rational philosophy*, and defined it to be that science which directed the thinking faculty in the search after truth. He divides it into *theoretical* and *practical*. Under the first head he treats of the principles of the science; 2nd, Of ideas or notions; 3rd, Of the judgments of the understanding; 4th, Of reasoning. And in the second general division, he attempts to show the uses to which Logic can be applied. These are, 1st,

To distinguish truth from falsehood, and the certain from the uncertain ; 2nd, The discovery of truth ; 3rd, For composition and the critical reading of literary and scientific works ; 4th, To the communication of truth to other minds ; 5th, For estimating the requisite force for the acquisition of knowledge ; and, 6th, For the every day and common duties of life.

This system had numerous admirers, many of whom wrote in its defence. There were also several authors of merit who opposed the views of Wolff on this branch of learning.

The whole of human knowledge is divided by Wolff into three classes, *history*, *philosophy*, and *mathematics*. The first embraces matters of fact, that is, every thing which has a material existence, as well as the events to which they and the movements of mankind are subjected. This division constitutes the foundation of knowledge ; and is the great magazine out of which the senses draw all their resources, to convey to the intellect. *Philosophy* is concerned with the *reason* why this state of things should exist ; examines into what laws regulate this intercourse which the senses have with gross matter ; and by what process we acquire those inward ideas or notions which lie at the root of all speculative inquiries. *Mathematics* relate to the form and quantity of things, and rest upon this general principle, that every thing finite has a determinate quantity or limit.

History is considered by Wolff as the grand foundation of Philosophy. All abstract theories

rest ultimately upon matters of fact. The classification of phenomena, and the investigations into their causes, give rise to a variety of principles and rules ; and the arrangement of these, and the inferences deducible from them, form a considerable number of branches of human knowledge, relating directly not only to the laws of the material world, but to the phenomena of human nature in all its varied and interesting aspects.*

Wolff affirms there are three orders of existing beings of which we have cognizance ; God, the human soul, and matter. These give rise to three grand divisions of knowledge ; natural theology, psychology, and physics. The soul has two faculties, the *understanding* and the *will* ; logic guides the former, and philosophy the latter. Physics appertain to the laws and properties of matter. Psychology and natural theology, united, give rise to metaphysics.†

An *idea*, according to Wolff, is the representation of a thing in the soul ; and a *notion*, is the representation of a thing under the aspect of *genus* and *species*. Genus and species relate only to individual things ; and it is by the mind's contemplating these that we can arrive at the knowledge of universals. All our *notions* have a *formal* and a *material* difference, and these two classes arise out of the particular manner in which we recognise individual things.‡ We find, in Wolff's arrangement of men-

* *Philosophia Rationalis*. chap. 1. Sect. 1, 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, 20, 28.

† *Ibid.* c. 3. § 55 to 86.

‡ *Logica*, c. 1. § 34 ; *Psychologia Empirica*, c. 1. § 55. 57.

tal phenomena, many remarks which may be found in Locke's "Essay;" particularly relating to clear and obscure ideas, adequate and inadequate, simple and complex, and the like.

The Leibnitzian theory of *sufficient reason*, furnished Wolff with his peculiar views of causation. He denominates a cause to be that which contains within itself *a reason* for the existence of some other thing. In every cause there must be a principle of existence, and a principle of knowledge or intelligence. Relatively to the maxim, *that every effect must have a cause*, Wolff states a somewhat qualifying condition, which displays no small portion of sagacity, "That which has only a contingent existence, must be produced by some *efficient* cause."*

Wolff entertained some peculiar ideas on the nature of essence and substance. In his work, "Rational Thoughts on God, the Universe, and the Human Soul," he enters very fully into this subject. He thinks that the *essence* of every thing, must always be a simple and uncompounded unit; for it must appertain to all the individual elements of the substance or thing of which it constitutes the essence or quality. He defines substance to be that which contains within itself the source of its own changes or mutations. Every substance has within itself the essential elements of all the changes of which it is susceptible.†

* *Ontologia*, c. 2, § 866. 876. 899.

† *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele*, § 14. 33. 86. 96. 114.; *Ontologia*, c. 2.

The practice which Wolff introduced, of treating every branch of knowledge through the medium of mathematical forms, became quite general throughout the whole of Germany. There was a complete rage for it in all the seats of learning. Croon, in his "*Dissertatio de Pietate Christiana*," (1730), applied mathematics to theology, and made a very strange thing of it. Michael Kelsch thought mathematical modes of reasoning the only thing for successfully communicating all kinds of instruction to the rising generation; and to forward his views, wrote a work, entitled, "*De Utilitate Methodi Mathematicæ in Docenda Juventute*," which was published in 1735. Stellwaag followed in the same track, and suggested, in his "*Meditatio Critica Philosophica*," that the Hebrew language might be rapidly and successfully taught through the means of mathematical rules. A multitude of other writers followed in the same steps, and in all branches of literature and science; among the number may be mentioned Wasser, Feyerlin, and Hagen. At length a check was given to this philosophical delusion, by Poppe, who clearly pointed out the distinction between mathematical evidence and the species of evidence which matters relating to the mind of man furnish. In this he did an essential service to sound philosophy and common sense. Hismen and Bazedow were both loud in condemning the application of geometrical forms to philosophical topics.*

* On Wolff's general merits De Gerando makes the following remarks:
 "La morale ou philosophie pratique de Wolff se recommande, comme sa

CROUSAZ.

Crousaz was one of the Geneva philosophers, and exercised no small influence over the philosophic mind of the Continent during his life-time. He was a man of quick parts, of a practical turn of thought, and by no means zealously wedded to systems or theories, unless he saw they could be applied to some useful end. His great *forte* lay in the common-sense views he took of metaphysical doctrines. If they seemed to clash with the ordinary opinions of mankind, or were calculated, in his opinion, to weaken or destroy moral and religious feelings, then he contemptuously discarded them from his consideration. Mere theories, as such, had no charms for him. To promote and extend really useful truths, and to display and illustrate them in an engaging and perspicuous manner, were the great objects of his labours, and the crowning trophies of his speculative ambition.

On the great question as to the origin of our

philosophie théorique, par la vaste étendue de son plan, l'harmonie qui y préside. Ses prolégomènes sont beaux, sa tendance est noble, ses promesses sont abondantes ; elle gouverne à la fois la pratique de la vie, la jurisprudence, la politique, le droit naturel. La liberté des actions humaines lui sert de point de départ ; la perfection est son but, la nature son type, le désintéressement sa condition, la connexion des droits et des devoirs sa conséquence, mais elle trompe trop souvent dans l'exécution les espérances qu'elle avait fait naître. Ainsi, la liberté s'évanouit sous l'efficacité des motifs déterminants, dont les effets, aux yeux de Wolff, sont inévitables. Aussi a-t-il partagé les reproches dirigés contre Leibnitz, et a-t-il été accusé, comme celui-ci, d'introduire une sorte de nécessité de l'empire de la volonté humaine."—(*Histoire Comparée*, vol. 8, p. 31.)

ideas, Crousaz thought there lay considerable ambiguity at the foundation of the controversy. One party used loose and indefinite language when they talked of ideas being different from the mind itself; and on the other hand, it certainly was not philosophical to affirm that we were born with a series of ideas independent of the exercise of our senses. The truth might be found by our steering a middle course. Men are born not with *innate* ideas, but with an *innate* power to be affected in a certain regular and invariable manner. We are born with the faculties to know, conceive, and reason in a particular manner; and these faculties will be found much more numerous than most people, at first sight, might be disposed to allow.*

Thought is defined by Crousaz to be *an act which is felt*. There are two species of perceptions; the one relates to ourselves, to our own inward feelings of consciousness; and the other refers to external objects around us. The author gives the name of *sensations* to the first class of perceptions, and *ideas* to the second. It is chiefly by consulting our *ideas* rather than our *sensations*, that we obtain the full knowledge of the nature of external bodies.† He does not agree with the maxim, attributed to Aristotle, *that there is nothing in the understanding that was not previously in the senses*. Crousaz maintains that all mathematical and moral truths belie the

* See Logique, Sections 2. 6. 7.

† "C'est donc en consultant nos idées plutôt que nos sensations, que nous connaissons les choses qui existent hors de nous."

soundness of this principle ; for that they are solely derived from the innate and constitutional sources of the mind itself.*

Crousaz attacked the philosophy of Leibnitz, as a whole, upon the grounds of its sapping the foundations of all morality and religion. The chief arguments which the philosopher of Geneva advances to establish his accusations are, that there is a mechanical fatality, or necessity, interwoven with the whole Leibnitzian theory, which it is impossible to harmonize with any correct ideas of Deity and a superintending providence ; and the same remark may be applied to the human will. If it be not free in all its determinations, then, as Crousaz affirms, there can be no such things as good and evil, just or unjust, rewards or punishments. All our notions on these important subjects must be erroneous, and all divine and human institutions, founded upon them, must be arrant folly and consummate injustice.†

ANDREW RUDIGER.

This author was a scholar of Thomatius, and cultivated philosophical speculations with great zeal and industry. His principal works are, "*Philosophia Synthetica*," published at Halle, in 1707 ; "*De Sensu Veri et Falsi*," 1709 ; and his "*Physica*

* *Logique*, sect. 3.

† See "*Examen de la Traduction en prose de l'Essai sur l'Homme de Pope*."

Divina," &c., which made its appearance at Frankfort in 1716.

Rudiger was a victim to ambitious singularity. He criticised all systems and opinions with a good deal of asperity, and could agree with none. He laboured hard to erect a metaphysical system of his own, out of various speculations, both ancient and modern; but he did not succeed. Aristotle, he conceived, had been harshly and ungenerously treated by the moderns; and this arose chiefly from their not being able to understand the Grecian Sage. Rudiger turned his attention especially to logic, with a view of moulding it into such a form as would not only prevent mankind from falling into error, in speculating and reasoning on the most important subjects, but would also afford remarkable facilities in the way of communicating the most profound knowledge of scientific subjects to others. With this view, he framed many new rules of logic, split old ones into several parts, and divided, sub-divided, and amalgamated, with all the zeal and expertness of a thorough reformer. But the learned of his day failed to appreciate these novelties; nor has posterity been more favourable to his popularity and reputation.

SYRBIUS.

This philosopher published his "*Philosophia Prima*," at Jena, in 1726. It contains much valuable matter. He set out in his inquiries with

a firm determination to think for himself; and hence he criticises, with some degree of severity, the respective systems of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff. For Locke he seems to have entertained a passionate attachment.

Syrbius considers the *idea* as a copy of the object which occupies the mind, when it thinks of or about an external object.* The faculty of attention is directed to the thing perceived, and this creates that peculiar action which we refer to the act of *perception*, as explained by Stewart and other writers of later date. Syrbius looks upon attention as occupying the same relative situation to the mind, as desire does to the will.

The mind is, in fact, the active agent of all its ideas and notions. The senses are of two kinds, outward and internal; and these are the two great inlets to all our knowledge. He gives to the internal the name of *reflection*, thus adopting the theory and classification of Locke. The power of *consciousness* is defined by the German philosopher to be the self-same thing as Locke has uniformly in his "Essay" considered it to be. On the question of innate ideas, Syrbius has adopted the notion, so prevalent with many English philosophers, that the *faculties* which create ideas are born with us, but not the precise ideas themselves. He thinks the dispute to be about words more than anything else.†

* "Exemplar rei in cogitante."

† *Philosophia Prima*, § 2. 17. 81.

JOHN. FR. BUDDÆUS.

This author was violently opposed to Wolff's doctrine, and Leibnitz himself came in for a share of his reproaches. His speculative works are, "*Bedenken über die Wolffianische Philosophie, &c.*" Frankfurt, 1724; "*Institutiones Philosophiæ Eclecticæ*;" Halle, 1732; and, "*Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione*," Jena, 1717.

Buddæus was a Professor in the University of Jena, and his opinions had a good deal of weight in Germany in his own day. He considered that both Leibnitz and Wolff had pursued a wrong course in philosophizing; and that they had thrown discredit upon the great doctrine of a Deity, as well as upon the leading principles of moral obligation.*

Spinoza's system was energetically opposed by Buddæus, who affirmed, that though a mathematical form was given to it, yet there was no regular or consistent mathematical reasoning followed by the author. The whole theory was false and unsound. Buddæus also considered Descartes' proof of a Deity weak and unsatisfactory; and thought that the fullest evidence for a Supreme Being was derived from the consideration of our moral sentiments and feelings.†

The eclectic opinions of Buddæus are boldly stated on matters connected with the philosophy

* *Bedenken*, Sect. 4.

† See *De Atheismo*, pp. 20. 42.

of mind. The only way, he conceived, to prosecute this branch of knowledge with success, was to take what was good out of every system, and unite these selected materials into one grand and harmonious whole. The entire history of speculative philosophy, he says, speaks aloud for eclecticism, which is only another phrase for rational improvement.*

GOTTSCHED.

The metaphysical work of this author is entitled, "Erste Gründe der Gesamnten Weltweisheit," which made its appearance at Leipsic in 1743.

The philosophy of Gottsched was a mixture of the systems of Descartes and Leibnitz; though he was not deficient in powers of original thinking. He admitted the leading principle of consciousness laid down by Descartes, but he did not think it should hold the place of the first element of our knowledge. The author enters warmly, and at considerable length, into this matter. He conceives that the two primitive elements of our knowledge are the *principle of contradiction* and *sufficient reason*. These are the fertile sources of all forms of thought. The formation of our ideas is a complex operation, produced from the joint action of sensation, perception, attention, and abstraction.†

Experience and observation are discussed at con-

* Institutiones Phil. Eclecticae, pp. 15. 30.

† Erste Gründe der Gesamnten Weltweisheit, part 1.

siderable length by Gottsched ; and he endeavours to show that they are a source of a vast portion of our information and knowledge. But to render them unerring guides we must place them under a regular system of rules, the result of careful and judicious deduction. It is by a process of this kind, that we are able to penetrate into the secrets of nature, and to make a profitable and rational use of our knowledge.*

Gottsched's philosophy, in its general features, makes many near approaches to that of Locke and Condillac. It has a great deal of that *common sense* character about it, which so conspicuously predominates in the writings of both the English philosopher and his French admirer and commentator. The grand object of the German was to test knowledge by its utility.

MARTIN KNUTZEN.

This German writer mingled metaphysical disquisitions with Logic, and endeavoured to introduce the geometrical method into both departments of knowledge. Wolff was his chief guide. The principal points in the writings of Knutzen are his observations on the sources of error in our speculations, on what constitutes a standard of truth, the reliance we are justified in placing on the testimonies of our senses, and on the theory of Probabilities. These matters will be found fully

* Erste Gründe der Gesamnten Weltweisheit, part 1. pp. 126-135.

entered into, in his work, entitled "*Elementa Philosophiæ Rationalis*," published in 1741.

CRUCIUS.

This author was Professor of theology at Leipsic, and was distinguished in his day for the extent of his metaphysical knowledge, and for his active and zealous labours in its promulgation throughout Germany. His chief works are "*Weg zur Gewissheit, &c.*" Leipsic, 1747; "*Entwurf der Nothwendigen Vernunft Wahrheiten*," Leipsic, 1745; "*Dissertatio de usu et limitibus Rationis Sufficientis*," Leipsic, 1752; "*De summis Rationis Principiis*," Leipsic, 1752.

Crucius did not agree with Wolff in the general principles of his philosophy; he thought it too formal and mechanical, and calculated to weaken the religious feelings of young students in particular. He viewed all speculation through the medium of theological truth; and it was one of the grand purposes of his life to endeavour to reconcile philosophy, in its widest signification, with religion.

There are many very excellent rules in his works on the application of language to all philosophical disquisitions. He shows the errors in reasoning from ill-defined terms, and lays down judicious rules for the employment of a scientific phraseology.*

Crucius has paid attention to some points of

* *Weg zur Gewissheit*, p. 5.

considerable importance in philosophy. He looks upon the principle of *contradiction* as only of secondary moment, and exclusively confined to the mathematical sciences. There is, relatively to all speculations on mind, another of higher import, namely, the *impossibility of conceiving certain things otherwise than true*. This exereises a powerful control over the judgment, and compels the understanding to give an assent to propositions by a very short and summary process of reasoning. *Inseparability* and *incompatibility* are offshoots of this principle. In fact, the reasonings of Crucius, in this part of his system, are grounded precisely on the views of the human mind entertained by those who belong to the Scotch or common-sense School.

Crucius reproaches Leibnitz and Wolff with confounding the purely logical principle of thought with the foundations of human knowledge. He maintains that if this distinction had been clearly and steadily kept in view by these two distinguished philosophers, they would not have hazarded so many groundless and futile conjectures on questions of vital importance in philosophy.

WALCH.

The philosophy of Walch is of a solid and common-sense character, and it is evident he had been a zealous student of Loeke, and had entered into his views to a considerable extent. His two chief works are, "The philosophical Lexicon," and his "Introduction to Philosophy."

According to Walch experience and contemplation

are the basis of all philosophy. We can only form general axioms or principles of science, and lay down rules for the treatment of them by the understanding, by paying a close and skilful attention to what is moving around us, and to what is passing in our own minds. This is the grand source of our most elevated and important branches of human knowledge. Even the science of theology itself must be maintained and supported by experience, and general truths deduced by the mind from it.*

All knowledge, Walch says, has its foundation in *sensation* or *sentiment* (Empfindung); but then this sensation or sentiment is used by the author in an extensive sense; it includes what we denominate consciousness, as well as sensation generally. So, in this respect, he seems to have almost adopted the chief feature in Locke's system. The consciousness of Walch is the active principle of reflection of our countryman.†

It has been a matter of astonishment among historians to find Walch, so prudent and rational in his ordinary philosophical speculations, giving way to a belief in evil spirits, demons, and witchcraft. This species of mysticism troubled him greatly; and tended to lessen, during his lifetime, that useful and beneficial influence which his writings were otherwise fitted to produce.‡

* Einleitung in die Philos. § 9. 10. 15. 17. † Ibid. § 4. 10. 13.

‡ Ce n'est pas sans quelque surprise que l'on voit un philosophe qui s'annonçait avec autant de prudence et de réserve, s'engager dans les voies du mysticisme, et joindre à une philosophie fondée sur l'expérience

AUGUSTUS FR. MÜLLER.

This author founded his speculative system upon a certain interpretation of Locke's doctrine, so prevalent, a few years after, in France, that sensation, and sensation alone, was the only and true foundation of all knowledge. Müller maintained that we had no general ideas which were not derived from the senses; and he considered logical truth to consist in the agreement of thought with sensation, and metaphysical truth in the agreement between the sensation and the object. Leibnitz's idea of *sufficient reason*, he entirely discarded.

SAM. CHRIS. HOLLMANN.

Hollmann was a professor in the University of Gottingen, and was distinguished in his day for his philosophical talents. He published his "Institutions of Philosophy" in 1727. It is an able work, and was highly eulogised when it first made its appearance. The author discards the *pre-established harmony* of Leibnitz, and thinks it entirely unten-

une philosophie secrète qui pénètre les mystères de la nature et embrasse le règne des intelligences. Le mystère philosophique, tel qu'il le conçoit, est relatif aux choses dont l'existence nous est connue, sans que nous puissions nous en expliquer les propriétés. Cette connaissance s'obtient, dit-il, ou par nos propres sensations, ou par le récit des autres hommes. Cette philosophie embrasse les opérations des mauvais esprits, les revenants, la magie, la sorcellerie, &c. Walch, ici, était entraîné par les exemples des maîtres dont il avait recueilli les leçons." (De Gernando, Vol. 8. p. 49.)

able. He adopts the theory of L  cke, that the senses are the sources of our knowledge. All philosophy he divides into two branches, *physics* and *pneumatology*; the former embraces objects of the material world; and the latter, matters of a mental or spiritual kind. His ideas on space and duration are original and profound.*

RENSCH.

Rensch obtained a considerable reputation in his day for his metaphysical knowledge. He was a man of profound and subtile cast of mind, and joined great ardour and industry to it. His "Systema Logicum," published at Jena in 1741, is a compound from Aristotle, the Port Royal Logic, Wolff, Lange, and Rudiger.

The philosophy of Rensch shows the influence which Locke was now obtaining on the Continent. The German considers the soul as modified by the power of external things, and the modifications so produced are what we conceive and call representations of the mind. They are primarily only simple perceptions, and by the power of consciousness they become somewhat altered and refined into what we call *mental conceptions*. First of all come *sensations*; these, in their turn, become internal and external; the former comprehending those ideas which we have of our own minds, and other

* Institut. Philos. Vol. 10. 17. 29.

matters of an abstract nature; and the latter is confined to the mere qualities or properties of external bodies. This is the ordinary procedure of the human understanding, in the acquirement of all kinds of knowledge and science.

The author considers observation and experiment as the foundations of all logical truth. These can never be dispensed with in any system of rational knowledge.

Rensch amalgamated the principle of *contradiction*, and the *sufficient reason* of Leibnitz, with his other views on the mind. These Leibnitzian elements of speculation rather marred the uniformity and cogency of his system. He maintained we had mental principles of intuition; and these played a very important part in the mental economy. He seems to have considered cause and effect rather under a sceptical point of view, which appeared ill-suited to the general common-sense character of all his other philosophical speculations.*

G. J. S'GRAVESANDE.

This philosopher was born at Bois-le-Duc, in 1688, and studied at the University of Leyden, where he became Professor.

The work in which are contained his metaphysical principles and opinions, is called "Introduction à la Philosophie," and was published at

* Systema Logicum, § 1. 4. 6. 9. 16. 22. 45. 47. 80. 93.

Leyden in 1748. The treatise is divided into two parts, Metaphysics and Logic.

S'Gravesande was little inclined to speculative theories respecting the human understanding. Although well acquainted with the most celebrated of them, both ancient and modern, yet he displays great reserve in expressing his own opinion on keenly-agitated questions. It is recorded of him, that when once earnestly pressed to state his opinion respecting a theory on the origin of our ideas, he avoided giving an answer, by remarking "that great minds make systems, but good ones believe them not."

S'Gravesande seems to have coincided with Loeke in all the leading points of his discussions on the mind. He distinguishes ideas into three classes or sorts. We have ideas of things which the soul sees in itself; we have other ideas from the act of comparing and judging of these among themselves; and then we have another class of ideas which come immediately through the senses, and make us acquainted with external things around us. Here is sensation, and a kind of double reflection.*

The act of perception is defined to be, *whatever is immediately present to the mind*. This is precisely the same as what Loeke states he meant by the word idea. And S'Gravesande joins with him in the same definition of the term.†

On the origin of our ideas generally, S'Gravesande expressed himself dissatisfied with the theory

* Introduction à la Philosophie, c. 1. § 5. 6. 7.

† Métaphysique, c. 1. § 311. 313.

of Descartes, and with the views of Malebranche and Leibnitz on the same subject. He carefully examines all the statements of those distinguished men, and comes to the conclusion that their respective theories are essentially defective in solving the interesting problem.

Relative to causation S'Gravesande affirms, that everything which has not a beginning is self-existent; and whatever is not self-existent has a beginning; and that which has a beginning owes its existence to a foreign cause.*

The Logic of S'Gravesande is a most valuable work, and for many years after his death it was a general favourite in several of the most renowned seats of learning on the Continent. He classifies our complex or general notions, shows the nature of propositions, points out the principle which guides the mind in judging of all probabilities, singles out very carefully and judiciously the chief sources of our errors in reasoning, and lays down many excellent rules for fixing the attention of pupils, and strengthening their memories. In addition to all these, he shows the nature and use of analysis and synthesis, and the advantages to be derived from the employment of theories and hypotheses in many branches of knowledge.†

* *Métaphysique*, chap. 8. § 77. 79. 81. 85.

† *Ibid.* chaps. 17. 18. 22. 25. 32.

MEYER.

Meyer's work, "*Anfangs-Gründe der Schönen Wissenschaften*," published in 1748 at Halle, is a running commentary on the philosophical system of Baumgarten. Meyer was a zealous student of Leibnitz and Wolff, and considered their respective speculations as alone containing the true elements of mental science. His writings on the immortality of the soul are interesting.*

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING.

The literature of Germany owes a great deal to the genius and labours of Lessing. He became the champion and defender of Spinoza, in his work called "*Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*;" a book which brought upon its author the charge of pantheism. His metaphysical speculations are not of themselves of much importance. Leibnitz, Locke, and Wolff, were the three authors he most admired.

BAUMGARTEN.

Baumgarten's work, entitled "*Metaphysica*," was published at Halle in 1748, and excited a good deal of attention on its first appearance. He became the founder of a new school of philosophical writers in Germany; those who applied metaphy-

* *Anfangs-Gründe der Schönen Wissenschaften*, pp. 10. 24. 109.

sical principles to the cultivation and explanation of the fine arts, and matters of light literature.

This author was passionately fond of the philosophy of Leibnitz, and defended it with great zeal and ingenuity. The *Pre-established Harmony*, and the *Optimism* of the latter, were particular favourites with Baumgarten; and he has placed both of these speculative doctrines in comparatively new and varied lights.

Baumgarten maintains that the mind is composed of many independent faculties, and that the only way in which mental philosophy can be rendered useful, is to form a sound and comprehensive digest of the laws of thought, which ought to be thoroughly explained by definitions and axioms. It is in this manner alone that a true knowledge of our souls can be obtained, and made subservient to other interesting branches of knowledge and literature. He applied this mode of philosophizing to elucidate the principles on which the sublime and beautiful are founded.*

ELIE LUZAC.

This was a philosopher of Holland, of considerable eminence, not only in matters of speculation on mind, but in many other important branches of knowledge. His chief metaphysical work is entitled, "*Recherches sur quelques Principes des Connaissances Humaines*," which was published at

* *Metaphysica*, parts 1. 2. 3.

Gottingen in 1756. The author enters fully into the origin of our ideas, and takes the views of Leibnitz and Wolff for his guide. He is a sound and practical philosopher, and the reader will find many nice and important distinctions between the class of our ideas we possess relative to mental subjects, and those which we form from external objects.*

REIMARUS.

Herm. Sam. Reimarus published his "Vernunft Lehre, etc," at Hamburg and Kiel, 1756. He was a professor in the University of the former city. His system of logic has great merit for its clearness, its judicious arrangement of rules, for the numerous and profound observations scattered through it, and above all for the pious and religious tone which everywhere pervades it. The work has been one of the most popular of the kind in the north of Europe.

PLOUCQUET.

This author's works on philosophical topics are pretty numerous, and of some interest to the scientific speculator. The following list forms the most important of his treatises: "Methodus tam Demonstrandi directe omnes Syllogismorum Species, quam etc." Tübingen, 1763; "Methodus Calculandi in Logicis," Frankfort, 1764; "Fundamenta Philos.

* See pp. 20. 36. 64. and 78.

Speculativæ," 1769; "Institutiones Philos. Theoreticæ," 1772; "Elementa Philos. Contemplativæ," 1778.

The mental philosophy of Ploucquet is a strange compound, and is grounded upon erroneous ideas. He aimed at reducing all knowledge to one or two simple rules; and to frame a method which should mechanically, as it were, communicate information to students on every branch of science, with infallible certainty and remarkable expedition. The science of Logic he attempted to reduce to the most simple elements, and, by means of algebraical signs, to render it a matter of pure calculation. This being only the art of deducing, according to an immutable rule, the known from the unknown, is amply sufficient for the explanation of every department of human knowledge.* All judgments on facts or experience, he reduced to identical propositions, by aid of Leibnitz's principle of *sufficient reason*.

In his Treatise on Speculative Philosophy, there are many profound remarks on the nature of mind, the law of continuity as laid down by Leibnitz, and on the principles on which general truth or certainty rests. Many excellent and highly interesting observations on the existence of a Deity will also be found in his "Contemplative" philosophy.†

* Methodus Calculandi in Logicis, § 10. 18. 22. 104.

† See Elementa, Philos. Contempl. § 12. 104. 108.

MOSES MENDELSON.

This author was born at Dessau in 1729. His father was a Jew. At an early age he had to quit his parents' roof, on account of some domestic troubles, when he repaired to Berlin in 1742. Here he lived in great indigence for many years. Several charitable persons kindly furnished him with a lodging, and gave him a dinner on certain days of the week. He was employed as a copyist by a Rabbi, called Frankel, and this occupation made him intimately acquainted with the Talmud. In 1748, Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding fell into his hands, and this gave an entirely new turn to his thoughts. He studied it with great care, and it became a decided favourite with him in after life. He likewise studied the modern languages, and published his first Essay in German, upon "Sentiment."

He wrote on several metaphysical questions, but he did not study the science very methodically or profoundly. There is a work translated from the German into the Flemish, entitled "Philosophical Tracts, Letters, and Conversations of Moses Mendelsohn, translated from the German, and enriched with Notes, and a Life of the Author," by J. Brender, Leyden, 1784. This publication contains; 1st, A Biographical Sketch of the Author; 2nd, A Discussion on the Immateriality of the Human Soul; 3rd, Tracts on the Fundamental Principles of the Fine Arts; 4th, On Appearances;

5th, On the Resemblance among the Truths belonging to various Human Sciences.

Mendelsohn obtained the prize, proposed by the Academy of Berlin, upon the nature of evidence on which mental philosophy is grounded. The resolution of the question is effected by the use of Leibnitz's theory of *sufficient reason*. The arguments of Mendelsohn are more ingenious than solid. Indeed his *forte* did not lie in metaphysical speculations.*

There is a notice of this author in the Edinburgh Review, which is worthy of insertion here :—"The history of Mendelsohn is interesting in itself, and full of encouragement to all lovers of self-improvement. At thirteen he was a wandering Jew beggar, without health, without home, and almost without a language, for the jargon of broken Hebrew and provincial German which he spoke could scarcely be called one. At middle age, he could write his 'Phædon,' was a man of wealth and breeding, and ranked among the teachers of his age. Like Pope he abode by his original creed, though often solicited to change it; indeed the grand problem of his life was to better the inward and outward condition of his own ill-fated people; for whom he actually accomplished much benefit. He was a mild, shrewd, and worthy man; and might well love 'Phædon' and Socrates, for his own character was Socratic. He was a friend of Lessing's; indeed a pupil; for

* See Abhandlung ueber die Evidenz, Berlin, 1764; and Morgenstunden, 1786.

Lessing having accidentally met him at a class, recognised the spirit that lay struggling under such incumbrances, and generously undertook to help him. By teaching the poor Jew a little Greek, he disenchanted him from the Talmud and the Rabbins. The two were afterwards co-labourers in Nicolaï's 'Deutsche Bibliothek,' the first German *Review* of any character; which, however, in the hands of Nicolaï himself, it subsequently lost. Mendelssohn's works have mostly been translated into French.*

JOHN GODFREY VON HERDER.

Herder is one of the bright stars of Germany; and has been called the Fenelon of his country. He was a man of great industry and versatility of mind. His collected works amount to twenty-eight volumes.

Herder's metaphysical speculations were all blended with questions relative to man's moral and political condition and prospects. He looked upon humanity as a whole. The mind can only be known through its manifestations in the social, religious, and political relations of life; and in conjunction with the effective cultivation of the arts and sciences. He entertained lofty ideas of the dignity of human nature; and nothing roused his indignation so readily as low and degrading caricatures of life and manners.

The philosophy of Herder, in the abstract, is a compound from Descartes, Leibnitz, and Locke.

* Vol. 46, p. 305.

He mingled sensation and inward reflection together in divers proportions, as it immediately suited the end he had in view. It was by the union of these that he constructed his notions of the complete harmony of nature; a doctrine which pervades the whole of his philosophical speculations, on almost every topic where abstract reasoning could be brought to bear.*

Herder was an admirer and a defender of Spinoza. He maintains that the most implacable and bitter enemies of the Amsterdam philosopher were the Cartesians, whose doctrines he adopted, and legitimately and logically carried out to their ultimate consequences. Herder considers it unjust to accuse Spinoza of atheism, for that his doctrine is only an extravagant or transcendental species of theism, pardonable in a man who had been educated in the Jewish faith. Herder asserts that all the ambiguity which has arisen, in reference to the import of the speculations of Spinoza, may fairly be attributed to the use of the word *substance*.†

FRANCIS HEMSTERHUIS.

Hemsterhuis is one of the most profound and amiable philosophers of whom the Low Countries can boast. He was educated with great care under the eye of his father, who was himself one of the learned men of the eighteenth century.

* Vom Erkennen und Empfinden, 50. 51. 58.

† Gespräche über Spinoza's Systeme, pp. 101. 108. 111. 140. 142.

The first work published by young Hemsterhuis was a "*Lettre sur la Sculpture*," at Amsterdam, in 1769. A year after, another "*Lettre sur les Désirs*," made its appearance. His "*Lettre sur l'Homme et ses Rapports*," was printed in 1773. "*Sophyle, ou De la Philosophie*," "*Aristée, ou De la Divinité*," two dialogues, appeared in 1778 and 1779. Two other works, "*Alexis, ou De l'Age d'Or*," printed at Riga in 1787; and "*Simon, ou Des Facultés de l'Ame*," was given to the world after the Author's death. We must add to these, a "*Lettre de Dioclès à Diotime sur l'Athéisme*."

At the time Hemsterhuis appeared, the general tone of speculative philosophy, both in his own country and in Germany, was assuming a very stiff and formal character. One treatise followed at the back of another, with the same set of principles and forms of reasoning. It was becoming tame and lifeless, academical and pedantic. The loftier powers of man's nature were seldom called into requisition; and every thing like intelligent and heart-stirring speculations on the nature and destinies of man, were becoming, year after year, more deeply engulfed in Scholastic forms and rules. Hemsterhuis broke through this monotonous state of things, and succeeded in turning up new mould, and in imparting, even beyond the boundaries of his own country, an imaginative freshness to all mental inquiries.

In his dialogues, Hemsterhuis has employed the Socratic method, for which he had a particular affection, and of which he has made a very happy use. The spirit of Socrates also animates him.

- His great aim was to communicate knowledge ; and he therefore tested the soundness of metaphysical systems and principles, by the suggestions and dictates of common sense. Plato, too, is an object of his veneration and imitation. Like him, Hemsterhuis loves to descant on the moral and intellectual grandeur of man, to luxuriate in imaginative and poetical forms, and to frame ingenious allegories for the illustration and solution of mental phenomena. The universe had, in his eyes, many different faces, only some of which we see in all their loveliness and beauty. We are not prepared for a complete development of nature's wonderful operations. To realize all knowledge, it
- would be necessary we should be denuded of our material and perishable incumbrances. The present life is only an introductory state, a laborious preparation for that true life, towards which all the breathings of the soul aspire.*

* "Avant de jeter les yeux sur quelques points de la Philosophie d'Hemsterhuis, il est utile et juste de se rappeler à soi-même et de rappeler aux autres le temps où il a vécu. Ses écrits portent, à la vérité, la marque d'une vive et profonde opposition aux doctrines de cette époque ; mais, quelque forte, quelque sincère que fût cette opposition, et quelque distants que soient ses ouvrages, par leur caractère saint et moral, de ces mêmes doctrines, elles lui font souvent violence, pénètrent et s'insinuent malgré lui et comme à son insçu. Hemsterhuis lui-même paya donc un tribut aux idées régnantes de son temps. Et dût-on voir, dans l'influence qu'exerçaient sur les pensées d'un écrivain les pensées de son siècle, une espèce de fatalité que repousse une âme libre et indépendante ; dût-on s'indigner de l'occasion qu'elle peut fournir à certains auteurs de justifier ou d'excuser leurs erreurs et leurs aberrations, en les mettant sur le compte du temps où ils écrivaient, toujours est-il vrai que cette influence est inévitable, et que l'on appartient toujours par quelque endroit au siècle où l'on a vécu." (Coup d'Œil sur la Philosophie d'Hemsterhuis, par M. Van de Weyer, 1826.)

A being who feels, according to Hemsterhuis, can only have a sensation from an external body, by the means of an idea, or by an image intervening between the object and that which feels. Ideas are of three different degrees of clearness. First, some objects affect our organs of sensation so vividly, that every idea we have of them is full and clear; secondly, some of our senses are but partially affected, and then the ideas are proportionally indistinct; and thirdly, when our sensation is excited only through the medium of signs, then all the ideas from this source are eluded and confused.*

The use of natural signs, to correspond with and communicate our ideas to others, is the great characteristic which distinguishes men from the low creation. This power constitutes man a rational being.†

Hemsterhuis contends for a voluntary power in man. The consciousness of possessing this power, and the daily and hourly manifestations of it, are of themselves a sufficient evidence of its existence.‡

In Hemsterhuis' Letter on Atheism, he maintains there are three kinds of Atheists. The first are those enveloped in utter blindness and ignorance; the second, those who entertain a species of

* *Lettre sur l'Homme*, &c. pp. 6. 7. 18. 31. 32. 44; *Sophyle*, pp. 145, 146, 147. 150. 175.

† *Lettre sur l'Homme*, &c., pp. 7, 8, 9. 17. 23.

‡ *Aristée*, pp. 256. 264; *Simon*, p. 357.

Polytheism ; and the third, those persons, common in modern times, who rest upon a system of unbelief, founded on a false form of scientific reasoning.

The Institute of France makes the following observations on Hemsterhuis, in its " Rapport Historique sur les Progrès de l'Histoire et de la Littérature Ancienne ; Dupuis, 1789."

" Si les services rendus à ces deux grands intérêts de l'humanité (la vérité et la vertu,) fondent une juste gloire, la mémoire d'Hemsterhuis sera glorieuse pour la Hollande ; il a reproduit avec succès la méthode des anciens, le dialogue ; il a conservé leur simplicité, il cherche la vérité, et la fait éclore en s'interrogeant lui-même, à l'exemple de Socrate son modèle ; il parle de la vertu comme Platon. Sa métaphysique, comme celle de ce dernier, est quelquefois trop peu solidement assise, et sa doctrine des essences manque d'exactitude : mais si ses idées ne sont pas toujours rigoureusement justes, toujours du moins elles lui appartiennent en propre ; et combien ses intentions sont pures et éclairées ! quelle droiture préside à ses recherches ! La philosophie, dans ses écrits, conserve toujours le langage et la dignité qui lui conviennent, soit qu'elle dévoile les secrets des affections humaines, qu'elle trace les caractères du beau, qu'elle fixe les rapports de l'homme avec la nature et ses semblables, qu'elle définisse la nature du principe pensant, ou qu'enfin elle s'élève à l'Auteur de toutes choses. En détruisant les erreurs modernes, il conserve ce calme qui appartient à

une raison supérieure, et cette indulgence qui appartient à une bienveillance éclairée."*

* The best Edition of the Works of Hemsterhuis is that Edited in 1826, in 2 vols., Louvain, by M. Sylvain Van de Weyer, now Belgian Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of London.—See Note C. at the End of this Volume.

CHAPTER VII.

BERKELEY AND COLLIER.

BISHOP BERKELEY.

BISHOP Berkeley is one of the most acute and distinguished metaphysicians of whom England can boast. No man ever cultivated philosophy, and published so much that was of a really debatable nature, and yet made so few personal enemies. He was admired and esteemed by all who had the happiness of his acquaintance. Atterbury says of him, "So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and so much humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman."

Berkeley's metaphysical disquisitions are chiefly contained in his "New Theory of Vision," published in 1709; his "Principles of Human Knowledge," printed in 1710; and the "Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous," which made their appearance a year or two after. These are all works of singular genius, profundity, and merit. They naturally divide his

whole philosophy into three parts; 1st, His theory of vision; 2nd, His opinions on the nature of abstract ideas; and 3rd, His notions on the non-existence of matter. These three divisions constitute the three pillars on which his system rests.

The theory of vision propounded by Berkeley was one of the most brilliant mental discoveries of the eighteenth century. Its principles may be briefly stated in the following observations.

The aim of the author is to make us perceive the *immediate* and *natural* appearance of all objects of sight, from those conclusions of the understanding, respecting their figure, magnitude, distance, situation, &c., which we seem to come to by an almost *instantaneous perception*. Our ordinary notions upon the subject are, that we judge of the figure, distance, situation, &c. of external objects, by the sense of sight *alone*. But this, the learned Bishop demonstrates, is not the case. The faculty of sight alone will not impart these judgments to us. There must be the operations of another sense joined to that of sight, namely, the sense of touch or feeling. The impression which is made on us by external objects, through the means of sight alone, is, in metaphysical language, termed the *original perception*; and the impression made on us by the joint operations of sight and touch, is called the *acquired perception*.

The following remarks, from the Introduction to the Essay on Vision, will make this matter a little more comprehensible to the ordinary reader. The author says, "It is, I think, *agreed by all*, that

distance, of itself, cannot be seen. For distance being a line directed end-wise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter.

“I find it also acknowledged, that the estimate we make of the distance of objects considerably remote, is rather an act of judgment grounded on *experience*, than of sense. For example, when I perceive a great number of intermediate objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and the like, which I have experienced to take up a considerable space, I thence form a judgment or conclusion that the object I see beyond them is at a great distance. Again, when an object appears faint and small, which, at a near distance, I have experienced to make a vigorous and large appearance, I instantly conclude it to be far off. And this, it is evident, is the result of *experience*; without which, from the faintness and littleness, I should not have inferred any thing concerning the distance of objects.

“But when an object is placed at so near a distance, as that the interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion to it, it is the received opinion that the two optic axes, concurring at the object, do there make an angle, by means of which, according as it is greater or less, the object is perceived to be nearer or farther off.

“There is another way mentioned by optic writers, whereby they will have us judge of those distances, in respect of which the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible bigness; and that is, the greater

or less divergency of the rays which, issuing from the visible point, do fall on the pupil; that point being judged nearest, which is seen by most diverging rays, and that remoter, which is seen by less diverging rays."

These statements are made by the Bishop to show what was the current of opinion amongst philosophers as to the nature of vision. But he considers them all unsatisfactory, and states his own theory. This, by a variety of details, he expounds; shews the reader how the ideas of distance, &c. are suggested to the mind; and then establishes the conclusion of his own investigations into this curious and interesting subject by stating, "*that a man born blind, being made to see, would not at first have any idea of distance by sight. The sun and stars, the remotest object as well as the nearest, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind.*"

This theory of Dr. Berkeley's was, after its publication, fully established by the famous operation which Dr. Cheselden performed on a young man, for cataract in both eyes, who had been blind for many years by the effects of small pox. The result of the experiment was that the man felt a set of entirely novel sensations. He said everything was in his eye at once, and he could not tell the distance of anything. This he had to learn from experience, by the assistance of the faculty of touch. During his blindness he had learned to distinguish the dog from the cat; but when couched, he could not tell the difference between them, and had to

learn it by experience, with the joint co-operation of touch and sight.

As the facts connected with this experiment for cataract are exceedingly curious, both in a metaphysical point of view and as connected with the theory of vision, we shall state them more at length. This young man thought scarlet the most beautiful of all colours, and the first time he saw black it gave him very great uneasiness; and when he saw a negro woman he was quite shocked. At first he knew not the shape of anything, nor could he distinguish one object from another by their figure or magnitude. He was very much surprised that those things which he liked best did not appear the most agreeable to his eyes; for he calculated that those persons would appear most beautiful whom he loved the most. About two months after he had been couched, pictures appeared to him as solid bodies, but before he considered them only as party-coloured planes, or surfaces diversified with a variety of paints. Being shown his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch, and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vastly surprised, asking how it could be that a large face could be expressed in so little room. The room he was in, he said, he knew to be but part of the house; yet he could not conceive that the whole house could look bigger. A year after his first seeing, being carried to Epsom Downs, and observing a large prospect, he was exceedingly delighted with it, and called it a new kind of seeing. Only having been couched in one eye at first, after the second

one was operated on, all objects appeared to him much larger by this eye, than by the other; but he had not, Mr. Cheselden says, double vision, that he was ever able to discover.*

Voltaire was among the first in France to make the Bishop's theory public. In his "Elements of the Newtonian Philosophy," the poet and philosopher makes the following remarks. "It is absolutely necessary to admit, that distance, magnitude, and figure, are not, properly speaking, visible objects; that is, they are not the proper and immediate objects of sight. The proper and immediate objects of vision are light and colours; all the rest we learn in the course of time by experience alone. We learn to see, just as we learn to speak and to read. The only difference is, that the act of seeing is more easy, inasmuch as nature is our tutor in this instance."

The soundness of this theory of Berkeley's has recently been called in question by Mr. Bailey, in a work entitled "A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision." The whole question is gone into with great care and minuteness. Mr. Bailey has pointedly directed attention to the phenomena of consciousness, and attempts to show that there is no foundation for the Bishop's opinion from this source. He has analysed our perceptions of magnitude and figure, and maintains that our notions of these things do not bear out Berkeley's theory. The visual perceptions manifested by the animal

* See Smith's Optics, book 1.

creation, by infants, and by persons operated on for blindness, are all opposed to the ideas of Berkeley.

Mr. Bailey makes a preliminary distinction on the question at issue, which it is necessary to keep in view, when sitting in judgment on his opinions. He says, there is one statement, that sight alone is unable to determine that visible things are external, or at *any* distance whatever from the eye ; and the other point is, that sight, though possessed of the power of estimating that objects are placed at *some* distance from the organ of vision, has not the power of perceiving and estimating the relative distances between two or more things. He says, "Whether objects are seen to be external or at *some* distance, is one question altogether distinct from the inquiry, whether objects are seen by the unassisted vision to be at *different* distances from the percipient." And then the author adds, "yet Berkeley uniformly assumes them to be the same ; or, at least, takes it for granted that they are to be determined by the same arguments."*

We cannot, for want of space, enter into the controversy ; we shall merely quote a concluding paragraph from the work of Mr. Bailey, and refer the reader to the treatise itself for further information on this curious and interesting subject. "This general reception of it (Berkeley's theory) is undoubtedly a proof of the great ingenuity with which it is developed and maintained, and yet, a close examination will scarcely fail to convince any

* A Review of Berkeley's Theory, p. 16.

one, that the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, is rather a clever mustering of plausible arguments in support of a favourite notion, by a mind delighting in its own subtlety, than a masterly exposition of the subject in hand, or a skilful arrangement of a train of ideas in their due logical order and dependence. It has little method, and abounds in repetition for want of it, while the author scarcely seems at all times sufficiently master of the impalpable and shadowy notions which he has called up, to escape confusion and perplexity.*

We cannot leave this part of our subject, without making a reference to an able review of Mr. Bailey's work, in one of the most popular and spirited periodicals of the day; namely, *Blackwood's Magazine*.† The reader will find Berkeley's Theory supported with great ingenuity. We shall just quote a sentence or two, which may, perhaps, throw some light on the matter:—"The following consideration may help the reader to understand how the sight becomes instructed by the touch. Our natural visual judgment undoubtedly is, as we have said, that the eye and the landscape which it sees are precisely co-extensive with each other; and the natural conclusion must be, that whatever surface is sufficient to cover the one, must be sufficient to cover the other also. But is this found to be the case? By no means. You lay your finger on your eye, and it completely covers it. You then lay the same finger on the landscape, and it does

* Review, p. 238.

† For June, 1842.

not cover, perhaps, the hundred millionth part of its surface. Thus are the judgments and conclusions of the eye corrected and refuted by the finger, until at length the eye actually believes that it sees things to be larger than itself—a total mistake, however, on its part, as Berkeley was the first to show; for the object which it seems to see as greatly larger than itself, is only *suggested* by another object which is always smaller than itself. The small visible object suggests the thought of a larger tangible object, and the latter it is which chiefly occupies the mind; but still it is never seen; it is merely suggested by the other object which is presented to the vision.”*

The opinions entertained by Bishop Berkeley on the nature of abstract ideas and abstract terms, are important. He strikes at the root of all *realism*. We shall quote a few passages from his works on this subject.

“In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing *abstract ideas* or

* Blackwood's Mag. Vol. LI., p. 829.

notions of things. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers, must needs acknowledge that no small part of them is spent about abstract ideas. These are, in a more especial manner, thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the names of *logic* and *metaphysics*, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarcely find any question handled in such a manner, as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

“It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved : this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension ; but only that the mind can frame to itself by *abstraction* the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

“Again, the mind having observed that in the

particular extensions perceived by sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

“And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings, which include several co-existent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and so

makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences, which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of *man*, or, if you please, humanity or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour; because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of *man*, the mind leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures, frameth the idea of *animal*, which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By *body* is meant, body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, with covering either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked; hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness, being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the *abstract idea*. Upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither

walking, nor flying, nor creeping: it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.

“Whether others have this wonderful faculty of *abstracting their ideas*, they best can tell; for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated;

or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper acceptations of *abstraction*. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to *abstract notions*.”*

We must now make a few remarks on the *idealism* of Berkeley ; a part of his system which has been, from its very nature, a fruitful source of raillery against him and his disciples. The key to this part of his system will be found in those motives which induced him to discuss the existence of a material world, and in those purposes he aimed at accomplishing. He was a zealous and sincere Christian ; he had carefully studied all the heathen and modern theories of philosophy ; and he had formed the opinion, that doubt and scepticism, of whatever species, might be legitimately traced to particular views as to the laws of matter and material existences. To remove this grand obstacle to a sounder faith, was the darling object of his mind. In his own words we find a record of his wishes. “Matter,” says he, “being once *expelled out of nature*, drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions. Without it your Epicureans and Hobbists, and the like, have not even a shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.”

The *idealism* of the Bishop is expounded in three

* Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 5—7.

dialogues. In the first he develops the notions which ordinary people, and philosophers, entertain as to the primary and secondary qualities of matter, and the nature and existence of body; and from this review he attempts to prove that both classes of individuals have very imperfect and inadequate conceptions on the subject.

In the second dialogue he gives us his own ideas on this abstract topic; and endeavours to prove that corporeal things have an existence in the minds which conceive them, but that these corporeal things do not exist externally to the minds of all men at the same time; but only to the mind of the Deity himself; and, consequently, that matter, taken in the ordinary sense of that word, does not only not exist, but that it is quite impossible that it should.

The third dialogue is devoted to the answering objections against this view of external things; to the clearing up of the whole theory; and to the displaying its innate harmony and solidity.

Berkeley never denies the existence of mental phenomena; on the contrary, he confines himself exclusively to the evidence of the senses. He will accept only that which they teach; not one item more. Consciousness is the rock on which he has placed himself, and from which he hurls defiance to all his assailants. "I am not," says he, "for exchanging things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since these *immediate objects of perception*, which according to you are only *appearances of things*, I take to be the real things themselves."

Again, "What *you* call the empty forms and outside of things, seem to *me* the very things themselves We both therefore agree, that we perceive only sensible forms : but herein we differ ; you will have them to be empty appearances ; I, real beings. In short, *you do not trust your senses ; I do.*"*

The Bishop is always very anxious that his denial of *matter* may be clearly comprehended. He says, "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sensation or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence I deny is that which philosophers call *matter* or *corporeal substance*. And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it."

Notwithstanding all these declarations and explanations, there is still, even at this moment, a general belief, that the whole of Berkeley's theory is an absurd paradox. His system appears to be contrary to the common sense of mankind. Matter is believed to be what men see, handle, and taste, and they seldom reflect upon the philosophical sense in which the word matter is used ; always meaning something distinct from that which is so seen, handled, and tasted. "Now, it was against this metaphysical phantom of the brain," says one of Berkeley's modern apologists, "this crotchet-word of philosophers, and against it alone, that all the

* Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous.

attacks of Berkeley were directed. The doctrine that the realities of things were not made for man, and that he must rest satisfied with mere appearances, was regarded, and rightly, by him, as the parent of scepticism, with all her desolating train. He saw that philosophy, in giving up the reality immediately within her grasp, in favour of a reality supposed to be delusive, which lay beyond the limits of experience, resembled the dog in the fable, who, carrying a piece of meat across a river, let the substance slip from his jaws, while with foolish greed he snatched at the shadow in the stream. The dog lost his dinner, and philosophy let go her secure hold upon truth. He therefore sided with the vulgar, who recognise no distinction between the reality and the appearance of objects; and repudiating the baseless hypothesis of a world existing unknown and unperceived, he resolutely maintained that what are called the sensible shows of things are in truth the very things themselves.”*

The idealism of Berkeley appears to have been adopted and maintained, with the sole view of always keeping the principle in full vigour, *that the mind of man is an immaterial substance*. This seems to have been his grand aim and object. It was to prove to his readers that the mind itself was the author of its own actions, thoughts, and ideas. We find this laid down with great care. He says, “But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something

* Blackwood's Mag., June 1842.

which perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as *willing, imaging, remembering*, about them. This *perceiving, active* being, is what I call *mind, spirit, soul, myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but *a thing entirely distinct from them*, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived." "A spirit is one simple, undivided, *active* being; as it perceives ideas, it is called the *understanding*; and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the *will*." "There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which *will* or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure. For by the word *spirit* we mean only that which *thinks, wills, and perceives*; and this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. But it will be objected, that if there is no idea signified by the term *soul, spirit, and substance*, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, these words do mean or signify a *real thing*, which is neither an idea, nor like an idea, but that which *perceives* ideas, and *wills, and reasons* about them."*

In his work entitled "Siris, or Reflections on Tar Water," which was the fruit of his advanced years, he says, "Perhaps the truth about innate ideas may be, that there are properly no ideas or passive objects in the mind but what are derived from sense; but that there are also, besides these, her own acts and operations; such are notions."

* Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 24. 36. 40. 96.

This amiable philosopher seems to have prosecuted his mental disquisitions with a sincere desire after truth. He very justly and eloquently remarks:—"Truth is the cry of all, but the game of few. Certainly, where it is the chief passion, it does not give way to vulgar cares, nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life; active perhaps to pursue, but not fit to weigh and revise. He that would make real progress in knowledge, must dedicate his age as well as youth, the latter growth as well as the first fruits, at the altar of Truth."

Bishop Berkeley has many claims upon the gratitude of philosophers. He was one of the most single-minded, pure, and benevolent of human beings. His grand aim was to elevate and dignify the philosophy of human nature. Possessed of intellectual powers of the highest order, he employed them for the refinement and elevation of mankind. He was profoundly imbued with the spirit of the Platonic philosophy of mind; and here we may find the true key to all his speculations. He seems always to have felt as if mankind were under a weighty obligation, for the numerous and important advantages, which have, directly and indirectly, flowed from this pure and elevated Grecian fountain. He was a great enemy to that low and grovelling philosophy, which imagines there is nothing so important as a knowledge of the mechanical laws and attributes of matter; nothing but what must come under our bodily senses, and he handled, tasted, and weighed. With

all such speculators he had little in common. He loved to roam unfettered over boundless regions of intellectual nature, and to trace out all those secret springs of human thought, which, in all ages of the world, have been never failing objects of intense interest to real genius and talent.*

ARTHUR COLLIER.

Collier was Rector of Langford Magna, and his book, published in 1713, is entitled, "Clavis Universalis; or a New Inquiry after Truth: being a Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an External World." The author seems to have written this work without the slightest knowledge of Berkeley's speculations; and this coincidence of opinion and purpose is one, among many curious circumstances of the same kind, which the history of speculative opinions furnishes.†

The speculations of Mr. Collier seem to be founded on the same principles as those of Bishop Berkeley. Neither deny the phenomena of nature, but only its *materiality*. Collier says, "The ques-

* See Note D. at the end of the Volume.

† "Some years ago, Mr. Berkeley, of Trinity College Dublin, and Mr. Collier, of Langford Magna, near Sarum, without having communicated their thoughts to each other, hit upon a new scheme of the principles of philosophy, which, notwithstanding the character of the authors, and the importance of the thing, has not yet been publicly confessed. The titles of their respective Essays are 'The Principles of Human Knowledge, and the Impossibility of an External World.' The great truth they advance is, that in Nature there is, there can be, nothing but spirit and ideas." (Grub Street Journal, No. 107.)

tion I am concerned about is in general this, whether there be any such thing as an external world. And my title will suffice to inform my reader, that the negative of this question is the point I am to demonstrate.

"In order to which, let us first explain the terms. Accordingly by *world*, I mean whatsoever is usually understood by the terms body, extension, space, matter, quantity, &c.; or if there be any other word in our English tongue which is synonymous with all or any of these terms. And now nothing remains but the explanation of the word *external*."

The author then goes on to show, that this word external means absolute, self-existent, and independent; and these he denies that body or extension possesses. All that which we call matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, and is entirely and solely dependent upon, mind, thought, or perception; and nothing is capable of an existence, which does not depend upon the same thing. Further on the author says, "I declare that in affirming that there is no external world, I make no doubt or question of the existence of bodies, or whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It is with me a first principle, that whatsoever is seen, is. To deny, or doubt of this, is arrant scepticism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part or office of a disputant, or philosopher; so that it will be remembered from this time, that my inquiry is not concerning the existence, but altogether concerning the extra-existence of certain things or objects;

or, in other words, what I affirm or contend for, is not that bodies do not exist, or that the external world does not exist; but that such and such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not exist *externally*; or in universal terms, that there is no such thing as an external world.”*

The following passages will furnish the reader with a correct idea of the speculative system of the Reverend author. “When I affirm that all matter exists in mind, or that no matter is external, I do not mean that the world, or any visible object of it, which I, for instance, see, is dependent on the mind of any other person besides myself; or that the world, or matter, which any other person sees, is dependent upon mine, or any other person’s mind, or faculty of perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as grant, that the world which John sees is external to Peter, and the world which Peter sees is external to John. That is, I hold the thing to be the same in this, as in any other case of sensation; for instance that of sound. Here two or more persons, who are present at a concert of music, may indeed in some sense be said to hear the same notes or melody; but yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is not the very same with the sound which another hears, because the souls or persons are supposed to be different; and, therefore, the sound which Peter hears, is external to or independent of the soul of John; and that which John hears, is external to the soul or person of Peter.

* *Clavis Universalis*, pp. 3. 4.

"When I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but necessarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished by the proper names of John, Peter, &c., I have no design to affirm that every part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must needs exist in some created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe that infinite world might exist, though not a single created (or rather merely created) mind were ever in being. And as in fact there are thousands and tens of thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there is an universe, or material world in being, which is, at least, numerically different from every material world perceived by mere creatures. By this I mean the great mundane idea of created matter, by which all things are produced; or rather by which the great God gives sensations to all his thinking creatures, and by which things that are not, are preserved and ordered in the same manner as if they were."*

It would appear that Collier had read with great care the speculations of Descartes, Malebranche, and Norris; and there can be no doubt but he had profited to some extent by their respective inquiries. But there is throughout the whole of the "*Clavis Universalis*," a visible trace of original thinking. That the author substantially worked out the problem by his own unassisted efforts, is quite apparent; and in every part of the treatise he displays a degree of acuteness, and a clearness

* *Clavis Universalis*, pp. 6. 7.

of reasoning, which we really do not find in Berkeley himself. The late Professor Stewart makes the following observations on the merits of Collier.

“Another very acute metaphysician of the same Church (Arthur Collier) has met with greater injustice. His name is not to be found in any of our Biographical Dictionaries. In point of date, his publication is some years posterior to that of Norris, and therefore it does not possess the same claims to originality; but it is far superior to it in logical clearness and precision, and is not obscured to the same degree with the mystical theology (after the example of Malebranche) connected with the scheme of idealism. Indeed when compared with the writings of Berkeley himself, it yields to them less in force of argument, than in composition and variety of illustration.”*

* Dissertation, p. 168.

CHAPTER VIII.

BROWNE AND HUME.

PETER BROWNE.

THIS author was Bishop of Cork and Ross, and published his work, entitled "The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding," in 1729.

The author maintains, "That we have no other faculties of perceiving or knowing anything divine or human but our five *senses* and our *reason*." The sensations from external objects are the materials with which the "pure intellect" operates, and produces all those ideas which we usually ascribe to the mind as a whole.

The work is interesting in a historical point of view, as well as for its intrinsic merits. It is mentioned in a note to Professor Stewart's "Dissertation" as affording a singular instance of a coincidence of opinion between Browne and Mr. Hume. "The Procedure" was published full ten years before Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature" ap-

peared. There is no proof that the latter author ever saw the Bishop's work. There is, however, a very singular anticipation of the philosopher's views as to some of our abstract ideas, particularly those of *power, cause and effect, existence, infinity*, and the like.

The Reverend author ridicules the practice of modern metaphysicians, of calling certain judgments or conclusions of the mind by the name of *ideas*. His speculations on *power* are curious, and the reader will find them in the 69th page of the volume. We shall here, however, quote a single passage on this subject. "The want of distinguishing rightly between the *simple perceptions of sense*, and the *simple apprehensions of the intellect*; between the *primary* and *simple* ideas of sensation which are *independent* of the pure intellect, and those *secondary* compound ideas which are its *creatures*; for want, I say, of observing these fundamental distinctions through our modern systems of logic and metaphysics, their authors, instead of *helping* the understanding, and enabling it to clear up things obscure and difficult, have on the contrary rendered the plainest truths mysterious and unintelligible."*

The mind, according to Bishop Browne, is a *tabula rasa*, and "the ideas of *sense* are the *first foundations* on which we raise our whole superstructure of knowledge."† Sensations are thus

* P. 407.

† P. 384.

"the *original materials* and groundwork of all our information.....The very idea of *existence*, which is the most direct and immediate one we have with respect to immaterial beings, is from the senses.....So likewise all the idea or notion we have of *power*, is from the operations we observe in things purely material one upon another; or from the operation of the *mind* upon its *ideas*, and its voluntary moving of the *body*; and therefore, because we have no *proper* notion or *direct* idea of the power of creation, or of producing a thing into being, no part of which existed before, we *endeavour* to conceive it after the best manner we can.....Thus we form a conception of *eternity* itself from *time*. And likewise, by enlarging the idea we have of *space* and *extension*, the mind forms to itself the best positive conception of *infinity*; and all the notion we have of it, is only a *negation* of any stop or boundary."*

DAVID HUME.

Mr. Hume's metaphysical speculations are expounded in his "Treatise on Human Nature," which was his first publication; and in his "Essays," which contain the opinions of his riper years.

The first work appeared in 1739, but, according to his own account, it excited no public attention. "Never literary attempt," says he, "was more un-

* pp. 386. 388.

fortunate. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur amongst the zealots."

The leading objects of the "Treatise on Human Nature," are detailed by the author in the following words. "It is evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature, and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. If therefore the sciences of mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of Man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connection with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society and dependent on each other. Here then is the only expedient from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method which we have hitherto followed, and, instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or centre of these sciences, to human nature itself; which, being once masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory. From this station

we may extend our conquests over all those sciences which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those which are the objects of pure curiosity. There is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the science of Man, and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.

“And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself, must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing reflection to consider that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural, at the distance of above a whole century ; since we find, in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origin of these sciences ; and that, reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention and excited the curiosity of the public.”

There is a striking resemblance between the speculations of Mr. Hume, on the human mind, and those of his immediate predecessors, especially Mr.

Locke. According to the Scottish philosopher's opinion, all our ideas or knowledge may be divided into two grand branches; namely, *impressions* and *ideas*. Impressions embrace all our sensations from our external senses; and ideas comprehend all those thoughts which relate to the higher functions of the mind, as remembering, imagining, reasoning, &c. These superior ideas or notions, he maintains, are *copies* of our impressions; and the terms we employ in denoting them are the only objects or signs with which a philosopher has anything to do in the consideration of them.

Bishop Berkeley had just preceded Hume, and aimed at showing that we had no good grounds for supposing there was any such thing as matter, apart from the sensations which it produced in us. Hume conceived that the Bishop had stopped short in his route, and that he ought to have applied the same principles of reasoning to *mind* also. Hume says of Berkeley, "Most of the writings of that very ingenious philosopher form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the Sceptics as well as against the Atheists and Free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction."

Berkeley maintained we had no experience of an external universe, save from our perceptions; and

Hume, following the same mode of reasoning, says we can have no idea of *mind* either, but from our own conception or ideas of it. Everything, in the way of knowledge, of which we can boast, is comprised in impressions and ideas; and these do not furnish us with a knowledge of anything we may call *mind*, beyond a mere succession of them.

These opinions of Hume's excited great attention among philosophers in all parts of Europe. Many severely condemned them, and considered them not only foolish, but destructive to all rational ideas of morality and religion. His scepticism became a standing topic for ridicule and banter. "Nothing but impressions and ideas in nature" had a startling sound to philosophic ears. But his scepticism was not, in this part of his system, of such an absolute description as is commonly imagined; in fact, the real difference between himself and his antagonists was more apparent than real; more in verbal phraseology than in principle. He had to make such qualifications of his views as brought him fully within the threshold of orthodoxy and common-sense. His language¹⁸ is very striking. "Nature," says he, "by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light upon account of their customary connection with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever

has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this *total* scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a faculty *which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered unavoidable.*" Again, "If belief were a simple act of the thought, without any peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of force or vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case terminate in a total suspension of judgment. But as experience will sufficiently convince any one that although he finds no error in my arguments, yet he still continues to believe and think and reason as usual, he may safely conclude that his reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, *which it is impossible for mere ideas and reflection to destroy.* Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. *Nature has not left this to his choice,* and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, *what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but it is in vain to ask *whether there be body or not; that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.*"*

* Treatise on Human Nature, Part 4.

These qualifications and confessions bring him to the same point as his adversaries ; he must acknowledge the existence and supremacy of those "*fundamental principles of belief*," which have, ever since his day, been put forward as a check against the licentiousness of his scepticism.*

The most important part of Mr. Hume's philosophical theory is that which relates to *cause and effect*. This is especially worthy of notice, for the momentous consequences involved in it. He maintains that all the reasonings of Hobbes, Dr. Clarke, and Locke, to prove the proposition that "*every effect must have a cause*," are completely fallacious and absurd ; or to use his own words, "that every demonstration which has been produced for the necessity of a cause to every new existence, is fallacious and sophistical." The principle of his theory is contained in these few words ; "One event follows another ; but we never observe any *tie* between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be *that we have no idea of power at all* ; and that words of this kind are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reason-

* Sir James Mackintosh relates that he once observed to the late Dr. Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, that he thought Reid and Hume differed more in words than opinion ; and that Brown answered, "Yes, Reid bawled out, We must believe in an outward world ; but added in a whisper, We can give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out, We can give no reason for such a notion ; and whispers, I own we cannot get rid of it."

ings or in common life.”* In the course of his reasonings on this subject, he endeavours to show that all physical causes and effects are known to us merely as *antecedents* and *consequents*; or that one event follows or goes before another. “When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able in a single instance to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects; consequently, there is not, in any single instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.”†

The author seems to have considered this theory of causation as of a very startling nature; for he tells us, “I am sensible that, of all the paradoxes which I have had, or shall hereafter have, occasion to advance in the course of this treatise, the present is the most violent.”

The theory is specious, but that is all that can be said of it. There is more involved in our ideas of cause and effect, than mere sequences; there is the idea of *power*; and in reference to mental operations, that of *intelligence* and *will* besides.

* Essays, vol. 2, p. 79.

† Essays, sect. 7.

It may be observed, that the word *conjoined*, used by Hume, is in opposition to *connected*. The language of the philosopher is, that two events take place together, or immediately follow each other ; but he maintains they are entirely loose and separate, and have no influence upon one another. "All events," says he, "seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another, but we never can observe any *tie* between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*." If this reasoning were correct, we might reverse the ordinary language of causation, and affirm, that the tides are the cause of the changes in the moon, that summer creates winter, that day is the cause of night, or night the cause of day ; in fact, we could overturn all the reasoning of philosophers, and the daily experience of the mass of mankind, if we could prove that everything was "loose and separate," and had no necessary connection with each other.

The word *cause*, even when applied to physical inquiries, always produces a thorough conviction that two or more objects are not merely *conjoined*, but *connected*. The judgment is here under a controlling influence, though the *manner* in which it is affected is hid from our senses or consciousness. The whole of Hume's theory is this : We can have no knowledge of the properties of external bodies, except through the medium of our *senses* ; and secondly, that our *senses* never furnish us with any information respecting the *connection* between physical events. It may, however, be observed, that the senses afford no evidence that the events

are "loose" and unconnected; in fact, they give no information either for or against. The *vinculum*, or bond, can no more be conceived by the *senses*, than a material substance or substratum itself; and the only evidence we can have of its existence or non-existence, is, by examining whether the effects or phenomena observed are such as must necessarily proceed from its existence or non-existence. If, for example, cold, above a certain degree, be applied to water, the water is invariably converted into ice; and if fire be applied to wax, the wax is always melted. When we compare these facts with the conclusions drawn from the two foregoing experiments, we are compelled to *believe*, that the *application* of cold to water, and fire to wax, is, somehow or other, *really connected* with the congelation of the former and the melting of the latter. We have here every reason to ascribe a power of causation to the *cold* and the *fire*, which the nature of the events will admit of.

When we come to look at moral and intellectual causes and effects, the case assumes a novel and important aspect. If Mr. Hume's theory is found defective and illusory in reference to physical phenomena, it is still worse fitted to harmonize with any movements of the mind of man. In all material events, where mere matter is concerned, the notion of *power* is invariably involved in every conception we have of cause; but in addition to power, in every moral phenomenon we have both *intelligence* and *will* included in our ideas of causation. To reason on man's moral obligations upon mere

sequences of events, would be the most ridiculous mode of proceeding imaginable. Indeed, society could not exist a day upon any such system. Cause and effect in reference to human nature, occupy nine-tenths of every thing in the shape of knowledge and duty among mankind; but never for a single moment are *power*, *intelligence*, and *will*, lost sight of, or made to merge into a formal and mechanical series of mere antecedents and consequents. There is nothing that mankind have less doubt about, than cause and effect, in their ordinary movements in life; and to tell them that neither their own feelings nor sensations have any existence at all, would not appear to them more preposterous, than to even hint that all their movements in life are simply one event following another in a regular and concatenated series.

Of all the sceptical doctrines, this of cause and effect is the most untenable, and also the most inimical to virtue and religion. But of this we shall speak more at length, in another section of this work.*

Mr. Hume's attempt at solving the problem, *that men have a firm belief in the established laws*

* We may mention here, that two English metaphysical writers, a considerable time prior to Hume's day, entertained the same notions on cause and effect as he did.

"All knowledge of causes is deductive; for we know of none by simple intuition, but through the mediation of their effects. So that we cannot conclude any thing to be the cause of another, *but from its continual accompanying it*; for the *causality* itself is *insensible*."—(Glanvil's *Sceptis Scientifica*.)

"What we call experience is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequents ... No man can

of nature, is by no means a successful one. He says, "All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same. These relations are *resemblance, proportions in quality and number, degrees of any quality and contrariety*; none of which are implied in this proposition, *whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence*. That proposition is not, therefore, intuitively certain. At least, any one who would assert it to be intuitively certain, must deny these to be the only infallible relations, and must find some other relation of that kind to be implied in it, which it will be then time enough to examine." We shall not at present enter into any discussion of this doctrine, as it will come regularly before us, when we have to notice the works of some of our modern metaphysicians.

Every reader of Hume's metaphysical works must perceive the sceptical spirit which pervades them. This, indeed, has been a subject of remark and censure among all his critics. He set out, like his immediate predecessors, Descartes and Malebranche, with calling in question the truth of every thing; and he ended, not in being

have in his mind a conception of the future, for the future is not yet; but of our conceptions of the past we make a future, or rather call past, future, relatively. Thus, after a man has been accustomed to see like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to anything he had seen before, he looks there shall follow it the same that followed them."—(Hobbes.)

so fortunate as they were, in seizing hold of something which they considered truth, but in that discouraging and unenviable position *of doubting even of his very doubts*. Nothing seemed to give him so much real pleasure, as when he thought he had driven his reader up into a corner, from whence he could not make his escape, without breaking through the meshes of the sophistical net laid for his capture or entanglement. There is, throughout the whole of Hume's philosophical works, metaphysical, moral, and political, an evident want of that sincere and candid love of truth, which should constantly animate the breast of a true philosopher. He appeared to make sport with the elements of all human knowledge; to be insensible to their value to human happiness; and to countenance a cold and heartless application of them to the most important pursuits of life.

Perhaps we may find a key to this sceptical spirit of Hume's, in the character of his mind. He tells us unreservedly, and the statement is corroborated by all his personal friends, that the love of notoriety and fame was the ruling motive in all his literary undertakings. To startle, to dazzle, to surprise, to excite attention or even opposition, was his supreme delight. Hence we always find him rummaging among topics, which afforded him sufficient materials for the gratification of his paradoxical propensities. The doctrines of the existence or non-existence of a material world, cause and effect, necessity and free-will, the academical questions on

the first principles of natural theology, were all fruitful topics for sceptical doubts; and he pushed his inquiries into the most remote corners of them, to endeavour to obtain something which should induce mankind, to the end of time, to admire the subtilty and profundity of his genius.

CHAPTER IX.

ENCYCLOPEDIE FRANCAISE.

THE publication of the French Encyclopedia commenced in 1745, under the superintendence of D'Alembert, Diderot, and others, and formed, in the eighteenth century, one of the most important events in the history of human knowledge. The influence which this work exercised over metaphysical science, and those branches of learning intimately blended with it, religion, morals, and politics, was prodigious, in every part of the Continent of Europe where letters were cultivated. This influence was not so sensibly felt in England; at least, in reference to investigations into the nature of the human mind. But in Continental countries this ponderous work served as a kind of common store-house, out of which materials could be drawn for every conceivable theory of human nature, and for the support of every doctrine, whether rational or irrational, beneficial or injurious, religious or irreligious.

There is no theoretical set of principles or doctrines on mental subjects, formally stated and expounded, which constitutes the aggregate or corporate faith of the Editors of this celebrated and able work; but there is *a spirit* which breathes through its pages, which may be everywhere recognised, and of whose real character and tangibility no reader can possibly be mistaken. This spirit does not manifest itself by dubious or fleeting indications; it possesses all the substantial attributes of a living and active principle. It directs, counsels, dictates, argues, and enforces; and under the philosophical garb of modest doubts, great impartiality, and a devoted love of truth and knowledge, it imparts to the reader, by an under-current of communication, what are its own views, opinions, principles, and wishes.

The plan of the publication was extremely favourable to this double purpose. It gave a full and general summary of all mental systems, both ancient and modern, including all the philosophical absurdities of the Eastern nations; and frequently besides, inserted whole treatises, from particular authors, on the nature of the human mind. This gave ample scope for incidental remarks and discussions, and for incorporating obnoxious principles, under the cover of candid opposition, or liberal criticism. This mode of intellectual warfare, against sound and wholesome systems of speculation, must be fully apparent to every reader of the *Encyclopédie*.

The influence exercised over the minds of men of letters, and the reading public generally, for many years, by the publication and exposition of such a numerous and undigested assemblage of doctrines and opinions, must have been, and we know from facts it was, stupendous and overwhelming beyond all precedent. It gave a licence for the uprooting of every sound and common-sense view of man's intellectual faculties and powers. Human nature was broadly caricatured and ridiculed in every page. The long established foundations of wisdom were shaken to their base; and the various superstructures reared upon it, which had been the objects of veneration for ages, were demolished, and scattered to the winds of heaven. A favourite principle was inculcated by the Encyclopedists, that man knew little or nothing about his own mind; and to make a hearty and frank acknowledgment of this ignorance, was the surest test of an enlightened spirit. To doubt, was an infallible indication of wisdom; and to disbelieve, a sign of an independent and philosophical mind.

In conformity with this notable discovery, it was necessary to begin and study human nature *de novo*; and in order to make the frame-work of the new system substantial and secure, it was thought expedient to fix the standard of humanity as low as possible. This was the only effectual remedy for checking the growth of all those presumed extravagances and prejudices, which naturally spring out of a dignified origin and purpose. Hence

it is that we find the general complexion of the mental philosophy of the Encyclopédie, sordid and grovelling. Man is here nearly levelled with the brute creation. All his mental powers, faculties, and purposes, are illustrated by the physical machinery of animal life, habits, instincts, and destiny. Every thing lofty, sublime, and rational, was studiously excluded; and some vague expressions about the infinite perfectibility of his earthly career, substituted in their place.

There were three leading instruments employed by the Encyclopedists for lowering the standard of mental philosophy; namely, their theory as to the origin of all our knowledge; the doctrine of materialism; and philosophical necessity.

Their theory of human knowledge professed to be founded on Mr. Locke's doctrine, *that all our ideas were derived from the senses*. This principle, however, was laid down in such a manner as to prove quite at variance with what the English metaphysician understood by it. Diderot says, "Every idea must necessarily, when brought to its ultimate decomposition, resolve itself into a *sensible* representation or picture; and since every thing *in* our understanding has been introduced there by the channel of sensation, whatever proceeds *out* of the understanding is either chimerical, or must be able, in returning by the same road, to re-attach itself to its sensible archetype. Hence an important rule in philosophy, that every expression which cannot find an external and a sensible object to which it can thus establish its affinity, is

destitute of signification.”* Again, Condorcet, another contributor to the Encyclopedia, says, “Locke was the first who proved *that all our ideas are compounded of sensations.*”

The second instrument which the Encyclopedists used, materialism, is everywhere directly and indirectly inculcated throughout this wonderful publication. Diderot threw all his material opinions and prejudices into the work. His God was *nature, life, the universe*. In all discussions on matter and motion, he attempts to show us the image of a Deity only through the medium of universal life and animation. The laws of material existence were to him the sole instruments he used in all his philosophical disquisitions.

The third instrument, philosophical necessity, was quite a favourite one, and produced dreadful effects upon the minds of those who adopted it in their systems of mental philosophy. Diderot says, in a letter to De Grimm, “I am now, my dear friend, going to quit the tone of a preacher, to take, if I can, that of a philosopher. Examine it narrowly, and you will see that the word *Liberty* is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not and that there cannot be free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive a being acting without a motive, than we can one of the arms of a balance acting

* Œuvres, tome 4.

without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us, is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit, which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they will and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue, nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. What then is the distinction among men? The doing of good and the doing of ill! The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. But though neither the doer of good or of ill be free, man is nevertheless a being to be modified; it is for this reason the doer of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold. From thence the good effects of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of poverty, &c.; from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly attached to the good, nor more angry with the wicked than with the whirlwind which fills one's eyes with dust. Strictly speaking, there is but one sort of causes, that is, physical causes. There is but one sort of necessity, which is the same for all beings. This is what reconciles me to human-kind: it is for this reason I exhorted you to philanthropy. Adopt these principles, if you think them good, or show me that they are bad. If you adopt them, they

will reconeile *you* too with others and with yourself: you will neither be pleased nor angry with yourself for being what you are. Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom. Beside this, all is prejudice and false philosophy."

It is not in the article *Liberté*, in the Encyclopædia, that the real sentiments of the Editors of this able work make their appearance. This article was written by Voltaire, who does not seem to have entered into the question with any great stock of knowledge of the peculiar nature of this subtle controversy; but who, nevertheless, was inclined, from his previous well known sentiments, to give a portion of liberty to human actions. It is from divers other parts of this work, and from the *general spirit* which runs through the whole mass of questions connected with the principles of human nature, that the doctrine of necessity, in its absolute and most pernicious form, meets the reader's eye at every turn.*

* The following observations on the Encyclopædia are from the pen of a recent French writer, and we shall give them in his own words. It is proper that its merits, as well as demerits, should be noticed.

"Peu de livres parurent plus à propos que l'Encyclopédie. Résumer les connaissances humaines devait être une des occupations naturelles d'hommes qui s'employaient à changer le monde. On n'a de sécurité pour avancer qu'avec la connaissance parfaite de ce qu'on laisse derrière soi. La rédaction de l'Encyclopédie eut aussi l'avantage d'associer entre eux les philosophes, et d'enrôler pour la même affaire tous les esprits.

"Diderot anima, conduisit l'entreprise, et la soutint jusqu'au bout; il avait un ami d'humeur tout-à-fait contraire à la sienne, D'Alembert; ces deux hommes grandirent en se réunissant. Exact, élégant, sagace, spirituel et fin, D'Alembert par la rédaction de sa préface eut presque

tous les honneurs du succès. C'était un excellent résumé de la science moderne, tracé d'une main habile et ferme, où se trouvèrent appréciés et mis en lumière les travaux des maîtres de la philosophie, de Bacon, de Leibnitz, de Descartes et de Newton. La probité de l'écrivain était évidente; il renvoyait à chacun ce qui lui appartenait et apurait le compte de l'esprit humain avec la netteté la plus honnête. Cependant D'Alembert se lassa plutôt que Diderot; il lâcha pied au milieu de l'expédition. Diderot resta seul, mais ferme, mais aussi opiniâtre qu'aventureux, donnant aux jeunes gens et aux poltrons l'exemple de cette persévérance qui seule peut consommer les choses.

"L'Encyclopédie, quels que soient ses défauts relevés par Voltaire, reconnus par D'Alembert et Diderot, a servi puissamment la cause du siècle.

"Elle a réuni dans un même faisceau toutes les connaissances humaines, les sciences exactes, physiques et naturelles, les arts mécaniques, les lettres, la théologie, la philosophie et la législation.

"Elle a appliqué certaines généralités de Bacon; excellent exemple!

"Elle a résumé les travaux accomplis, et provoqué de nouvelles découvertes.

"Elle a remué les esprits; elle a répandu le goût de l'étude; elle a contraint les savants à la clarté; elle a enseigné le passé et fait songer à l'avenir." (Lerminier, De l'Influence de la Philosophie, p. 68.)

CHAPTER X.

FATHER BUFFIER, AND THE ABBE CONDILLAC.

THESE two metaphysical authors lived in the bosom, and possessed the entire confidence of the Catholic Church; and wrote nearly about the same period. No two writers, however, agreed and differed in so many things as they did. Both were zealously attached to religious doctrines and principles, and both thought they were giving support to their confirmation and establishment. But how opposite their systems both in principle and in results! The one wielded the synthetic, and the other the analytic instrument of reasoning. Buffier loved to generalize the operations and movements of mind; Condillac analyzed and simplified, until he brought it to the very verge of matter itself. Buffier is fully entitled to the honour, in point of date, of laying the foundation of that system of speculation and philosophy, which had, in after years, to make a bold and desperate stand against the absurd and pernicious doctrines which

flowed from the interpretation put upon Condillac's theory of human knowledge. Thus were the "bane and antidote" produced nearly at the same time, and from among the sincere, pious, and zealous disciples of the same Church.

FATHER BUFFIER.

The work entitled "A Treatise of First Truths," by this learned Jesuit, was written in opposition to the metaphysical systems of Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley; and maintains the position, that a principle of common sense is the foundation of all human knowledge. Some of the friends and admirers of the author in England have accused Drs. Reid, Oswald, and Beattie, whose philosophical works are grounded upon the same principle, with borrowing very liberally from the Frenchman, without making the slightest acknowledgment. But the truth of this accusation is denied by the friends of the Scotch writers. Be this as it may, certain it is, that there is a most striking resemblance between the principles of Buffier and those which constitute the essence of the systems advanced by the writers just now alluded to.

Father Buffier lays down certain criteria for the discovery of truth. The first criterion is, "That the truths assumed as maxims of common sense should be such, *that it is impossible for any disputant either to attack or defend them, but by means of propositions which are more certain*

than the propositions in question. If the reader pay attention to the terms of this principle here laid down by the learned Father, he will find it indicative of a profound knowledge of the nature of all mental exercises. It manifests in every line of it, that it is the result of long and patient thinking. The second criterion is, "That such maxims of common sense extend their practical influence even to those individuals who affect to dispute their authority."

The faculty of *common sense* is defined by Buffier in the following words. "It is a faculty which appears in all men, or at least in the far greater number of them, when they have arrived at the age of reason, enabling them to form a common and uniform judgment on subjects essentially connected with the ordinary concerns of life."*

* The term *Sens commun* hardly agrees with our English term of *Common sense*; the French *Bon sens* or *Raison*, is perhaps a nearer approximation to it. The exact meaning of the term, even among ourselves, is not very precisely fixed. Sir James Mackintosh describes the faculty in question thus: "Common sense is that average portion of understanding possessed by most men, which, as it is nearly always applied to conduct, has acquired an almost exclusively practical sense." Archbishop Whateley says: "By Common sense is meant (when the term is used with any distinct meaning) an exercise of judgment, unaided by any art or system of rules; such as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence; in which, having no established principles to guide us—no line of procedure, as it were, distinctly chalked out—we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common sense." Mr. Harris observes: "There are Truths, or Universals, of so *obvious* a kind, that *every mind* or *intellect*, not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail

Four classes of truths are clearly deducible from this faculty of common sense, as defined by Père Buffier. 1st. Those truths which spontaneously develop themselves in the mind, without the aid or intervention of the will or of reflexion. 2nd. Those which we can neither undertake to establish or to attack, without the assistance of other propositions that are not more obvious or certain than these truths themselves. 3rd. Such truths as have been universally received among men of all ages of the world, in all countries, and by all classes of minds; and which, if called in question, it is only in one of a hundred or in a thousand cases. 4th. Truths so forcibly and vividly impressed upon us, that we regulate our conduct by them, in spite of the refined sophistry of those who adopt contrary opinions; but who, nevertheless, bear testimony to the truth of our opinions, by regulating their own conduct in strict conformity with them.

Buffier's great work, which contains, in fact, the embodiment of all his most excellent views of human knowledge, is contained in his "*Cours de Sciences sur des Principes Nouveaux et Simples; pour former le Langage, l'Esprit et le Cœur, dans l'usage ordinaire de la Vie.*" This work appeared

to recognise them." "It is absurd," says Doctor Reid, "to conceive that there can be any opposition between *reason* and *common sense*. It is indeed the first-born of reason; and as they are completely joined together in speech, and in writing, they are inseparable in their nature." So much for definitions. They are more ambiguous than the thing to be explained. This is the invariable result, whenever an attempt is made to define terms of general use.

at Paris in 1732. It is full of wisdom and good sense.*

In Buffier's "First Truths," we find him stating them to be as follows. 1st. Something exists external to myself, and I am not the only being existing in the universe. 2nd. There is such a palpable difference between that which I call *mind* or *spirit*, and that which I denominate *body* or *matter*, that I cannot seriously confound the one with the other, nor really or sincerely believe that the properties of the one, which are *figure* and *motion*, can in any way or degree correspond with the properties of the other, which are *emotion* and *thought*. 3rd. Whatever is affirmed by the experience and testimony of all men, must be true. 4th. There is a power or faculty in man called *reason*, in opposition to *absurdity*; what is termed *prudence*, in contradistinction to *imprudence*; and that which we call *liberty*, in opposition to *necessary* or *constrained* action. 5th. That which combines within itself a variety of parts to produce a given end or purpose, and which is marked by regular returns, cannot be the effect of *chance*, but must be ascribed to an *intelligent* principle or agent. 6th. A fact attested by a great number of individuals, who declare they were eye witnesses of it, cannot be reasonably doubted.

* Buffier's "Cours de Sciences," which is a rare and costly book, in folio, contains a great many treatises, some of which had been published separately. Among the number we may mention the following. 1st. French Grammar on a New Plan. 2nd. A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on Eloquence. 3rd. A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on

To the question, If "First Truths" are denied by a disputant, how are we to argue with him? Buffier replies: "By demanding of your opponent in the first place, whether he does not admit at least one of those several propositions to be true; for example, that you and he are not the same individual. If he does not admit its truth, then you may spare yourself the trouble of disputing with him; because he is, by virtue of this denial, *one and the same person with yourself*; but if he does admit it, then he is a different person from you. If, therefore, you continue to argue with him, he acknowledges *that* to be a *truth*; and to point out to him that it is a *first truth*, you must remind him that it is susceptible of neither demonstration nor denial, by any proposition more clear, or capable of making a deeper impression on the mind. You must ask him, moreover, if he can seriously doubt that there are other persons in the world besides himself; or that *chance* could have constructed such a thing as a watch, which by the mere effect of chance should continue regularly to mark the hour; and in a similar way you may proceed with all the other propositions, which I have called *First Truths*. You may make appeals to the sentiments and opinions of mankind, to ascertain if it be possible to think they are not true, in spite of every subtilty and

Poetry. 4th. *Traité de Premières Vérités, et de la Source de nos Jugemens.* 5th. *Treatise on Necessary Truths, or the Principles of Reasoning; Elements of Metaphysics.* 6th. *An Examination into those common ideas or instinctive feelings, which lead the mass of uneducated and unreflecting individuals to sound and correct conclusions, on every-day matters of moment.* 10th. *Discourses on many subjects connected with a scientific course of instruction, &c. &c.*

sophistical statement respecting them. We must always remember that whenever we meet with a uniformity of sentiment among mankind on any particular point, it is the voice of human nature which speaks; and there can be no sterling philosophy embodied in any course, which attempts to stifle this voice by over-refined speculations.”*

Buffier lays it down as a valuable rule, in all attempts at philosophizing on human nature, not to seek metaphysical evidence or truth, where the human understanding cannot, and ought not to expect it. We are entitled only to demand that degree or species of evidence which belongs to a particular subject; always taking care to distinguish vividness of evidence from certainty of evidence. Nature, in numerous and important cases, compels us to receive the evidence she offers; and to become a philosopher it is not necessary for us to renounce *common sense*.†

The critiques which Father Buffier makes on some of the most eminent of modern metaphysicians, are at once enlightened and candid. He praises Descartes for having given a useful and powerful impulse to philosophical studies; for discouraging the arid and cumbersome forms of scholastic lore; and for having insisted, in all his speculations, on the obvious distinctions between mind and matter. His observations on the *Cogito, ergo sum*, are just and discriminating.‡

Buffier thinks Malebranche the most distin-

* *Elémens des Métaphysiques*, Dial. 6.

† *Ibid.*, Dial. 6.

‡ *Cours des Sciences*, § 12. 267. 485. *Principes du Raisonnement*, § 135. 249. 326. 385.

guished among philosophers. He does not altogether acquiesce in his doctrines. Gassendi and Locke are also highly spoken of. Buffier makes some acute and profound observations on the statements of the latter as to universal truths, simple and complex ideas, upon free-will, the immateriality of the mind, and on personal identity.*

The metaphysical speculations of Father Buffier have not obtained any great share of attention from his philosophical countrymen. But the following testimonies to his merits may, in justice to him, be given here. Voltaire, in his Catalogue of illustrious Writers who adorned the reign of Louis XIV., speaks of Buffier in the following words. "There are portions of his metaphysical writings which Locke would not have disavowed; and he is the only Jesuit in whose works a rational philosophy is to be found." M. Destutt Traey,† a French philosopher of considerable talent, says, "It is certain, for my own part, that I very much lament that I only knew the writings of Father Buffier a short time ago. Had I seen them earlier, they would have spared me considerable trouble and embarrassment. I also regret that Condillac, in his profound and sagacious meditations on human intelligence, had not paid more attention to the opinions of the learned Jesuit."

"Buffier," says Sir James Mackintosh, "the only Jesuit whose name has a place in the history

* *Traité des Premières Vérités*, § 58. 146. 267. 366.

† *Elémens d'Idéologie*, tom. 3. pp. 136. 137. Paris edition, 1822.

of abstract philosophy, has no peculiar opinions which would have required any mention of him as a moralist, were it not for the great reputation of his 'Treatise on First Truths,' with which Dr. Reid so remarkably, though unaware of it, coincides, even in the application of so practical a term as common sense, to denote the faculty which recognises the truth of first principles. His philosophical writings are remarkable for their perfect clearness of expression, which, since the great example of Descartes and Pascal, has been so generally diffused as to have become one of the enviable peculiarities of French philosophical style, and almost of the French language."*

ABBE CONDILLAC.

No French writer has ever exercised so great an influence over the minds of the literati of France, on subjects connected with mental philosophy, as the Abbé Condillae. We may distinctly trace the influence of his pen, in almost every metaphysical

* "On ne peut méconnaître dans ces vues du P. Buffier sur le sens commun et les vérités premières ou immédiates, le germe encore imparfait de la philosophie développée depuis, avec tant de succès, par l'école d'Ecosse. Sur ces préliminaires, il a fondé une métaphysique simple et réservée; il a réduit à ses véritables termes la théorie des essences; il a présenté sur l'ordre des considérations qui se rencontrent rarement dans les traités de métaphysique, et qui devraient cependant y occuper une place essentielle; il a également offert sur l'action, telle qu'elle se déploie dans les causes, des vues qui ne sont point sans nouveauté et sans mérite. Il a reconnu dans l'âme humaine une action propre, une action réelle, et ces vues l'ont conduit à caractériser la notion de cause mieux que ne l'ont fait la plupart des philosophes.—(De Gerando, Histoire Comparée, Vol. 7. p. 259.)

publication which has issued from the Parisian press, from his own day down to the present hour. He was the zealous and indefatigable champion of the whole of Locke's system of the human mind ; and it is principally, nay almost entirely, through his expositions and translations of the English philosopher's works, that Condillac's countrymen have been made acquainted with the opinions and principles of the " Essay on the Human Understanding."

Condillac was preceptor to the Duke of Parma, and his philosophical writings were composed with a direct reference to the instruction of his pupil. The most important parts of the mental disquisitions of the Abbé are those which treat of the "Origin of our Knowledge," "On Sensation," and "On the Use of Language, in all Speculations on the Mind of Man." These divisions of his works comprehend and embody the principal doctrines of Mr. Locke, and are treated in a style and manner, so lively, clear, and forcible, that few readers can peruse them, without being under an impression that they have *now* triumphed over all the difficulties, and puzzling and knotty questions, of metaphysical philosophy.

It has been laid to the charge of Condillac, that he has often either misunderstood or misrepresented the general scope and tenor of Locke's system ; and, also, that he laid the foundation of all that species of loose mental and ethical philosophy, which was based, or pretended to be based upon the notion *that all our ideas were the result of ex-*

ternal impressions ; and which philosophy inundated the whole of France, and other parts of the continent of Europe, and gave birth to all those innumerable systems of scepticism and irreligion, which have produced such bitter fruits, and, poisoned, at their source, the springs of all rational knowledge of human nature. I think, however, that this view of the consequences resulting from Condillac's labours, is of a too sombre and overcharged description. We ought to be a little considerate on the pious Abbé, and lay no more on his shoulders than what strict justice demands. We ought to bear in mind, that there is no guarding the plainest truths, and the most carefully selected forms of expression, from the misapprehension of minds bent upon twisting everything into some favourite theory. The system he undertook to develop, was, from its very nature, remarkably susceptible of misconception, and of being turned to purposes subversive of sound knowledge and rational religion. The French mind is, constitutionally, a peculiar mind ; it seizes with eagerness every thing of a material and tangible nature. It has no natural relish or aptitude for very abstruse matter ; it likes something palpable and obvious ; something to handle, to see, and to feel. Barren abstractions are not things suited to the national taste. Locke's Essay, or any thing professing the same doctrines, was sure to be earnestly caught up, and moulded into many fantastic shapes and forms ; because it had that outward analytical and material character, which best suits the speculative genius of the people. This easily enough

accounts for the firm hold which Condillac's disquisitions took of the public mind, and for the wilful and absurd perversions of his doctrines.

The double functions of sensation and reflection are explicitly pointed out by Condillac. He says, "Considering man at the first moment of his birth, his soul experiences different sensations, such as light, colours, pain, pleasure, motion, rest, &c. These are his first thoughts. Following him to the period of his existence when he begins to reflect upon his sensations, we perceive that he forms to himself ideas of the various operations of his own mind; such as perceiving, imagining, &c. These constitute the second class of his thoughts. Sensation, and the operations of our minds are, then, the two sources of our knowledge."* It would seem from this passage, that the Abbé considered the power of reflection as an *active* one; but it is also clear that he gradually begins to speak of it, as being nearly allied, if not completely identified, with the *passive* power of mere sensation. This is considered the point from whence he diverges from Locke, and which produced among his disciples and followers such a strange medley of opinions, in France in particular, during the latter part of the eighteenth century. In his "*Traité des Sensations*," he tells us, "that its principal aim is to show how all our knowledge, and *all our faculties*, are derived from sensation;" and in the same work, a little further on, he remarks, that it is a great de-

* Vol. 1, p. 19.

fect in Locke's system, that he did not perceive that all the faculties of the soul might be derived from sensation. He also frequently tells us that our faculties or mental powers are merely "transformed sensations." The following passages are pointedly confirmatory of this theory. "Locke," says Condillac, "distinguishes two sources of our ideas, sensation and reflection. It would have been more correct to recognise but one; for this reason, reflection is, *in principle*, nothing but sensation itself; and furthermore it is not so much a source of our ideas as a kind of canal through which they flow from sensation. This ambiguity, though trivial, has thrown a considerable obscurity over his system. He simply contents himself with maintaining that the soul perceives, thinks, doubts, believes, reasons, wills, reflects; and that we are conscious of the existence of these operations, because we recognise them in the mind, and we know they contribute to the progress of knowledge; but Locke did not perceive their true origin, and the principle from which they flowed; he never suspected that they might only be the result of mere habit." "Judgment, reflection, the passions, in short, all the faculties of the soul are nothing but sensation, which transforms itself differently."* Thus we see that the author step by step proceeds to strip the powers of the mind, both individually and collectively, of their spontaneous and voluntary action, and to reduce them to the *passive* state of

* Qui se transforme différemment.

mere sensational feeling. We have attention, judgment, memory, reasoning, abstraction, &c., gradually brought within the sphere of sensation. "When," says he, "we experience a multitude of sensations at one time, possessed of the same degree of vivacity, man is then merely an animal that feels; experience teaches us that the multitude of impressions destroys the activity of the mind. When, however, there is only one sensation, or a number is considerably diminished in their intensity, the mind is then occupied almost exclusively with the sensation which retains its vivacity; and *this sensation becomes attention*.....Our sensations may be divided into two classes, those which we have had, and those which we experience at the present moment. We perceive them both at once, but under different points of view; the one is a thing past, and the other present. The term *sensation* designates the present impression; but the impression which has previously been in the mind takes the name of memory, as a thing formerly felt. Memory, therefore, is only transformed sensation.

"When there is an act of double attention, comparison is the result; to attend to two ideas, is to compare them; the operations are identical. We cannot however do this, without recognising either a resemblance or difference between them; this recognition is *to judge*. The operations of comparing and judging, are only *attention*; and it is in this manner that sensation becomes, successively, attention, comparison, and judgment."

There are innumerable passages in the works of Condillac, which are pointedly at open variance with this materializing of the faculties of the mind. We find him every now and then breaking out into eulogistic strains on the superior powers of the soul, and how different they are, in their nature and origin, from mere sensation. He expressly lays down the distinction between the *evidence of reason* and the *evidence of fact*; and shows, in language as forcible and as orthodox in its tone and meaning, as Mr. Locke himself could have used, that there is something besides mere sensation requisite to enable us to recognise the truth of abstract propositions.*

Again, he tells us that the senses are only the *occasional causes* of knowledge; they do not feel; it is the soul alone which feels; it is to it alone that all sensations appertain. To be possessed of knowledge, is it only requisite we should have organs of sensation? By no means. These organs are common to all; but we have not all the same degree of knowledge.† Thus it is that the Abbé is continually involved in apparent contradiction. At one time he spiritualizes sensation, and at another materializes the superior faculties of the mind; so that it becomes difficult to say what his real opinions were. I feel confident it would be a comparatively easy task to show, from detached passages in his writings, that he was the most orthodox spiritualist that ever wrote on the mind;

* Logique, chaps. 2. 7. 9.

† Logique, chap. 1.

and, just in the same manner, he may be made the champion of every absurd paradox which disgraced the philosophy of his country during the latter section of the last century.

Condillac's theory of language is ingenious but fallacious. He makes it the source of many of our intellectual faculties, such as recollection, imagination, contemplation, judgment, and reasoning; whereas language is only the *instrument* of the mind. The very use of language pre-supposes the internal operations of the mental faculty, and the existence of certain notions and ideas, of which general and particular terms or signs are only the indications. Science, according to Condillac, is only well and accurately constructed language. Nothing can be more absurd than a declaration of this kind. We shall have more, however, to say on this point, in another place.

In Condillac's "*Traité des Systèmes*," published in 1749, we find him discussing the most remarkable of the metaphysical systems which had appeared in modern times. He dissents from the innate ideas of Descartes, the ideas of Deity maintained by Malebranche, the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, and the doctrines of Spinoza. In all these discussions the reader will find a rich fund of profound observation and critical distinctions. The system of Spinoza, in particular, is analyzed to perfection.

Condillac's "*Art de Penser*," is an excellent work; and contains a very clear development of

the author's general principle relative to the formation of our ideas, and the best means of communicating knowledge to others.*

* The complete works of Condillac were published at Paris, 1821, in 16 vols. 8vo.

CHAPTER XI.

ROUSSEAU, DUMARSAIS, VAUVENARGUES, LE CAT,
TURGOT, AND D'ALEMBERT.

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

ROUSSEAU was not a theoretical metaphysician, but he did cultivate the science of mind to some extent. His power of disseminating what he did know was prodigious. No man in France ever displayed more influence over the imagination of the people, or could more intensely rivet their attention, than the author of "Emilius." His mental philosophy was chiefly taken from the writings of Descartes and Montaigne. It was on the whole an impure mixture, and its influence was any thing but salutary on the minds of the public.

DUMARSAIS.

The metaphysical opinions of Dumarsais are contained in his "Logique," which is grounded on that of the Port-Royal. There is great clearness

and simplicity in all the mental disquisitions of the author. He culls out of all preceding writers what he considers worthy of selection, and adds many novel and acute observations of his own.

Dumarsais rejects the doctrine of innate ideas, and thinks there is no good ground for their existence. He acknowledges, however, the existence of an *innate* aptitude to acquire certain ideas, and this he thinks is one of the great principles of our nature, which those who are occupied with the important office of instructors should carefully study.

The impressions we receive from external objects he denominates *immediate sentiments* ; and the recognition which the mind takes of these, by an act of inward reflection, he calls *mediate sentiments*. These latter ideas are the most important we possess.

The faculty of *abstraction* is considered the most important of all the mental powers ; it is the key to all our knowledge. Dumarsais describes it with great clearness and accuracy. On the nature of language, and its influence on the mind in the operations of reasoning, the author has treated at considerable length in his "Fragmens sur les Causes de la Parole." In this work he has adopted the maxim of Leibnitz, that *language is the mirror of the understanding*.

VAUVENARGUES.

Luc de Classiers, Marquis de Vauvenargues, was

descended from an ancient and noble family in Provence, and was born in 1715. He is the author of a small metaphysical work, entitled "*Introduction à la Connaissance de l'Esprit Humain.*" He entered the army at a very early age, and remained there for the space of nine years. Having lost his health from the fatigues he underwent at the famous retreat from Prague, in 1742, he quitted the profession of arms. He was soon after attacked by small-pox, which nearly deprived him of sight. He died in 1747, at the age of thirty-two years.*

The metaphysical opinions of Vauvenargues seem to have been founded on those of Mr. Locke. The former maintains there are three intellectual principles in man, *the imagination, reflection, and memory.* By the term imagination, he seems to mean the gift of conceiving things in a metaphorical or figurative manner ; and, also, to include all the sensations we experience from the external senses. He says, "Imagination speaks always to the senses ; and is the inventor of the arts, and the ornament of the mind."

Reflection is the power we possess of falling back, as it were, upon our ideas ; of examining them, and modifying, combining, and arranging them as we

* Marmontel speaks highly of Vauvenargues. He says, "En le lisant, je crois encore l'entendre, et je ne sais pas si sa conversation n'avait pas même quelque chose de plus animé, de plus délicat que ses divins écrits." Again the same writer remarks, "Doux, sensible, compatissant, il tenait nos âmes dans ses mains. Une sérénité inaltérable dérobait ses douleurs aux yeux de l'amitié. Pour soutenir l'adversité, on n'avait besoin que de son exemple ; et témoin de l'égalité de son âme, on n'osait être malheureux avec lui."

like. This power is the foundation of all reasoning and argumentation.

Memory acts as a sort of *dépôt* or store-house for our ideas. Most of our reasonings are founded upon the faculty of memory. It is requisite, however, for a perfect constitution of mind, that the memory should bear a due proportion to the other powers. It is chiefly upon this harmony that our mental excellencies depend.

Upon these three faculties of the mind the Marquis engrafts all our other intellectual powers. These are invention, quickness, sagacity, correctness of judgment, common sense, depth of thought, delicacy and sensibility, comprehension of mind, wit, taste, genius, seriousness, and presence of mind.

The views of Vauvenargues on that power of the mind called common sense, is worthy of notice. "Good sense, or common sense," says he, "does not seem to consist in a very subtile or profound judgment, but rather in that accurate perception of those obvious relations which objects bear to our nature and condition. Common sense does not then mean the act of thinking upon things with what is commonly designated great profundity of thought, but in considering them in relation to their utility, and their obvious connexions with every-day life and movements."

"If we look through a microscope, we shall undoubtedly perceive many qualities of objects which the eye alone does not reveal to us; but then we shall see all such objects not in their natural relations to the nature of man, as they manifest them-

selves to his unassisted vision. Subtile minds, in like manner, penetrate too deeply into things; but that which keeps steadily in view the mutual relation of things, is termed good or common sense.”*

The metaphysical speculations of the Marquis de Vauvenargues seem to have been especial favourites with Voltaire, as the following letter from this distinguished writer will testify. We shall give it in the original, as it more forcibly displays the peculiar turn of the writer's mind, than any translation would do.

“J’ai usé, mon très-aimable philosophe, de la permission que vous m’avez donnée. J’ai crayonné un des meilleurs livres† que nous ayons en notre langue, après l’avoir relu avec un extrême recueillement. J’y ai admiré de nouveau cette belle âme, si sublime, si éloquente et si vraie; cette foule d’idées neuves ou rendues d’une manière si hardie, si précise; ces coups de pinceau si fiers et si tendres. Il ne tient qu’à vous de séparer cette profusion de diamants de quelques pierres fausses ou enchassées d’une manière étrangère à notre langue. Il faut que ce livre soit excellent d’un bout à l’autre. Je vous conjure de faire cet honneur à notre nation et à vous-même, et de rendre ce service à l’esprit humain. Je me garde bien d’insister sur mes critiques; je les soumets à votre raison, à votre goût, et j’exclus l’amour propre de notre tribunal.

* *Moralistes Français*, p. 484, Paris, 1834.

† *Introduction à la Connaissance de l’Esprit Humain*.

J'ai la plus grande impatience de vous embrasser. Je vous supplie de dire à notre ami Marmontel qu'il m'envoie sur-le-champ ce qu'il sait bien ; il n'a qu'à l'adresser par la poste chez M. d'Argenson, Ministre des Affaires-Etrangères, à Versailles. Il faut deux enveloppes, la première à moi, la dernière à M. d'Argenson.

“ Adieu, belle âme et beau génie,

“ VOLTAIRE.”

“ *Versailles, Mai, 1746.*”

We shall also add to this letter of Voltaire's, a few remarks by a very recent French author, on the character and merits of Vauvenargues.

“ Vauvenargues avait l'âme ardente et l'esprit vaste ; Dieu et l'humanité étaient l'objet des passions de ce jeune homme. Dans le peu de jours qu'il passa sur la terre, il avait pris un sublime essor ; il était sorti de la religion traditionnelle pour s'élever à des émotions nouvelles..... *Cet enfant timide*, suivant l'expression de Voltaire, a d'incroyables audaces dans ses conceptions, et porte une singulière maturité dans ses jugemens. S'il eût vécu, il eût grandi de telle façon que personne ne l'eût dépassé peut-être. En voyant ce jeune soldat philosophe rapporter de la retraite de Prague, qu'il fit pendant trente lieues de glace, les semences de mort qui déchirèrent sa poitrine, on est percé de cette inconsolable tristesse qui sur les tombes de Barnave et d'André Chénier vous contraint à baisser la tête. Ces jeunes aigles de la philosophie,

de la poésie et de la tribune, semblent n'avoir un instant paru, que pour servir d'auspices à l'émancipation de l'humanité."*

LE CAT.

Le Cat published his "Traité des Sens" in 1740; and his "Traité des Sensations" many years afterwards. His great aim is to explain all the mental phenomena upon physiological principles. Thought and reasoning, joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, love and hatred, are only the result of the mechanical organization of our senses.

Sensations are of two kinds, *immediate* and *mediate*. Out of these two he makes again three classes of sensations, the *intellectual*, the *animal*, and the *animo-vegetable*. The intellectual order includes presentiments, visions, the art of divination, prediction, and those supernatural and extraordinary gifts with which some individuals are occasionally endowed. To the animal class he ascribes all sympathetic affections of every kind and degree; and to the animo-vegetable sensations, all magnetic cures and virtues. All these effects and operations are explained by means of an *animal fluid*, which pervades the whole of living beings.

The immortality of the mind is only a sentiment.†

* De l'influence de la Philosophie du 18me Siècle. Par G. Lerminier. Paris, 1834.

† Œuvres Philosophiques, tom. 1. p. 85.

ANNE ROBERT JACQUES TURGOT.

Turgot was one of the most eminent characters of which France can boast in the last century. He studied at the Sorbonne, and evinced in his youth a decided predilection for metaphysical studies. These were checked, however, by other occupations; but he cultivated mental science at intervals in his active and eventful life, even to within a very short time of its termination.

Locke and Condillac were his great guides, and his speculations evince how carefully he had studied them. In the article "Existence," which he wrote for the "Encyclopédie Française," we find Turgot enter into many ontological speculations, which display a healthy philosophy, and a more than usual portion of common sense. He considers *existence* under two points of view; the one relative to ourselves, and the other relative to the existence of things around us. He maintains that if we confine our speculations to the first point, as Descartes did, we shall only have a partial and one-sided view of the real foundations of human knowledge.*

The speculations of Turgot had led him to imagine that our various trains of ideas were very much like pictures on a piece of canvas, and that there was no absolute necessity to assume the existence of any material substance without us. At

* Œuvres de Turgot, Art. Existence, p. 96.

the same time he admitted that the existence of bodies might be legitimately demonstrated from a consideration of cause and effect. The connection and sympathy which subsist between the eye and the hand, between our speculative conclusions on the laws of phenomena and the experience of their results, and between the ideas of our own personality and the existence of other beings around us, go far to furnish the most incontestable proof of the real existence of external objects.*

Turgot entered into the nature of language, as a philosophical instrument of thought, with great earnestness and good effect. His speculations on this subject are in the highest degree interesting.†

D'ALEMBERT.

D'Alembert is one of the most able and distinguished writers in the history of the republic of letters; one of the bright luminaries of the eighteenth century.

The metaphysical writings of this philosopher are but scanty; but his indirect influence over the speculations of his contemporaries on mental topics, was very considerable indeed. This cannot be denied when it is considered that he was one of the principal Editors of, and writers in, the famous "Encyclopédie Française."

The mental principles and speculations found in

* Œuvres, Etymologie, p. 62; Réflexions sur les Langues, p. 85.

† Art. Existence, p. 124. Réfut. de Berkeley, p. 136.

D'Alembert's "Elements of Philosophy," a work which brought him such a host of enemies, are of a very meagre and unsubstantial nature. Here the author seems to have entered into the philosophy of mind with great coldness and no small degree of prejudice; not certainly in keeping with the zeal and warmth of feeling he afterwards displayed, on divers occasions, in reference to this branch of knowledge.

The only thing we shall notice here is, a quotation from his Preliminary Discourse prefixed to the Encyclopedia, respecting the classification of human knowledge generally; a piece of writing well worthy of preservation in every history of the philosophy of the mind.

He says: "The objects about which our minds are occupied, are either spiritual or material; and the media employed for this purpose are our ideas, either directly received, or derived from reflection. The system of our direct knowledge consists entirely in the passive and mechanical accumulation which belongs exclusively to the province of memory. Reflection is of two kinds, according as it is employed in reasoning on the objects of our direct ideas, or in studying them as models for imitation.

"Thus Memory, Reason (strictly so called), and Imagination, are the three modes in which the mind operates on the subjects of its thoughts. By Imagination, however, is here to be understood, not the faculty of conceiving or representing to ourselves what we have formerly perceived, a faculty

which differs in nothing from the memory of these perceptions, and which, if it were not relieved by the invention of signs, would be in a state of continual exercise. The power which we denote by this name has a nobler province allotted to it, that of rendering imitation subservient to the creations of genius.

“These three faculties suggest a corresponding division of human knowledge into three branches. 1st. History, which derives its materials from Memory; 2nd. Philosophy, which is the product of Reason; and 3rd. Poetry (comprehending under this title all the fine arts), which is the offspring of Imagination. If we place Reason before Imagination, it is because this order appears to us conformable to the natural progress of our intellectual operations. The Imagination is a creative faculty; and the mind, before it attempts to create, begins by reasoning on what it sees and knows. Nor is this all. In the faculty of Imagination both Reason and Memory are, to a certain extent, combined; the mind never imagining or creating objects but such as are analogous to those whereof it has had previous experience. Where this analogy is wanting, the combinations are extravagant and displeasing; and consequently, in that agreeable imitation of nature, at which the fine arts aim in common, invention is necessarily subjected to the control of rules, which it is the business of the philosopher to investigate.

“In farther justification of this arrangement it may be remarked, that reason, in the course of its

successive operations on the subjects of thought, by creating abstract and general ideas, remote from the perceptions of sense, leads to the exercise of imagination as the last step of the process. Thus metaphysics and geometry are, of all the sciences belonging to reason, those in which imagination has the greatest share. I ask pardon for this observation, from those men of taste who, little aware of the near affinity of geometry to their own pursuits, and still less suspecting that the only intermediate step between them is formed by metaphysics, are disposed to employ their wit in depreciating its value. The truth is, that to the geometer who invents, imagination is not less essential than to the poet who creates. They operate, indeed, differently on their object; the former abstracting and analysing, where the latter combines and adorns; two processes of the mind, it must at the same time be confessed, which seem from experience to be so little congenial, that it may be doubted if the talents of a great geometer and of a great poet will ever be united in the same person. But whether these talents be or be not mutually exclusive, certain it is, that they who possess the one, have no right to despise those who cultivate the other. Of all the great men of antiquity, Archimedes is perhaps he who is the best entitled to be placed by the side of Homer."

We find some passages in the metaphysical writings of D'Alembert which evidently show that he was inclined to the doctrine of original mental powers, or instinctive feelings. In his "Discours

Préliminaire," he remarks, "The fact is, that, as no relation can be discovered between a sensation of the mind, and the object which produces it, or at least to which we refer it, it does not appear possible to trace, by a process of reasoning, any practicable passage from the sensation to the object. Nothing but a kind of *instinct*, more certain in its operations than reason itself, could so forcibly carry us across that wide interval which divides mind from matter." We also find, in his "Elémens de Philosophie," the following observations on the same topic. "There are, in every science, principles, true, or supposed to be true, which the mind lays hold of by a *species of instinct*. To the guidance of this instinct we ought implicitly to commit ourselves; otherwise we shall be compelled to recognise the existence of a series of principles without limit, and abandon the possibility of any fixed points for the commencement of our reasonings, and, consequently, we must be plunged into universal scepticism."

D'Alembert was a materialist of the most absolute kind. He maintains that "Creation is absurd and impossible. Matter is, therefore, not to be created, consequently has not been created, consequently is eternal."*

* Letter to Frederic II., 1770.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF FREDERIC THE GREAT, KING OF PRUSSIA, AND THE BERLIN ACADEMY.

THE metaphysical school of Frederic the Great, and the Royal Academy of Berlin, exercised a very powerful influence over the philosophic mind of Europe for many years. The Academy was founded in 1700, chiefly for the purpose of cultivating physical science, history, and the belles-lettres; and to these objects it principally confined itself for many years. Leibnitz was one of its early pillars, and almost all the most distinguished members of this learned association displayed a marked predilection for his speculative philosophy. As Frederic approached to manhood, he displayed a great fondness for metaphysical subjects. Indeed he tells us in his posthumous works, and in his voluminous correspondence, that topics of philosophy were his incessant study, the mistress of his affections. The influence and power he exercised over the Academy,

while he was Prince Royal, induced its members to extend their subjects of inquiry, and to embrace discussions on mental subjects, and enter fully into the philosophy of Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, and other distinguished men of the age. Frederic collected around himself and the Academy, the most learned and famous men he could find, from all parts of Europe; but particularly from France, for whose literature he evinced a decided and most enthusiastic admiration. He had Voltaire, and D'Alembert, and Maupertuis, and a host of minor spirits, continually around him;* and they brought with them all the speculative doctrines of the "Encyclopédie," which were immediately transplanted into the *Transactions* of the Berlin Institution. The whole establishment, when fully organized and equipped, presented the most motley group of *savans* ever brought into one focus; it was a Noah's Ark, containing specimens of every thing speculatively rare and curious under the sun.

It would be a rather difficult thing to say what were Frederic's own opinions on mental philosophy. He was fluctuating and unsteady in his views, and always coquetting with every speculative novelty which presented itself. He possessed a fair portion of knowledge of the systems of Descartes and Leibnitz, and also of Locke, as far as

* "I have laid the foundation of our new Academy, and have acquired Wolff, Maupertuis, and Algarotti. I am waiting for the answers of S'Gravesande, Vaucanson, and Euler."—(Frederic II., Letters, 1740.)

the Continental philosophers knew him. Wolff's opinions, too, came in for a share of the royal attention. It may fairly, I conceive, be laid to his charge, that he was a materialist, so far at least as the spirituality and immortality of the soul are concerned. He adopted a good many of the opinions of Locke; but Leibnitz was his great favourite. He loved to dwell upon the most obscure and profound parts of the "Pre-established Harmony," and thought that the whole process of physical creation, and the laws of mind, could be easily explained by this notable theory.

Frederic often played the sophist. Hear him arguing against the testimonies of our senses: "The testimony of the senses, which is naturally the most certain one we possess, is not exempt from incertitude. Our eyes deceive us when they paint a distant tower round, which on approach is found to be square. We sometimes imagine we hear sounds, that have no existence but in our imagination, and that only consist in a deaf impression made upon our ears. The sense of smelling is not less inaccurate than the other senses. We occasionally think we smell the odours of flowers, in meadows or in groves, which flowers are not there to be found; and, at the very moment I am speaking to you, I perceive from the blood which starts on my hand, that I have been stung by a fly. The heat of our discourse rendered me insensible to the pain. The touch has failed in its office. Since, therefore, that which we profess least doubtful is itself

so very doubtful, how can you speak with so much certitude on abstract subjects of philosophy ?”*

Again he observes, “ Speaking in a philosophic sense, we are absolutely acquainted with no one thing. We suspect there are certain truths of which we form a vague idea, and to these we attribute, by the organs of speech, certain sounds which we call scientific terms. With these sounds we satisfy our ears. Our mind imagines it understands them, yet, being well examined, they present nothing but confused ideas to the imagination ; so that our philosophy is reduced to the habit, in which we have indulged ourselves, of employing obscure expressions and terms, the meaning of which we but little comprehend ; and to profound meditation on effects, the causes of which remain perfectly unknown and concealed.”†

The following critical remarks from the Royal pen of Frederic, on the *Système de la Nature*, are worth quoting, inasmuch as they show that he was not inclined to renounce the idea of a Deity altogether : “ This is a work which seduces at first reading, and the defects of which, being concealed with great art, are not discovered till the book has been several times perused. The author has had the address to keep the consequences of his principles out of sight, that he may mislead critical examination. The illusion, however, is not so potent but that the inconsistencies and contradictions into which he has fallen, may be perceived, as may the confessions he makes, which are opposite to his system, and which seem to be ex-

* Works, vol. 5, p. 220.

† Ibid., p. 220.

torted from him by the force of truth. The metaphysical subjects on which he treats are obscure, and surrounded with the greatest difficulties. To be led astray is pardonable, when we enter a labyrinth in which so many before us have been lost.”*

FORMEY.—This learned person was Secretary to the Berlin Academy for several years, and took a very active part in its speculations on the mind. He was an enthusiastic admirer of Leibnitz, and adopted his theory, with some modifications made to it by Wolff. Formey was not a philosophical fanatic, or a scoffer at serious opinions, like many of his coadjutors; but a man of sound sense and religious sentiments. He founded his reasonings on the common and every-day principles of human life; and endeavoured to bring the evidence they furnished to bear on the great and important doctrine of an all-wise and intelligent Deity.†

BEGNELIN.—This member of the Academy took a leading part in discussions on the principle of *sufficient reason*, which had often formed topics of controversy among the philosophers in the Prussian Court. The metaphysical opinions of Begnelin are profound and rational, and bear the imprint of originality and independence of mind.

M. DE BEAUSOBRE.—This author was a native of Berlin, and published a work, called “Pyrrho-

* Posthumous Works of Frederick II., vol. 5. p. 149.

† Mémoires de l'Académie de Berlin, for 1747—1756. See also his *Mélanges Philosophiques*, tom. 1.

nisme Raisonnable." As its name implies, it contains a series of doubts on the foundations of human knowledge. The author makes an attack on all the systems of speculation, both ancient and modern; and endeavours to show that great obscurity and uncertainty overhang them.

MERIAN.—This philosopher was the successor of Formey in the Secretaryship of the Academy; and was a fertile contributor to its Memoirs. He was a man of great knowledge and talent, and all his disquisitions on mind are peculiarly entitled to notice. The systems of Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz formed the staple articles of his metaphysical speculations. He found something good in all of them.

MAUPERTUIS.—This French author is well known as a mathematician and natural philosopher. After he was called to Berlin by the King of Prussia, he changed the course of his studies, and entered upon metaphysical discussions with great ardour. His speculations on the nature and origin of language occupy a prominent station in his new studies. He considered language as the result of a mental act of reflection, similar to the manner in which geometers make use of signs, or naturalists frame a nomenclature.*

Maupertuis considered all our ideas as originating in the external senses. These furnished, as it were, the materials, and the mind elaborated them.

* *Réflexions sur l'Origine des Langues*, Sect. 7.

This was, in fact, Locke's idea of the origin of our knowledge, according to the French interpretation of his "Essay."

Maupertuis' speculations on an intelligent First Cause, are contained in a communication he sent to the Academy, on the laws of motion.*

The doctrines and opinions of Spinoza, which had gained, in the middle of the eighteenth century, a considerable footing in Germany, became subjects of controversy and debate in the Berlin Academy. Two authors took a conspicuous lead in their refutation—these were JARIGES and ACHARD.

DAVIES.—Davies was a great favourite with Frederic, and communicated many philosophical papers to the Academy. He was a Professor at Jena, and a man of great talent and industry. His work "*Via ad Veritatem*," was published in that city in 1755.

Davies wrote many articles on Ontology, Psychology, Cosmology, and Natural Theology, in all of which he displayed great scientific knowledge, an intimate acquaintance with the history of speculative opinions, and a correctness and elegance of style not surpassed by any writer of his day.

Knowledge, according to Davies, is the seizing of the chain which binds truths together. All philosophy has for its aim to unravel the intricate and apparently perplexing maze of things around us.

Truth is that which is possible; and to recognise

* See *Mémoires de l'Académie de Berlin*, Années 1746, 1752, 1757.

a truth, is to have an object present to the thought ; but then it must be in conformity with the truth of things, as we see them established in objects around us. This knowledge constitutes certainty, when we can show a *sufficient reason* for its being what it is.*

Davies maintained the existence of *images*, as the medium through which the mind obtained a knowledge of the external world. "I perceive a thing," says he, "and I have an *image* of it. This becomes a *notion*, if conceived under a universal aspect."†

J. B. BOYER, MARQUIS D'ARGENS.—This writer was one of the *savans* who was connected with the Berlin Academy, and its royal patron, Frederic II. D'Argens had led a roving and adventurous life, but finally settled down at the Prussian court, where he assiduously laboured to stand high in the estimation of the philosophical monarch, but succeeded indifferently in the object of his ambition.‡ D'Argens published at the Hague, in 1755, a work in three volumes, entitled, "*La Philosophie du Bon Sens*." The author endeavours to prove that our ordinary conclusions on the science of metaphysics, and also on logic, and on natural philosophy, do not rest on any solid foundation. A sceptical spirit predominates throughout the whole

* *Via ad Veritatem*, § 6. 9. 44. 52. 54. 58.

† *Ibid.*, c. 1. § 69; c. 2. § 71.

‡ "I imagine D'Argens is mad. Do not tell him so, however; but take good care not to stir the bile of our philosopher, who appears to me to have more of that merchandise than of good sense."—(Letter of Frederic II. to M. Jordan.)

work. Its appearance created great dissatisfaction among the French Clergy. The author complains bitterly to Frederic of the contemptuous and vindictive spirit which was displayed against his philosophy throughout the whole of France. "The further to vex me," says he, "the king's people have denounced my 'Philosophie du Bon Sens' to the Parliament of Paris as an impious book, and it has been burnt by the hands of the hangman."*

* D'Argens' Letter to the King of Prussia.

CHAPTER XIII.

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DR. REID.

THE writings of Dr. Reid form an important epoch in the history of mental philosophy. He was the first writer of any distinction who reared the standard of rebellion against the leading foundations of Locke's system; and who laid down those maxims and principles, relative to the philosophy of mind, which have subsequently been denominated the *Scotch* or *Common-sense* school of metaphysics.

There are three publications of Reid's, on which his philosophy, as a whole, is founded; namely, his "Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense," published in 1764; his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," 1785; and his "Essay on the Active Powers," 1788. The first treatise is the most systematic and important.

Much has been written within the last fifty years, relative to Reid's system, both in England and on

the Continent; little therefore that is new can be said upon it. But its nature and merits lie within comparatively narrow limits; we shall, therefore, endeavour to furnish the reader with a bird's-eye view of the leading points connected with his mental speculations. To give something like method to our observations, we shall notice Reid's doctrines under four points of view; 1st, His ideas of the *representational* hypothesis connected with perception; 2nd, His ideas of, and combat with the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume; 3rd, His own opinions of the nature and operations of mind; and 4th, Objections which have commonly been urged against his theory as a whole. Our notice of the Doctor's system, as a body, must necessarily be limited here; as we shall have to refer to several phases of it, when we come to the works of some of his most voluminous and distinguished disciples.

We have already noticed that Locke's meaning as to the word *idea* has been generally misconceived by Dr. Reid and his followers. Locke tells us that he means it to "stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks;" and as being "synonymous with *phantasm*, NOTION, or *species*; or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." And throughout his whole "Essay," there is not a single passage, when fairly and candidly interpreted, in which he does not use the term *idea* to mean simply a *thought* or *notion*.

Dr. Reid, however, puts a different construction on his language. "It is a fundamental principle,"

says Reid, "of the ideal system, (meaning Locke's) that every object of thought must be an impression or an idea, that is, a faint *copy* of some preceding impression."* "Ideas, according to Mr. Locke, are nothing but the immediate objects of the mind in thinking. Modern philosophers, as well as the Peripatetics of old, have conceded that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thought; and there must be some *image* of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name *idea*, in the philosophical sense of it, is given to these internal and immediate objects of our thought."† This is the general meaning which the Doctor and all his chief disciples attach to Locke's use of the word *idea*; and it is upon this peculiar acception that a great portion of the *common-sense* philosophy is grounded.‡

It is worthy of remark, that Dr. Reid only, I

* Inquiry into the Human Mind, p. 53.

† Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p. 22.

‡ "For my own part, I can see no good reason for supposing that Locke did not believe that our ideas of primary qualities are really resemblances or copies of those qualities, when we know for certain, that, till our own times, this has been the universal doctrine of the Schools, from Aristotle downwards."—(Stewart's Philosophical Essays, page 89.)

"Reid deservedly takes the lead, as having brought about an important reformation in philosophy. He has not only corrected many mistakes of Locke, but he has endeavoured to explode the whole doctrine of ideas which prevailed from the time of Aristotle, till it was attacked by the Scotch philosopher. According to this doctrine, nothing can be present to the mind but one idea, which is supposed to be some kind of representation of the object from which it proceeds. It is not enough that the senses be affected in a particular way; the only result of such affection is the production of an idea, and this idea alone is perceived by the mind. Our readers must recollect, that when the Cartesians speak of *ideas*, they use the word in a sense quite different from its ordinary

believe, quotes Locke's definition of the word *idea* once, but this quotation is a garbled one. He says, "Mr. Locke, who uses the word *idea* so very frequently, tells us, that he means the same thing by it as is commonly meant by *species* and *phantasm*." The word *notion* is omitted, and also the more full and explanatory terms, *whatever is the object of the mind when it thinks*. This is decidedly unfair towards Locke.

The principal object which Dr. Reid has in view in his "Inquiry," is to show us, that the system of speculative philosophy which maintains that we perceive or know external bodies only through the means of those things we call *ideas*, is unsound and erroneous. It was, he alleges, the universal doctrine, that ideas are not the objects themselves, but only the representatives of them. The late Dr. Thomas Brown showed in his "Lectures," that this opinion of Reid's, as to the meaning which philosophers generally attached to *ideas*, was entirely groundless, and was nothing more nor less than a pure phantom of his own imagination. We cannot, however, enter into this controversy, but must pass on to other points of the common-sense philosophy.*

One of the first steps which Dr. Reid took,

acceptation in our language. They understand an *idea* as a representation transmitted to the mind through the senses, and which communicates an impression without imparting any portion of its substance. This is the philosophical meaning of the word *idea* as employed by Locke and all the Cartesians. In our language it is considered synonymous with *notion* or *conception*."—(Art. Metaphysics in the Edinburgh Encyclopedia.)

* See this matter most ably and learnedly treated, by Sir Wm. Hamilton, in the 51st vol. of the Edinburgh Review.

therefore, was to overturn this representative system, and to show what was the true theory of perception. With this view he hoped to silence for ever all sceptics and ideal philosophers. He commences with sensation and perception, and he endeavours to show that it is impossible to ascertain what the real process of the mind is in the act of perception. There exists the *mind*, this we are conscious of; then there is the *object*, this, he says, we know by the like testimony of consciousness; but there is nothing intermediate, nothing representative, to connect the mind as perceiving, with the object perceived. The only way, therefore, by which we are able to explain this intercourse between mind and matter is, to have recourse to certain intuitive or original principles of belief, which cannot be denied without running into the wildest absurdity and extravagance. If, for example, I see a house, I have only a simple apprehension of it by *sensation*; but I am led at the same time, by the very nature of the mind, or by this act of sensation, to form certain judgments or conclusions respecting it; that the house is of a certain size, a certain form, and above all, that it really exists. These conclusions, the Doctor says, are involved in the very act of *sensation*, and we cannot refuse our unqualified acquiescence in them. These he calls original and infallible judgments, which all men, in every state of existence, must take as the original elements of all their reasonings and movements in life. This he likewise calls the *common sense of mankind*.

Let us state the question in another form. Reid says the mind does not perceive things *mediately*, but *immediately*. He is not, it is true, always consistent with himself on this point; but there can be no doubt but he distinctly maintains that it is only by immediate means that a knowledge of things is obtained. There are no ideas, nor images, nor species, nor phantasms; but the mind stands "face to face," to the things perceived. Nothing intervenes between mind and matter. "Our senses," says he, "have a double province; they furnish us with a variety of sensations, some pleasant, others painful, and others indifferent; at the same time they give us a *conception*, and an *invincible belief*, of the existence of external objects. This conception and belief, which nature produces by means of the senses, we call *perception*."

Reid also maintains that our *sensations* have no *resemblance* whatever to their causes. He often tells us, that the external universe bears no likeness to the sensations of it. "Indeed," says he, "no man can conceive any sensation to resemble any known quality of bodies. Nor can any man show, by any good argument, that all our sensations might not have been as they are, though no body, nor quality of body, had ever existed.

The author's theory of perception amounts simply to this. External objects produce certain sensations in us; by these sensations we perceive the existence of certain properties or qualities capable of producing them. These qualities or properties are distinguishable into *primary* and *secondary*;

the first we perceive *immediately*, and the second *mediately*.

This "Common-sense" theory of perception has very recently been vigorously and eloquently combated in one of our chief periodical publications.* The Reviewer contends that Reid has entirely misconceived the nature of perception, and has adopted, not only in principle, but practically and in detail, that very representative system, which it was professedly the great object of his ambition to eradicate effectually from the province of philosophy. By adopting the psychological hypothesis, he virtually stultified his own propositions. We cannot enter into this discussion, but shall merely present the reader with a short extract from the paper in question.

"The merits of Dr. Reid, then, as a reformer of philosophy, amount in our opinion to this:—he was among the first to *say* and to *write* that the representative theory of perception was false and erroneous, and the fountain-head of scepticism and idealism. But this admission of his merits must be accompanied by the qualification, that he adopted, as the basis of his philosophy, a principle which rendered nugatory all his protestations. It is of no use to disclaim a conclusion, if we accept the premises which inevitably lead to it. Dr. Reid disclaimed the representative theory, but he embraced its premises; and thus he virtually ratified the conclusions of the very system which he

* Blackwood's Magazine for August, 1847.

clamorously denounced. In his language he is opposed to representationalism, but in his doctrine he lends it the strongest support, by accepting as the foundation of his philosophy an analysis of the perception of matter."

We must now say a few words on Reid's controversy with the Sceptics and Idealists, Berkeley and Hume in particular.

The reader will bear in mind that Reid's philosophy as a whole, is connected, directly and pointedly, with the great problem which philosophers have been engaged in solving for more than two thousand years. We have a perception of the existence of something without us, called *matter*. Is this perception a relation between the mind and the material world; or is it simply a state or modification of the thinking principle? All mankind believe in a thing which they call *matter*; but what *kind* of a thing is it? Does this matter exist *per se*, or is it a modification or only a thing *perceived* by the mind? If it possesses an individual existence independent of the mind, it is then susceptible of analysis; but if only a state of the mind, it is not subject to such a process. This is the state of the question at issue; and it has received innumerable and opposite answers, from metaphysicians of all ages and countries.

Two classes may perhaps comprehend the mass of these disputants. One states the perception of matter to be an elementary fact, which no reasoning can either go beyond or demonstrate; the second maintains that the act of perception admits the

existence of mind on the one hand, and an external thing, called matter, on the other. Perception is considered by the last class, to be an effect from real matter.

Reid's arguments against those who deny the existence of matter, are certainly very weak and defective. He lays down the position himself, that perception *is entirely an act of the mind*; so that he does, in substance, only affirm the same thing as Berkeley and Hume do. Both assert that we cannot go beyond our own consciousness, and therefore can never know things *per se*; but they never call in question the "common-sense" belief that matter exists externally.

The grand argument, therefore, used by Dr. Reid, for the existence of a material world, is founded on the irresistible belief which arises from perception and memory. That this belief is universal and influential, no one can question, not even the Sceptics themselves; but it may still be affirmed, that this is not *proving* the existence of any thing beyond the existence of mere perception and memory. The main question is then left by Dr. Reid precisely where he found it. On this intricate and keenly contested question, there are some well-directed and forcible remarks in the Edinburgh Review, written by the late Dr. Brown, which we shall here transcribe. They are rather long; but they touch upon the controverted points so admirably, that the reader will not regret their insertion.

"Dr. Reid's sole argument for the real existence of a material world, is founded on the irre-

sistible belief of it that is implied in perception and memory; a belief, the foundations of which he seems to think it would be something more than absurd to call in question. Now, the reality of this general persuasion or belief no one ever attempted to deny. The question is only about its justness or truth. It is conceivable, certainly, in every case, that our belief should be erroneous; and there can be nothing absurd in suggesting reasons for doubting of its constant recurrence, even after all our endeavours to familiarise ourselves with the objections that have been made to it, are not absolutely without parallel in the history of the human faculties. All children believe that the earth is at rest, and that the sun and the fixed stars perform a diurnal revolution round it. They also believe that the place which they occupy on the surface is absolutely the uppermost, and that the inhabitants of the opposite surface must be suspended in an inverted position. Now, of this universal, practical, and irresistible belief all persons of education are easily disabused in speculation, though it influences their ordinary language, and continues, in fact, to be the habitual impression of their minds. In the same way, a Berkeleyan might admit the constant recurrence of the illusions of sense, although his speculative reason were sufficiently convinced of their fallacy.

“The phenomena of dreaming and of delirium, however, appear to afford a sort of *experimentum crucis* to demonstrate that a real external existence is not necessary to produce sensation and percep-

tion in the human mind. Is it utterly absurd and ridiculous to maintain that all the objects of our thoughts may be 'such stuff as dreams are made of?' or that the uniformity of Nature gives us some reason to presume, that the perceptions of maniacs and of rational men are manufactured, like their organs, out of the same materials? There is a species of insanity known among medical men by the epithet *notional*, in which there is frequently no general depravation of the reasoning and judging faculties, but where the disease consists entirely in the patient mistaking the objects of his thought or imagination for real and present existences. The error of his perceptions, in such a case, is only detected by comparing them with the perceptions of other people; and it is evident that he has just the same reason to impute error to them, as they can have individually for imputing it to him. The majority, indeed, necessarily carries the point as to all practical consequences; but is there any absurdity in alleging that we have no internal, infallible, and necessary assurance of that on which the internal conviction of an individual must be supported, and may be overruled by the testimony of his fellow-creatures?

"Dr. Reid has himself admitted, that 'we might probably have been so made, as to have all the perceptions and sensations which we now have, without any impression on our bodily organs at all.' It is surely altogether as reasonable to say, that we might have had all those perceptions, without the aid or intervention of any material

existence at all. Those perceptions might still have been accompanied with a belief, too, that would not have been less universal or irresistible, for being utterly without a foundation in reality. In short, our perceptions can never afford any complete or irrefragable proof of the real existence of external things; because it is easy to conceive that we might have such perceptions without them. We do not know, therefore, with certainty, that our perceptions are ever produced by external objects; and in the cases to which we have just alluded, we find perception and a concomitant belief, where we know with certainty that it is *not* produced by an external existence."

"It has been said, however, that we have the same evidence for the existence of the material world as for that of our own thoughts or conceptions; as we have no reason for believing in the latter, but that we cannot help it; which is equally true of the former. Now this appears to us to be very inaccurately argued. Whatever we doubt, and whatever we prove, we must plainly begin with consciousness: that alone is certain—all the rest is inference. Does Dr. Reid mean to assert, that our perception of external objects is not a necessary preliminary to any proof of their reality, or that our belief in their reality is not founded upon our consciousness of perceiving them? Our perceptions, then, and not the existence of their objects, are what we cannot help believing; and it would be nearly as reasonable to say that we must take all our dreams for realities, because we can-

not doubt that we dream, as it is to assert that we have the same evidence for the existence of an external world, as for the existence of the sensations by which it is suggested to our minds."*

Reid, in numerous places, affirms that we can give no reasons whatever for our belief in an external world; the only thing we can use against the Sceptics is, an *instinctive principle*. If this be not granted us, we must succumb to their attacks. This is after all but a very weak statement in defence of a great and important principle. To take shelter under such an indefinite thing as instinct, is little short of surrendering the contested point at once. "To talk of Dr. Reid," says an able Reviewer, "as if his writings had opposed a barrier to the prevalence of sceptical philosophy, is an evident mistake. Dr. Reid successfully refuted the principles by which Berkeley and Hume endeavoured to establish their conclusions; but the conclusions themselves he himself adopted as the very premises from which he reasons. The impossibility of proving the existence of a material world from reason, or experience, or instruction, or habit, or any other principle hitherto known to philosophers, is the argument, and the only argument, by which he endeavours to force upon us his theory of instinctive principles."†

"Reid," says Dr. Brown, "considers his refutation of the ideal system, as involving almost every thing which is truly his. Yet there are few cir-

* Vol. III. . . . † Quarterly Review.

cumstances connected with the fortune of modern philosophy, that appear to me more wonderful, than that a mind like Dr. Reid's, so learned in the history of metaphysical science, should have conceived that on this point any great merit, at least any merit of originality, was justly preferable to him particularly. Indeed, the only circumstance which appears to me wonderful, is, that the claim thus made by him should have been so readily and generally admitted."—(Lectures, p. 155.)

The leading objections which have been popularly urged against the doctrines of Dr. Reid, are the following.

1st. All the Materialists, of whatever cast or grade, affirm that the Doctor has assumed the existence of mind, as a distinct and independent principle in man, without proving it. This is quite true; but the author's object was simply to unfold the phenomena of consciousness, without entering into any inquiries as to the connexion between mind and matter. On this point, his friend, and the enthusiastic defender of his philosophy, Professor Stewart, has made some excellent and pertinent remarks; in which he has shown, that Reid has really nothing to do with theories as to the *cause* of mental phenomena, but only to place on record those facts, which a patient attention to our own feelings and sensations fully establishes.

2nd. There have been objections urged against Dr. Reid's notions as to the nature of our belief. He asserts that the credit to human testimony is not derived from reasoning and experience, as is

commonly maintained ; and as a proof of his position, he affirms, that our faith or belief is greatest when our experience is least, and our reason the feeblest ; and this is in childhood. A child, without reason and experience, will believe any thing you tell it. Now this opinion of the Doctor's is founded on a gross and palpable mistake : and it is supported by a species of reasoning so puerile and sophistical, as to be altogether unworthy of a man of such talents and reputation. It is known to every one that there are two kinds of belief ; an *implicit belief*, and a *rational belief* ; and it is equally well known that the rational faith we place on the relations of others, is, in all transactions of life, substantially regulated by our experience and reasoning. Implicit belief is also substantially a mark of ignorance and imbecility of mind. We have nothing to do here with that particular application of this general truth, that man's belief is regulated by what he has experienced ; which induced Doctor Reid to discard it, and set up a counter-principle. We are to look at the matter as it really stands before us, regardless of any imaginary logical consequences to which it may lead. Mr. Hume attempted to make a sceptical application of a common truth ; but this can form no valid reason why we should run into gross absurdity. What Hume meant by belief, was a *rational belief*, not an implicit one ; and if there be any one thing more evident than another, deducible from the daily observation of human life, it is, that men in-

variably regulate their rational faith in the testimony of others, by the deductions of reason and the suggestions of experience. There was no danger from conceding such a truth to the sceptic; and the use which Mr. Hume made of it, in reference to the truth of miracles, clearly shows, that, even in his hands, it was not susceptible of that sceptical application, to which he fondly anticipated it would prove so serviceable. There was, therefore, no need of Dr. Reid's flying to the rescue, when nothing was in danger.

3rd. Another principal objection brought against Dr. Reid's mental system is, the immense number of original and independent powers of the mind he attempts to establish. Dr. Priestley, his most able and popular opponent, makes the following statistical table of these original powers.

1	{	A present sensation suggests	{	The belief of the present existence of an object.
		Memory		The belief of its past existence.
		Imagination..		No belief at all.
2	Mental affections		{	The belief and idea of our own existence.
3	{		{	Their peculiar corresponding sensations.
		Odours, tastes, sounds, and certain affections of the optic nerve. ...		
4	A hard substance		{	The sensation of hardness, and the belief of something hard.

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| 5 | { | An extended substance. | { | The idea of extension and space. |
| | | All primary qualities of bodies | { | Their peculiar sensations. |
| | | A body in motion | | The idea of motion. |
| 6 | { | Certain forms of the features, articulations of the voice, and attitudes of the body.. | { | The idea and belief of certain thoughts, purposes and dispositions of the mind. |
| 7 | { | Inverted images on the retina | | Upright vision. |
| 8 | { | Images in corresponding parts of both eyes. | | Single vision. |
| 9 | { | Pains in any part of the body | { | The idea of the place where the pain is seated. |
| 10 | | The parallel motion of the eyes, as necessary to distinct vision. | | |
| 11 | | The sense of veracity, or a disposition to speak the truth. | | |
| 12 | | A sense of credulity, or a disposition to believe others. | | |
| 13 | | The inductive faculty, by which we infer similar effects from similar causes.* | | |

Various opinions have been held, by Dr. Reid's commentators and critics, as to his precise meaning of the term *common sense*, which is used so frequently in his writings. Some contend that his notions of this mental faculty were essentially the same as those maintained by Dr. Beattie; while others again say, that Reid used the term more

* Examinations, &c., p. 9.

correctly, and with a more circumscribed meaning than the former. Where the truth lies it is difficult to determine. Dr. Reid says, in his work "On the Intellectual Powers," that "There is a certain degree of *sense*, which is necessary to our being subjects of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs, and answerable for our conduct to others. This is called *common sense*, because it is common to all men with whom we can transact business." Again he says, "The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting with common prudence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true and what is false, in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends."

It is necessary we should notice Dr. Reid's theory respecting the nature of *testimony from experience*. This forms an important item in his system. The Doctor's opinions may be gathered from the following passages in his writings. "This process of the human mind is so familiar, that we never think of inquiring into the principles upon which it is founded. We are apt to conceive it as a self-evident truth, that what is to come must be similar to what is past. Thus, if a certain degree of cold freezes water to-day, and has been known to do so in time past, we have no doubt but the same degree of cold will freeze water to-morrow, or a year hence. This is a truth which all men believe as soon as they understand it, I readily admit; but the question is, Whence does this evidence arise?" Again he says, "Experience

informs us that things have been conjoined in time past; but no man ever had any experience of what is future; and this is the very question to be resolved, "*How we come to believe that the future will be like the past?*" Here, then, follows the solution of this problem. "The wise Author of nature hath implanted in human minds an *original principle*, by which we believe and expect a continuance of the course of nature, and the continuance of those connexions which we have observed in time past." Again: "Upon this principle of our constitution, not only acquired perception, but all inductive reasoning, and all our reasoning from analogy, are grounded; and therefore, for want of another name, we shall beg leave to call it the *inductive principle*. It is from the force of this principle, that we immediately assent to that axiom, upon which all our knowledge of nature is built, *that effects of the same kind must have the same cause*. A child has found a prick of a pin conjoined with pain; hence he believes and knows, that these things are naturally connected; he knows that the one will always follow the other. If any man will only call this an association of ideas, I dispute not about words, but I think he speaks very improperly. For if we express it in plain English, it is a prescience, that things which he hath found conjoined in time past, will be conjoined in time to come. And this prescience is not the effect of reasoning, but of an *original principle* of human nature, which I have called the *inductive principle*. It leads often into mistakes, but is of infi-

But what is the nature of this "inductive principle," and what are its offices in the mental economy? Why this is not an individual act or power, but a compound one, and, also, of great complexity of construction. It is nothing, in fact, but that which we denominate *reason*. This "inductive principle" of the Doctor's implies observation, analysis, synthesis, and induction, which are just the constituent elements, so to speak, of every process of reasoning. Man's dependence upon the stability of the laws and operations of nature, is the growth of time and experience alone; and he is not invested with any "inductive principle," by which he infallibly, and upon the spur of the moment, arrives at the truth of general principles of knowledge. The belief *that the future will be like the past*, is built upon the most enlarged experience of facts and the nicest calculations. But according to Dr. Reid's notions, if a man perceives the conjunction of two events to-day, he has an infallible belief that they will be likewise conjoined to-morrow, by the simple operation of this instinctive "inductive principle." But nothing can be more absurd than this. If mankind were to draw conclusions in this way, and act upon them, there would be an end of all knowledge, and a speedy termination to their own existence. What becomes of *probable evidence* upon the Doctor's theory? Why it can have no existence whatever. And yet how large a portion of our knowledge comes fairly under this description of evidence.

Probable truth is in requisition every moment of our lives, from the cradle to the grave.*

. See Note E. at the end of the Volume.

* The best Edition of Reid's works is that Edited by Sir William Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1846.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE STATE OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY AND SPAIN DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE brilliant anticipations which were entertained of the successful prosecution of philosophy in Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were not realized in the eighteenth. The national mind lapsed into a state of apathy and torpor, and nothing fell from the Italian pen, on mental science, which bore the imprint of original or profound thought. What philosophic literature there was, during nearly the whole of the last century, was chiefly confined to commonplace compilations, or academical elements of scholastic instruction. The bold speculations of Ficinus, Bruno, Cardan, and Campanella, were nearly forgotten; and the general tone of intellectual vigour and enterprise sank far below the average standard of surrounding nations.

This state of things may perhaps be readily accounted for from the circumstance that in Italy—

and the same remark may apply to Spain—there were no great and stirring movements, in the general frame of society, such as prevailed in England, France, Holland, and Germany. The religious and political institutions of the South of Europe were of such a character, as to exile a liberal and independent philosophy from the ordinary course of academical instruction; and the public mind being little excited with topics nearly allied to mental philosophy, there was no adequate incentive to speculative inquiries among the general mass of literary and professional citizens. Both in Italy and Spain the religious orders, schools, and monastic institutions, engrossed almost every thing in the shape of science and public instruction. Here all speculative novelties were viewed with suspicion, and the aspirations of genius were chilled into torpor by a tame and inexcusable attachment to settled rules and prescriptive privileges. Nothing which bore the imprint of independent thought was held in much estimation. And the same causes which repressed the inventive and reasoning faculties at home, tended to exclude a knowledge of the mental movements of neighbouring countries. And hence it is that we find, that long after Descartes had penetrated into every university and every town in the North of Europe, and had roused the slumbering energies of the people into active speculation, by the novelty and scientific excellence of his philosophic method, he was almost unknown, even by name, among the inhabitants of the South, who had, a century before, been the active and

intelligent revivers of Grecian and Roman philosophy and literature.

The paucity of speculative habits among the modern inhabitants of Italy and Spain is the more to be regretted, inasmuch as both nations possess intellectual gifts of a high order. The Italian mind is a clear, argumentative, and common-sense mind. It has little constitutional sympathy with mysticism and paradox. In all its contributions to mental philosophy we recognise a healthy tone of rational thought, a contemplative sobriety, a sincere love and veneration of truth, and a constant desire manifested to make speculative inquiries subservient to some useful purpose. And on the other hand, we have no right to consider the Spanish mind as a barren or stupid one. On the contrary, it is full to overflowing with rare and rich materials. In light and satirical productions the Spanish people are beyond all praise and imitation; and their Romances have never been equalled by any nation. In poetry, history, theology, and jurisprudence, the Spanish labours are of more than an average respectability. The barrenness of speculative and abstract knowledge of human nature is certainly conspicuous in Spain; but this arises from no radical or constitutional imperfections in the minds of its people, to take a part in philosophical disquisitions of this kind; but is chiefly to be attributed to the religious, social, and political institutions of the country.

VICO.

Vico is unquestionably one of the brightest ornaments in modern Italian literature and philosophy. He was a man of consummate genius and vast erudition. His great *forte* did not precisely lie in metaphysics; but in moral and political philosophy, and the kindred science of jurisprudence.

His knowledge, however, of mental speculations, both ancient and modern, was very accurate and extensive. He has given us in his own life, a minute account of the progress of his knowledge in speculative doctrines; and of the changes of opinion he experienced in roaming from one system to another.

He was placed, when young, under the care of two distinguished Jesuits, Father Del Balzo and Father Ricci, both of whom were profound metaphysicians, and the latter a most enthusiastic admirer of the doctrines of Zeno. The writings of Suarez occupied the attention of young Vico; and from them he became acquainted with the most comprehensive and well digested rules and maxims, not only connected with the science of legislation, but with the more profound philosophy of mind. Plato, however, was his grand object of admiration, the centre of all his speculations, the point from which he intended to take his departure in every thing connected with the science of human nature. There was a spirituality in Plato's system, which took a firm hold of the mind of the young philoso-

pher ; a spirituality, in fact, which he could find no where else ; and which he conceived, if steadily kept in view, and brought within the rules and maxims of a sound philosophy, was sufficient to reconcile all conflicting opinions among men ; and enable them at once, not only to correct every speculative error, but to place the science of government itself in all countries, upon such a firm basis, as would produce the most happy results to the human race. Such were the youthful thoughts and aspirations of Vico.

Panting after speculative novelties, he visited Naples, and commenced the study of the Epicurean philosophy, as interpreted and expounded by Gassendi. This afforded gratification for a season. Lucretius became next the object of attraction ; but there was too much material mechanism in his system for the taste of Vico. These perambulations among the ancient sages tended but to rivet him more firmly to the doctrines of the "divine" Plato, which he now clearly saw formed the only foundation on which any solid and enlightened philosophy of man could possibly be reared.

The speculations of Descartes were now becoming prevalent in every university in his native country, and he commenced the study of his system with all the ardour of his mind, and the deep veneration he entertained for its distinguished founder. While he agreed with many of its leading principles, he yet saw it was not without defects ; and these related chiefly to the want of that lofty

spiritualism which, Vico contended, was absolutely necessary to reconcile philosophy with the genius of Christianity, and make that union subservient to the best interests of man.*

The human soul considered relatively to the body, occupies the same situation, in Vico's opinion, that the Deity does to the universe. Socrates taught us moral philosophy, or rather brought it down from heaven. Nothing is so contrary and injurious to our nature as ignorance and error. The fall of man has introduced disorders in language, in mind, and in heart; and the remedies for these are virtue, science, and eloquence. There are two most essential matters for man to know; the end or object of all studies, and the best methods of prosecuting them. Metaphysics teach us that the infinite is more certain than the finite; the soul than the body; God than man,—man that is ignorant how he moves, or feels, or knows. Christianity has been given to us, and has brought in its train that pure morality and Christian jurisprudence, which should form the end or object of all human studies.

There are three elements of all Divine and human science; knowledge, will, and power. The principle of the whole is intelligence. The eye of intelligence is reason; and the eternal flambeau of reason is God. These three elements teach us our own personal existence; and we can in turn explain them again by the power of thought. The first

* See the *Life of Vico*, prefixed to the Edition of his Works, pp. 21, 24, 29, 35, 36.

principles of all wisdom and science come from the Deity.*

With these opinions, the author wrote what he called his "New Science," the chief aim of which is, to show the origin of the principles of natural right and justice, from the *humanity of nations*; or to trace the origin of human manners and social institutions, according to a certain chronological and rational order, going back as far as the most obscure and fabulous times of Greece. He wished to derive from the primitive and vulgar traditions of mankind, materials which would throw a steady and clear light upon the origin of all institutions, sciences, and arts; and by this means the principles of civil polity would be developed with a fulness and exactitude hitherto unattained. He divided his principles of investigation into two kinds; those of ideas, and idioms of language. By the aid of the former, he hoped to discover the historical elements of astronomy and chronology, which he termed the two *eyes* of history; and from thence a full chart of universal history would be framed, a thing of which modern nations were entirely destitute. By means of these general ideas, which such a comprehensive and remote inquiry into the history of our race would furnish, we should be able to trace and consolidate those progressive principles of philosophy which would establish metaphysical science upon a certain and infallible basis; that is, upon the natural theology of all

* De Universi Juris Uno Principio, 1720, pp. 21—27. De Constantia Jurisprudentis, 1721.

nations, and those conceptions which natural existence stimulates man to form of the nature and power of the Gods. Vico maintains that the theology of the Gentiles is precisely the same as that of the times of theological poetry. Through the means of metaphysical speculations he unfolds the moral and political principles common to all nations. In the course of time men yielded to social changes; and by this means, the personal nature of each nation became more fully and prominently developed; and the consequence was, that various species of government were instituted, and corresponding changes in manners and customs effected.

The other instrument employed by Vico, the history of language, aided the solution of the great problem. There is a common principle running through all languages, and he wished to embody this in a Universal Etymological Dictionary, with a view of giving a full explanation of all the maxims of the natural rights of nations. It is with this double set of principles, from *ideas* and *language*, which he denominates the *philosophy* and *philology* of human nature, that he conceived he was able to unfold the *history of the Eternal Ideal, according to the decrees of Providence*, which would show the nature of all natural right, justice, and equity, necessary for the guidance and happiness of both nations and individuals. This *history* embraces all the general and particular histories of every nation, from their foundation, throughout all their progressive stages of civilization, and to their decline and extinction. The

monuments of antiquity demonstrate three great epochs of existence, namely, of the gods, of heroes, and of men; or the periods of comparative obscurity, namely, of fables and of history. To these three grand landmarks three different languages correspond, the hieroglyphic, the symbolical, and the conventional; and to these were also attached three forms of government, that of families, the aristocratic, or castes, and the popular. From these sprang two essential principles involved in all modes and forms of civil polity, those of authority and reason.*

This is a summary of the "New Science," of Vico. A great number of profound metaphysical observations are scattered throughout the work, or are deducible from the principles laid down in it. Altogether it is full of interesting matter to the student of speculative knowledge. The author's mind was guided by the most ennobling and lofty views of the nature of man, and his future destiny; and his disquisitions, though occasionally verging towards the mystical and visionary, are, nevertheless, in general good keeping with the lofty aspirations of his genius. "The human mind," says he, "judges of the remote and unknown from the present and the known. Philosophy, to be of any utility to mankind, must elevate him, and support him when falling, without annihilating his being, or allowing him to see corruption.

* *Principj di Scienza Nuova*, pp. 10. 35—60. *Del Metodo*, pp. 1. 43.

True philosophers are of the Platonic school, who harmonise with the science of legislation in three grand points,—that there is a Deity, that human passions and desires must be under a system of control ; and that the soul of man is immortal.”*

“Philosophy,” says Vico again, “contemplates reason, and forms the science of truth. Philology recognises the authority of human judgment, and this creates the consciousness of certainty. Philosophers and philologists deceive themselves if they neglect to give mutual aid to each other. Human judgment, uncertain in its nature, obtains the infallible sanction of *common sense*, in matters of necessity and utility. Common sense is an unreflecting judgment, which is felt, or rather which is formed, by a community, a people, a nation, and, in fact, by all mankind. Uniform ideas, created among people who have no knowledge of each other, must be stamped with the seal of truth.”†

In another place Vico says, “True wisdom perfects the understanding and regulates the will ; clears up a knowledge of the most exalted things, and directs us to make a choice of the best. The most momentous and elevated knowledge is that which relates to the Deity ; and the best things to select are those which produce the greatest amount of good to mankind. A sound and enlightened system of metaphysics incorporates the doctrine of a Deity, because it throws a logical light

* *Scienza Nuova*, pp. 1. 6. *Del Metodo*, pp. 149. 151.

† *Scienza Nuova*, §§. 6. 7. 9. 11. 12. 22.

over all the suggestions and movements of the mind : and it purifies the heart by a humane and noble morality.”*

Vico defines a mental faculty to be that which has the *power* to do a certain thing without constraint or effort. He approves of the scholastic division of the mind into separate powers, such as imagination, memory, reasoning, &c., because he considers they give rise to phenomena which are marked with an individual and distinctive character. The imagination he considers the most prominently defined of all the intellectual powers.

MURATORI.

This author was born in 1672. At the early age of twenty, he was considered a prodigy in all kinds of learning and philosophy. In 1735, he wrote a metaphysical work, in opposition to Huet's “*De la Faiblesse de l'Esprit Humain*,” entitled “*Delle Forze dell'Intendimento Umano*.”

Muratori by no means displayed a friendly feeling towards letters and philosophy. When Tassoni proposed the question, “Whether science and letters were necessary in States, either for princes or youth ?” Muratori took the negative side of the argument, and endeavoured to show, that the revival of learning in his own country, which common fame proclaimed as a glorious event, had been productive of great evils ; evils, in fact, of a more

* Del Metodo, t. 2, p. 3.

hideous character than those which characterised the most ignorant and barbarous countries. He particularly dwells upon the mischiefs which had resulted from the writings of Hobbes, Toland, Dodwell, Locke, Collins, Tindal, Spinoza, and Bayle. But though all these writers were obnoxious to him, yet none gave him so much umbrage as Huet, Bishop of Avranches. He declaims against the venerable prelate with great vehemence and bitterness; and accuses him of sapping the foundation of all knowledge, religion, and virtue. In the midst, however, of all this declamatory wrath, many excellent observations are scattered throughout the work; particularly on the faculties of the mind generally, and that of imagination in particular.*

In 1749, Muratori published his work "On Morals," in which there are many valuable remarks on mental philosophy. The first six chapters of the treatise are the most interesting to the metaphysician. The author's observations on *reason*, and the right use of it in all mental inquiries, are just and interesting.†

GENOVESI.

This metaphysical writer was born in the kingdom of Naples, in 1712. He wrote a work on the human mind, entitled "*Disciplinarum Metaphysicarum Elementa*." In this treatise the author

* *Delle Forze dell'Intendimento Umano*, pp. 333. 347. Venice, 1745.

† See the 14th, 15th, and 16th chapters of the Author's work in opposition to Huet; they contain many excellent observations.

enters fully into all the great questions relative to the philosophy of mind ; such as identity, non-identity, possibility, impossibility, necessity, and chance. He then proceeds to define what is designated by relation, subject, substance, attribute, and form ; then broaches the question of essences, and inquires into that which we commonly mean by the word *nature*. Similarity and variety are fully discussed ; and in addition to all these topics, we have full expositions of logic and morals.

Genovesi seems to have imbibed the spirit of the philosophy of Bacon and Locke. This is conspicuous in the speculations and in all the divisions of his materials. His opinions were considered bold for his age ; and it is said, that he would have been sacrificed, had not the Archbishop of Taranto, Grand Almoner to the King, interposed in his behalf. As a public teacher of philosophy, Genovesi was unrivalled in the Neapolitan Provinces.

In the author's treatise, "*Elementa Metaphysicæ*," he discusses the nature of ideas, and the use of signs or symbols to represent them. His definition of the word *idea* seems to be nearly the same as that given by Locke. Genovesi uses the terms, "form, species, image, knowledge of a thing, or whatever is present to the mind when it perceives or thinks, and which represents a distinct individual object, either itself, or something existing or possible." He asks the question, Is an idea different from the act of perception ? He examines three several theories on this point ; and at last seeks refuge from the perplexities of the

question, in the definition of the Schoolmen, that ideas are *material* and *intellectual*; the first of which are the *occasion* of the second; and the agreement or harmony subsisting between them constitutes them *perceptions*.*

Genovesi enumerates *seven* distinct theories for the origin of our ideas: 1st, That ideas are innate; 2nd, That the mind has the power of creating its own ideas; 3rd, The hypothesis of *occasional causes*; 4th, The notion of Malebranche, and others, that our souls being united to the Divine nature, we see all things through Him; 5th, The system expressed in the old maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu*; 6th, The principle maintained by Lucretius, that ideas were the real images of external things; and 7th, The opinion of those who think that sensation and reflection are both required in the creation of ideas, yet nevertheless admit that there are still insurmountable difficulties hedged around the solution of the problem of perception. After all the consideration which Genovesi has given to the subject, he confesses himself as belonging to the philosophers of the last class.†

There are four grand sources of all human knowledge; these, according to the Italian philosopher, are consciousness, sensation, testimony, and reasoning. Upon these four divisions, the author has erected a stupendous frame-work of definitions and distinctions, which occupies a considerable portion

* *Elementa Metaphysicæ*, definit. 6.

† *Ibid.*, c. 3.; *Della Logica*, c. 4.

of his disquisitions on logic. Our ideas are viewed under four different aspects; what they are in their origin; as they are in themselves; what they appear to be relatively to other objects; and according to the manner in which they present themselves.

Under the first point of view, ideas are adventitious, fictitious, or natural. Adventitious ideas, arising from sensation, are those of material bodies, their qualities, forms, and modes of action. Fictitious ideas are formed in our own understandings, from similitude, proportion, association, abstraction, and deduction. Natural ideas, called innate, constitute the foundation of the conceptions we have of our own existence, of all the internal phenomena of the thinking principle, of the notions we have of justice, truth, right, &c.

Ideas under the second general aspect, are intelligible or sensible, simple or compound. Under the third aspect they are positive or negative, adequate or inadequate, singular or universal, absolute or relative, abstract or concrete, real or chimerical. Ideas under the last aspect, are either clear or obscure, or distinct or confused.*

Genovesi conceives that the only foundation for a rational system of Logic, is a knowledge of the powers or faculties of the mind; and he terms the first or psychological part of his treatise on the art of reasoning, a species of intellectual medicine for the cure of the maladies of the understanding. There is uncommon care manifested in the arrangement of the work; and the divisions of the subject

* *Elementa Art. Logice Crit. chap. 1.; Della Logica, chap. 4.*

are natural and judicious. There are four sources of our ignorance; a want of distinct conceptions, not being able to compare them with each other, not referring them to their objects, and not perceiving the relation between means and ends. Our mental errors, abstractly considered, may likewise be classified under four heads; errors in the primary ideas, in judgments, in discourse, and in method. The sources of these errors are three in number; the constitution of the mind itself, the nature of matter, and the various other external agents around us. Errors from the imperfections of language, form another important class; and these Genovesi dwells upon at considerable length.

Genovesi maintains that ideas are to be considered as different things from the mind which perceives them. This principle is laid down in several places in his works. He rejects the notion of Arnauld, who held a contrary doctrine, and considers it as entirely unworthy of his genius and learning.*

There are four kinds of truths—moral, natural, metaphysical, and logical; and there are five stages of knowledge—ignorance, doubt, opinion, belief, and science. Belief, or faith, is simply persuasion. It differs from science, inasmuch as the latter rests upon evidence and motives; whereas faith is, to have complete and perfect confidence in the testimony of one supposed to know the matter related.

The nature of truth, and its *criterium*, are dis-

* *Elementa Metaphysicæ*, prop. 30.

cussed at considerable length by Genovesi. His general opinion in every branch of knowledge has a species of evidence peculiar to itself. The criterium of mathematical knowledge applied to all the abstract sciences; physical certainty, to all matters belonging to natural history; and moral evidence, to whatever relates to human nature.*

A modern Italian author makes the following remarks on the general merits of Genovesi as a philosopher. "Few can lay juster claims to the title of a reformer of Italian philosophy, than Genovesi, who not only made it known to, but respected by, the learned of other countries. He knew how to enrich it with sound logical strictures, profound metaphysical discussions, and correct moral reflections. However numerous and distinguished the philosophers who have trodden the same path before him, and who have anxiously endeavoured, by profound meditations and sound maxims, to assist the mind to think clearly and eogently, (and Bacon, Malebranche, Locke, Wolff, and others, have almost exhausted every thing which could be said upon the subject), still Genovesi knew how to embellish his subject with original speculations and remarks, and to furnish his readers with a system of Logic, not only full and complete for philosophical purposes, but highly useful to private individuals, and for the purposes of civil society."†

* Art. *Logicae Verit. ejusque Criterion*, c. 3.

† "Ma chi può veramente dirsi il riformatore dell' Italiana filosofia, chi la fece tosto conoscere e rispettare da' più dotti filosofi delle altre nazioni, chi seppe arricchire di nuovi pregi la logica, la metafisica, e la

FRANCESCO VINCISLAO BARKOVICH.

This author was a professor of philosophy, and a man deeply skilled in the history of Speculative Science. He published "*Saggio sulla natura e sull' origine delle passioni.*" He was an enthusiastic admirer of Descartes; and defended his philosophy against all the attacks made upon it in Italy. Barkovich wrote also on the "*Origin of Evil,*" and on the "*Human Faculties.*"

GIACOMO STELLINI.

This Italian was born in 1699, and very early in life made great progress in metaphysical science, as well as in that of moral philosophy. His work "*Del retto uso delle Umane Facoltà,*" contains his principles of mental speculation. He views the whole of the philosophy of mind through the medium of theology; and mixes up his observations on both branches of knowledge in such a manner, that it becomes difficult to ascertain what his views

morale, fu il celebre Genovesi. Tuttochè molti fossero stati i filosofi che cercarono con sottili riflessioni e giusti precetti d'ajutare la mente a pensare ed a ragionare con esattezza e verità, e Bacone, Malebranche, Locke, Wolfio, e molt' altri sembrassero avere esaurito quanto v'era da scrivere su tale arte, seppe nondimeno il Genovesi trovare nuove osservazioni, e nuovi avvertimenti da preporre, e dare una logica più piena e compiuta, e più utile non solo allo studio della filosofia e generalmente ad ogni studio scientifico, ma eziandio alla condotta morale, ed alla civile società." (*Dell' Origine, de' Progressi, e dello Stato Attuale d'ogni Letteratura.* Dall' Abbate D. Juan Andres. Tomo 15, pp. 200—261. Venezia 1800.)

of the human faculties really were. He displays a great veneration for Descartes and Malebranche; as well as for the ancient Grecian philosophers.

BOSCOVICH.

Roger Joseph Boscovich was a native of Ragusa, and was instructed amongst the Jesuits of Rome. In his early years he applied himself with great ardour to the study of philosophy. In 1758 his work entitled "*Theoria Philosophiæ Naturalis*," made its appearance; and shortly afterwards his Didactic poem of "*Benedictus*." These two works contain his metaphysical opinions with respect to the nature of matter and mind.

The peculiar opinions of Father Boscovich relate to his theory of matter. He affirms that all previous theories have been rash and unwarranted. He says that the *ultimate atoms* of which matter is composed, are *unextended atoms*, or rather *mathematical points*, endowed with certain powers of *attraction* and *repulsion*; and it is from the exercise of these powers, according to fixed and regular laws, that the phenomena of the external universe are derived. There is no such thing as *actual contact in nature*; for all those appearances which mankind commonly attribute to *contact*, arise from *repulsive powers* in the unextended atoms, filling those parts of space where our external senses perceive objects. Matter, according to this theory, and considered as a mere object of perception, is

solely a *power of resistance* opposed to that portion of power which our physical strength is able to exert over other material things.

It has been stated by the advocates and admirers of this theory, that, though encircled with many difficulties, which they cannot remove, it has nevertheless established three propositions. 1st, That the commonly received notion of the atoms of matter being *unextended* and *hard*, is an erroneous impression. 2nd, That there are no facts to support such notions; and 3rd, That there are some facts which countenance the theory of Father Boscovich. These facts relate to the compressibility and elasticity of all known bodies; to their contraction when cold; "and to certain optical and electrical experiments, which show that various effects, which our imperfect senses lead us to ascribe to the actual contact of different bodies, are in fact produced by a repulsive power, extended to a real, though imperceptible, distance from their surfaces. The same phenomena, therefore, may be produced by repulsion, which we commonly ascribe to contact; and if so, why not refer to the same cause all effects of the same nature."*

From a first glance it might be inferred that the separate existence of a material world was very problematical. But this is not warranted by anything in the writings of the learned Jesuit; on the contrary, he is particular in dwelling upon that powerful principle in our nature, by which we are instinctively

* Stewart's Phil. Essays, p. 124.

and necessarily led to the belief of an external universe. In his poem "Benedictus," he remarks; "By the power of *reflection* we are enabled to distinguish two different classes of ideas excited in our minds. To some of these we are impelled, *by a very powerful instinct, common to all men*, to ascribe an origin foreign to the mind itself, and depending on certain external objects. Others, we believe, with the most complete conviction, to have their origin in the mind, and *to depend upon the mind for their existence*. The instruments or organs by which we receive the first kind of ideas are called the *senses*; their external cause, or as it is commonly called *the object*, is denoted by the words *matter* and *body*. The source of the second class of ideas (which we discover by reflecting on the subjects of our own consciousness) is called the *mind* or *soul*.

"In this manner we become acquainted with two different kinds of *substances*, the *only* substances of which we possess any knowledge; the one, a sensible or perceptible substance; the other, a substance endowed with the powers of thought and volition. Of the existence of neither is it possible for us to doubt, (such is the force of the intimations we receive from nature); not even in those cases when, offering violence to ourselves, we listen to the suggestions of the Pyrrhonists and the Egoists, and other sophistical perverters of the truth. Nay, even these Sceptics themselves are forced to acknowledge that whatever doubts they may have experienced in their hours of speculation, vanish

completely when the objects of their doubts are present to their senses."*

This theory of matter of Father Boscovich, is countenanced by the speculations of several English philosophers of great reputation. In particular, the late Dr. Hutton, in his work entitled "Dissertations on different subjects in Natural Philosophy," endeavours to show that the property of incompressibility or hardness is not to be considered as an *absolute* property, but only a relative one. He remarks, "Instead, then, of saying that matter, of which natural bodies are composed, is perfectly hard and impenetrable, which is the received opinion of philosophers, we would affirm that there is no permanent property of this kind in a material thing, but that there are certain resisting powers in bodies, by which their volumes and figures are represented to us in the actual information; which powers, however, might be overcome. In that case, the extension of the most solid body would be considered only as a *conditional* thing, like the hardness of a body of ice; which hardness is, in the aqueous state of that body, perfectly destroyed."

Dr. Priestley conceived that Boscovich's theory was favourable to some important theological speculations. He says, "I will add in this place, though it will be considered more fully hereafter, that this supposition of matter having (besides extension) no other properties but those of attraction

* Tom. 1. p. 331.

and repulsion, greatly relieves the difficulty which attends the supposition of the *creation of it out of nothing*, and also the continual moving of it, by a being who has hitherto been supposed to have no common property with it. For according to this hypothesis, both the creating mind, and the created substance, are equally destitute of solidity or impenetrability; so that there can be no difficulty whatever in supposing that the latter may have been the offspring of the former.”*

J. G. DE SORIA.

This author's work was published at Amsterdam in 1741, under the title of “*Rationalis Philosophiæ Institutiones*.” It is founded on the system of Genovesi; and contains nothing of a theoretical nature, and not much of any thing original. The author seemed well acquainted with the systems of Descartes and Locke; and partially incorporated some of their views along with his own speculations. The treatise of Soria is useful to students; and, though rather over-burdened with rules, displays a rational and common-sense view of the Italian philosophy of the day.†

FACCIOLATI.

Facciolati was a Professor in the University of

* *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, p. 23. See a further account of Roscovich in the “*Estratto della Letteratura d'Europa*,” in Fabroni's Collection, and the *Journal of Modena*. See also Note F. at the End of this Volume.

† *Rationalis Phil.* cap. 1. 3. 6.

Pavia, and a man of considerable learning and talent as a public lecturer on philosophy. His works are, "Rudimenta Logica," 1728; "Institutiones Logicæ Peripateticæ," 1729; and "Acroases Dialecticæ," 1750.

The author takes the philosophy of Aristotle for his guide. The speculations of modern metaphysicians and logicians are but seldom noticed in his works. There are, according to this author, two criteria of certainty, historical evidence and what he calls *living sense*; which latter is made to stand for that which testifies of our own knowledge of ourselves. Perception is considered a simple act of intuition; and is different from a *notion*, which is the act of the mind in perceiving. All *ideas* are the result of the active energy of the mind itself, operating on the materials which sensation produces. Properly speaking there are no innate ideas; but the mental powers and faculties themselves are innate.*

Facciolati develops the rules of reasoning with great care; and many valuable suggestions are scattered over his works, both on the nature of mind abstractly considered, and on the best rules and maxims for its practical instruction and cultivation.

VERNEY.

This writer was Archdeacon of Evora, and a man of great boldness and talent. He is the author of several works of considerable merit; some of

* Rudimenta Logica, pp. 17, 22, 26, 31, 39, 52.

which appeared under assumed names. In 1746 he published a treatise entitled "The True Method of Study:" and in 1764, "an Essay on the best means of restoring Science and Letters in Portugal."* There are three other works under his real name: one "On Logic," another "On Metaphysics," and the third, "An Introduction to Philosophy and Theology." These three last treatises have been recently translated and published by Doctor Joseph Maymo y Ribes.

Verney's is an enlightened philosophy. He was anxious to revive among the youth in Spain and Portugal a relish for speculative studies. He was well acquainted with the systems of Locke and Gassendi, and with several other mental theories. The object of philosophy, he maintained, was to obtain new ideas, and to learn to arrange and methodise them. He seems to have adopted Locke's system; for he refers many of our notions directly to sense, and others to the internal power of reflection. All our ideas relate to three things, *substances, modes, and relations*. On the nature of abstraction he adopts the theory developed by Locke; and likewise falls into his views relative to the use and origin of general terms.

GREGORIO BRESSARI.

Bressari published "Il Modo della Filosofia introdotta dal Galileo ragguagliato al Saggio di Platone e di Aristotile," 1753; "Discorsi sopra le

* This work was translated into French in 1762, and published at Lisbon and Paris.

Obbiezioni fatte dal Galileo alla dottrina di Aristotile," 1760; and "Essai de Philosophie Morale sur l'Education des Enfants."

In the first publication the author attempts to refute the four famous dialogues of Galileo upon the "System of the World." The second work has the same object in view, but treated of in a different manner.* The last is the most successful of all Bressari's productions; and it shows that he had studied most profoundly all our modern metaphysicians. He died at Padua in 1771.

J. B. SCARELLA.

Scarella was a profound metaphysician, and displayed no little originality in his speculations. His work, published in 1762, called "*Elementa Logicæ, Anthologiæ, Psychologiæ*," is generally considered by his countrymen as a book containing many views of mental inquiries entitled to the consideration of the philosopher. The senses and experience appeared to Scarella by no means adequate to account for all the abstract and general notions men entertain on a variety of important subjects; and this view of mind induced him to conclude, that many of our universal conceptions are solely the work of the innate capacity of the intellect itself. He conceives there is no other rational hypothesis to account for their origin.†

* The opinions of Galileo upon Logic, or the principles of reasoning, are well entitled to the reader's attention. They will be found in the 2d Volume of his Works. Milan Edition.

† *Elementa Logicæ*, pp. 6. 15. 24. 35.

FERNANDO DE ZAVALOS.

This Spanish author's work, "*La Falsa Filosofía*," was published at Madrid in 1775, in six volumes. It is a ponderous mass of discussion and speculation. It is written in the Scholastic form, full of divisions and sub-divisions.

The author first treats of Atheism, which he considers under various points of view. He shows that, in every form it assumes, it is detrimental to the mental and social feelings of the individual who entertains it; and that it is equally derogatory to his intelligence and reason.

Deistical opinions are likewise discussed by the author. These he handles very minutely; and endeavours to show that there is no consistent or philosophical resting-place between absolute Atheism and Revelation.

Materialism he severely condemns; and he points out the various forms which it assumes in systems of philosophy. The work as a whole is full of learning, but it is heavy and tedious reading.

BALDINOTTI.

Baldinotti was an eminent cultivator of mental studies; and obtained a distinguished reputation throughout Italy, for the extent of his erudition, and for the practical tenor of his philosophical disquisitions. His work, published at Ticini in 1787, entitled "*De Recta Mentis Institutione*," has main-

tained to the present day a respectable reputation among the modern metaphysical treatises in Italy.

Baldinotti was an admirer, and in many respects an imitator, of Genovesi. To the genius of Bacon and of Galileo he pays a devoted reverence; and conceives that they unitedly exercised a most important influence over the progress of sound philosophy during the whole of the last century. "Galileo," says he, "was the founder of a new school, not an Etruscan, or Italian, but a European school; he was the parent of a new philosophy. A humble but zealous disciple of nature, he opened its interesting volume to man, and devoted himself entirely to its study and elucidation."* To Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz, he pays becoming homage; but criticises with some degree of severity the speculations of Hobbes, S'Gravesande, Rüdiger, Thomasius, Crousaz, and Buffier.

Baldinotti is anxious to impress upon the minds of the youth of Italy the advantages to be derived from the invigorating studies of mental philosophy; and in order to stimulate them to exertion, he brings to their recollection the fame which their country justly merited, for its labours in the revival of letters during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.†

The author points out, with care and exactness, the precise limits of the human faculties; and how futile it is to attempt to solve matters which are evidently beyond the mental comprehension of the

De Recta Mentis Institutione, § 127.

† Ibid, §§ 25. 34.

most gifted of mankind. The final causes of things, the nature or essences of bodies, and such like topics, only provoke useless and unprofitable wrangling, but never satisfy the wants of true wisdom. He likewise treats of the nature of causation, as developed by Spinoza and Hume; and endeavours to show that both these writers entertained erroneous views on the subject.

Baldinotti was not partial to theoretical speculations. His system is confined to the framing of judicious rules and arrangements of our ordinary stock of knowledge. He entertains, however, a high opinion of the nature and usefulness of metaphysical knowledge; for he affirms that to it appertains the province of fixing the principles of human knowledge, and of regulating the judgment in matters where invention and discovery have a proper sphere for their display.

APPIANO BUONAFEDE.

This author published a work entitled "*Della Restaurazione di Ogni Filosofia ne' Secoli 16, 17, 18;*" at Venice, 1784. This publication contains a history of the commonly known theories of metaphysical science. In addition it gives an account of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic philosophies. We have also an examination of the writings of Lord Bacon, and several other modern writers on the mind, whose works have obtained some share of celebrity since the revival of letters in Europe.

The chapter devoted to Pyrrhonism is well entitled to especial notice. There is great cleverness displayed, and the author shows an intimate acquaintance with the whole history of modern scepticism.

MAZZARELLI.

Mazzarelli published "*Il buon uso della Logica in Materia di Religione*," in 1787. Many excellent metaphysical observations will be found in this publication. The author has clearly pointed out where logical rules and principles of reasoning may be fairly and advantageously applied in theological disquisitions. Every thing he advances is indicative of a sound and healthy mind.

ARTEAGA.

Don Estevan de Arteaga is one of those writers who endeavour to throw some light upon our ideas connected with the fine arts, from an examination of the phenomena of mind. His work, published at Madrid in 1789, is intitled, "*Investigaciones Filosoficas sobre La Belleza Ideal*."

The author's aim in this treatise is, to show that the great diversity of opinion among mankind on matters connected with the whole circle of the fine arts, and the difficulty of completely analyzing the principles on which they are grounded, arise from our not understanding the faculties of the mind, and the modes in which it operates on body, and body on it. We are involved in a deep and

frightful darkness, in all matters connected with the origin of our ideas, with the nature of our voluntary notions, and with the influences which the nervous system of the brain exercises over the movements of the whole man. All these barriers stand in our way in attempting to effect a full inquiry into the nature, extent, and use of those mental principles which refer more directly to matters of taste and sentiment. And hence also arise those contradictory judgments and varied opinions, found not only among different nations, but among members of the same civil community, on what constitutes the elementary principles of the grand, the beautiful, and the good.

The author affirms that the fine arts can never be successfully cultivated, unless we adopt a more correct and comprehensive system of mental philosophy. Had we a proper knowledge of our minds, we should soon be able to recognise those fine threads of thought and feeling, which enter into all our reasonings and judgments respecting works of art. We should then possess full and adequate ideas of poetry, painting, music, sculpture, and other branches of artistic knowledge; and be able to give a proper stimulus and direction to those peculiar mental faculties on which such arts respectively rest. Without a metaphysical knowledge of this kind, we are no more able to reason accurately on matters of beauty and taste, than a blind man is to descant on the nature and varieties of colours.*

* Investigaciones Filosóficas, pp. 2. 3.

The most mysterious parts of the mental economy, in the eyes of Arteaga, are, the union of the soul with the body, and the operations of the senses. How ideas are generated by this process, he thinks it beyond the powers of man to explain. The simple perceptions of the external qualities of material objects, do not appear to him so puzzling; but the formation of complex notions, such as enter largely into all our judgments of artistic excellencies or defects, have never been satisfactorily accounted for upon any mental hypothesis whatever. It is for this reason that he strenuously recommends a more sedulous and profound cultivation of the powers of the mind, and particularly of its more active and imaginative ones, for the purpose of throwing light upon all matters connected with polite literature and the arts.*

PIETRO TAMBURINI BRESCIANO.—Breseiano was a writer on moral philosophy, and published, in 1798, "Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia Morale." The most interesting and important chapter in this work, is that devoted to an examination of the Cartesian philosophy. In addition to this the author gives a detailed account of the several prominent theories of morals, promulgated since Lord Bacon's time; and discusses their merits in reference to the intellectual constitution of man.

The following are some Italian authors on mental philosophy, whose works I have not had the

* Investigaciones Filosóficas, pp. 7. 10.

opportunity of consulting. I have taken the notice of them from Lombardi's "*Storia della Letteratura Italiana*" and the "*Biografia*" of the kingdom of Naples, 1813.

CLAUDIO FROMOND.—Fromond was born in 1704, and was a member of one of the religious orders in Italy. He occupied a Chair of Logic in 1738. His work entitled "*Nova et Generalis Introductio ad Philosophiam*" was published soon after that date. There are several metaphysical principles slightly touched upon in the treatise, but it chiefly relates to physical inquiries.

GIAMMARIA ORTES.—Ortes cultivated metaphysical subjects to some extent, and with some success. His work called "*Riflessioni sugli oggetti apprensibili e sulle cognizioni umane per rapporto alle lingue*," obtained him considerable applause among philosophical readers of his own country.

FRANCESCO ANTONIO GRIMALDI.—This writer was a professor in one of the public Universities of Calabria. He is the author of "*Riflessioni sopra l'Ineguaglianza tra gli Uomini*." He opposes the views of Rousseau, whom he censures rather severely.

VINCENZO MICHELI.—This author was a native of Sicily, and gained considerable reputation for his metaphysical talents. The system of Wolff engaged much of his attention; and he entered

deeply into the principles of "Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Necessary Connection."*

ANDREA SPAGNI.—This was a laborious writer on philosophy. He wrote on the nature of Ideas, on Cause and Effect, upon Good and Evil, and on Miracles.

* *Biografia degli Uom. Illustr. della Sicilia*, 1818.

CHAPTER XV.

WATTS, HUTCHESON, HARRIS, TUCKER, AND
HORNE TOOKE.

DR. WATTS.

WATTS's "Logic, or the Right use of Reason," published in 1725, has long been a classical work in the English language. It is not, however, a treatise embracing any metaphysical system or theory, save that of Mr. Locke, on which it is built.

On the nature of ideas, the author puts forth the following statement.

"First, the nature of perception shall just be mentioned, though this may seem to belong to another science rather than Logic.

"Perception is that act of the mind, (or as some philosophers call it, rather a passion or impression,) whereby the mind becomes conscious of any thing, as when I feel *hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat*; when I see a *horse, a tree, or a man*; when I hear a human *voice, or thunder*; I am conscious of these things, and this is called *perception*.

"An *idea* is genercally defined a '*representation of a thing in the mind*;' it is a representation of something that we have *seen, felt, heard, &c.* That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought, wish, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the *idea* of hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c.

"It is not the outward object or *thing which is perceived*; nor is it the very perception, or sense and feeling, of hunger or cold, &c., which is the *idea*; but the thing as it exists in the mind by way of conception or representation; this is properly the *idea*."*

Of the objects of perception, Dr. Watts makes the following remarks. "The object of perception is that which is represented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern according to which the idea is formed; and thus judgments, propositions, reasonings, and long discourses, may all become objects of perception.* * * * Every *object* of our ideas is called a *theme*, whether it be a *being* or *not-being*; for *not-being* may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being."†

The Doctor divides all our ideas into four classes; clear and distinct, or obscured and confused; vulgar or learned; perfect or imperfect; and true or false.‡

Dr. Watts's "Improvement of the Mind" is an excellent work. It is metaphysics carried into every-day life and practice. Its grand object is to point out those general rules which it is proper to

* *Logic*, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 15.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

observe, in conducting the intellectual, moral, and religious education of youth. The work is full of good sense and practical wisdom, but contains little which can properly come within the range of mental philosophy. The first volume contains the rules and remarks necessary to obtain knowledge, and the second is devoted to explaining the most simple and efficient mode of communicating that knowledge to others.*

DR. HUTCHESON.

Dr. Hutcheson is rather a theoretical moralist than a metaphysician. There are, however, many interesting and important principles connected with mental philosophy slightly touched upon in his works. These are "An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," 1729; "*Philosophia Moralis*," 1745; and "Synopsis *Metaphysica*." The two last were text-books for his students.

The fame of Hutcheson is chiefly connected with the progress of metaphysical speculations in Scotland. His public lectures in the University of Glasgow, awakened among the youth of that long established and popular seminary of learning, a decided taste for mental inquiries; and gave rise to that peculiar method of philosophizing, which has more or less characterised all the metaphysical discussions which have emanated from that country for the last century.

* Edition 1782.

Hutcheson diverged from the systems which referred our knowledge chiefly to sensation; and he showed that there were a vast number of our more elevated and abstract notions, particularly relative to beauty and virtue, and the operations of the imagination, which seem to spring solely from the internal movements or resources of mind itself. In this point of view his philosophy generally is of historical interest.

On the nature of *perception*, Dr. Hutcheson remarks, "Those ideas which are raised in the mind upon the presence of external objects, and their acting upon our bodies, are called *sensations*. We find that the mind in such cases is passive, and has not power directly to prevent the perception or idea, or to vary it at its reception, as long as we continue our minds in a state fit to be acted upon by the external object."*

"The mind," he says again, "has a power of *compounding* ideas which were received separately; of *comparing* objects by means of the ideas, and of observing their relations and proportion; of *enlarging* and *diminishing* its ideas at pleasure, or in a certain ratio or degree; and of considering *separately* each of the simple ideas which might perhaps have been impressed on the sensation. This last operation we commonly call *abstraction*."†

In the "Synopsis Metaphysica," he maintains that there are certain mental axioms, which do not owe their existence to sensation, but are *con-
nate* with the power of the mind itself. His rea-

* Inquiry concerning Beauty and Order, p. 2.

† Ibid., p. 3.

sonings on this point are very cogent and conclusive; and there are few of the writers of Scotland, since his day, who have added much to the solidity and perspicuity of his philosophy.

JAMES HARRIS.

Mr. Harris published his "*Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar*," in 1751. The grand and leading object of the work is to show the connection between language and mind. The author observes, that "It is a phrase often applied to man, when speaking, that *he speaks his mind*; as much as to say, that his speech or discourse is a publishing of *some energy or motion of the soul*. So it indeed is in every one that speaks. Now the powers of the soul (over and above the mere nutritive) may be included all of them in those of *perception* and those of *volition*. By the powers of perception I mean the *senses* and the *intellect*; by the powers of volition I mean in an extended sense, not only the *will*, but the several *passions* and *appetites*; in short, all *that moves to action, whether rational or irrational*. If then the leading powers of the soul be these two, it is plain that every speech or sentence, as far as it exhibits the soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

"If we *assert*, then is it a sentence which respects the powers of *perception*. For what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to publish some *perception* either of the senses

or of the intellect. Again, if we *interrogate*, or if we *command*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish*, what do we do but publish so many different *volitions*? For who is it that *questions*? He that has a desire to be informed. Who is it that *commands*? He that has a *will*, which he would have obeyed. What are those beings, who either *wish* or *pray*? Those who feel certain wants, either for themselves or others.

"If then the soul's leading powers be the two above mentioned, and if it be true that all speech is a publication of these powers, it will follow that *every sentence will be either a sentence of asseveration, or a sentence of volition.*"*

Our notion or idea of *time* is thus accounted for by Mr. Harris. "The world has been likened to a variety of things, but it appears to resemble no one more than some moving spectacle, (such as a procession or a triumph,) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing as fast as others make their appearance. The senses look on while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is *immediately present*, which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to the soul's superior powers. Having done this they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing save what is present and instantaneous. But to the *memory*, to the *imagination*, and above all to the *intellect*, the several *nows* and *instants* are not lost, as to the *senses*, but are preserved and made objects of *steady* comprehension, however in their own nature they

* Works, Edit. Earl of Malmesbury, Vol. 1. p. 224.

may be transitory and passing. Now it is from contemplating two or more of these *instants* under one view, together with that interval of continuity which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the idea of *time*.”*

Mr. Harris differs entirely from Mr. Loeke's theory as to the origin of our knowledge. Sensation and reflection are not adequate, he conceives, to account for it. There must be innate *forms* of thought. Harris says, “Had we not better reason thus, upon such an abstruse subject? Either all *minds* have their ideas *derived*, or all have them *original*; or some have them original, and some derived. If all minds have them derived, they must be derived from something *which is itself not mind*, and thus we insensibly fall into a kind of atheism. If all have them original, *then are all minds divine*, an hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one* mind (at least) have *original* ideas, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those minds, whose ideas are *derived*, most likely to derive them? From *mind*, or from *body*? From *mind*, a thing *homogeneous*, or from *body*, a thing *heterogeneous*? From mind such as (from the hypothesis) has *original ideas*, or from *body*, which we cannot discover to have any ideas at all? An examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts.”†

* Works, Vol. 1. p. 274.

† Ibid., Vol. 1. p. 429.

In that part of Mr. Harris's work called "Philosophical Arrangements," in the second volume, the reader will find a great number of ingenious remarks on metaphysical subjects. Indeed this division of his treatise is more interesting than his "Hermes." We cannot however enter into its nature or merits.

ABRAHAM TUCKER.

Tucker's "Light of Nature Pursued," published in 1763, has been considered by many as an interesting book. It is written in a peculiar style; desultory, unconnected, and rambling; much upon the same plan as Montaigne's Essays.

The treatise is in four volumes; but the author's metaphysical speculations on the origin of our knowledge, are chiefly confined to the first. Body and mind, he sets out with affirming, are two distinct objects.

Tucker uses the word *idea* in a loose and undetermined sense. He says, "Idea is the same as image, and the term imagination implies a receptacle of images; but image being appropriated by common use to visible objects, could not well be extended to other things without confusion; wherefore, learned men have imported the Greek word *idea*, signifying image or appearance; to which, being their own peculiar property, they might affix as large a signification as they pleased. For the image of a sound or of goodness would have offended our delicacy, but the idea of either goes down

glibly ; therefore, idea is the same with respect to things in general, as image with respect to objects of vision.”*

The faculties of the mind are treated of at considerable length, but there is not anything of novelty in the arrangement or illustration of them. Tucker has done little more here than merely to copy Locke.

On the nature of *reflection*, the author remarks, “But those ideas before mentioned having gained admittance through the avenues of sensation, do, by their mutual action upon one another, and by their operation on the mind, or of the mind upon them, generate new ideas, which the senses were not capable of conveying ; such as willing, discerning, remembering, comparison, relation, power, and innumerable others.”†

Tucker has been accused, and justly, of taking many of his views of the mind from Dr. Hartley ; and merely changing some of the leading technical terms. Instead of the Doctor’s *Association of Ideas*, we have *Translation*. Sir James Mackintosh observes, relative to this plagiarism, that in the part of his work, (Tucker’s,) which relates to the intellect, he has adopted much from Hartley ; hiding, and thereby aggravating the offence by a change of technical terms ; and he was ungrateful enough to countenance the vulgar sneer which involves the mental analysis of that philosopher in the ridicule to which his physiological hypothesis is liable.”‡

* *Light of Nature Pursued*, vol. 1, p. 38. † *Ibid.* vol. 1, p. 132.

‡ *Dissertation*, p. 371.

Tucker was a zealous disciple of Locke, of whom he speaks with the greatest deference and respect. "Mr. Locke," says he, "in particular, has contributed not a little to facilitate the increase of knowledge, by pointing out the sources and channels from whence it must be derived, and clearing away that incumbrance of innate ideas, real essences, and such like rubbish, that obstructed the searches of the studious formerly; so that the reasonings of men are become more accurate, more solid, and if one may say so, more reasonable than they were before. I cannot expect to run to such lengths as he has done; for if I may advance one step further in the way that he leads, or suggest a single hint that may be improved by some abler hand for the real benefit of mankind, I shall not think that I have laboured in vain, nor lived in vain. Whatever I may be able to do, I stand much indebted to Mr. Locke, for having learned from him which way to direct my observation, and how to make use of what I observe."

JOHN HORNE TOOKE.

This author, so well known in political and literary history, is commonly considered as a metaphysician of the pure nominalist or material school. His famous "*Επεα Πτεροεντα*, or *Diversions of Purley*," contains his opinions of the nature of language as an instrument of thought.

Tooke conceived that there were no general or abstract ideas; but only general terms of language.

His views may be embodied in two or three short quotations from the above work. "And amongst many other things, I think he (Locke) would not have talked of the *composition of ideas*; but would have seen that it was merely a contrivance of language; and, consequently that it was as improper to speak of a *complex idea*, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star; and that they are not ideas, but merely *terms*, which are *general* and *abstract*.....I only desire you to read the 'Essay on the Human Understanding' again with attention, and see whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded, will not hold equally true and clear, if you substitute the composition, &c., of *terms*, wherever he has supposed a composition, &c., of *ideas*. And if that shall, upon consideration, appear to you to be the case, you will need no other argument against the *composition of ideas*. It being exactly similar to that unanswerable one, which Mr. Locke himself declares to be sufficient against their being innate. For the supposition is unnecessary. Every purpose for which the composition of ideas was imagined, being more easily and naturally answered by the composition of terms; whilst at the same time it does likewise clear up many difficulties, in which the supposed composition of ideas necessarily involves us."*

* Diversions, pp. 21. 22. See also the Author's Letter to Mr. Dunning.

CHAPTER XVI.

DIDEROT, COCHET, BATTEAUX, VOLTAIRE,
HELVETIUS, AND D'HOLBACH.

DENIS DIDEROT.

DIDEROT was one of the most active and distinguished of the French *savans* of the eighteenth century. His connexion with the *Encyclopédie* and all the most eminent of its contributors, gave him an unlimited sway over the speculative opinions of his countrymen.

The metaphysics of Diderot were of a most decidedly material cast. An idea was a sensation; and general or abstract conceptions of the mind, only *transformed* sensations. This was the sum total of his creed.

The works of Diderot amount to fifteen volumes octavo; but there are only two or three of them which contain speculations relating to the mental and moral nature of man.

The doctrines of necessity and materialism form the ground work of all his disquisitions. Every-

thing is matter ; and nothing could have happened otherwise than it has done, or will do in future. All his philosophical writings exercised a pernicious influence over the minds of his countrymen ; by inducing them to consider man, in his relations, as only a single degree above the beasts that perish.

COCHET.

Cochet published at Paris, in 1753, his work, "*La Métaphysique, qui contient l'Ontologie, la Théologie Naturelle, et la Pneumatologie*:" another work, "*La Clef des Sciences et des Beaux Arts*," was published a short time after.

The metaphysical speculations of this author are evidently a compound of the doctrines of Gassendi and Malebranchc. They are not characterised by any great subtilty or comprehensivness of aim ; but many judicious and ingenious remarks are interspersed throughout the pages of the first mentioned work. Both treatises evidently indicate a mind familiarised with mental discussions, and possessing no ordinary philosophical attainments. The author has given a mathematical form to his reasonings, by stating them under the heads of axioms, definitions, &c. The utility of treating topics on the human mind in this mode, is very questionable.

ABBE BATTEAUX.

The Abbé's chief work is "*Histoire des Causes Premières ; ou Exposition Sommaire des Pensées*

des Philosophes sur les Principes des Etres," 1769. In this treatise the learned ecclesiastic enters into an inquiry relative to *First Causes* by a minute and rigid examination of the opinions which most of the leading nations of the world have entertained on this important subject. These critical judgments of the author are marked with great clearness, acuteness, and impartiality. He gives likewise an exposition of *First Causes* from the Schools of the most distinguished philosophers of antiquity.

VOLTAIRE.

The genius of Voltaire was all-predominant over France, and even over some neighbouring continental countries, for half a century. His influence in the walks of philosophy was nearly as great as in polite literature. Though not possessing mental qualifications expressly fitted for constructing theories and expounding them with effect, yet he displayed a remarkable quickness and aptitude for the cultivation of abstract studies; to such an extent, at least, as to make them comparatively agreeable and popularly instructive.

Voltaire was at once great and little, disinterested and selfish, profound and shallow. He laboured from an ardent desire to enlighten his age; yet we see in almost every movement, the cravings of an inordinate vanity, and the little jealousies and spites of a narrow soul. He could discuss the most profound and important questions,

with a gravity and seriousness befitting their intrinsic worth; and yet he would often mar all his exertions by some display of low and degrading buffoonery. For instance, he treats Leibnitz's *Pre-Established Harmony*, with philosophical decorum and attention; and then writes his "Candidus, or all for the Best," to overwhelm the theory with a load of caustic wit and gross obscenity. And this was the mode in which he exercised his unrivalled powers during his long and eventful life. He was a zealous advocate for intellectual freedom, but a despot at heart; could write sensibly and eloquently on the being of a God, and the obligations of morality, and yet sport his light and impious jests upon both. He was a lover of all that is noble, sublime, and beautiful, in nature and in man; still he took delight in wallowing in the mire, and bespattering all around him with mud and dirt. He was, unquestionably, the most discordant intellectual compound of his age and country.

There is this characteristic circumstance, however, about the philosophical writings of Voltaire, that they display more than an average share of *common sense*. He was no enthusiastic visionary; no dealer in incomprehensible dogmas; no system or world-maker. What was sensible, intelligent, and demonstrative, always claimed his attention. He could be dogmatical and superficial; but he could not be stupid or silly. The leading features of a system he could depict with unrivalled clearness and effect. Hence we find him the able and zeal-

ous expounder of the Newtonian system, and the theory of Locke. The mental speculations of the latter philosopher were great favorites with him; and he made them known and respected from one end of Europe to the other. But he did this in his own way and fashion. He gave an unfair representation of Locke's doctrine, from his lack and disregard of a just and refined discrimination. This may be pardoned, from the peculiar construction of Voltaire's mind, and from the circumstance of his having imparted to the speculations of our countryman a high degree of interest among all the profound thinkers of Europe. The poet's influence was all-powerful in his day. A great poetical genius, to whom kings, and popes, and cardinals, and the wise and mighty of the earth, paid homage, could not but give a wide currency to every thing he discussed, either for good or for ill.

The connexion which Voltaire had with the theatre of France, was no inconsiderable item in the mass of power he exercised over the philosophy of his age. The stage was the great arena of literature during the eighteenth century, and he held the chief place among a numerous and powerful host of brilliant rivals. He made many attempts, some of which were successful, to introduce philosophical opinions and sentiments in theatrical pieces; and this expedient gave a popular currency to a great portion of what was really obnoxious and unsound in his abstract speculations. The public mind, the gay and thoughtless, became charged

with a mass of abstract crudities, which exercised, many years after, a baneful influence on the happiness, virtue, and religion of his country.

The mental philosophy of Voltaire is a mixture of good and bad; but whether the beneficial predominates over the injurious, it would be a difficult matter to determine. All his articles on metaphysical topics vary in their execution and purpose, from the impulse under which they were written, and from the circumstances in which the author happened for the moment to be placed. When he was hand in glove with Frederic the Great, he was one kind of philosopher; when with Diderot and D'Alembert, in the office of the *Encyclopédie*, he was of another stamp; and when he received some mark of attention from any member of the Catholic Church, which was not very often, then he discussed philosophical doctrines in the spirit of a saint. He invariably wrote in earnest; and his philosophical opinions were always his own conscientious opinions for the time being. They are consequently detached, desultory, and unconnected; diversified in their style, tone, and object. We have from his prolific and versatile pen essays on the origin of our ideas; on the nature of matter and mind; the constitutional differences among men; the nature and proof of a Supreme Being; the doctrine of liberty and necessity; and many others; all of which are comprehended under the title of "*Traité de Métaphysique*." His "*Dictionnaire Philosophique*" contains also many speculations on metaphysics.

As an instance of the hasty and superficial

manner in which Voltaire conducted his metaphysical speculations, we may cite an instance, relative to the doctrine of *innate ideas*. Speaking of Descartes' notions on the subject, he says :—

“Descartes asserted that the soul, at its coming into the body, is informed with the whole series of metaphysical notions; knowing God; infinite space; possessing all abstract ideas; in a word, completely endowed with the most sublime lights, which it unhappily forgets at its issuing from the womb.

“With regard to myself, I am as little inclined as Locke could be, to fancy that, some weeks after I was conceived, I was a very learned soul; knowing at that time a thousand things which I forgot at my birth; and possessing, when in the womb, (though to no manner of purpose,) knowledge which I lost the instant I had occasion for it, and which I have never since been able to recover perfectly.”*

Now this is just that mode of misrepresentation and caricature, which the great poet adopted on a variety of interesting and momentous questions connected with human nature. His chief aim was to raise the laugh against any thing he was disinclined to adopt or to investigate profoundly. Nothing ever fell from Descartes' pen that could, by any fair or candid interpretation, form a ground for such childish and disreputable remarks.

In the same manner we find him trifling with the good sense of the reader, relative to the doctrine

* Letters concerning the English Nation.

of liberty and necessity. He is enthusiastic and eloquent against the scheme of fatalism ; as we see in the following lines :—

“ Vois de la liberté cet ennemi mutin,
Aveugle partisan d'un aveugle destin ;
Entends comme il consulte, approuve, ou délibère ;
Entends de quel reproche il couvre un adversaire ;
Vois comment d'un rival il cherehe à se venger,
Comme il punit son fils, et le veut corriger.
Il le croyait donc libre ?—Oui, sans doute, et lui-même
Dément à chaque pas son funeste expliquer,
Ce dogme absurde à eroire, absurde à pratiquer.
Il reconnoît en lui le sentiment qu'il brave,
Il agit comme libre et parle comme esclave.”

In prose he ridicules all this *poetical* philosophy. He makes an appeal, in favour of material necessity, to the heavenly bodies ; to the comets, the planets, and the fixed stars ; and asks if it be at all probable, that when we perceive all this immense host of worlds obeying fixed and eternal laws, an insignificant creature like man, only five feet odd inches in stature, should claim the right of doing what he pleases ? The thing, he says, is absurd.

On the nature of the human soul, Voltaire is as variable in his sentiments and opinions, as on most other metaphysical subjects. The general current of his discussions on this topic, runs into materialism. There may be, he thinks, a chain of beings, rising to infinity ; and matter may be endowed with the power of thinking. He says : “ This idea seems to us worthy of the greatness of God,

if any ever was, or can be. Among these substances he might no doubt have chosen one, in order to place it in our body, and which is known by the name of the human soul ; the sacred books which we have read, tell us this soul is immortal. Reason in this point agrees with revelation ; for how is it possible any substance should perish ; and if all nature should perish, yet being must ever exist. We cannot conceive such a thing as the creation of a substance ; and it is equally impossible for us to form any idea of its annihilation. But we dare not venture to assert, that the Sovereign Lord of all things may not also have given sentiment and perception to the being called matter. You are perfectly sure that the essence of your soul is thought, which is what we are by no means positive of.....Thought may be, not the essence of the thinking substance, but a gift which the Creator may have given to those we call thinking beings.”*

With respect to the great doctrine of a Deity, it is almost impossible to determine what were Voltaire's settled opinions on it. In many parts of his writings, the idea of a God seems to merge into something material, necessary, and eternal ; in others again, his opinions seem to be as sound and orthodox as any rational Christian could require. In his examinations of the metaphysics of Sir Isaac Newton and M. Leibnitz, he argues strenuously for the intelligent personality of the

* Œuvres, vol. 13, p. 109.

Deity. He says : " Sir Isaac Newton was firmly persuaded of the existence of a God ; by which he understood not only an infinite, omnipotent, eternal, and creating Being ; but moreover a Master, who has made a relation between himself and his creatures ; for the knowledge of a God without such relation is a mere barren idea, which leaves human nature destitute of morality and virtue.

" Hence this great philosopher makes a very singular remark at the end of his *Principia*, viz., that we do not say, *my eternal, my infinite*, because those attributes have no relation to human nature ; but that we do, and ought to say, *my God* ; thereby implying, that we understand him to be the master and preserver of our lives, and the object of our thoughts. I remember that in many conversations I had with Clarke in the year 1726, that great man never mentioned the name of God without a most remarkable recognition and reverence ; and upon my observing to him the impression it made on me, he told me that he had insensibly learned that custom (which indeed every one should practise) from Sir Isaac Newton.

" Sir Isaac's philosophy necessarily leads to the knowledge of a Supreme Being, who has created and disposed every thing freely. For if, according to him, and indeed according to the reason of things, the world is finite ; if there is a *vacuum*, matter does not then exist ; and if so, it must receive its existence from a free cause. If matter gravitates, as it has been plainly demonstrated that it does, it does not gravitate by its own nature, and

must therefore have received its gravitation from God. If the planets move in one direction rather than in another in an unresisting space, the hand of the Creator has then ordered their courses in this direction with an absolute freedom."

For further sentiments respecting a Deity, we may also refer the reader to the articles in Voltaire's "Dictionnaire Philosophique," *Dieu* and *Style*, wherein he expresses himself with becoming indignation and horror of the atheism promulgated in D'Holbach's "System of Nature."*

HELVETIUS.

This author is known to metaphysicians principally from his two works, "On the Mind," and "On Man." The latter is a posthumous publication. The mental theory maintained in these two

* Voltaire's works are published at Paris in 56 volumes, 1834.

"Voltaire a eu le mérite de songer à introduire dans l'histoire *les mœurs des nations* et les détails de la vie privée; c'est quelque chose. Voltaire, il faut le dire encore, a le sentiment de l'humanité; mais ce sentiment, mal dirigé par une critique sans exactitude et sans profondeur, dégénère constamment en déclamations assez bonnes dans d'assez mauvaises tragédies, mais qui ne valent rien dans l'histoire, où la passion et le sentiment doivent faire place à l'intelligence. D'ailleurs, quand on s'emporte si violemment contre ce qui a gouverné si longtemps l'espèce humaine, au fond c'est l'humanité qu'on accuse; car enfin un état, une religion ne s'établit pas, ne se soutient pas toute seule; il faut qu'elle trouve quelque consentement parmi les hommes. Il est vrai que sur la fin de son existence elle essaie souvent de s'en passer; mais d'abord elle n'a pu s'établir que par là; et je ne dis pas seulement par le consentement, mais par l'approbation, par la confiance et par l'amour, en un mot, par la sympathie des masses avec les lois religieuses ou politiques qui leur étaient annoncées."—(Cousin, Histoire de la Philosophie, 11me leçon.)

treatises is, that all our ideas are derived from the senses; that all men's minds possess originally an equal aptitude for knowledge; and that the difference which we find to exist between one mind and another, arises from the difference in education; meaning by this term not only domestic treatment, but that kind of education we obtain from the different situations in life in which we are placed. In our author's opinion, all the operations of the mind may be resolved into this general one, that of observing the resemblances and differences between objects, and their fitness and unfitness with regard to ourselves. A judgment formed after a comparison of material objects, is a pure sensation; and every conclusion of the understanding with regard to abstract ideas, may be considered as precisely the same thing.

The desire men have to live in a state of society, is the result of their bodily wants. Interest and want are the principles of all sociability. It is, therefore, those principles alone (of which few writers have given clear ideas) that unite men among themselves; and the force of their union is always in proportion to that of habit and want. From the moment the young savage, or the young bear, is able to provide for his nourishment and his defence, the one quits the hut, and the other the den of his parents. The eagle, in like manner, drives away her young ones from the nest, the moment they have sufficient strength to dart upon their prey and live without her aid.

It may be remarked here, that the whole theory

of Helvetius rests upon the physical distinction which exists between man and the animal creation. In his book "*De l'Esprit*," he lays down the following propositions on this topic.

1st. That the feet of quadrupeds terminate either in horns, in nails, or in claws. This peculiar organization of the feet deprives them of the power of touch, considered as a medium of communication with external objects, and also from making even the smallest advances in the mechanical arts of life.

2nd. The life of most animals is of shorter duration than that of man, and on this account they have not the power to make so many observations, nor to acquire so many ideas.

3rd. The provision which nature has made for the clothing and self-defence of animals being more effective than for man, fewer inducements or motives are furnished the former to stimulate their invention. If beasts of prey are more cunning and adroit than others, it is because hunger excites their invention, and leads them to employ stratagems for the capture of their prey.

4th. Man is the most prolific and versatile of all animals. He lives under every climate; and in proportion as any species of animals capable of making observations on things around them is multiplied, the more ideas and the greater ingenuity is it likely to possess in the course of time.

Helvetius then goes on to show why monkeys, whose paws bear a striking resemblance to the human hand, seem to have no principle of intellectual or social improvement in their nature. The author

attempts to account for this discrepancy by assigning the following causes: Men are numerous; few monkeys have the strength of men, and their social confederacies are of a temporary character; monkeys have few wants, and, consequently, the faculty of invention is not called into exercise; they live a shorter time, and the organic structure of their bodies keeps them, like children, in constant motion.

The author adds to these propositions the observation, that by combining all these marked differences between man and other animals, we may easily perceive why sensibility and memory, which are faculties common to both, should in the lower animals be unproductive of any intellectual fruit.*

Helvetius has made a dexterous use of the *law of continuity*, as laid down by Leibnitz. In support of his favourite theory, the original equality of all

* " Nous avons en nous deux facultés, ou, si je l'ose dire, deux puissances passives, dont l'existence est généralement et distinctement reconnue.

" L'une est la faculté de recevoir les impressions différentes que font sur nous les objets extérieurs; on la nomme *sensibilité physique*.

" L'autre est la faculté de conserver l'impression que ces objets ont faite sur nous; on l'appelle *mémoire*; et la mémoire n'est autre chose qu'une sensation continuée, mais affaiblie.

" Ces facultés, que je regarde comme les causes productrices de nos pensées, et qui nous sont communes avec les animaux, ne nous fourniraient cependant qu'un très-petit nombre d'idées, si elles n'étaient jointes en nous à une certaine organisation extérieure.

" Si la nature, au lieu de mains et de doigts flexibles, eût terminé nos poignets par un pied de cheval, qui doute que les hommes, sans arts, sans habitations, sans défense contre les animaux, tout occupés du soin de pourvoir à leur nourriture et d'éviter les bêtes féroces, ne fussent encore errans dans les forêts comme de troupeaux fugitifs."—(De l'Esprit, p. 12.)

men, he endeavours to show that the successive advancement in science, made by different philosophers at various times, is just the result of a system of intellectual progression; one man going a little beyond another, till discovery reaches a certain point; and then it is fully consummated by some mind, not superior in power to its predecessors, but only placed in a position to give a finishing stroke to their accumulated labours. "It is," he observes, "upon *this* mind that the world is always ready to bestow the attribute of genius. From the tragedies of 'The Passion,' to the poets Hardi and Rotrou, and to the 'Marianne' of Tristram, the French theatre was always acquiring successively an infinite number of inconsiderable improvements. Corneille was born at a moment when the addition he made to the art could not fail to form an epoch; and accordingly Corneille is universally regarded as a genius. I am far from wishing to detract from the glory of this great poet. I wish only to prove, that *nature never proceeds per saltum*, and that the *law of continuity is always exactly observed*. The remarks now made on the dramatic art, may also be applied to the sciences which rest on observation."*

One of the leading ideas running through the whole speculative system of Helvetius, is, that *happiness* is the grand object of man's desire and solicitude; and that the *mind* is so constituted, as to aid him in this pursuit. In proportion as the

* De l'Esprit, Dis. 4, chap. 1. Stewart's Dissertations, p. 135.

intellectual faculties are judiciously developed and exercised, exactly in the same degree is the happiness of the individual and of society promoted. This position is worked out in a variety of forms by Helvetius; both in his treatise "*De l'Esprit*," and "*De l'Homme*." The same opinion of this moral and mental nature of man, predominates in his poem "*Le Bonheur*."*

If a reader can withdraw his mind from any thoughts of the theory of Helvetius, and keep it to a consideration of his facts and observations, he will find a rich fund of sound knowledge in his writings. He was deeply read in history, and showed himself an acute observer of mankind.

BARON D'HOLBACH.

This author's reputed treatise, "*Système de la Nature*," was published in Paris, 4 vols., 1770.

This work has been translated into most of the languages of Europe. It is an open declaration of Atheism in its worst form; and its metaphysics are a compound of the most absolute fatality and the grossest materialism.

The principles of this work lie in a small compass. There exist a multitude of material objects, which are perpetually receiving and communicating different degrees of motion. This motion makes matter change its place; and every being, by virtue

* See in particular *De l'Esprit*, 4 Dis. chap. 13.

of its particular nature and constitution, is susceptible of a power of producing, receiving, and communicating this motion in divers forms and degrees. Matter and motion exist from all eternity; they cannot be annihilated, nor were they ever created. The existence of any other thing or cause, external to matter, cannot be demonstrated. The different kinds of matter, and the different powers they possess in receiving and communicating motion, are the sole cause of all the varied phenomena of the material universe. We see amongst external objects some disposed to unite with one another, and some disposed to rebel. This has given rise to a certain nomenclature descriptive of these laws of motion, such as attraction and repulsion, antipathies and sympathies, affinities, relations, &c.

Moralists ought to consider man under a somewhat analagous point of view; as possessed of love and hatred, friendship and aversion. But these are but the result of matter and motion; self-love performs the same office in human nature, that motion does in the material world; and both the moral and the physical phenomena we behold, are connected together by laws of eternal immutability. The world altogether ought to be considered as an immense chain of causes and effects; and all things of a miraculous nature are radically impossible.

"He who distinguishes," says Baron D'Holbach, *"the soul from the body, only makes a distinction between his brain and himself."* Such in few words is the theory involved in the famous "*Système de*

la Nature;" a work which produced fearful and incalculable consequences in France for many years.*

* The "Système de la Nature" was attacked by many writers in France; particularly by Nic. Sylv. Bergier, Confessor to the Aunts of Louis XVI.; Salv. de Castillon; Guillaume de Rochefort; and Louis Claude de Saint Martin. It is stated upon some French authorities, that Naigeon carried the Manuscript of the "Système de la Nature," to Amsterdam, where it was printed by Michel Rey; and by this means it was surreptitiously circulated in France. Almost all the other irreligious publications of D'Holbach were printed at the same place, and transmitted to the press by the same agent.

CHAPTER XVII.



THE MENTAL THEORIES OF VIBRATIONS, AND
THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS—HARTLEY, BONNET,
PRIESTLEY, DARWIN, AND BELSHAM.

WE come now to notice a class of opinions, relative to the nature and operations of mind, somewhat different from the general current of those which have fallen under review in the preceding chapters of this Volume. The doctrines we are now about to notice, occupied a considerable share of attention fifty years ago; but have been gradually receding from philosophical discussion, and public interest, both in England and on the Continent, since the death of Dr. Priestley. They possess, however, some value in themselves, besides the mere historical importance attached to them.

We have here classed these five metaphysicians together, from the similarity, or rather the complete identity of their mental speculations. Dr. Hartley's theory is contained in his "Observations on Man;" the Disquisitions of M. Bonnet, of Ge-

neva, in his "*Essai Analytique de l'Ame*," and "*Contemplation de la Nature*;" Dr. Priestley's thoughts are expounded in his "*Preliminary Essay*" to an abridgment of Dr. Hartley's "*Observations*;" Dr. Darwin's opinions are contained in his "*Zoonomia*;" and Dr. Belsham's system will be found in his "*Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind*."

In arranging our statements and observations in this Chapter, we shall first notice the doctrines of Vibrations, and Associations of Ideas; and then offer a few remarks on the writings of the respective philosophers whose names we have above enumerated, and who are connected with the history of this class of opinions on mental philosophy. This discussion must needs be, in some measure, a mingled one; for it is impossible to separate our comments on the general principles of the theories under consideration, from the comments, observations, and statements of those who have supported and promulgated them. We shall endeavour, however, to be brief, and to avoid repetitions as much as we possibly can.

From Dr. Hartley's own account, as well as from that of his zealous and respectable followers, Drs. Priestley and Belsham, it would appear that the first suggestions which he received of the doctrine of vibrations were from some casual hints contained in the works of Sir Isaac Newton. In that philosopher's "*Principia*," and in the *Queries* at the end of his "*Optics*," we find the remarks alluded to. Sir Isaac Newton supposes that a very subtile and

elastic fluid, which he calls *æther*, for the sake merely of giving it a name, is diffused through the pores of all gross bodies, as well as through the open spaces that are void of gross matter. He supposes likewise that it is rarer in the pores of bodies than in open spaces, and even rarer in small pores and dense bodies than in large pores and rare bodies; and also that its density increases in receding from gross matter; so, for instance, as to be greater at the one-hundredth of an inch from the surface of any body than at its surface; and so on in a corresponding proportion. To the action of this æther he ascribes the attractions of gravitation and cohesion, the attractions and repulsions of electrical bodies, the mutual influences of bodies and light upon each other, the effects and communications of heat, and the performance of *animal sensation and motion*. In the Queries attached to Sir Isaac's "Optics," we find the following:—"Do not the rays of light, in falling upon the bottom of the eye, excite vibrations in the *tunica retina*? which vibrations being propagated along the solid fibres of the optic nerves into the brain, cause the sense of seeing. For, because dense bodies conserve their heat a long time, and the densest bodies conserve their heat the longest, the vibrations of their parts are of a lasting nature; and therefore may be propagated along solid fibres of uniform dense matter to a great distance, for conveying into the brain the impressions made upon all the organs of sense. For that motion which can continue long in one and the same part of a body, can be propagated a

long way from one part to another, supposing the body homogeneous; so that the motion may not be reflected, refracted, interrupted, or disordered by any unevenness of the body.

“Do not several sorts of rays make vibrations of several bignesses, which, according to their bignesses, excite sensations of several colours, much after the manner that the vibrations of the air, according to their several bignesses, excite sensations of several sounds? And particularly, do not the most refrangible rays excite the shortest vibrations for making a sensation of deep violet, the least refrangible the largest for making a sensation of deep red, and the several intermediate sorts of rays vibrations of several intermediate bignesses, to make sensations of the several intermediate colours?”

Upon the suggestions contained in these quotations, the Doctor founded his whole system of vibrations. His doctrine may be briefly comprehended in the following summary:—All our ideas and sensations are derived from external objects acting through the medium of our organs of sense or perception; namely, sight, taste, hearing, feeling, and smelling. These different organs consist of nerves suited to their nature; and by these nerves being affected by the external impulse of various bodies, they convey these outward impressions to the brain, which is the great reservoir or common centre of the nervous influence. The nerves and the brain are considered to be the same in their natures and properties. Whether these

nerves resemble *tubes*, for the purpose of conveying a fluid, or they partake of the nature of chords or strings, is not fully decided; but Dr. Priestley is inclined to the latter supposition, that the nerves vibrate somewhat analogous to a stringed instrument of music.

That sensations are conveyed to the brain in the form of vibration, is rendered highly probable from the manner in which the senses of seeing and hearing are affected. It is maintained that the retina is affected with a tremulous motion by the rays of light falling upon it, and this impression or motion continues for some time, and seems gradually to die away when the object which produced it is removed. If a person keep his eye fixed for any length of time upon a luminous object, and afterwards shut it, he will observe that the impression he feels seems to partake of the nature of a tremulous or vibratory motion. If the nerves employed in vision are affected at their extremity in this tremulous manner, does it not become exceedingly probable that the impression is conveyed to the brain by a continuation of this same motion, seeing that the brain is of precisely the same nature as the nerves, and consequently that an idea is nothing more than a vibratory motion of the parts of the brain?

As the texture of the nerves, as far as observations can be made, appears to be the same in all the senses or organs of perception, it is but reasonable to infer, from the analogy of structure, that, if impressions on one sense be conveyed to the brain

by vibrations, the impressions upon the other senses will be conveyed in the same manner. In the organ of hearing this is very probable. The professors in the science of "Acoustics" tell us, that sound is produced by the agitation or vibratory motion of the air; and since this vibratory motion must consist of successive pulses, it will communicate a tremulous motion to the auditory nerve, and this motion will be communicated to the brain, and produce in us the idea or sensation of sound.

The mode in which material bodies act upon us by way of vibrations, is thus described by Hartley. "These vibrations are motions backwards and forwards of the small particles; of the same kind with the oscillations of pendulums, and the tremblings of the particles of sounding bodies. They must be conceived to be exceedingly short and small, so as not to have the least efficacy to disturb or move the whole bodies of the nerves or brain. For that the nerves themselves should vibrate like musical strings, is highly absurd..... We are to suppose the particles which vibrate to be of the inferior orders, and not those biggest particles, on which the operations in chemistry and the colour of natural bodies depend, according to Sir Isaac Newton. Hence I call the medullary particles, which vibrate, infinitesimal."*

It is maintained by Hartley and his followers, that the immense number and variety of vibrations which must take place in the brain at one and the same time, when our various senses are affected,

* Observations on Man, vol. 1. p. 12.

can create no difficulty in this hypothesis, particularly if we consider that there seems to be no limit to the number and variety of the vibrations with which the air itself is capable of being impressed. In a concert, where a great number of instruments are employed, a person skilled in the art of music can attend to any one of these instruments which he pleases, to the almost total exclusion of the rest. When we attend crowded assemblies, where many voices are to be heard at one and the same time, we learn the art of attending to any one or two of them; but there can be no doubt but that the sound of the other voices makes an impression on our ear, but from the inactivity of that faculty which makes us pay attention to our ideas, we do not receive any sensible impression from them.

The various kinds of simple as well as complex ideas may be accounted for, from the great difference in the nature of the vibrations occasioned in the brain, by various *degrees* of force in the vibrations, by a difference in their *kinds*, by the situation of the brain where they take place, *by the line of direction* in entering the brain, and *by the original differences in the constitution of the nerves themselves*.

The phenomena of vibrations are supposed to correspond happily enough in accounting for our *pleasurable* and *painful* sensations, by differing in *degree* and not in *kind*, and by passing insensibly from the pleasurable to the painful state. Thus, warmth to a moderate degree is pleasant and agreeable; but when it is increased beyond a certain measure, it becomes positively painful. Dr. Hart-

ley conjectures that the limit of pleasure and of pain is the *solution of continuity* in the particles of the nerves and brain, occasioned by the violent vibrations which accompany the sense of pain.

In a solid though soft substance like the brain, vibrations affecting any part of it, will leave that part more disposed to vibrate in future; so that when a second impression is made on it through the medium of any of the senses or organs of perception, this second impression will, from this predisposition in the brain to be more readily affected by repetition, be easily detected from a first impression; and it is further affirmed, that if two or more vibrations take place in the brain at the same time, they will modify and affect one another to a certain degree; and when any one of them affects the brain at a subsequent period, it will be more disposed to act upon the former vibration with which it had been previously, in point of time, connected. From this supposed love or sympathy, the associations of ideas and memory are attempted to be deduced.

From this brief outline of the system of vibrations, the reader will, I hope, be able to form to himself a pretty correct conception of its nature. To give a more detailed account would only be attended with additional irksomeness, as the whole doctrine is dry, abstruse, and but little calculated to engage the attention of the general reader. Besides, the system of Hartley is not very susceptible of condensation, or of correct abridgment, on account of the facts and circumstances being so

numerous, and the speculations so subtile and refined.

It may be remarked, that Dr. Hartley's system flatly denies the spontaneity of mind. He had still, however, to take a first moving power for granted; so that he was placed in no more favourable position than many other metaphysicians whose systems he thought erroneous. It was easy to make the whole man vibrate, from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet; but what puzzled the Doctor was, whence arose the first or moving mental power? He was obliged to jump to a conclusion at once; he must have a rallying point, or his system was lifeless. "Thus," says he, "I *suppose*, or *postulate*, in my first proposition, that sensations arise in the soul from motions excited in the medullary substance in the brain."* The brain is thus made the centre of all sensation and reflection; and by the innate power of this medullary substance, the whole man is set in motion; and all his thoughts, modes of reasoning, sentiments, habits, are, by this simple gratuitous principle, attempted to be accounted for.

Let us, however, pass over this fundamental assumption; let us admit all that the Doctor demands; what is the result? Suppose that all the nerves were to vibrate, and we were to find thinking or mental perception to follow: this would not enable us to account for any intellectual operations; for we should be just as far from their compre-

* Observations on Man, vol. 1, p. 526.

hension as before. If the brain and the whole nervous system were laid bare, as we display the wires in a piano-forte, and we could see all the various vibrations which are effected by the operations of external objects upon the senses; still we should be as far removed from a knowledge of the thinking principle, or mind, as we were before such wonderful mechanism was exhibited to our view. We might register every movement, and we might observe with great accuracy and minuteness various connections, between particular medullary motions and particular trains of thought; and yet there would not one single ray of intelligence fall upon the "sightless eye-ball" of the mind, as to its nature or principles of operation. This is evidently beyond the reach of any such theory.

We may also remark, that we find in all the arguments and observations which have been from time to time urged by the opponents of Dr. Hartley, against this theory of vibrations, that what lay at the bottom of all their opposition was, that it savoured too strongly of sheer *mechanism*. This can never be tolerated by mankind. It strikes at the root of some of the most powerful of the active feelings and principles of our nature. No matter how ingeniously contrived the machine may be; how fine its cords and pulleys, and easy and regular its movements; the moment it is displayed before us, we feel an instinctive thrill of horror; and immediately fall back upon our own conceived dignity of origin and nature, and inwardly resolve not to be made mere machines. This accounts for

the fate of all such physiological systems as that of Hartley. Mankind can never view an attempted approximation between matter and mind with calmness and complacency. There is no belief so deeply seated, and which manifests its existence in such a variety of ways, and with such overpowering emotions, as that which maintains that mind is *not* matter. Every thing about us repels the mechanical theorists from our intimate communion. We consider their mission to be, to deprive us of one of our most valuable prerogatives; to strip us of the noblest attribute of existence; and to level us with the animal creation. To listen to their statements and suggestions, is treason against our own honour and conscious dignity.

Such is the general outline of the Hartleian vibratory philosophy, and the ordinary feelings we display towards all such speculations. It is now nearly sunk into oblivion, both in England and on the Continent. It is certainly not now in a position to realize the splendid anticipations of its enthusiastic founder, when he thought that the time would soon arrive, "when future generations, shall put all kinds of evidences and inquiries into mathematical forms; reducing Aristotle's ten categories, and Bishop Wilkins' forty *summa genera*, to the head of quantity alone; so as to make mathematics and logic, natural history and civil history, natural philosophy and philosophy, of all other kinds, coincide *omni ex parte*."*

* Professor Stewart has the following remarks on the spirit of this system of philosophy: "When I study the intellectual powers of man,

We come now to the consideration of the second grand division of Dr. Hartley's system, the *Association of Ideas*. This has more plausibility and interest about it than the theory we have just noticed. The doctrine of Association was first hinted at by Hobbes; and after him Locke, in his "Essay on the Human Understanding," enters into some explanations respecting its nature, under the designation of sympathies and antipathies, which he termed *non-naturals*. He refers these "to trains of motion in the animal spirits, which, once set agoing, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, it is thus that ideas seem to be produced in our minds; or, if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into

in the writings of Hartley, of Priestley, of Darwin, or of Tooke, I feel as if I were examining the sorry mechanism that gives motion to a puppet. If, for a moment, I am carried along by their theories of human knowledge and of human life, I seem to myself to be admitted behind the curtain of what I had once conceived to be a magnificent theatre; and while I survey the tinsel frippery of the wardrobe, and the paltry decorations of the scenery, am mortified to discover the trick which had cheated my eye at a distance. This surely is not the characteristic of truth or of nature; the beauties of which invite our closest inspection; deriving new lustre from those microscopical researches which deform the most finished productions of art. If in our physical inquiries concerning a material world, every step that has been hitherto gained has at once exalted our conceptions of its immensity and of its order, can we reasonably suppose that the genuine philosophy of mind is to disclose to us a spectacle less pleasing or less elevating, than fancy or vanity had disposed us to anticipate?"—(Phil. Essays, p. 237.)

that track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body."

Afterwards, Mr. Gay, a clergyman in the West of England, slightly treated this subject in a dissertation prefixed to Bishop Law's translation of Archbishop King's "Origin of Evil." Mr. Gay says, "Our approbation of morality, and all affections whatever, are resolvable into reason, pointing out private happiness ; and are conversant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end ; and whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the association of ideas, and may properly enough be called habits. If this be clearly made out, the necessity of supposing a moral sense or public affections to be implanted in us, (since it arises only from the insufficiency of all other schemes to account for human actions,) will immediately vanish." It was from these hints that Dr. Hartley turned his attention to the doctrine now under consideration, on which it will now be our duty to make a few remarks.

There are three things which refer to Hartley's doctrine of association ; sensations, ideas, and muscular movements. These having been previously experienced, have a natural tendency to recal each other at any time and in any order. The Doctor says, "If any sensation A, idea B, or muscular motion C, be associated a sufficient number of times with any other sensation D, idea E, or muscular motion F ; it will at last excite the simple idea E, or the very muscular motion F."

With respect to sensations generally, Dr. Hart-

ley divides the associating principle into two kinds ; *synchronous* and *successive*. The former relates to the tangible qualities of bodies, such as produce smells, tastes, and the like ; the latter to those ideas which arise in the order in which their association took place. The power of association grows feebler in proportion as the number of synechronous or successive impressions is increased. But in complex cases, where the *memory* in its full extent is developed, the powers of the mind are more energetically exercised and called into requisition.*

The operation of the principle of association on our passions and desires is thus described. "When our love and hatred are excited to a certain degree, they put us upon a variety of actions, and may be termed desire and aversion ; by which last word I understand an active hatred. Now the actions which flow from desire and aversion, are entirely the result of associating powers and circumstances. The young child learns to grasp, and to go up to the play-thing that pleases him, and to withdraw his hand from the fire that burns him ; at first from the mechanism of his nature, and without any deliberate purpose of obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain, or any explicit reasoning about them. By degrees he learns,—partly from the recurrency of these mechanical tendencies, inspired by God, as one may say, by means of the nature which he has given us, and partly from the instruction and imitation of others,—to pursue everything which he loves

* Observations, Vol. 1. p. 67.

and desires, fly from everything which he hates, and to reason about the doing of this, just as he does about other matters. And because mankind are for the most part pursuing or avoiding something or other, the desire of happiness and the aversion to misery are supposed to be inseparable from, and essential to, all intelligent natures. But this does not seem to be an exact or correct way of speaking. The most general of our desires and aversions are fictitious; that is, generated by association; and therefore admit of intervals, augmentations, and diminutions. And whoever will be sufficiently attentive to the workings of his own mind, and the actions resulting therefrom, or to the actions of others, and the affections which may be supposed to occasion them, will find such differences and singularities in different persons, and in the same persons at different times, as no way agree to the notion of an essential, original, perpetual desire of happiness, and endeavour to obtain it; but much rather to the fictitious associated desires and endeavours here asserted.”*

The doctrine of association of ideas, when considered apart from muscular susceptibility, and confined to mental and moral phenomena, is a very defective theory of human knowledge. That there is a connection between our sensations, ideas, and emotions, is indisputable; for without such a bond between past and present, there could be no such thing as knowledge of any kind. But that this

* *Observations*, Vol. 1. p. 370.

connection is itself the source of our knowledge, seems not so much an absurdity, as a thing completely incomprehensible. Connection of itself can account for nothing, can create nothing. It is a state of existence, or a fact; but not involving any other state of existence, or any other fact. The order in which things present themselves to our remembrance can never of itself be the origin of the ideas; it is only a bare circumstance attending their existence or presence in the mind.

But the most important objection which may be urged against the theory of association is, that it is a matter of great doubt whether there be any such faculty as association at all. It is only *memory* with a new name. It must be remembered that association has an invariable reference to *past* sensations and ideas; the past and it are indissolubly united. Now the power of memory has just this exclusive province assigned to it. To talk of Mr. Hobbes or Mr. Locke discovering a powerful and comprehensive faculty of the mind, two hundred years ago, which had never before been noticed by previous philosophers, is certainly a very startling announcement, and may well inspire a little incredulity. But a slight consideration will enable us to show that the modern discovery is really no discovery at all; and that all that has been done is to clothe old doctrines and well-established facts, in a new and fashionable garb.

Association is defined to be the tendency of one idea or sensation to introduce another idea or sensation. Granted; but how do we come to the

knowledge of this tendency? By experience, it is answered. But what is experience? Why it is the *remembrance* of that which is past. For example, let A. be a present idea which has a tendency to introduce another idea called B. This tendency is called association. Now how can we assert or deny anything about A.'s power over B., until B. has been present to the understanding? The very proposition that A. has a tendency to introduce B. involves in it a specific act of memory.

Not confining ourselves, however, to Dr. Hartley's ideas of association, let us cast a glance at the language of other distinguished philosophers in reference to this intellectual power. The late Professor Stewart gives us a description of what he means by association of ideas. "In passing along a road which we have frequently travelled in the company of a friend, the particulars of the conversations in which we were then engaged are perpetually *suggested* to us by the objects we meet with. In such a scene we *recollect* that such a subject was started; and in passing the different houses and plantations and rivers, the arguments we were discussing when we last saw them *recur spontaneously to the memory*." If any one were called upon to give a definition of *memory*, could he give a more clear or appropriate one than by employing the words just quoted?

Dr. Priestley, the great champion for association, observes, "The natural *progress* of a passion may be most distinctly seen in that of the love of money. No person is born with the love of money,

as such ; a child is, indeed, pleased with a piece of coin, as he is with other things, the form or the splendour of which strikes his eye ; but this is very different from that emotion which a man who has been accustomed to the use of money, and has known the want of it, feels upon being presented with a guinea or a shilling. This emotion is a very complex one, the component parts of which are indistinguishable, but which have been separately connected with the idea of money, and the uses of it. For after a child has received the first species of pleasure from a piece of money as a mere *play-thing*, he receives additional pleasure from the possession of it, by connecting with the idea of it the idea of the various pleasures and advantages which it is able to procure him ; and, in time, that complex idea of pleasure, which was originally formed from the various pleasures which it was the means of procuring, is so intimately connected with the idea of money, that it becomes an object of a proper passion ; so that men are capable of pursuing it without ever reflecting on the *use* that it may possibly be of to them."

Now may we not ask, How is a child enabled to connect the various pleasures and advantages which it receives from time to time by the spending of money, but by the operation of his memory ? You give him a piece of money ; he goes and buys sweetmeats with it ; he receives pleasure from the eating of them ; and the next time he sees any money, he wishes to have it, because the pleasure

he received from eating the last purchase comes fresh into his recollection. Why refer a case like this to a principle of association, when it as clearly and as plainly belongs to the province of memory as words can be made to convey anything moral or intellectual? The Doctor says, that various pleasures are somehow connected, in the child's mind, with the money. Certainly; no one doubts that fact. But this connection is nothing but what mankind, in all ages, have attributed to memory. To refer a fact such as Dr. Priestley has just stated, to any other source, could arise only from whim or caprice, or the most determined and bigoted love of system.

The origin of an affection is accounted for in a similar manner by Mr. Belsham, a zealous advocate of Hartley's doctrine. He says, "I love my friend; this affection is compounded of complacency and good will. I think upon him with complacency because he possesses many virtues, because he has been the immediate cause of many pleasing sensations and *recollections*, because his idea is associated with many other pleasures than those which he has directly produced. I desire his happiness from a sense of gratitude, from the delight I take in seeing him happy, and from the conviction that the greater his happiness is, the greater will be his capacity for communicating happiness to others, &c. These feelings coalesce into a complex and vivid affection; I call it friendship; it associates itself with the person of my friend, with his idea, with his name, and with many circum-

stances naturally or fortuitously connected with him.”*

The principles which are said to regulate the association of ideas, are precisely those on which memory is founded. Resemblance and contrariety, continuity in time and place, cause and effect, premises and conclusion, have all an obvious and striking effect in bringing past ideas and events to our remembrance.

Let us quote a few more sentences from Dr. Hartley, showing how men obtain notions of virtue and vice, and we shall there find that he is only describing the faculty of memory. He says, “We come, in the last place, to consider moral accomplishments and defects, or virtue and vice. Now it is very evident that the many advantages, public and private, which arise from the first, will engage the world to bestow upon it much honour and applause, in the same manner as the evil consequences of vice must make *it* the object of censure and reproach. Since therefore the child is affected with the words expressing honour and censure, both from the separate influences of these words, and from the application of the phrases of this kind to other subjects of praise and dispraise, he must be affected by the commendations bestowed upon him when he has done well; and by the censures passed on him when he has done ill.

“These commendations and censures are also attended with great immediate rewards and punish-

* Belsham's *Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind*, pp. 208, 209.

ments, likewise with the hopes and fears relating to another world; and where the moral sense is sufficiently generated, with great secret indeterminate pleasure and pain of this kind; and these associations add a particular force to the honour and shame belonging respectively to virtue and vice. At the same time, it is easy to see, that some considerable progress in life is ordinarily required, before men come to be deeply and lastingly affected by these things; also that this kind of honour and shame may at last, from the superior force of the associated pleasures and pains, absorb, as it were, all the other kinds. A religious man becomes at last insensible, in a great measure, to every eulogium and reproach, excepting such as he comprehends will rest upon him at the last day, from Him whose judgment cannot err."

It is quite obvious that we have memory, and memory alone, depicted in these quotations. The child *remembers* the connections which he either recognises by his own personal experience, or which are pointed out to him by those around him; and the things or matters so treasured up in the memory, form the elements of his knowledge. There is nothing, however, in the cases now cited, to require a particular faculty of the mind; on the contrary, the ordinary power of memory is amply sufficient to comprehend all the facts which the Doctor here brings before our notice.

Perhaps the most important considerations, connected with this attempt, to show the identity of memory with association, are the language and

arguments of Dr. Hartley himself. He says, "The rudiments of *memory* are laid in the perpetual recurrency of the same impressions, and clusters of impressions. Here these leave traces, in which the order preserved may be understood from the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh propositions. The traces which letters and words, *i. e.* clusters of letters, leave, afford an instance and example of this; and as in languages the letters are fewer than the syllables, and the syllables than the words, and the words than the sentences, so the single sensible impressions, and the small clusters of them, are comparatively few in respect of the larger clusters; and being so, they must occur more frequently, so as the sooner to beget those traces which I call the *rudiments or elements of memory*. When these traces or ideas begin to recur frequently, this also contributes to fix them and their order in the *memory*, in the same manner as the frequent impressions of the objects themselves." The whole of this passage contains neither more nor less than an illustration of simple memory.

But we have a still more striking and unqualified declaration from the Doctor's pen on this subject, than that just mentioned. Notwithstanding his invincible attachment to a theory, he virtually abandons it altogether, and makes memory do that very precise thing which he labours throughout his two volumes to make association perform. Hear his words, which slip out quite by accident, and on which he appears to be in evident terror to

dilate ; “ *for the same reason also, the whole powers of the soul may be referred to the MEMORY, when taken in a large sense.*” Now, will any of the disciples of the Doctor tell us, in what *other sense*, either large or circumscribed, the faculty of memory does *not* account for as much as the power of association ?

In fact, so completely may the identity of the two powers be established, from Dr. Hartley’s own illustrations and statements, that we will venture to predict, that, let any man take his two volumes, and whenever he finds the words *association, associates, associating, sympathizing, &c.*, replace them with the words *memory, remembered, remembrance, connected in the mind, &c.*, and he will find the various passages in which the former class of words are used, as full and complete, when the words descriptive of memory are employed, as they were in their original form.

DR. HARTLEY.

Dr. Hartley belonged to the medical profession, and published his work, “*Observations on Man,*” in 1749.*

He considers man as consisting of two parts, mind and body. *Sensations* are those impressions or feelings of the mind, which arise from external objects. *Ideas* are internal feelings, which spring

* Hartley had published a small work previous to this, called “*Conjecturæ quædam, de Sensu, Motu, et Idearum Generatione.*”

up in the mind of themselves, and are purely of an intellectual character. Ideas of sensation may be called *simple*; intellectual ones, *complex*.

The Doctor frames the classification of all mental phenomena from the *pleasures* and *pains* which our ideas produce. His arrangement is thus: Sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, the moral sense. The faculties of the mind, properly so called, are, Memory, imagination or fancy, understanding, affection, and will.

The motions of the body he divides into two kinds, *automatic* and *voluntary*. The automatic are those which arise from the mechanical construction of the body; and the voluntary, those which arise from our ideas and affections, which are referred to the mind as their source.

Notwithstanding the reference which Dr. Hartley makes to our *intellectual* ideas, and the distinction which he points out between them and ideas of *sensation*, we are not to conclude that he coincided with Locke and others, that the intellectual conceptions we have, arise from the mind *reflecting* on its own powers, or on the materials furnished to it by the senses. Hartley pointedly tells us that he differs from Locke in this matter. He says, "It may not be amiss here to take notice how far the theory of these papers has led me to differ, in respect of logic, from Mr. Locke's excellent 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' to which the world is so much indebted for removing prejudices and incumbrances, and advancing real and

useful knowledge. First, then, it appears to me, that all the most complex ideas arise from sensation, and that *reflection is not a distinct source*, as Mr. Locke makes it.”*

It is due to Dr. Hartley to mention, that he was always extremely anxious, after the publication of his work, that no *material* conclusions should be drawn from his theory, relative to the nature of mind. Its immateriality was a sacred doctrine in his eyes; and he hoped that the guarded manner in which he had stated his various propositions, would preserve this doctrine intact. His definition of matter was this; “That it is a mere passive thing, of whose very essence it is to be endued with a *vis inertiae*; for this *vis inertiae* presents itself immediately in all our observations and experiments upon it, and is inseparable from it, even in idea.” In laying down this proposition, the Doctor conceived that the materiality of the sensitive soul was entirely precluded by the very terms in which matter is defined. It is incapable of sensation; this, he argued, was his fundamental principle. If there were any other agent capable of imparting sensation, the soul might be influenced by it; but this did not affect his doctrine of its immateriality. It is quite obvious however that, notwithstanding these explanatory distinctions, Hartley stood upon the very brink of materialism.

Dr. Hartley was a strict necessitarian; indeed his system could scarcely allow him to be any thing

* Observations on Man, p. 360.

else. His reasons for the doctrine of necessity, and the objections to which it is, in his opinion, fairly liable, will be found in the second volume, under the head, "Mechanism of the Human Mind."

CHARLES BONNET.

Charles Bonnet was a distinguished naturalist of Geneva, and a man of sincere religious feelings and great piety. He published many works on Natural History; in which many of his peculiar metaphysical opinions will be found, scattered in various directions throughout their pages. His chief speculations connected directly with mental philosophy will be found in his "Considérations sur les Opinions de l'Ame, et sur l'Education," published in London, 1745; his "Essai Analytique sur les Facultés de l'Ame," Copenhagen, 1760; and his "Palingénésie Philosophique, ou Idées sur l'Etat passé, et sur l'Etat futur des Estres vivants," Geneva, 1769.

The opinions of Bonnet are nearly the same with those of Dr. Hartley, and were published about the same time. The philosopher of Geneva speaks of the nerves possessing the power of *vibrating*; but he differs from Hartley in considering them susceptible of vibration like the strings of a musical instrument. Bonnet affirms they have no resemblance to any such thing. He imagines there may be a subtile and refined kind of ether which co-operates with, or acts upon, the nerves, in some manner we cannot as yet fully comprehend;

but which may perhaps act in the same way as the electric fluid operates on solid bodies. His own words are, "But though the nerves are moved, they are not stretched, like the chords of an instrument. Do objects, then, which affect them, produce vibrations similar to that in a tightened chord? Do these vibrations instantly communicate themselves to the seat of the soul? The thing appears difficult to conceive. But if we admit that there may be in the nerves a fluid, the elasticity and subtilty of which approaches in its nature to that of light or ether, we shall then be easily able to explain, by the assistance of such a fluid, the quickness with which impressions are conveyed to the soul, and the mode in which so many different operations are performed by it."*

Again, in the author's "Contemplation de la Nature," he has the following remarks:—"Finally, physiologists who have maintained that the nerves were solid, have adopted this opinion from deceptive appearances. They wished, besides, to confer upon the nerves the power of oscillation, in order to explain the phenomena of sensation. But the nerves do not oscillate. They move, but are not elastic. If a nerve be cut, it does not retire. It is the invisible fluid or ether which the nerves contain, which endows them with that elasticity which has been sometimes ascribed to them."†

As an apology for his physiological speculations, he tells us in his "Essai," "I have put into my

* *Essai Anal.*, chap. 5.

† *Partie 7me.*

work a good deal of physics, and but little of metaphysics ; indeed what could I say of the mind, in itself? We know little of it. Man is a compound being. He only has ideas through the medium of the senses ; and even his most complex or abstract conceptions are derived through this channel. It is upon his body, and by his body, that the mind displays itself. It is necessary then we should fall back again upon physical inquiries, in order to account for the origin of all that which the mind experiences ; we are as ignorant of an *idea*, as of the mind itself. We know however that our ideas are connected with certain fibres, because we *see* them ; and by this means we can obtain a little knowledge of their movements, their end or purpose, and the ties which connect them together."

The doctrine of necessary connection was maintained by Bonnet.* When speaking of the *sufficient reason* of Leibnitz, he affirms that the transcendent metaphysics of the German philosopher will appear to us more intelligible and interesting, when we consider them under this point of view, that every thing in nature is connected together by a necessary and fixed law. All the actions of

* " La liberté n'est que la faculté par laquelle l'âme exécute sa volonté ; elle est subordonnée à la volonté ; elle suit la détermination, elle en est l'effet, la conséquence ; mais la volonté, à son tour, est soumise aux motifs, au jeu des organes, à l'action des objets. Ainsi, une même chaîne embrasse le physique et le moral, lie le passé au présent, le présent à l'avenir, l'avenir à l'éternité. La sagesse qui a ordonné l'existence de cette chaîne, a sans doute voulu chacun des chaînons qui la composent."—(Essai Analytique, chap. 10.)

individual beings are under the control and guidance of superior ones.*

Bonnet differed from Condillac, and those French philosophers who adopted his theory of *transformed sensations*. He seems to have nearly coincided with Locke as to the active nature of the power of inward reflection. But still he considered this power was not the source of our primitive ideas.† Bonnet was also an ardent advocate for the immateriality of the thinking principle; yet he does not set a high value on this really important doctrine. He thinks there needs be no alarm respecting its material nature, since the Almighty's power, in endowing matter with the attribute of thought, must ever be a subject calculated to call forth our pious reverence and admiration.‡

Bonnet's views of the origin of our knowledge, are grounded upon the speculations of Locke. He thought the principle which the latter laid down in his "Essay," that sensation is substantially the foundation of all our ideas, was quite an axiom; and that it was scarcely necessary to enter into any formal illustrations of it.§ As to the origin of some of our more intellectual and abstract conceptions,—such as existence, time, space, and the like—he conceived that these were represented to us by signs,

* Œuvres, tom. 8. pp. 303. 304. 305.

† Essai Analytique, chap. 15. 16. § 230. 259. 260.

‡ "Si quelqu'un démontreroit jamais, que l'âme est matérielle, loin de s'en alarmer, il faudroit admirer la puissance, qui auroit, donné à la matière la capacité de penser." (Palingénésie, vol. 1. p. 50.)

§ Essai Analytique sur l'Ame, chap. 2.

and that these essentially depended upon magnitude, motion, and matter ; all of which were objects upon which our senses were perpetually acting, or from which they were constantly receiving impressions.*

Bonnet conceives that all our abstract conceptions may be classed under two divisions ; sensible and intellectual. He refers what we commonly term *notions*, to the second class. He separates *notion* from perception ; the latter being simply the action of the mind upon the senses. When the mind falls back upon itself, scans its own movements and states of being, and separates them in conception from the ideas of things around it, it then obtains a full comprehension of its own existence, and of its consciousness, and of its personal identity. In these speculations it is quite clear that Bonnet had in view the systems of Descartes and Leibnitz.†

The mind is not altogether passive in sensation ; for the author thinks that the very act of knowing an object by the senses, and recognising it, implies an active state of existence.‡

This philosopher uses the word *idea* in its most extended sense, as standing for every thing of which the soul is conscious. Whatever be our emotions, sentiments, or feelings, these are made known through the instrumentality of ideas. These ideas, however, are only the signs of external things ; and the Almighty has established this con-

* *Essai Analytique*, § 17. 18. 24. 36.

† *Ibid.*, 9—15.

‡ *Ibid.*, chap. 7—9.

nection between the sign and the thing signified. This relation between ideas and objects is entirely independent of the thinking principle. Perceptions are the representatives of objects; notions are deduced from objects. All notions have their foundation in the natural constitution of things; they are, in fact, nature itself considered under different aspects and relations; but all these aspects and relations are external to the understanding, and have an independent existence.*

All judgments and reasonings are, in Bonnet's estimation, simply the perceptions of relations subsisting between our ideas, or between things themselves. What is right or wrong, just or unjust, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, harmonious or discordant, depends entirely on the constituted relations of things in connection with the mind itself.†

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY.

Dr. Priestley was unquestionably one of the most eminent philosophers of the eighteenth century. As a cultivator of physical science, few equal and none surpass him, in the importance of his discoveries. He was, besides, one of the most active

* *Essai Analytique*, chap. 14. 15. 16. 19.

† "Car les rapports dérivent de la nature des choses. Les idées de perfection morale ne sont donc point du tout de la création de notre entendement ... L'entendement juge des rapports moraux, comme la sensibilité juge des rapports physiques. L'amour-propre ne diffère point de l'amour de la perfection, de la bienveillance; il est l'unique moteur des êtres sentants et des êtres intelligents."—(*Essai Analytique*, §§ 421. 521.)

and able religious controversialists of his day, and a metaphysician of no mean order and acquirements.

The chief works of Dr. Priestley which have a direct and special reference to mental philosophy, are "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit," 1777; "Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry, &c.;" "Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, with Essays relating to the subject;" and in addition to these, there is a volume of correspondence between the author and Dr. Price, relative to matters contained in the "Disquisitions."

Dr. Priestley's metaphysical creed embraces four leading doctrines; he adopted the theory of vibrations, the association of ideas, the scheme of philosophical necessity, and the soul's materiality. On all these topics he has furnished us with extended dissertations; and whatever opinions may be entertained of any or all or them, there are few persons but will readily admit that the Doctor has displayed both great zeal and great ability in defence of them.

The systems of vibrations, associations of ideas, and necessity, we shall pass over; and shall confine our remarks to the doctrine of the materiality of the soul. This is fully developed in the "Disquisitions."

The author candidly informs us that he entertained for many years great doubts of the material hypothesis, which he in after life unqualifiedly adopted; and that he had entered on the subject, and conducted all his examinations of it,

under a deep and solemn impression of its religious and moral importance. And every man who has any knowledge of the character of the Doctor, and the nature of his writings generally, must give him full credit for rectitude of purpose and disinterested boldness, in the prosecution of his inquiries.

The author enters on the discussion of his subject with a statement of his views as to the nature of matter, and to the notions we commonly entertain of it. It is defined to be a thing possessed of *extension*, *solidity* or *impenetrability*, and consequently of a *vis inertiae*. Now this notion of matter Dr. Priestley dissents from. He affirms that it does not possess the power of solidity; but that that which we call and consider impenetrability is nothing but the powers of attraction and repulsion. "The reason," says he, "why *solid extent* has been thought to be a complete definition of matter, is because it was imagined that we could separate from our idea of it everything else belonging to it, and leave these two properties independent of the rest, and subsisting by themselves. But it was not considered that, in consequence of taking away *attraction*, which is a *power*, *solidity* itself vanishes."*

"It will perhaps be said, that the particles of which any solid atom consists, may be conceived to be placed close together, without any mutual attraction between them. But then this atom will be entirely destitute of *compactness* and hardness, which is requisite to its being impenetrable. Or if

* Disquisitions, p. 6.

its parts be held together by some *foreign power*, it will still be true that *power* is necessary to its *solidity* or *essence*; since without it every particle would fall from each other, and be dispersed."*

The author is anxious that his readers should not, from these views of the nature of matter, conclude that it was *self-existent* or eternal. He says, "All that my argument amounts to is, that from whatever source these powers are derived, or by whatever being they are communicated, matter cannot exist without them; and if that superior power, or being, withdraw its influence, the substance itself necessarily ceases to exist, or is annihilated."

These opinions respecting the solidity of matter, which the Doctor adopted from Boseovich, form the ground-work of his subsequent reasonings respecting the homogeneous nature of man. He is unquestionably endowed with perception and thought, but these depend upon the brain and nervous system. As far as we are able to judge, the faculty of thinking and the state of the brain always bear a certain correspondence or relation to each other. There is no instance of the existence of thought when the brain is destroyed; and whenever that material organ is injured, or impeded in its regular and natural movements, there is a corresponding derangement in the mind or thought.

That thought is only a modification of matter, the Doctor attempts to prove by the following considerations.

* Disquisitions, p. 7.

Thought depends on the senses ; for there is not a single idea but what may be proved to come into the mind through that channel. With the system of sensation which we possess, there could have been no such thing as thought, if we had not had just such a peculiarly organized body as we have. "The notion, therefore, of the possibility of thinking in man without an organized frame, is not only destitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to them ; and yet these appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philosophers."*

If thought were the result of an immaterial substance, we might expect it to display more vigour and activity, in proportion as the bodily frame became weakened and diseased ; but the very contrary of this is the case.

If the mental principle were immaterial, all the faculties of mind would be so too ; whereas we see several of these well defined powers greatly impaired during old age, and during the progress of bodily distempers and maladies. "Since, therefore, all the faculties of the mind, separately taken, appear to be mortal, the substance or principle in which they exist must be pronounced to be mortal too."†

* An immaterial substance can have no *extension* ; it can have neither length, breadth, nor thickness ; everything belonging to it must be simple and indivisible. Now when we consider that ideas are derived from external objects, and must bear a re-

* Disquisitions, p. 34.

† Ibid. p. 36.

semblance to them, ideas must be divisible also. "The idea of a man, for instance, could in no sense correspond to a man, which is the archetype of it, if it did not consist of the ideas of his *head, arms, trunk, legs, &c.* It, therefore, consists of *parts*, and consequently is *divisible*."

The nature of many of our *affections* militates against the notion of the immateriality of the thinking principle. They "necessarily imply *melioration*, and *depravation*, which is something similar to *corruption*."

These are the leading philosophical or abstract propositions, from which the Doctor deduces his conclusion that the mind is merely a property of matter. He attempts to strengthen this conclusion from the consideration of various mental phenomena, where the sympathy between the mind and body is conspicuous; from certain declarations in the Scriptures; and from the history of opinions relative to the origin of the soul, and the nature of matter, entertained by philosophers from the earliest period down to his own time. There is considerable ingenuity and erudition displayed in these various illustrations.

ERASMUS DARWIN.

This author was a physician at Derby, and a man well known in the literary world of his day, both for his imaginative and philosophical talents. He belongs to the *material* school of metaphysics,

and in principle completely identified himself with the opinions of Hartley and Priestley.

The principal work of Dr. Darwin, in which his peculiar opinions on the intellectual nature are developed, is his "*Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Life*," 1796. In the author's "*Botanic Garden*," a poem, some of his views are displayed, but not to any great extent.

All the mental operations are materialized by Dr. Darwin. Our perceptions and ideas of external objects result from the stimulus which these objects give to the muscular fibres of our organs of sensation. The connection, which is commonly termed the association, of ideas, is produced in precisely the same manner as our muscular motions are.

We have no ideas of anything but from the senses. "If you wonder what organs of sense can be excited into motion, when you call up the ideas of wisdom or benevolence, which Mr. Locke has termed abstract ideas; I ask you by what organs of sense you first became acquainted with those ideas? And the answer will be reciprocal; for it is certain that all our ideas were originally acquired by our organs of sense; for whatever excites our perception must be external to the organ which perceives it, and we have no inlets to knowledge but by our perceptions."*

The spirit or principle of animation has four dif-

* *Zoonomia*, p. 28.

ferent modes of action; *irritation, sensation, volition, and association*. These four divisions are developed at considerable length, and illustrated by numerous references to particular states and conditions of the body. The result however is, that "We can create nothing new, we can only combine or separate the ideas which we have already received by our perceptions."....."Perceptions signify those ideas which are preceded by irritation, and succeeded by the sense of sensation, of pleasure, and pain."....."Memory includes two classes of ideas, either those which are preceded by voluntary exertion, or those which are suggested by their associations with other ideas."....."Reasoning is that operation of the sensorium by which we excite two or many tribes of ideas; and then re-excite the ideas in which they differ or correspond. If we determine this difference, it is called judgment; if we in vain endeavour to determine it, it is called doubting."*

BELSHAM.

It is scarcely necessary to enter into a formal examination of this author's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind," published in 1801, except for the mere purpose of finishing the historical group of writers connected with Dr. Hartley's system. *Necessity* and *Materialism* constitute the

* Zoonomia, Vol. 1. p. 132.

entire essence of Belsham's Treatise; and these two doctrines, he expresses a hope, he has made as clear and intelligible as it is possible to make them. The "Elements" will prove, even to metaphysical readers, very heavy and dry reading.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PRICE, OSWALD, BEATTIE, FERGUSON, KAIMES,
AND MONBODDO.

THE Continental interpretators of Locke's system, the speculative opinions of Hume and Berkeley, and the material theory of Hartley, excited alarm in the minds of many learned and pious persons in England. They thought that religious and moral opinions and sentiments were seriously damaged by the promulgation of such doctrines; and that something by way of antidote at least should be prepared to check the influence of the insidious poison. A more common-sense and spiritual tone was given to speculative tenets on the mind; and they were viewed more in conjunction with the spirit of religion and morality than heretofore. Those who felt it necessary to make a bold stand against what they considered erroneous and dangerous opinions, viewed human nature through a more familiar, but not less interesting, medium; the medium of common life, and every-day feelings

and sentiments. They tested abstract principles by experience. They discovered striking discrepancies between theory and practice. They viewed man in all his relations in life; and collected into one common focus those opinions and judgments which seemed to have a universal influence over their minds and movements. These became their elements of philosophy,—the definitions, and axioms, and propositions, on which appeals were afterwards made to the universal understanding, will, and feelings of the human race. The disquisitions of the authors whose names we have placed at the head of this chapter, do not therefore belong to the same category with many of the formal and systematic writers on the mind we have noticed; the former cultivating mental philosophy in conjunction with other branches of knowledge; and, on this account, their speculations are more varied, and have less of a theoretical and logical form about them, than the treatises of the latter. In the estimation of Price and Beattie, and their disciples, the discussion of mind is a means to an end; not the end itself. Man has higher and more important objects to attend to, than a mere gratification of his curiosity relative to the thinking principle. He has to look at things connected with his happiness, both here and in a future state of being; and must, therefore, make all the susceptibilities and appliances of his whole nature subservient to the attainment of the grand objects of his existence. These authors admit the paramount importance of metaphysical knowledge; but they all contend

that it is not important *per se*, but only relatively to the condition of man as a religious, moral, and accountable being.

DR. RICHARD PRICE.

Dr. Price was a Non-conformist divine, and a man of great talents and philosophical attainments. His chief works connected with the science of mind are, "A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals," 1757; and his controversial letters with Dr. Priestley relative to the nature of mind and spirit.

Price is, in principle, diametrically opposed to Locke, and nearly coincides with the opinions of Cudworth, and some other of the early English Platonists. The Doctor's "Review" has a special reference to questions connected with our moral principles and sentiments, but still it is fundamentally based on the peculiar mental theory we have just now mentioned. We shall illustrate this by a quotation or two.

In respect to the origin of our ideas, Dr. Price observes; "Sensation and reflection have been commonly reckoned the sources of our ideas; and Mr. Locke has taken no small pains to prove this. How much soever, on the whole, I admire his excellent "Essay," I cannot think him sufficiently clear and explicit on this subject.....The power, I assert, that *understands*, or the faculty within us that discerns *truth*, and that compares all the objects of thought and *judges* of them, is a spring

of new ideas.....The power which judges of the perceptions of the senses, and contradicts their decisions, which discovers the nature of the sensible qualities of objects, inquires into their causes, and distinguishes between what is real and what is not real in them, must be a power within us which is superior to sense.”*

“Were not *sense* and *knowledge* entirely different, we should rest satisfied with sensible impressions, such as light, colours, and sounds, and inquire no more about them, at least when the impressions are strong and vigorous. Whereas, on the contrary, we necessarily desire some further acquaintance with them, and can never be satisfied till we have subjected them to the survey of reason. Sense presents *particular* forms to the mind ; but cannot rise to any *general ideas*. It is the intellect that examines and compares the presented forms, that rises above individuals to universal and abstract ideas ; and thus looks downwards upon objects, takes in at one view an infinity of particulars, and is capable of discovering general truths. Sense sees only the *outside* of things ; reason acquaints us with their *natures*. Sensation is only a mode of feeling in the mind ; but knowledge implies an active and vital energy of the mind. Feeling pain for example, is the effect of sense ; but the understanding is employed when pain itself is made an object of the mind’s reflection, or held up before it, in order to discover its nature and causes.....In a

* Review of the Principal Questions, &c., p. 17.

word, it appears that *sense* and *understanding* are faculties of the soul totally different ; the one being conversant only about particulars, the other about universals ; the one not *discerning*, but *suffering* ; the other not *suffering*, but *discerning* ; and signifying the soul's *power* of surveying and examining all things, in order to judge of them."*

JAMES OSWALD.

Mr. Oswald's work is entitled "An Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of Religion," and was published at Edinburgh, in 1765.

The definition which he gives of *common sense* is nearly the same as that which we find in the writings of Reid and Beattie ; although Oswald seems to go a step beyond them, in conferring upon it the attributes of an *instinct*. He thinks that philosophers have always been directing their attention to matters which lie at a great distance from the immediate purposes and movements of human nature, and have neglected to examine with care those every-day impulses and judgments, which actuate the mass of mankind in all states of existence. Metaphysicians, according to his notions, have in all their discussions, been continually shooting over the heads of mankind. Oswald's instinctive feelings of common sense, may be corrupted and weakened, by the prejudices, passions, and vices, which result from a bad education ; but

* Review, p. 21.

they can never be annihilated from the human breast. The voice of the majority of mankind will always proclaim their existence, and the paramount influence of the conduct, passions, opinions, and judgments of the multitude. These instinctive feelings have all the force of regular axioms ; and it would just be as irrational, and more injurious to the interests of men, to deny the existence and truth of any one of these feelings, than it would be to deny any of the axioms on which mathematical evidence is grounded.

DR. JAMES BEATTIE.

The opinions of Dr. Beattie on metaphysical subjects are contained in his work "On the Nature and Immutability of Truth ;" a work which has gone through many editions, but which is now comparatively but little known to ordinary readers of subjects connected with the nature and faculties of the human mind. Dr. Beattie was a man of great talent and genius. He had a sharp and pungent wit, a lively fancy and refined taste, an extensive acquaintance with polite literature, joined to a clear, concise, and nervous style of composition. He enjoyed great reputation and influence in his lifetime. But none of his writings on the abstract sciences show that he had a first-rate, profound, and philosophical range of mind. He skimmed over the surface of things ; and though his movements were always graceful and pleasing, yet he never grappled with abstract principles or elaborate systems, in

a manner that showed his mind was equal to the task. He appeared to be ambitious of being considered a deep thinker, but he never really was one. Plain principles and common-sense views of life and conduct he could display in a singularly pleasing and agreeable manner, but he always seemed out of his natural element when he undertook to examine or discuss very subtle or abstract systems of human speculation. The poet, the scholar, and the writer of polite literature, were always predominant, and bore down his comparatively feeble powers of philosophical abstraction.

This view of Dr. Beattie's mental constitution is, I conceive, amply confirmed by facts from his own literary history. His "Essay on Truth" was a very popular work, and gained the author by far the greater portion of fame he enjoyed during his lifetime. He entered upon the composition of this work under a deep sense of religious obligation, and every reader who has perused it with judgment and impartiality, must give the author credit for sincerity of purpose and praiseworthy intentions. Yet notwithstanding the many excellencies of this publication, it bears undeniable evidence of being the fruits of a mind not by any means adapted to the profound and accurate analysis of mental operations and principles. He glides with a self-complacency often amusing, over difficulties with which he found himself unable to grapple; employs declamation for reasoning; and replies to the arguments of his antagonists with repartees, witticisms, and raillery. As a mere abstract work, the "Essay

on 'Truth ' never enjoyed, even during the author's life, a moderate share of reputation amongst his own philosophical friends, though he lived with them upon the most tender terms of reciprocal friendship. This arose entirely from an inward conviction in the minds of all who were able to form a tolerably correct estimate of the Doctor's mind, that he had, in this instance, undertaken a work which his natural and acquired habits of thought were inadequate to accomplish successfully.

As illustrative, to a certain extent, of the truth of these remarks, it may be mentioned, that in most of the biographical notices of Dr. Beattie it is incidentally stated, that the " Essay on Truth " was composed at such an expense of mental labour and excitement, that it did more towards shattering his nervous system than any thing he ever performed. Now to those who are acquainted with the general nature of works of this description, and the portion of mental wear and tear they require, it will be fully apparent there was not any great demand made upon the energies of any man who possessed philosophical stamina of ordinary firmness and strength. That the Essay did greatly impair his health, is a fact of undoubted credit, and the cause may be easily accounted for. Nothing harasses a man's mind so much as the engaging in a labour, but feebly supported by natural fitness and acquired habits of thinking. On the light, ingenious, and sprightly mind of Doctor Beattie, the abstruse questions connected with metaphysics and morals, must have exercised a chilling and

withering influence. Every movement would be one of difficulty and pain ; and the exhaustion of such a piece of mental mechanism as his, must have been very considerable indeed, even under the most favorable circumstances in which it could be called into active operation.

There is something however bordering on melancholy relative to the philosophical writings of Dr. Beattie. We have alluded to the want of sympathy manifested by his friends and contemporaries ; and, though this arose, in our humble opinion, from the notion of his unfitness for such labours, yet we think it was carried beyond all due bounds. The speculative party who have usually gone under the name of the Scotch metaphysicians, have scarcely deigned to notice him, even by a passing glance, though he fought disinterestedly and valiantly in defence of the common philosophical creed. Their neglect has been most pointed and cutting. He was, however, worthy of more generous treatment. To a large class of readers his work "On Truth" proved exceedingly useful ; and even now, it will amply repay a careful and cordial perusal.

In this Treatise of Beattie, we find that the leading feature of his metaphysical system was the doctrine of *Common Sense*. With this mental faculty his name is now chiefly associated as a writer on the mind. What he means by this power or faculty we shall state in his own words. "The term *common sense* hath, in modern times, been used by philosophers, both French and British, to signify that power of the mind which perceives

truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will, whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and *therefore properly called a SENSE*; and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and, therefore, properly called *COMMON SENSE*.”*

Dr. Beattie distinguishes this faculty of *common sense* from the faculty of *reason*, in the following words. “Reason, on the other hand, is used by those who are most accurate in distinguishing, to signify that power of the human mind by which we are convinced that a relation belongs to two ideas, on account of our having found that these ideas bear certain relations to other ideas. In a word, it is that faculty which enables us, from relations or ideas that are known, to investigate such as are unknown; and without which we never could proceed in the discovery of truth a single step beyond first principles or intuitive axioms. It is in this last sense that we are to use the word *reason* in the course of this inquiry.”†

In reference to this doctrine of Dr. Beattie’s, we shall here add a few remarks from Professor Stewart’s “Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.” “It is to be regretted, as a circumstance unfavourable to the reception of Dr. Beat-

* Essay on Truth, p. 40.

† Ibid., pp. 36. 37.

tie's valuable Essay among accurate reasoners, that in the outset of his discussions he did not confine himself to some such general explanation of this phrase as is given in the foregoing extracts from Buffier and Reid, without affecting a tone of logical precision in his definitions and distinctions, which, so far from being necessary to his intended argument, were evidently out of place in a work designed as a popular antidote against the illusions of metaphysical scepticism. The very idea, indeed, of appealing to *common sense*, virtually implies that these words are to be understood in their ordinary acceptation, unrestricted and unmodified by any technical refinements and comments. This part of the Essay, accordingly, which is by far the most vulnerable part of it, has been attacked with advantage, not only by the Translator of Buffier, but by Sir James Stewart, in a very acute letter published in the last edition of his works."*

LORD KAIMES.

Henry Home, afterwards Lord Kaimes, was one of the most distinguished men of his day. His metaphysical opinions are contained in his two works, "Elements of Criticism," 1763; and "Sketches of the History of Man," 1774.

The "Elements" have a special reference to our critical principles of taste relative to the fine arts; and the author only casually introduces mental

* Vol. 2. p. 91.

disquisitions, for the purpose of illustrating his main subject. He treats of trains of ideas or perceptions in the following manner. "A man while awake is sensible of a continued train of perceptions and ideas passing in his mind. It requires no activity on his part to carry on the train; nor can he at will add to the train any idea that has no connection with it. At the same time, we learn from daily experience, that the train of thought is not merely casual; and if it depend not upon will, nor upon chance, by what law is it governed?"

The answer which the author gives to this question, constitutes the essence of his work. He attempts to show that certain principles which regulate these trains of perceptions and ideas in the mind, are the fruitful sources of all that we call grand and beautiful, both in nature and in art.

The author's views of the mind, and its faculties and modes of operation, are more fully developed in his "Sketches of the History of Man." These will be found in the third book of the second volume.

Kaimes' theory of human knowledge is grounded upon that of Locke; but he is more explicit in the recognition of the power of inward reflection. He says, "Our external senses are a source of knowledge; they lay open to us external subjects, their qualities, their actions, with events produced by these actions. The *internal senses* are another source of knowledge; they lay open to us things passing in the mind; thinking, for example, deliberating, inclining, resolving, willing, consenting,

and other actions; and they also lay open to us our emotions and passions. There is a sense in which we perceive the truth of many propositions; such as that everything which begins to exist must have a cause; that every effect, adapted to some end or purpose, proceeds from a designing cause; and that every effect, adapted to a good end or purpose, proceeds from a designing and benevolent cause. A multitude of axioms, in every science, are perceived to be equally true."* The author then goes on to show, that it is from the internal sense of the mind that we derive our ideas of a Deity, of moral obligation, and of all those abstract conceptions connected with cause and effect.

"All reasoning," says his Lordship, "requires two mental powers, namely, the power of invention, and of perceiving relations. By the former are discovered immediate propositions, equally related to the fundamental proposition and to the conclusion; and by the latter we perceive that the different links which compose the chain of reasoning are all connected together by the same relation."†

The various kinds of reasoning are pointed out at some length by the noble author; such as analytical reasoning, reasoning from testimony, analogy, &c. Our knowledge is intuitive, demonstrative, and probable.

Lord Kaimes has, in his "Sketches," given us an analysis of Aristotle's Logic; and has also

* Sketches of the History of Man, Vol. 2. p. 103.

† Ibid., Vol. 2. p. 107.

added, in the 6th chapter, some valuable remarks on the means of improving our reasoning faculties.

ADAM FERGUSON.

Doctor Ferguson's "Principles of Moral and Political Science" contain but few remarks on metaphysical subjects. The mind is viewed through the medium of our moral and social faculties and feelings. The author adopts the theory of Locke, modified by Reid's ideas of the origin of our perceptive knowledge.

The whole of human knowledge may be referred to four sources; consciousness, perception, testimony, and inference. The two first are primary and immediate; and the two last secondary and derived.*

The author enters into a consideration of the powers or faculties of observation, memory, imagination, and abstraction; but there is not much that is original, either in arrangement or in matter.†

LORD MONBODDO.

James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, belongs to a class of metaphysicians somewhat different to that

* Principles of Morals, &c. Vol. 1. p. 77.

† "Il n'est pas possible non plus de prendre au sérieux l'ouvrage tant vanté de Ferguson sur la *Société Civile*, ouvrage sans aucun caractère, où règne un ton de moralité fort estimable, mais où la faiblesse des idées le dispute à celle de l'érudition."—(Cousin, Histoire de la Philosophie, 11me leçon.)

with which we have associated him. He published his "Origin and Progress of Language," in 1773; and his "Ancient Metaphysics," in 6 volumes 4to, in 1778.

There is an immense body of learning concentrated in these bulky volumes; but it is of such a kind as not to prove of much interest or utility in this historical Treatise. We must therefore refer the reader to the works themselves. We shall barely remark, that the general tone of the philosophical sentiments displayed in the "Origin of Languages," approaches to that of the ancient Epicureans. In the "Ancient Metaphysics," we have the most extravagant and enthusiastic admiration of the philosophy of the sages of Greece; as well as of everything connected with the arts of painting, sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, oratory, and polite literature generally. The work is full of eccentric notions.

CHAPTER XIX.



EMMANUEL KANT.

WE come to another land-mark in the philosophy of mind, striking and interesting in its outline and figure. Like some bold and fantastic headland on a flat and monotonous coast, it rears its rugged head to the sky, and at once inspires the speculative mariner with hope, and admonishes him of danger.

On this occasion a few digressive remarks are requisite. In our historical progress, if we have not been successful in imparting much that is instructive and interesting to the reader, we have at least been able to keep up an intercourse with him, through the medium of our mother tongue. We trust, considering the nature of our subject, that we have not palled his ear with uncouth terms, nor drawn too liberally upon his admiration by a formidable array of pompous and crudite phrases. Our greatest ambition has been to make ourselves

readily understood ; and to endeavour to carry out, in the use of language, the common but useful maxim, "of doing at Rome as they do at Rome."

We shall now, however, have to move in another direction, and assume another character. The intercourse with the reader will be partially interrupted by the employment of terms and technical phrases to which he is a stranger. We shall appear stiff and formal in his eyes. There will be an air of oracular profundity in every thing we utter. The mysticism of the East will seem to fall upon us ; we shall be enveloped with the robes of the Alexandrian Platonists, and express ourselves with all the solemn grandeur of Cabalistic abstruseness. We shall for a season assume the grotesque habiliments of a masquerade, a situation by no means comfortable to the lovers of ease and simplicity. But we have a task to perform, and we cannot execute it unless we comply with certain conditions. The German philosophers have long disdained to speak as other men speak. We have had no trouble to decipher the language of the French, the Italian, the Spanish, and the Flemish ; but when we come to the German metaphysician, we find him bristling with such an array of forms and technicalities of speech, as renders him unapproachable, unless we comply with his own terms. We must attempt to think as he thinks, and speak as he speaks, or there is no good to be done with him. He has a way of his own, with which "strangers intermeddle not."

We regret this partial estrangement between the

reader and ourselves. We have always considered the curse upon our progenitors at the tower of Babel to be the severest ever uttered ; but we never open a book on German metaphysics, that this truth does not flash vividly before our minds with an additional glare. It is not, however, agreeable to philosophical etiquette to be cynical or uncharitable. We have great and illustrious names before us, and we shall pay them every degree of respect and homage. We shall endeavour to cultivate a becoming frame of mind and temper, for the duties we have to perform. We shall never think of the declaration of a late eminent French diplomatist, "that words were given not to express, but to conceal, men's thoughts;" nor of the coarse saying of Swift, "stir a puddle hole, and it will appear as deep as the sea;" no; our minds shall cherish no such sentiments. Patience must be our motto; and if the reader will only exercise it, and keep up a little extra attention, we promise him that he will obtain glimpses here and there, over a wild and novel region, which will gratify the love of adventure, if it do nothing more.

Kant's "*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*," or "*Critique of Pure Reason*," was published in 1781, when the author was in his *fifty-seventh* year; just one year older than Locke was, when his immortal "*Essay*" made its appearance. The "*Critique*" was not favourably received on its first publication; in fact, we are told by the biographers of Kant, that there were very few copies of it sold for the first *six years*, and that the printer was just upon the point of

consigning the whole impression to the purchasers of waste paper, when, from some accident or other, an interest was excited in favour of the work, and three editions of it were disposed of in a very short period after.*

I consider the metaphysical system of Kant to afford a striking manifestation of the great importance of the principles involved in the long and fiercely contested question, on the freedom of the human will. This matter has lain at the root of almost every system of ancient and modern philosophy. We meet with its influence in every direction. There is no shaking it off; for it

* The philosopher Herder pays the following just and adequate tribute to the character and memory of Kant: "J'ai eu le bonheur de connaître un philosophe, et de l'avoir eu pour maître. Il avait dans la maturité de l'âge toute la gaieté d'un jeune homme; il la conserva jusque dans l'extrême vieillesse. Son front ouvert, construit pour la méditation, était le siège d'une satisfaction et d'une sérénité imperturbable. La parole la plus féconde en pensées coulait de ses lèvres. La fine plaisanterie, l'esprit, la jovialité même, étaient comme à ses ordres, et son enseignement était la conversation la plus aisée et la plus intéressante. Il faisait grand cas des écrits de Rousseau, qui paraissaient alors, et revenait toujours à la connaissance impartiale de la nature et à la valeur morale de l'homme. L'histoire de l'humanité, des nations, et du monde extérieur, la physique, les mathématiques, et l'expérience, étaient les sources où il puisait les matières propres à vivifier ses leçons et sa conversation. Rien de ce qui vaut la peine d'être su ne lui était indifférent. Aucune intrigue, aucune secte, aucun préjugé, aucun nom imposant, n'avait sur lui la moindre influence, dès qu'il s'agissait de propager et de soutenir la vérité. Il encourageait et contraignait, d'une manière aimable, à penser par soi-même; le despotisme était étranger à son âme. Son agréable image est encore devant moi; c'est Socrate pour les intentions. Je souhaite à sa philosophie un tel succès, qu'après avoir déraciné les épines de la sophistique, elle fasse croître la semence de l'entendement, de la raison, et d'une législation morale, pure, et heureuse."

assumes so many shapes and forms, that the most subtile mind, and the most vigilant attention to consciousness, are scarcely able to detect its numerous ramifications. That this question of liberty and necessity had taken a deep root in the mind of Kant, and caused him infinite perplexity, is abundantly evident from his own words, in giving us an account of the source from which he derived the first suggestions for his own system. The following extract shews an exceedingly curious and interesting fact in the history of mental philosophy.

"Since the Essays," says Kant, "of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since the origin of metaphysics, as far as their history extends, no circumstance has occurred which might have been more decisive of the fate of this science, than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He proceeded upon a single but important idea in metaphysics, the connection of cause and effect, and the *concomitant notions of power and action*. He challenged *reason* to answer him what title she had to imagine, that any thing may be so constituted as that, if it be given, something else is also thereby inferred; for the idea of cause denotes this. He proved beyond contradiction, that it is impossible for reason to think of such a connexion *à priori*, for it contains *necessity*; but it is not possible to perceive how, because something is, something else must necessarily be; nor how the idea of such a connection can be introduced *à priori*.

"I freely own it was these suggestions of Hume

which first, many years ago, roused me from my dogmatical slumbers, and gave to my inquiries quite a different direction in the field of speculative philosophy. I was far from being carried away by his conclusions, the fallacy of which chiefly arose from his not forming to himself an idea of the *whole of his problem*, but merely investigating a part of it, the solution of which was impossible without a comprehensive view of the whole. When we proceed on a well founded, though not thoroughly digested thought, we may expect, by patient and continued reflection, to prosecute it further than the acute genius had done to whom we are entitled for the first spark of this light. I first inquired, therefore, whether Hume's objection might not be a general one, and soon found, that the idea of cause and effect is far from being the only one by which the understanding *à priori* thinks of the connection of things; but rather that the science of metaphysics is altogether founded upon these connections. I endeavoured to ascertain their number; and, having succeeded in this attempt, I proceeded to the examination of those general ideas, which, I was now convinced, are not, as Hume apprehended, derived from experience, but arise out of the pure understanding. This deduction, which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor, and which nobody besides him had ever conceived, although every one makes use of these ideas without asking himself upon what their validity is founded; this deduction, I say, is the most difficult which could have been undertaken for the behoof of me-

taphysics ; and what was still more embarrassing, metaphysics could not have offered me the smallest assistance, because that deduction ought first to establish the possibility of a system of metaphysics. As I had now succeeded in the explanation of Hume's problem, not merely in a particular instance, but with a view of the whole power of pure reason, I could advance with sure but tedious steps, to determine completely, and upon general principles, the compass of pure reason, both what is the sphere of its exertion, and what are its limits ; which was all that was required for erecting a system of metaphysics upon a proper and solid foundation."

Philosophy is considered by Kant, under three different aspects ; it is dogmatical, sceptical, and critical. Dogmatical philosophy is that which rests upon assumed and intuitive principles ; sceptical philosophy calls in question the certainty or sufficiency of these principles ; and critical philosophy takes upon itself the task of examining the intuitive principles of the dogmatist, and the doubting ones of the sceptic. The critical philosopher presents us with a complete chart of all human knowledge, derived from an analytical examination of the thinking principle in man.

These three distinctions must always be kept steadily in view in all disquisitions on the nature and extent of knowledge. This knowledge is not a simple or uniform thing ; but a compound of many ingredients ; and is constantly varying in its aspect and combinations. This arises from the following

cause. To form correct conceptions of human knowledge as a whole, we must bear in mind two things; the *subject* of knowledge, and the *object* of it; that is, the thing which thinks, and the things which are thought of. Now whatever alters the relative position of these two *forms* of thought with respect to each other, alters in like manner our judgments and conclusions; or in other words, whatever changes or modifies *subjective* or *objective* existence, makes a corresponding change in our knowledge. Still however this knowledge is perceived by the mind as *one thing*; it is not intellectually perceived in its individual parts, but only in a state of complexity or combination. Further; we never can know anything *as it really is in itself*; we have no *positive* knowledge of things without us; for we can only know them by means of those laws which modify their real attributes or qualities.

Kant terms that *empirical* philosophy, which relates to our belief in the reality or certainty of external things; and for this reason, because we are led into a firm belief that these external things are what they appear to us to be. Empiricism is, therefore, simply experience. When, however, we exercise our reason relative to this empirical or experimental knowledge, with a view of correcting or modifying our conclusions or judgments respecting its notifications, then this is termed by Kant *transcendental philosophy*, because it displays the highest and noblest powers of the intellect. It deals exclusively with *à priori* principles and con-

clusions. Empirical perceptions are necessarily contingent, fluctuating, and variable; for they are susceptible of perpetual change, from the various relations subsisting between our sensations and external objects. It is different, however, with our *à priori* conclusions; they are fixed, unalterable, and permanent; all men entertain them, and universality and necessity are stamped upon them by the hand of nature.

We have here then two things: mind, and something external to mind, which we call the world or universe. This mind or understanding cannot know things *per se*; it is engrossed solely with its own conceptions or ideas. The universe is not known as it really is; it is *phenomena* alone which possess any *reality* for us. This phenomenal reality is, however, quite certain; though of an *ideal* character, it has not the least sceptical tendencies. It rests upon *consciousness*, and this cannot be doubted without running into the grossest folly and absurdity. Kant maintains there are *noumena*, or *things in themselves*; but these, *as things in themselves*, we cannot know, because the *forms* of the mind or understanding will not admit a knowledge of them. To obtain a knowledge of things *per se*, we would needs require a set of intellectual faculties for the express purpose. Our communication, therefore, with the external universe, is through the medium of the understanding, which imparts to objects those *forms*, under which we know and recognise them. Perception then is, according to Kant, the mind co-operating with external objects. These

objects are the materials with which the mind acts, and on which it imposes certain *forms* or conditions. These forms or conditions constitute the nature or essence of mind ; and without them we should not be able to recognise the existence of things around us. If the mind did not act, or impose its own forms or conditions on itself, *sensation* would prove a dead and useless operation. We should then be destitute of experience, and consequently of all knowledge.

It is requisite to notice, especially for the guidance of all young students of German philosophy, that in every act of *perception* there is a *subjective* knowledge implied ; a knowledge of the existence of the subject which perceives or thinks. This is called, in the phraseology of the Kantian metaphysics, *SELF*, or the being I call *I* ; in fact, the *Ego*. The subject is involved in the declarations, I KNOW, I WILL, I ACT, and the like. In this subject or *self*, *three* great faculties are included,—*cognition*, by which I know ; *volition*, by which I will ; and *judgment*, which constitutes the bond of union between thought and will, and determines the individual to specific action.

It is necessary we should know the nature of this power of *cognition* or thought. Kant divides it into *three* parts ; pure sensibility, pure intelligence, and pure reason. *Sensations* are produced by the first, *conceptions* by the second, and *ideas* by the third.

Pure sensibility, or the power of being affected by external objects, Kant terms the *receptivity* of

the mind, and considers it as entirely passive in its nature. He divides it, however, into two parts, when considered in relation to *time* and *space*. *Internal* sensibility consists in considering our sensations relatively to *time*; and *external*, relatively to *space*.

In the Kantian philosophy, *space* and *time* occupy a conspicuous station; and they prove the source of a great portion of the obscurity and haziness in which it is perpetually enveloped, no matter into whose hands it falls for explanation. According to Kant, *space* and *time* are involved in all sensations, however minutely analysed. They are the constant and invariable *forms* of our sensibility. They haunt us in every conceivable mental state. We can form no conception of anything which does not exist in space; nor can any sensation or feeling be conceived by the mind without a reference to time. Time and space, therefore, form the necessary elements of everything which exists; without them all would vanish into nothingness. Matter itself, in all the multifarious forms in which it is presented to us, might be conceived to be annihilated; yet would space and time still remain. But yet Kant tells us that these two things have no *objective reality*; they only exist as forms of our mental sensibility. Nothing can be in itself *larger* or *smaller*, or *before* or *after*; because space and time are only modes of our own existence, and not the representatives of things without, having a positive and independent being separate from our minds. The ideas of space are

not derived from any of the senses, as sight, smell, taste, hearing; nor even from touch, to which it has been often referred by writers on the mind. No mental process of which we are cognizant accounts for the notion of space. Every conception of an external object suggests it; but yet we are so constituted that we cannot make *space alone* an object of consciousness, without having the object to which it is related before the mind's eye also. The same thing may be stated as to *time*, which cannot be an object of attention separated from some material or mental thing. *Internal* sensibility regulates this matter. It points out our individual existence, as well as suggests the notion of *time*, from the various changes which attend our thoughts, emotions, and feelings. These perpetual variations we internally feel, produce the ideas or notions of *succession* and *number*, the former of which is only another name for time. The principle, therefore, which Kant deduces from these considerations is, that as *space* and *time* are not furnished by the materials which operate on the senses, they are not resolvable into experience, and must, therefore, be pure *à priori* elements of cognition, or pure intuitions of the thinking power.

We come now to another important division of our mental nature, *pure intelligence*. Sensibility we perceive is passive. The sensations we have through it afford no knowledge; they are dead and lifeless. Pure intelligence is required to breathe upon these inert masses of feelings and emotions, to give them life and vitality. This faculty is the

grand and active instrument of thought in the Kantian hypothesis. It fixes, establishes, determines, and methodises everything. It investigates all the original notions found in the understanding, traces their descent, and demonstrates that they are not in any sense empirical, but the pure result of the mind itself. The *categories* of Kant refer to the *pure intellect*; and are stated by him as follows.—

QUANTITY—Unity, Plurality, Totality.

QUALITY—Reality, Negation, Limitation.

RELATION—Substance, Cause, Reciprocation.

MODALITY—Possibility, Existence, Necessity.

The sensations we derive by *pure sensibility*, and they are moulded into *conceptions*, by the faculty of *pure intelligence*; which, besides performing this office, is the source of all the *judgments* which we form of external things. The mental conditions on which these judgments rest, are four, and they are contained in the above categorical list. These four primary classes are again subdivided into the following forms.—

QUANTITY—produces judgments of a universal, particular, and singular character.

QUALITY—produces affirmative, negative, infinite judgments.

RELATION—produces categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive judgments.

MODALITY—produces problematical, assertory, apodictical judgments.

In these categories, Kant affirms, we find the *true forms* of the understanding. They are the

constant and invariable conditions of all mental conceptions ; and are the things which connect or bind the understanding with all external objects. All judgments from these categories are *à priori* judgments.

Kant divides all our judgments into two kinds ; analytic and synthetic. Analytic judgments are a sort of experimental sketch ; the result of a separation of the different qualities or properties of any thing ; as, a square has four sides, and body has extension and density. Synthetic judgments are independent of experience, are universal in their nature ; and no opposition to them can be proved, or can be conceivable.

The system of logic which Kant developed is chiefly grounded upon these categories of the pure intellect. Logic he considers as altogether distinct from metaphysics, and as embracing the mere forms of thought, and those laws which regulate its movements. The system which he taught is now generally followed in Germany. All logical forms of reasoning are referred to three divisions ; transcendental, universal, and special. Transcendental logic expounds the laws and conditions of the understanding and of pure reason. These the author divides again into analytic and dialectic ; the former has a direct reference to *truth*, and the latter to specious appearances, and sophistical wranglings and subtilities. Universal logic is *pure* and *practical*. Pure logic is again divided into elementary and methodical. Elementary logic consists in the development of the constitutional or original forms

of the mind ; conception, judgment, reasoning ; and an exposition of the laws of thought under the respective heads of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *form*. Methodical logic is confined to *definition*, *division*, and *proof*.

These matters being connected, in the system of Kant, with the *pure intellect*, we pass now to the consideration of another of the great faculties of the mind, that of *pure reason*. We have seen how pure sensibility produces sensations or perception ; how the pure understanding moulds these into conceptions ; still there wanted another power to methodise, arrange, and place these conceptions in such a position, as to constitute general and comprehensive truths. This task is left to *pure reason* to accomplish. It is the most important and the most elevated of all our mental powers. It confers absolute *unity* upon our conceptions. Its three great attributes are absolute unity, absolute totality, and absolute causation. All these absolute ideas are involved in every act of reasoning. This is obvious from the slightest consideration. We designate or speak of a thing as a *whole*, as being the *cause* of another thing, and as being in itself a *single* thing. These elementary or primary ideas of the pure reason enter into every form of ratiocination.

There is, however, another view of this pure reason. It has, according to Kant, three forms or *grand ideas*. These have an existence altogether independent of experience ; they soar above the pure intellect ; they form, in fact, the cupola to the

fabrie of thought. These three great ideas rest upon three subjects; the universe, the soul, and God. The mode in which this union is effected we shall attempt to illustrate in the following manner.

When the pure sensibility has furnished us with sensations from material objects, and the understanding formed them into conceptions, the pure reason takes and classifies them, according to certain principles of its own nature. This generalization of the conceptions from outward objects, enables us to establish certain general truths respecting all things which come under our observation. However minutely we may analyze material bodies, and carefully register the results of our examinations; still if there were no power of the mind to collect, embody, arrange, and generalize the multifarious observations we make, we could derive little or no benefit or instruction from them; nor could any general propositions be established for the guidance of the mind in the pursuit and communication of truth. Every thing would be disjointed, isolated, and particular. All such general propositions, which it is the express design of the pure reason to frame, have a natural tendency to perfect unity. All the facts and observations connected with natural history, astronomy, chemistry, and the like, are grouped together by the pure reason; and we comprehend the whole under the term or designation of the *universe*. It embraces the entire mass of all real or possible physical knowledge. We think of it, speak of it, and reason about it,

under this form of absolute unity. This is the first grand idea or form of reason.

Besides the material universe, there are other objects of which the sensibility and the understanding jointly furnish us with vivid conceptions. These arise from our inward frame; from the feelings, emotions, passions, desires, thoughts, &c., which constitute our moral and intellectual nature. The pure reason takes cognizance of these as well as of material agencies and objects. It draws and consolidates general truths from the various phenomena which arise from them. Here we have the same principle of unity developed; we have the *I*, or *Ego*; our identity or personality; and in fact the *SOUL* itself, in all its totality, singleness, and absolute unity. We think, and speak of, and reason about the *soul* in the abstract, precisely in the same mode or manner as we do of the universe around us.

The third grand idea of pure reason relates to God. It springs out of the other two; the universe and the soul. This idea involves all the conditions or forms of existence of the material world, and of human nature. All reasonings relative to the mode of being, to the attributes, and to the moral nature of Deity, irresistibly draw us to perfect and absolute unity of nature and essence.

It is thus that Kant invests the pure reason with these comprehensive powers of generalizing all our individual perceptions, relative to the universe, the soul, and the Deity; thereby laying, as he

conceives, a sure and rational foundation for these three great branches or divisions of all pure metaphysics ; cosmology, psychology, and theology.

The distinguished and prominent station which the pure reason holds in the Kantian theory, is, however, more apparent than real. It has merely a regulative, arranging, generalizing, and subordinate office in the mental economy. It creates nothing ; it proves nothing ; it establishes nothing, beyond what the understanding furnishes. If it attempts to go beyond it ; to draw materials out of its own resources ; from that moment it falls into error and delusion of the grossest kind. It demonstrates the reality of neither the universe, the soul, nor the Deity ; all is invested with a mere subjective existence.

This is Kant's anatomy of the mind ; his theoretical exposition of the thinking principle. But to this abstract development he has added another, relative to moral and religious principles of our nature. This he denominates **PRACTICAL REASON**. We can form no conceptions of our powers, duties, and obligations, from the mere external impressions on our pure sensibility. We must here fall back upon consciousness. It is from this that we can learn our duty both to man and our Creator. Here we must penetrate into our internal structure ; examine all the motives, impulses, and aspirations of the soul ; and look at the final ends or purposes which its various faculties are fitted to produce. From this investigation we shall discover the nature of duty and of right ; of what is necessary, and what is expedient ; of what is good, and what per-

nicious ; of rewards and punishments ; and of the power of free-will. We must anatomize the whole of man's moral nature, his sentiments, feelings, and desires. All these inquiries must have an especial reference to consciousness. All moral laws exist *à priori* in the mind ; and are completely independent of the thinking principle. The whole moral economy of man points to another grand truth, that of the existence of a Deity. The *practical reason* of mankind clearly demonstrates that there must be a *supreme universal infinite reason* ; the subordinate must be supported by the superior. "The supreme reason, this absolute goodness, this judge of all, the rewarder of virtue, and punisher of vice ; is God." The Deity is not, however, a subject of abstract reasoning or demonstration.

Such is the general outline of the philosophy of Kant. We cannot possibly enter into minute matters of detail. These we must leave the reader to supply by a direct reference to the author's works. The system as a whole looks grand and imposing, and has an air of great strength and solidity. It is hedged round with a ponderous array of logical axioms, rules, definitions, and forms ; and with a phraseology at once original and scholastic. But with all these attractive appliances, it will not bear a close inspection. It is a huge and unwieldy mass of materials, arranged doubtless according to the author's notions of symmetrical proportion, but strangely at variance with all the established rules of intellectual architecture. The foundation of the edifice is manifestly inadequate

to bear the weighty and grotesque superstructure. While we are making a hasty and partial examination of it, we feel an unpleasant sensation of danger that the whole fabric will tumble down, and bury us in its ruins. While we are passing from one division of the "philosophic temple" to another, the eye detects immense rents and fissures in the walls; and parts of the building which appeared imposing and graceful at a distance, become uncouth and repulsive on a nearer approach and a closer view. Our chief wonder is, how a thing so utterly at variance with the simplicity of nature should ever have been made at all, and should have had so many admirers. Only this we know, that philosophy has its fashionable whims and eccentricities as well as any thing else, and that fantastical theories and systems must run their wonted course, in spite of all that rational and sober thought can do and say.

It would extend this notice to an unreasonable length, were we to offer even a rough outline of all the opinions which modern philosophers have expressed for and against the Kantian hypothesis. Indeed hundreds of volumes would scarcely contain the mass of controversial matter. We must content ourselves, therefore, with simply offering a few brief observations on the leading points of this far-famed but often ill-understood theory.

Kant compares himself to Copernicus, and conceives that his system of philosophy bears the same superiority to all preceding mental theories, that the Copernican system of astronomy does to the

opinions of the ancients on the laws of motion of the heavenly bodies. There is nothing to justify such a parallel. Kant's commencement with the faculties of the mind to demonstrate the phenomena of thought, has nothing original in it; the same thing has been done a hundred times since the days of Plato. In fact, if we take away the formal machinery, the technical frame-work of the Kantian hypothesis, we take everything which, on the score of originality, belongs to its propounder.

Kant's system rests on consciousness. He takes the veracity of its intimations for granted. He offers no proof of this; indeed he cannot offer any. But here he does not depart a single step from Descartes. The "*Cogito, ergo sum*," is the foundation of the Kantian, as well as it is of the Cartesian, system. Both philosophers took their departure from the same point; and, though their respective theories have an appearance of great dissimilarity, the difference, in point of principle, is more apparent than real.

Kant informs us, as we have already noticed, that his great object was to overthrow the scepticism of Hume. But in this he has not been successful. The foundation of all scepticism, both ancient and modern, is this, that things *may be* different from what they appear to us to be. If our sensations or conceptions do not intimate to us, in some way or other, that things are what they appear to be, then there can be no solid foundation for any kind of truth. Now Kant's main object in his philosophy is, to show that we have

no knowledge of anything, "neither in the heavens above nor in the earth beneath," but that which is purely phenomenal or sensational. We have no knowledge of things in themselves; the *noumena* of the universe are completely hid from view. We may, indeed, *believe* there is something external to phenomena; something which produces them; but we can give no proof whatever of this reality; we must acquiesce in this conclusion; and this is just what has been said by almost every metaphysician who preceded him. It is quite obvious that he coquettes with idealism and scepticism all through his work; he seems bewildered at every turn; and at last, as we shall show bye and bye, relinquishes in despair the great task he had undertaken, and leaves matters just where he found them.*

* A distinguished French philosopher, Victor Cousin, who affirms that he has demonstrated the fallacy of the Kantian theory, makes the following remarks in a late publication. "After having commenced with a system of idealism, Kant ended in scepticism. The problem upon which this distinguished man was wrecked, is that which modern philosophy finds still presented to notice at this hour. I gave a solution of this problem not long ago, which time has not yet shaken. This solution rests upon the essential distinction between *spontaneous reason* and *reflected reason*. If Kant, in his profound analysis, had seen the ultimate result of it; if, under reflection, he had seen the ultimate and simple fact; he would instantly have perceived that nothing is less personal than reason, particularly in the phenomena of pure thought; and, consequently, nothing less subjective, as the truths with which we are thus furnished are absolute truths; subjective, I admit, in their relation to ourselves in the phenomena of consciousness, but objective in reference to their complete independence. Truth is absolute, and independent of our reason, just as our reason is truly distinct from ourselves. Reason is not subjective; the subject is myself, it is personality, liberty, will. Reason has no attributes but personality and liberty. Who ever says, *my truth*, or *your truth*?"—(Cours de Philosophie, tom. 1. 1828.)

It has been considered by some writers, both in England and in France, that Kant gained, in the path of absolute certainty, a step in advance of his opponent Hume. The latter called in question the whole mass of human knowledge; but Kant denies the philosophy of this doubt, though he concedes that the human mind is *limited*. A disciple of Hume's might ask, "What are *your* limits of certainty? What authority have *you* to fix the line of demarcation between what is conditional and what is absolute? You merely tell us that knowledge cannot consist in the mere intimations of the senses, but that we must have the *à priori* conceptions to mix with these intimations; and yet the amalgamation of this matter and form only produces absolute truth *to us*. This is not extending the limits of absolute certainty a single inch. You tell me just what my master David tells me; he never calls in question *what appears to us*; but he wants to know what there is *beyond* this appearance, and you tell me plainly that we know nothing, and if even we attempt to know anything beyond this *apparent* knowledge, we immediately 'rush into thick darkness.'"

Have we anything beyond experience? Have we any *à priori* judgments? If we have, from whence do we derive them? Yes, Kant says, we have *à priori* judgments; and we obtain them in this manner, and in this manner alone. We have *sensations* from external bodies; we have certain *à priori* conceptions from the understanding; but the two powers must act upon each other, before

any mental *conception* can be formed of anything whatever. Now viewing this statement in every possible light, it always comes to this, that it is the same doctrine as Mr. Locke promulgated, that sensation and reflection are the sources of our knowledge; a doctrine which was essentially maintained in its integrity, even in Germany, up to the time when Kant's theory appeared. The operation of this *pure understanding* of the German philosopher upon the rough materials of sensation, has no essential characteristic difference from the reflective process of Locke; nor does it clear up a single difficulty which could be fairly brought against his system. The "Critique" of Kant has no advantage, on this ground, over the "Essay" of the Englishman. On the contrary, there would be no difficulty in showing that the system of Transcendental metaphysics has a more decided leaning to the mere *sensational* hypothesis of the French school, than Mr. Locke's work has. Kant, it must always be remembered, makes *sensation* the real foundation of everything in the shape of knowledge and certainty; inasmuch as the understanding and the pure reason create nothing, but are merely regulating and subordinate powers. To say that *sensation* furnishes the *material* of all thought, is in substance to surrender the operation and influence of the other higher faculties of the mind altogether. The *reflection* of Locke was a real *creative* power; very superior in point of authority to the *understanding* of Kant. There is really no difference, except in phraseology, between the mere

transformed sensations of Condillac, and the *conceptions* of the "Critique;" only the French philosopher did not give a name to his *transforming process*, and Kant did. The understanding transforms the *sensation* into a *conception*, but by what process, no mortal can divine.*

The most striking discrepancy in the philosophy

* "Au point de vue où nous venons de nous placer, la philosophie de Kant présente une sorte de dualisme, dans le divorce de la raison spéculative et de la raison pratique, de la forme et de la matière, du moi et du non-moi. Elle ne constitue pas un système organique de la science fondé sur l'unité. Elle est critique et analytique et nullement organique; elle n'est pas transcendante, mais transcendantale ou subjective; elle ne sort pas de la psychologie. La synthèse lui manque complètement et nécessairement, parce qu'elle s'est fermée la voie de la métaphysique. Le rapport des diverses parties qui la constituent n'est pas un enchaînement synthétique ou rationnel, mais une liaison formelle et abstraite, un rapport d'analogie formé par la réflexion. D'un autre côté, la partie analytique ou critique est encore fort incomplète. Kant l'a conçue d'une manière exclusive, comme critique de l'intelligence ou la faculté cognitive de l'esprit humain, et n'a pas remonté à sa source première, à la conscience, où se réfléchit l'activité tout entière de l'esprit, dans l'intelligence, dans le sentiment, et dans la volonté. Il y a plus; Kant n'a pas même épuisé le cadre de l'intelligence. Il n'a pas accompli avec fidélité la tâche qu'il avait entreprise, c'est-à-dire, la critique générale de la connaissance humaine. Il apporte à ses recherches la logique formelle d'Aristote comme une science parfaite. Il n'approfondit pas la connaissance sensible, en examinant les divers sens, la nature des impressions qui en dérivent, la manière dont nous arrivons à la connaissance des objets extérieurs, et la part qu'y prennent les diverses fonctions de l'intelligence. Il ne distingue pas assez les notions abstraites de l'entendement, et il les confond avec les catégories de la raison. Il méconnaît complètement le vrai caractère des catégories et des idées. Enfin, dans tous les degrés de la connaissance, il introduit une hypothèse première, dont il n'a pas vérifié la valeur, et qui le conduit aux erreurs les plus graves. Tels sont les lacunes et les défauts les plus importants de la méthode critique et de la doctrine de Kant."—(Essai Théorique et Historique sur la Génération des Connaissances Humaines, par Ciberhien, Bruxelles, 1844.)

of Kant, is that which manifests itself between his *speculative* and his *practical reason*. Here there is an inseparable gulf. Principles are laid down in the theoretical portion of his system, which are entirely given up in the practical. There is no bond, connection, or unity between the two branches of his theory.* He argues for the doctrines of morality, and the existence of a Deity, upon the plain principles of *common sense*, even as this is defined by many of the Scotch writers on the mind. He saw clearly that his abstract system would not bear the test of a practical application to the everyday movements and feelings of mankind; therefore he virtually renounced it, and reasoned upon the active principles of human nature, as most philosophers have done for these three thousand years past. And the *practical reason* is by far the most valuable portion of the speculative philosophy of Kant. There are many sublime and elevated thoughts in it. His reasonings on the *will*, a faculty only barely mentioned in his metaphysics, are excellent; and the candid and intelligent reader

* The following observations are from the pen of M. De Gerando :
 " *Practical reason* is a wing which Kant has prudently added to his edifice, from a sense of the inadequacy of the original design to answer the intended purpose. It bears a manifest resemblance to what some philosophers call an appeal to sentiment, founding belief on the necessity of acting. Whatever contempt Kant may affect for popular systems of philosophy, this manner of considering the subject is not unlike the disposition of those who, feeling their inability to obtain, by the exercise of their reason, a direct conviction of their religious creed, cling to it, nevertheless, with a blind eagerness, as a support essential to their morals and their happiness."

will find valuable positions laid down with great clearness and logical accuracy.*

The doctrines of Kant have excited, within the last forty years, considerable attention in France. They have generally been discussed with great ability and candour. There has been every disposition manifested by the philosophers of that country, to do ample justice to the merits of the philosopher of Königsberg; but their verdict has been, on the whole, unfavourable to his system. The following brief remarks may, perhaps, making allowances for many qualifications, embody the substance of their reasonings, on which this verdict has been given.

The knowledge of Being in general, or the

* Professor Stewart remarks in his Dissertation, "In some respects, the functions ascribed by Kant to his *practical* reason, are analogous to those ascribed to common sense, in the writings of Beattie and Oswald. But his view of the subject is, on the whole, infinitely more exceptionable than theirs: inasmuch as it sanctions the supposition, that the conclusions of *pure reason* are, in certain instances, at variance with *that* modification of reason which was meant by our Maker to be our guide in life; whereas the constant language of the other writers is, that all the different parts of our intellectual frame are in the most perfect harmony with each other.

"It is to the same practical modification of reason that Kant appeals in favour of the existence of the Deity, and of a future state of retribution; both of which articles of belief, he thinks, derive the whole of their evidence from the moral nature of man. His system, therefore, as far as I am able to comprehend it, tends rather to represent those as useful *credenda*, than as certain or even as probable truths. Indeed the whole of his moral superstructure will be found to rest ultimately on no better basis than the metaphysical *conundrum*, that the human mind (considered as a *noumenon*, and not as a *phenomenon*) neither exists in space nor in time."

Science of Deity, considered in all its unity of nature and attributes, must ever prove the only solid foundation for any system of rational psychology. The reason of this is, that the science of God contains the only principles,—the sole cause and source,—of all things external to man's existence. It is absurd then to give philosophy an exclusive psychological basis, because psychology is nothing more nor less than a mere assemblage of particular phenomena, collected by repeated observations. It has no ontological foundation ; and hence it wants a system of laws to bind and classify those phenomena, and form them into elements of sound knowledge. We must place philosophy upon something primitive, universal, and immutable. If we refuse to adopt this course, we shall have a science of pure negation, or rather a system of speculation destructive of all true knowledge. An examination into the mode adopted by Kant, relative to the laws of mind, will strikingly illustrate the truth of this position. He commenced, like Descartes, to philosophise *from himself*. He was under the necessity, therefore, to begin examining the instruments of knowledge, or reason abstractly considered. This having nothing positive, vital, or creative in it, produced only an abortive attempt to establish a rational philosophy. An examination into the laws of *pure reason* necessarily demanded a similar inquiry into the general laws of the whole of human nature ; inasmuch as, in the first case, philosophical observation was compressed into very narrow limits; while on the other hand, it was impos-

sible that human thought could develop its own nature and attributes. From this point of view the method of Kant infallibly leads to scepticism.

The psychology of the German "sage" has, however, many claims upon the gratitude of philosophers, on account of the elevation of its tone, and its removal from the selfish and formal systems so characteristic of the spirit of philosophy when his "Critique" made its appearance. He investigated human nature with great zeal and skill; and obtained such an accurate and systematic knowledge of his own mind, as to be able to trace out those necessary and general forms of thought, which he theoretically terms *Categories*; which are nothing more than the essential modes of existence which appertain to all intelligent creations. But these modes only designate limitations: they are only, in their own nature, a partial negation of the principle of infinity; and when they are separated from it, they only exhibit a barren and negative form of scientific truth.

The fundamental error, therefore, of the Kantian hypothesis is, that Kant, not taking his departure from Infinite Being, and reasoning downwards to what was limited and finite;—that is, instead of taking his stand upon something positive, to arrive at a correct knowledge of particulars,—grounds his views upon mere limitations themselves; and of course brought forward nothing but an unfruitful and negative theory, destructive of all science, inasmuch as it is a system of philosophy *about nothing at all*.*

In England the "Critical" philosophy of Kant has obtained, within the last thirty years, considerable attention; but still opinion is much divided upon its real nature and merits. It is impossible to speak of these criticisms but in a very general way; and it is with this understanding, that we submit what we think a fair and impartial outline of the general sentiments of the learned in this country, on the point in question, at the present moment.

Viewing the system in every possible light, candour obliges us to allow, that the German philosophy, as a whole, has a massive and imposing appearance. If it be not a temple to science and wisdom, it looks very much like one. There is a colossal power of thought and abstraction about it, which strikes every beholder with awe and amazement. And it must be conceded, that the eagerness with which it was seized by the German people, and its thorough ingraftation on the mind of the nation, can only be accounted for upon the supposition of its singular adaptation to the mental constitution of the country; and that the phenomena of human thought were, in their apprehensions, in some measure accounted for and developed by the system. The national enthusiasm in favour of the "*Critique of*

* See Cousin's "*Leçons de Philosophie sur Kant*;" Charles Buor's "*Philosophie de l'Absolu en Allemagne*;" Remusat's "*De la Philosophie Allemande*;" Willm's "*Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande*;" Berchon de Penhön's "*Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Leibnitz jusqu'à Hegel*."

Pure Reason," and the ordeal it has even in Germany gone through, justly entitle it to the serious consideration of all sincere lovers of mental philosophy. Large masses of thinking men, men daily accustomed to hard and severe thought, can never be led away by systems of downright folly and absurdity. There must be some rudiment of reason, some plausible display of argument, or some principle of harmony with the ordinary course of human nature, to call forth such a degree of attention and fervour as this system of philosophy has obtained.

On the score of its alleged mystical character, we are ready also to concede that the picture may be here overdrawn. Men are often led to call that mystical, which they do not or will not understand. We must not, therefore, come to hasty conclusions on this point. All sciences look very like mysteries to the uninitiated. But making the most liberal allowances on this point, every one at all acquainted with the subject must allow, that a certain portion of the mysterious still hangs around the system of Kant, notwithstanding all the commentaries, glosses, and explanations, which the ardour of the most devoted proselytism has conferred upon it. There is something which cannot be fathomed; which the mind can by no means lay hold of; which arouses the slumbering feelings of suspicion that all is not right; and that however difficult to prove, yet there is a something "rotten in the state of Denmark." No matter

with what delight you enter on the study of the system, nor what progress you make in it, there is always the same gloomy foreboding that the whole will turn out a dream and an empty show. And, as a proof of this, it may be mentioned, that there is scarcely a single English dissertation, or piece of criticism, from the pen of the most enthusiastic admirer of the German philosophy of mind, that does not contain some vital qualification as to its soundness and truth. Some say, "It is a wonderful system, if it *be true*;" another, "We ought not to condemn it till we have made ourselves completely masters of it, which we confess we have not yet done;" and a third, "We give no opinion, but only recommend investigation." All these, it must be acknowledged, are but unsatisfactory testimonials of the character and worth of the system.

Besides these considerations, it may be remarked, that looking at the fruits of the German system, another doubt arises as to its validity. It is a matter of painful notoriety, that since its promulgation, we have had, in Germany in particular,—where, if in any place, its bearings must be supposed to be well ascertained—a vast load of the most ridiculous and absurd books, grounded upon its principles. Where a system is liable to foolish and outrageous perversions, it is but reasonable we should entertain doubts as to its abstract soundness. New theories of human nature, professing a discovery of principles never recognised before, are always to be viewed with suspicion; and particularly so, if,

in their application to the varied aspect of human life, they give rise to extravagant caricatures of humanity and general knowledge. That this has been the result of the German philosophy, is admitted by its warmest friends, who have endeavoured to break the force of public animadversion, by liberal apologies grounded on its novelty and innate abstruseness.*

. The following is a German List of Kant's works.—“Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht,” 4te Aufl., Leipzig, 1833; “Kritik der practischen Vernunft,” 6te Aufl., Leipzig, 1827; “Kritik der reinen Vernunft,” 6te Aufl., Dresden, 1818; “Kritik der Urtheilskraft,” Berlin, 1799; “Logik,” Königsberg, 1800; “Von der Macht des Gemüths,” 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1824; “Elementa metaphysica Juris Doctrinæ,” Lat. vertit G. L. König, Groningen, 1820; “Metaphysik,” Königsberg, 1802; “Metaphysik der Sitten,” 2 Thle, Königsberg 1797; “Vorlesungen über Metaphysik,” Erfart, 1821; “Constitut. princip. Metaphys. morum,” in Lat. conv. Zwanziger, Lipsiæ, 1796; “Opera ad philos. crit.” Latine vert. P. G. Born, 3 vol. Lipsiæ, 1796; “Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,” Königsberg, 1794; “Theorie der reinen moralischen Religion,” Riga, 1796; “Sämmtliche kleine Schriften,” 3 Thle, Königsberg, 1796; “Frühere noch nicht gesammelte kleine Schriften,” 2 Thle, Linz und Frankfurt, 1795—1797; “Vorzügliehe kleine Schriften und Aufsätze,” mit Anmerkungen, herausgegeben von F. C. Starke, 2 Bde, Leipzig, 1833; “Vermischte Schriften,” Halle, 1799; “Metaphysische Anfangs-Gründe der Tugendlehre,” Königsberg, 1803; “Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre,” Leipzig, 1817. Kant's “Kritik” has been recently translated into French by M. Tissot. The “Critical Philosophy” was translated in 1798, by Dr. Willich. There is also a translation, London, 1838. Mr. Wigram's “Principles of the Kantesian or Transcendental Philosophy,” 1824, will be found a useful work.

* See Note G, at the end of the Volume; and also vols. 1. 3. 22. 28. 36. 46. and 50. of the Edinburgh Review, in which many excellent criticisms on Kant and his metaphysical system, will be found.

CHAPTER XX.

ON METAPHYSICAL WRITERS IN GERMANY WHO IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED AND FOLLOWED KANT, TILL THE TERMINATION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

ALMOST all the German writers who flourished within thirty years previous to the appearance of Kant's "*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*," adopted the system of Wolff, with here and there a sprinkling of the doctrines of Leibnitz, Descartes, and Locke. There is little in such treatises of what may be called speculation or theory. They chiefly come under the category of elementary and scholastic works; written with the express view of furnishing to students at the various seminaries of education, the requisite prescribed portion of knowledge on the science of mind.

After the publication of Kant's system, the whole of the metaphysical literati of Germany enlisted themselves under his banner. Their zeal, their industry, and their proselyting spirit, knew no bounds; and criticisms, abridgments, summaries,

abstracts, and commentaries, of and concerning the philosophy of "Pure Reason," crowded the libraries and book stalls throughout the length and breadth of the land. A man who did not know, or pretended not to know, the "Critical Philosophy" in all its bearings, was considered beyond the pale of literary civilization. He was at once an object of commiseration and contempt. Nothing could have been more gratifying to the literary ambition of the "Critical" Sage, than this universal and enthusiastic reception of his doctrines; so far at least as his own country was concerned. Here everything was admiration, harmony, and rapture. Nothing more was needed to fill up the German's cup of joy to the very brim, than to extend the knowledge of this "Pure Reason" to other portions of the civilized world; to concentrate its rays upon the mind of other less favoured nations; and to make their men of learning the admirers and cultivators of that system, which was to banish doubt and darkness for ever from the intellectual regions of human nature.

But alas! other nations remained long deaf to the charmer, though "charming never so wisely." The "Criticism of Pure Reason" excited their surprise, but never took hold of their understandings. Had all the coldness and indifference of the whole Northern people of Europe been concentrated into one focus, it could not have surpassed, in degree, the apathy displayed in Britain towards the disquisitions of Emmanuel Kant. Nothing, in fact, could be more heartless and discouraging. Though

his system was adorned with an English dress, yet it failed to attract the sympathies of the learned. There are in every country, and Great Britain has her full share of them, a number of persons whose minds have a strong affinity for whatever is quaint and obscure, and who charitably set down for absolute wisdom what they cannot comprehend. But even among this particular class of men, the "Critical Philosophy" failed to make a general impression. Its lineaments were too uncouth and forbidding even for their unnatural and diseased appetite for strange sights and philosophical wonders. Nor did the Kantian hypothesis seem more inviting to the lively temperaments of our French neighbours. The sprightly volatility of the *savants* of Paris could not brook the cumbersome and awkward yoke of the German system. They made many bold and chivalrous attempts to penetrate into it; but the parties were reluctantly obliged to give up the enterprise as altogether hopeless and forlorn.

It is, therefore, to the German nation that the system of "Pure Reason" properly and essentially belongs. It is admirably fitted to the turn of mind and genius of the people. It is indigenous to their soil, and can never be successfully or profitably cultivated in any other.

In giving an account of some of the metaphysical writers of Germany, from the time of Kant to the end of the eighteenth century, I am conscious of great imperfections in this enumeration, and in the attempt to furnish the reader with an intel-

ligible outline of the views of these respective authors. Their treatises are numerous, and so closely interwoven with the mystical spirit of their master, that it is difficult to penetrate through the murky medium which they have thrown around the "Critique of Pure Reason."

It may also be mentioned here, that some of the philosophical historians of Germany will be treated of in this chapter. These have all, more or less, been men of surprising industry and ability; and their labours have proved of the greatest benefit to the progress of knowledge and science. They are, consequently, justly entitled to our highest respect and veneration.

One remark we must make in reference to these historical works, namely, that they are all, with the exception of Brucker's, in a greater or less degree grounded on the "Critical Philosophy," and imbued with its spirit. Consequently all their representations of systems and opinions are viewed through this medium, and all their original disquisitions have a decided leaning to the Kantian theory. This circumstance makes these historical treatises, to a certain extent, one-sided and partial; and readers, comparatively ignorant of the peculiar features of German speculations, are apt, at first sight, to misinterpret the drift of the historians, and to set too light a value upon their herculean labours.

PAUL MAKO.

This was a Hungarian philosopher. His works

connected with mental science are, "*Compendiaria Logices Institutio*," 1766; and "*Compendiaria Metaphysices Institutio*," 1766. His logic is divided into two parts, theoretical and practical; the latter division is the most interesting. The entire work is however, only a compound from Wolff and other German writers and compilers.

The author's "*Compendium of Metaphysics*" embraces all those topics which purely elementary treatises on the Continent usually discussed in the middle of the eighteenth century. We have being, essence, substance, existence, time, space, motion, the faculties of the mind, the immateriality and immortality of the soul, and the elements of natural religion.*

JOHN JAMES BRUCKER.

Brucker is the author of the "*Critical History of Philosophy*." The work is a stupendous monument of the author's skill and labour. In this publication are comprised all the various branches of philosophy; all the periods of time when they first made their appearance; all the particular countries which gave them birth; all the relations these philosophical systems bear to each other; all the different sects and schools into which they were divided; all their numerous vicissitudes and changes over thousands of years; all the particular doctrines and principles involved in each sect; and, in fact,

* See the Author's Works, Edition 1769, Vienna.

every thing which could in the most remote degree be considered interesting to a philosophical reader or student to know.

To give anything like an abstract of such hereulean and diversified labours, would be obviously out of our power, in a limited publication of this kind. But for the use of the general reader, it may be briefly noticed that Brueker divided his history into three grand leading divisions.

The first division embraces the period from the earliest records of philosophy to the foundation of the Roman Monarchy. This leading division is again subdivided into two parts; namely, the antediluvian philosophy and the post-diluvian; defining the latter to comprise the different sects or schools of learning of all nations, but especially those of Greece under Thales and Pythagoras.

The second division extends from the foundation of the Roman monarchy until the revival of letters; and this wide interval of time embraces five parts, the philosophy of the Romans, the Orientals, the Jews, the Saracens, and the Christians.

The third grand division begins with the influence of Bacon's philosophy. This is again divided into five parts; 1st, The attempt to re-establish the doctrines of antiquity; 2nd, The revival of the ancient schools; 3rd, The attempt to extend the views of philosophers; 4th, Those sceptics who rejected all philosophy; and 5th, The philosophical Eclectics, or those great men who have regenerated true philosophy, and extended her boundaries beyond all previous anticipations.

A great drawback to Brucker's work is, that there are too many statements respecting the ancient philosophy which are little better than sheer fable. Giving importance to such matters does not promote real knowledge. There is also required, in his publication, a proper appreciation of general principles. These are buried amidst a huge mass of information, which can only, in fact, prove interesting or intelligible, in proportion as these general principles are brought to bear on the reader's mind and judgment.*

JOHN HENRY LAMBERT.

Lambert was a native of Alsace, and was distinguished both for his mathematical and metaphysical knowledge. In 1763, he published his "*Novum Organum*," at Leipsic, in two volumes. His metaphysical speculations are a compound from the works of Leibnitz, Wolff, and Bacon, in addition to many sagacious remarks of his own.†

* "We are told that 'among the learned of Germany, Brucker has never enjoyed a very distinguished reputation.' This I can very easily credit; but I am more inclined to interpret it to the disadvantage of the German taste, than to that of the historian. Brucker is indeed not distinguished by any extraordinary measure of depth or acuteness; but in industry, fidelity, and sound judgment, he has few superiors; qualities of infinitely greater value in the undertaking of a historical work, than that passion for systematical refinement which is so apt to betray the best-intentioned writers into false glosses on the opinions they record."
—(Stewart's Dissertation.)

† "Cet ingénieux et puissant Lambert, dont les mathématiques, qui lui doivent beaucoup, ne purent épuiser les forces, et qui ne toucha aucun

Lambert was an enthusiastic advocate of the opinion that geometrical reasonings could be applied with advantage to all branches of speculative knowledge. To develop this favourite idea, was the grand object which occupied his mind for many years. Full of this thought, he instituted a species of signs to express and indicate the various relations subsisting among our ideas generally, the extension of which they are susceptible, and their subordinate interest to each other. Taking Locke's system, to a certain extent, for a guide, particularly that part of it which related to simple and complex ideas, he made this abstract sufficiently comprehensive to bear the weight of the verbal and technical classifications he placed upon it. His plan proved useful, especially to students whose minds required some logical regulation or balance.

K. L. REINHOLD.

The works of this author are, "Versuch einer

sujet de physique ou de philosophie rationnelle, sans le couvrir de lumière. Les 'Lettres Cosmologiques,' qu'il écrivit par forme de délassement, sont pleines d'idées sublimes, fondées sur la philosophie la plus saine et la plus savante tout-à-la-fois. Il avait aussi dressé, sous le titre d'*Architectonique*, un tableau des principes sur lesquels se fondent les connaissances humaines. Cet ouvrage, au jugement des hommes les plus versés dans l'étude de leur langue, n'est pas exempt d'obscurité. Elle peut tenir en partie à la nature du sujet. Il est à regretter que sa *Logique*, intitulée *Organon*, ne soit traduite ni en Latin ni en Français, ni, je pense, en aucune langue. Un extrait bien fait de cet ouvrage, duquel on écarterait ce qui répugne au goût national, exciterait l'attention des philosophes, et la porterait sur une multitude d'objets qu'ils se sont accoutumés à regarder avec indifférence."—(Prevost, pp. 267. 268.)

neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungs-Vermögens," Prag. und Jena, 1789; "Ueber das Fundament der Philos. Wissensch." Jena, 1791; "Beiträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie, beim Anfange des 19 Jahrhunderts," Hamburg, 1802; "Versuch einer Kritik der Logik aus dem Standpunkte der Sprache," 1806; "Die alte Frage *Was ist die Wahrheit?*" Altona, 1820. This author's new theory of the human understanding rests upon what he calls the *representative faculty*. This power appears to be a modification of Kant's *pure reason*, and is applied to nearly the same purpose in attempting to explain the nature and laws of the human mind. In the latter part of the author's life, he devoted a great portion of his time to the consideration of the influence which language exercised over our trains of thought and our abstract judgments. His inquiries into this abstruse subject led him to conclude that a great number of our errors and misconceptions of each other's meaning, in the science of mind, might fairly be attributed to the natural imperfections of language, as a philosophical instrument of thought.

Reinhold maintained that a principle fundamentally true and primitive, which determined the form of science, but did not contain its matter, ought to be distinguished by the following marks.

1. All elementary truths of philosophy ought to be *immediately* perceived, and other truths *mediately*.

2. The fundamental truth ought to have an

existence external to all philosophy ; otherwise we should fall into the vicious mode of reasoning of those, who seek the principle of science in science itself.

3. This principle ought not to take for granted any reasoning ; it should simply be the expression of a fact.

4. It ought to be recognised by the reflection of all men, at all times, and under all circumstances.

5. Such a fundamental principle cannot consist in experience. Sensations, always individual things, have no general character or creative power to give birth to a general principle.

6. Such a principle ought, however, to appertain to all experience, and all our thoughts under every conceivable form and circumstance.”*

From this primitive principle of all science, Reinhold deduces his notions of *representation*, of the *object*, and of the *subject*. This faculty of representation is divided into two parts ; the one is that which has a relation with the *object*, and the other with the *subject*. The first constitutes its *matter*, and the second its *form*. Matter is *multiple*, but form is *unity*.

JOH. HEINR. ABICHT.

The works of this author are, “*Philosophie der Erkenntnisse*,” 1791 ; “*Von dem Nutzen und der Einrichtung eines zu logischen Uebungen*

* Beiträge, &c., pp. 140. 164. 170.

bestimmte collegium," Leipzig, 1790 ; "Verbesserte Logik oder Wahrheits-Wissenschaft," Fuerth, 1802 ; "Anleitung und Materialien zu cinem logisch-practischen Institut," Erlangen, 1796 ; "System der Elementar-Philosophie, oder vollständige Natur-Lehre der Erkenntniss Gefühls- und Willens-Kraft," Erlangen, 1796.

The metaphysics of this author are, as near as possible, those of Kant. He seems to have reared his superstructure upon the same foundation. An active spontaneity of mind, and singleness or unity of the thinking principle, appear to be the leading ideas which run through the whole of the author's speculations.

He defines Logic to be the *perception of truth*. Three questions are proposed, which embrace the whole science of reasoning:—1. Which is the best method of acquiring true knowledge ? 2. By what means are we able to distinguish truth from falsehood ? and 3. What is the best mode of arranging our acquired knowledge, so as it may be in strict conformity to truth ?

TENNEMANN.

"The History of Philosophy," by Professor Tennemann, was commenced in the year 1798, and was, we believe, finished in 1820. It is a most voluminous work, and is undoubtedly superior to any other history of the same nature which Germany has produced. It is full of learning, and the author has examined every topic of interest with

great care, judgment, and impartiality. He has been anxious on every occasion to identify himself completely with his author, and to make his case his own. This has given a liveliness and *gusto* to his writings, which we do not find in any of the German historians who preceded him.

Professor Tennemann has collected and arranged a vast portion of detached and scattered materials, and given unity of purpose and design to the whole. But the great drawback to this really elaborate and useful work, is the quaint language he has used. This must, at all times, prove a real blemish, in the eyes of every ordinary and common-sense reader.*

BUHLE.

The works of this German writer are voluminous, and naturally divide themselves into two parts; namely, "The Manual of the History of Philosophy

* "Among the secondary mischiefs resulting from the temporary popularity of Kant, none is more to be regretted than the influence of his works on the habits, both of thinking and of writing, of some very eminent men who have since given to the world histories of philosophy. That of Tenneman in particular (a work said to possess great merit) would appear to have been vitiated by his unfortunate bias to the views of its author. A very competent judge has said of it that 'It affords, as far as it is completed, the most accurate, the most minute, and the most rational view we yet possess of the different systems of philosophy; but that the critical philosophy being chosen as the vantage ground from whence the survey of former systems is taken, the continual reference in Kant's own language to his peculiar doctrines, renders it frequently impossible for those who have not studied the dark works of this modern Heraclitus to understand the strictures of the historian on the systems even of Aristotle or Plato.'"—(See the Article *BRUCKER*, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 7th Ed.)

and *Literary Criticism*," in eight volumes octavo ; and his "*History of Modern Philosophy since the Revival of Letters*," comprised also in eight volumes. These two works are different in their aim, and in their style and manner of execution. The first contains a multitude of extracts from different authors, with critical remarks upon them ; but these extracts are not made with much judgment, and the remarks upon them are often exceedingly puerile and uninteresting, and expressed in very obscure language. In the second work we find a recital of the various causes which produced the numerous revolutions of speculative opinions amongst the ancients, and particularly in reference to the schools of Aristotle and Plato. The writing is here more lively and enticing, and the author has thrown more intellectual life and vigour into his statements of facts, and his critical observations upon them.

Buhle is a zealous disciple of Kant, and loves at all times to descant upon the great value of his philosophy. This predilection has, in a considerable degree, prejudiced his mind against the merits of English moralists and metaphysicians, of whose writings and opinions he professes to give some account.

"When," says a distinguished author, "the above passage was written, I had not seen the work of Buhle. I have since had the opportunity of looking into the French translation of it, published at Paris in 1816 ; and I must frankly acknowledge, that I have seldom met with a greater

disappointment. The account there given of the Kantian system, to which I turned with peculiar eagerness, has, if possible, involved, *to my apprehension*, in additional obscurity that mysterious doctrine. From this, however, I did not feel myself entitled to form an estimate of the author's merits as a philosophical historian, till I had read some other articles of which I considered myself better qualified to judge. * * * *

"But the radical defect of Buhle's work is, the almost total want of references to original authors. We are presented only with the general results of the author's reading, without any guide to assist us in confirming his conclusions when right, or in correcting them when wrong. This circumstance is of itself sufficient to annihilate the value of any historical composition."*

D. TIEDEMANN.

This author's work is entitled, "*Geist der Speculativen Philosophie von Thales bis auf Socrates.*" Marburg, 1790, 1797. The History is conducted upon a different plan from that of Brucker. He has shown himself more a philosopher than a mere compiler, and has entered pretty fully into the merits of particular theories and doctrines. Matters of detail and of subordinate interest, he has passed over in silence; but has kept pretty steadily in view all those leading prin-

* Stewart's Dissertation.

eiples on which the philosophy of human nature is founded. He has entered with considerable discrimination into what really belongs to particular authors as their own, and what had been previously bequeathed to them by their predecessors; and the historian has marked out these distinctions in a liberal, dispassionate, and friendly spirit.

Tiedemann has not divided his History into philosophical epochs, nor followed the genealogy of the different schools of learning, but has kept to the order of time alone in all his delineations. The following passage on modern philosophy will offer the reader an opportunity of judging of his manner of treating those various subjects, which the comprehensive range of time he embraces, brings under his consideration.

“During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Philosophy made greater advances than in the brightest periods of Grecian history. In modern times there have been many new systems characterised by greater solidity and perspicuity than any systems which preceded them. At the present moment, Philosophy has, in all its varied conceptions, more harmony, a firmer consolidation of parts, and a more correct and refined analysis; principally by extending the limits of its range, and clearly pointing out the legitimate objects of its investigation. By the application of mathematical forms of reasoning, greater unity and precision have been given to all its elemental and first principles, and they have assumed that position which the nature of science has assigned them. All the varied branches of philosophy have received

great improvements by the light which has been thrown upon them by a more correct knowledge of our ideas, by judicious rules of definition, by numerous discoveries, and by a systematical order of arrangement. What advantages have not Ontology, Psychology, and Natural Theology, acquired by these mental developments; what have they not gained in point of correctness and connection?

“In the first place, Philosophy, in imitation of the Greeks, manifested a considerable bias towards materialism, to which it was led by the ordinary modes of studying the operations of nature. Descartes brought it afterwards back to pure spiritualism. Leibnitz and Berkeley idealized philosophy. The more light there was thrown upon the nature of understanding, and the more we were led to consider every thing through the exclusive medium of its own operations, the more specious did those peculiar views appear, and the more distantly were we removed from objects purely sensual.

“However, whatever might be the cause of that superior light, which has recently shed its rays over the principles and loftiest views of science, it has not yet entirely succeeded in dispersing any of those philosophical sects, which have, from the earliest records of time, sheltered themselves on the outskirts of its territory; and who gave to their own peculiar opinions, even in the most brilliant times of Grecian history, that unity and concord of arrangement which mathematical pursuits themselves enjoy. The sceptics, the atheists, the materialists, the theosophers, still continue to raise

their voices, by the side of the dogmatists, the deists, the spiritualists, and the peaceful thinkers; and they all find followers. We are constrained to acknowledge that one of the leading causes of this is, that the most distinguished men of the present day have still left much ambiguity relative to the primary ideas and fundamental principles of philosophy; and have not laid a sufficiently broad foundation and made all the parts of the superstructure rest firmly and harmoniously upon it: in one word, they have not sufficiently endeavoured to carry their criticisms upon pure reason into the nature of reason herself. Another cause, not less worthy of attention, consists in the great variety of human dispositions; for as long as there are lofty imaginations, we shall see theosophists and contemplatives; while there are minds incapable of taking hold of abstract propositions, we shall meet with materialists; and as long as there are enemies to order and regularity, atheists will not disappear from amongst us."

J. G. C. KIESEWETTER.

This German author's principal work on the mind was published at Berlin in 1798, entitled "Versuch einer Fasslichen Darstellung der Wichtigsten Wahrheiten der Neuern Philosophie, für Uneingeweihte." This is chiefly a sort of analytical dissertation on the philosophy of Kant. It was considered respectable in its day, but is now held in little repute among the learned in Germany. The burden of the work is, *how do we acquire*

knowledge? The answer to this comprehensive and important interrogatory is ; that all the knowledge we possess is derived from the external world, by way of experience ; and every thing which is above the limits of experience, is entirely hid from our view. But the sensible or external world itself we cannot know as it is in its real nature ; but only such as it is manifested to us by the conditions of our sensibility, ratified by the decisions of the understanding. Nevertheless, from the constituent properties of the understanding, necessary for our knowledge, we are enabled to deduce necessary and general rules, by which the objects of experience can be rigorously tested. These rules cannot be extended beyond experience, or made subservient to the acquisition of a knowledge of what things are in themselves.

There are also in our reason ideas which, though they do not produce any portion of knowledge, yet they are highly important in the mental economy, by acting as guides or finger-posts, in directing our steps into favourable paths in the field of science and speculation.*

SALOMON MAIMON.

This author was opposed to the system of Kant, because he considered the theory of the Critical Philosophy to be unsound, and that, if carried out, it would necessarily lead to general scepticism. The author's opinions will be found in "Die Kate-

* Versuch, &c., pp. 192—196.

gorie des Aristoteles : als eine Propädeutik zu einer Neuen Theorie des Denkens Dargestellet," Berlin, 1794.

Maimon maintained that the *transcendental* philosophy could not consistently demonstrate any objective reality, because the Kantian categories only obtained objective certainty by instrumentality of the *pure forms* of sensibility, time and space ; while these themselves were simply the categories of the pure understanding.

Our sensations, mixing with the two species of forms, retain their *material conditions* of experience ; and consequently, whatever there is of pure objective reality in their character, they preserve ; but they possess this reality, only by virtue of the Kantian agreement with the two forms of the understanding and reason, and not of their own right as mere sensations.

The union of the pure sensibility and the understanding, can only engender mathematical abstractions, or conceptions of geometrical truth.

The philosophy of Kant, Maimon observes, is self-contradictory. It is called transcendental or *pure* ; pretending to derive its sole principle from *à priori* sources ; while at the same time it makes an empirical or experimental condition an indispensable sanction for the truth of that principle.

GOTTLÖB ERNEST SCHULZE.

This metaphysician is the author of a work under

the title of "*Ænesidemus*,"* Helmstadt, 1792; which excited among the philosophers of Germany a considerable share of attention at the time of its publication. It contains observations on the fundamental principles of the philosophy of Reinhold, and consequently of Kant.

As the name of the work would seem to imply, its object is to express doubts as to the commonly received theories of the origin of human knowledge. Schulze conceived that the scepticism of Hume had not yet received a satisfactory refutation, and that it had been generally misunderstood by his opponents. In the opinion of the German philosopher, Hume's theory rested upon three points; 1st, That our knowledge solely consisted in our ideas, and these have a reality in proportion as they are connected with things external to us; 2nd, There is no principle which can authorize us to draw any conclusion from this connection between our perceptions and the objects perceived; and 3rd, That cause and effect which is the foundation of this connection, is itself a simple intellectual law, independent of experience.† Schulze takes his stand upon these objections; and though he does not go the length of calling in question the reality of an external universe, yet he distinctly

* "*Ænesidemus*, oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold, in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie, nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunft-Kritik."

† *Ænesidemus*, pp. 103. 109. 122.

maintains that this reality has never been demonstrated.

In illustration of this position, he observes that Locke and Leibnitz took opposite routes in their philosophical inquiries; but they both started from the same point, which was this, that the necessity we are under of conceiving things in a certain manner, entitles us to conclude that these things have a real and permanent existence, independent of our perceptions. This conclusion, Schulze contends, is only the common and vulgar opinion on the subject; and is not the result of any rigorous logical deduction whatever. We can know nothing beyond our ideas; and the relation that subsists between these ideas and external bodies, is itself only a conception of the mind; therefore we are still as far removed from certainty as ever. In fine, philosophers have been reasoning on this subject in a vicious circle, from the earliest times to the present moment.*

Schulze affirms that Reinhold had entertained erroneous notions on the nature of *consciousness*; for it is entirely destitute of those essential attributes which are requisite to a primary and universal axiom of philosophy. Consciousness is not a principle determined by itself, but only through the medium of certain powers of inward reflection, of the nature of which we are comparatively ignorant; besides, it is not universal, and is little more than a bare and isolated act of mere abstraction.†

* *Ænesidemus*, pp. 222. 238. 264.

† *Ibid*, pp. 60. 63. 70. 76. 82.

Reinhold's *representative* faculty is subjected to a severe criticism, and almost demonstrated by Schulze to be an untenable and superficial contrivance to bolster up a preconceived notion.*

Schulze agrees with Kant that there are in human knowledge certain synthetical *à priori* principles, which form a necessary and essential ingredient in all its forms; but still, it must be remembered that these principles are not deduced from experience, nor from the agreements which subsist between our ideas and external objects. Hence he demands of Kant, by what authority he was entitled to conclude, that the primary or original determinations of the mind were invested with absolute certainty from the synthetic judgments? This was a knotty question to propose. He shows that Kant has utterly failed to answer it; nay, that a great portion of the "Critical Philosophy," if logically and rigorously followed out to its final results, is calculated to lead to more comprehensive sceptical conclusions than even David Hume himself ever dreamt of.†

FRED. HENRY JACOBI.

The metaphysical speculations of Jacobi form a striking contrast to the general current of those prevalent in his own country during the latter half of the eighteenth century. He had a bold,

* *Ænesidemus*, pp. 84. 97. 186. 202. 272. 290.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 133. 180. 257. 294. See also Michelet's "Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Phil. in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel," vol. 1.

fervid, zealous, and elevated mind ; fond of dwelling on the noble and the good ; and entertaining a constitutional repugnance to every thing of a formal, earthly, and huckstering character. He held no terms with the dull and plodding, with the mere "hewers of wood, and drawers of water." Every thing which had spontaneity, life, vitality, and genius, he worshipped and revered ; but the compilers, and scholastic drudges of philosophy, he covered with ridicule, and spurned from his presence. He has been called the Plato of Germany, and he is fully entitled to the honourable appellation.

Jacobi was an enthusiastic metaphysician from his youth. He was originally engaged in mercantile affairs, but he relinquished these for a government situation, which allowed him leisure for the cultivation of his favourite studies. His first contribution to philosophy was a series of letters addressed to Mendelsohn, in which he criticised, with great severity, the system of Spinoza. He shows incontestably that this system leads, by a direct route, to complete atheism ; or rather that Spinozism itself is only a particular form or phase of that dogma. After this, he attacked the philosophy of Hume ; in which, among other matters, he defended himself against some severe censures which had been passed upon him, accusing him of wishing to suppress all reasoning whatsoever, and institute a species of blind and implicit faith in its stead. When this necessary duty was discharged, he attacked Fichte's speculations, and endeavoured

to demonstrate that they were unsound in point of logic, and sceptical in tendency. In fact, Jacobi kept up through life a running combat, a guerilla warfare with almost every shade of idealism and scepticism which appeared in his own country.*

Kant's system, in particular, underwent a searching criticism. Jacobi penetrated into every nook and crevice of it. In this task he displayed indomitable perseverance, and rare critical acumen. He examined the pure sensibility, the pure intelligence, and pure reason, and shewed the insufficiency and complexity of their individual and joint action; clearly pointed out their inadequacy to account for the great principle of absolute certitude;

"Montant et descendant tour-à-tour la grande échelle des perceptions, des formes, des notions et des idées, il fit voir qu'elle repose sur le néant et le vide, qu'elle se termine à une contradiction; que ces facultés passives qui devaient poser les matériaux, ne fournissent au fond que des inconnues; que ces facultés actives et supérieures, qui devaient effectuer les connexions, qui devaient produire les jugements *à priori*, source nécessaire de la science suivant le Kantisme, ne possèdent point les conditions nécessaires pour constituer un jugement; que la force manque d'un côté dans l'ouvrier, que la réalité manque de l'autre dans la matière employée. Il osa pénétrer dans les mystères du sécrétisme et n'y trouva qu'un hymen infécond, qu'un assemblage de mots, au lieu d'une véritable *synthèse* ou combinaison des choses. Il osa percer le nuage dont le criticisme a enveloppé les idées importantes et fondamentales de *réalité* et d'*objet*: rien ne lui sembla moins réel que cette prétendue réalité. L'objet ne lui parut, dans les notions Kantiennes, qu'un accident, qu'une modification du *sujet*; le sujet lui-même, appelé à soutenir un semblable jugement, s'évanouit comme une ombre légère. Après avoir expliqué la nature par le *moi*, le *moi* lui-même par une apparence, les apparences par les formes, il ne reste plus qu'une *forme* de *forme* ou qu'un ébauffage de formes, auquel les apparences servent de base, quoiqu'elles empruntent d'elles, d'une autre part, toute leur solidité." (De Gerando, vol. 8.)

and their utter incomprehensibility, when practically considered, in reference to the every-day movements, feelings, and opinions of mankind. This was the burden and consummation of his critical labours. In examining Kant's, as well as every other speculative system which came under his notice, Jacobi took his stand upon the broad and common sense principles of human nature. He stood upon this adamant rock; and scanned the speculative theories beneath, with a searching and somewhat disdainful eye. I know that man, says he within himself, is a social, reasoning, moral, and religious being; does this or that system harmonize with these suggestions and feelings of the rational soul, which fall upon my ear from each hemisphere, from every nation, from every community, and from every individual of the great human family? Are these universal tones of humanity nothing? Are they mere empty sounds; have they no more value or interest than the whistling of the winds among the leafless branches of the forest? Shall philosophy be entirely separated from human nature? Shall it be a mere barren, formal husk of logical subtilty and refinement? Oh no; it must fall back upon the broad principles of reason and feeling; it must direct and guide, and no longer mock and insult; it must raise and support, and not depress and weaken; it must elevate and soothe the affections, and lead them into the paths of virtue, disinterestedness, honour, and religion. A philosophy which answers not these noble purposes, is no philosophy at all; but the

mere drivellings of speculative inanity, vanity, and conceit. If we wish to obtain true knowledge, we must separate thought from the formula, principle from the dogma, what is internal and felt from that which is external and inanimate, the substance from the form, that which springs spontaneously out of the deep recesses of the soul, from what is merely outward and extraneous. This should be our constant aim, the final end of all our speculations.

Such were the leading sentiments which animated the bosom of Jacobi, during every period of his philosophical career. He was no mere closet speculator, no system maker, no attenuated epitome of abstract thought; but he brought every theory out to open day, tested it with all that was noble, good, sublime, and beautiful in nature; and if it were found wanting, he threw it aside as a useless bauble, or as a dangerous instrument. He never compromised the interests of true wisdom and science, never set any value on speculative disquisitions on account of their ingenuity alone; but solely in proportion as they were fitted to develop the active and living principles of nature and art, and promote the cultivation of noble and disinterested sentiments and feelings.

The reader of Jacobi must not, therefore, look for a regular consolidated theory of metaphysical speculation from his pen. He had no sympathy with, nor power to create, any such thing. There are, however, splendid thoughts, acute reasonings, and comprehensive views, scattered in ample pro-

fusion throughout all his works. Everything he touched upon became interesting in his hands.

In a psychological point of view, Jacobi considers the understanding to be that faculty which obtains mental results from a comparison of ideas. It teaches man to find a word for an object, and an object to represent a word; creates the sciences and arts, and theoretical and practical systems. But it is not by the understanding alone that man can arrive at the grand and comprehensive principles of all truth; these elements of all absolute wisdom, to which the human mind is perpetually aspiring, and desirous of obtaining. This pure form of truth can only be seized by *reason*, which is a distinct faculty from, and superior to, the understanding. This distinction is clearly manifested by a reference to the inferior creation when compared with man; and the common-sense language which is employed in all nations to express this comparison. No one speaks of the *reason* of an animal, though we have no hesitation in assigning understanding to it. This distinction rests upon the fact that man is endowed with both understanding and reason; but that the former alone is conferred on the animal creation, which only perceive the sensible universe, and are incapable of conceiving those supersensible ideas, which the intellectual eye of reason imparts to man, and which directs his attention to something which lies beyond the material and sensible objects around him. The understanding, considered in itself, is material, earthly, and irrational; neither recognising nor

appreciating what is purely mental, spontaneous, and creative; while reason, on the other hand, is idealistic, intelligent, and invested with the innate attributes of Deity itself.

The principle of *faith*, which forms an important element in the speculations of Jacobi, is not faith relative to revelation, but relative to nature. We believe and know that we have a body of our own, and that there are other thinking beings around us who are like constituted. This, of itself, is a surprising, a marvellous revelation. We feel ourselves affected in a particular manner, and we form the instant *belief* that there is something external to us, which is neither the sensation we experience, nor other things around us; and that the *faith* or belief centres in *ourselves*, and cannot go beyond. Here is a revelation of nature made to us; we adopt the fundamental truths which it reveals to us, without reasoning and without instruction. Were it not for the active and preserving influence of this faith, we could not exist for a single moment.

Jacobi's idea of Deity is noble and elevated. This is particularly displayed in his letters to Mendelsohn, in reference to the system of Spinoza. Jacobi always insisted that the only true idea of Supreme Power, was to invest it with intelligence and freedom of action; to avoid all allusions to mechanical agencies; and to guard against notions of fatalism and necessity.

The whole system of Jacobi bears a striking resemblance, both in spirit and form, to the speculations of Leibnitz, Malebranche, Fenelon, and Bos-

suet. His philosophy has a healthy freshness about it, which reminds one of the writings of these distinguished men; and which is the more gratefully and keenly relished, after wandering for some time through the tedious and arid regions of German metaphysics.*

J. G. HAMANN.

Hamann was a native of Königsberg, and was a fellow-student with Kant under Professor Kuntzen. Hamann was the author of many works, though he died at the comparatively early age of fifty-eight.

The chief work of Hamann is his examination of Kant's "Critique," which he loudly and unconditionally condemns.

The key to his philosophical system is, that all things have a divine origin, and are merged in the Godhead itself. In his conception, all scientific systems and methods are useless, and nothing but a scholastic incumbrance. Language is the *organon* of reason; and speaking is the translation of thoughts into words. Reason is speech, λόγος; philosophy the expression of speech (*aussprache*.) Language in general is not only the foundation of every thinking power, but likewise the source of all the jarring contests which reason has with itself.

We can comprehend neither the creation, nor the phenomena of the universe, without faith. It

* Jacobi's whole Works are collected and published in six volumes, Zurich, 1825.

is the natural condition of our intellectual faculties, and the moving principle of the soul. Every general proposition rests upon sound faith, and every abstraction of the mind owes its existence to it. The relation between faith and being is the same as cause and effect.

Reason and philosophy are one and the same thing; they are the word of God.

In the mystical school of Germany to which Hamann belongs, we find that the chief metaphysical principle pervading the history of humanity, is that of the coincidence of *contrariety*. This bears the imprint of the Divinity. It is the tree of knowledge of good and evil, converted by Christianity into the tree of life. There are in men two immutable principles, which form the knot or bond of contradiction. The Christian system has for its grand object the untying of this knot, by means of the principle of contradiction itself. All creation is under the influence of contrariety. In every direction we see the influence of two agencies or powers, from the concurrent action of which result all good, order, organization, and life. Man is more strikingly under the influence of the joint action of these powers than any other mundane creation. He is a fallen creature. He wished to be the centre of authority and power himself, and would not be subject to the Divine law. He rebelled against his Maker. On this account, all philosophy which is merely or solely grounded on man *himself*, on his own finite, frail, and corrupted nature, must contain in it the seeds of the serpent. The great law pro-

mulgated by Christianity is, "Mortify, annihilate thyself, to obtain a more elevated and lasting existence; die, that you may enjoy a superior life."

This fundamental truth, which Christianity teaches us, is immediately felt and responded to by our inward nature. The testimony which supports it, we term *reason* or *faith*. To place reason in contradiction with its own suggestions, is a puerile and suicidal act; and it is equally unwise to attempt to trace the eternal relations between reason and faith. No human faith excludes reason; whilst reason obeys faith, which is merely the result of our experience; it is, in its comprehensive sense, founded upon our judgments, knowledge, movements, and enjoyments.

FREDERIC NOVALIS.

This author, whose real name was Frederic, Baron von Hardenberg, was a metaphysical poet of some note in Germany. His works are published in two volumes, edited by Tieck and Schlegel, under the title of "Novalis Schriften."

His views of mental philosophy are not very intelligible; they seem to abound with a great portion of mysticism and rhapsodical conceits. As far as they are susceptible of being embodied in any thing approaching to plain words, they amount to this, that true philosophy consists in passing over all considerations of an individual, finite, and limited nature; in standing aloof from every thing connected with subjective *self*; and in fixing the

mental eye upon a more elevated and noble object, the infinite and all-perfect Deity. From this source, and from this alone, can we derive that inward light, that true faith, which can reveal to us principles of a true and unerring philosophy. We must take our stand on Divinity itself; we must sink every thing connected with material and wordly matters, and become absorbed, as it were, in the contemplation of heavenly light and heavenly knowledge. This is that inward and spiritual life which the wisest of the sages of antiquity were for ever aspiring after, and which has been fully revealed in the scheme of the Christian Dispensation. Unless we become completely identified with the Deity, the Supreme Mind, we must for ever remain strangers to true science and rational knowledge: we may be familiar with the outward forms or symbols of them; but their spirit must be hidden from our view. All that which is revealed to us in the works of nature is but an index or guide to our minds. It is merely to point to a higher sphere of intelligence. Every thing we see is but an image,—but the reflected power of superior agency. The *death* or mortification of *self*, of every thing relating to the *moi*, and the *non-moi*, is the full and complete realization of absolute truth. Universal life resembles a dialogue in which thousands of tongues take a part, representing all powers, agencies, and movements, which are consolidated into one universal object or being.*

* See the 2nd Volume of the "Schriften," in which the "Hymnen an die Nacht" is contained.

JACOB SIGISMOND BECK.

Beck was a Professor in the College of Rostock, and a man of considerable learning and talents. His works are, "Auszug aus Kant's kritischen Schriften," 1793, 1796; "Commenta über Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten," 1798; "Grundriss der Critischen Philosophie," 1796; "Lehrbuch der Logik;" "Ueber die moral. Natur des Mensch. Willens."

All philosophy, according to Beck, should be based upon facts, or experimental knowledge. If we depart from this point, we only wander in the dark.

He adopts the notion of *representative* ideas, and it is upon this foundation that all his abstruse speculations are built.

IRWING.

The metaphysical speculations of Irwing are contained in the following treatises; "Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen," 1777, 1785; "Fragmente der Natur-Moral, oder Betrachtungen über die Mittel der Glückseligkeit," 1782.

The system of Irwing does not differ widely from that of Locke. He forms two grand sources of knowledge; the one passive, in sensation, and the other active, in reflection. Mere brute matter, which we may consider as the raw material of all

our intellectual treasures, is comprehended in all sensations or sensible perceptions ; but they are again subjected to another inward process by our mental faculties, and from thence we derive the whole of our more elevated conceptions of being and its attributes.*

In the minor details and illustrations of the author's work, which has unquestionable merit, we find nearly the same plan pursued as in Locke's "Essay." The great division of our ideas, the sensible and reflective, is kept constantly in view, and is made the basis of all the speculations in the treatise.

E. PLATNER.

Platner was a distinguished philosopher in his day. The following are his publications which have a direct bearing upon metaphysical subjects. "Philosophische Aphorismen," 1800; *Lehrbuch der Logik und Metaphysik*, 1796; "Neue Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise," 1790.

Platner belonged originally to the school of Leibnitz, whose system he studied in his younger years, and entirely adopted. He subsequently changed his views, and incorporated some of Kant's ideas with that system ; and afterwards formed a sort of speculative compound of many curious and original materials.

Platner asks, "What is this world in which man

* *Erfahrungen*, &c., vol. 1, part 2.

is placed? What are those relations which he has with it? These are questions which inquisitive man is constantly putting to himself, whenever he throws his eyes over the universe. These are also the questions which philosophy has always been called upon to solve."*

Leibnitz's notion of *representation* took a firm hold of the mind of Platner, as well as many of his contemporaries. He conceives that these representatives constitute the matter or essence of all thinking operations. He has availed himself of every possible argument to support this theory. With Leibnitz he admits a complete class of representations, of which we are entirely *unconscious*. He maintains that these representations are received into the mind in a passive manner; they are the joint production of the senses and imagination. Those which emanate from the soul itself, and of which it is conscious, are perfect and complete representations; while those of which we are not fully conscious are ranged under the class of *notions*, and relate partly to the object and partly to the subject of thought. To constitute perfect knowledge, there must be an entire representation.†

Sensation and sentiment (*empfindung*) appertain to a distinct order or class of representations. The one is the consciousness of the soul of its own

* Aphorismen, §§ 1. 7.

† The term *representation*, (*vorstellung*) used here and elsewhere, connected with German metaphysics, must be taken to mean something similar to our English word *conception*. This is not the identical term, but if the reader will think of a very full, well-defined conception, he will have something as near as possible to a *representation*. *Image* is too strong a word.

being; the other of the existence of an object different from itself; sensation has a direct relation to thought itself; sentiment relates to an idea. Sensation is connected with want, and a desire to be satisfied. There are three kinds of sensations, considered relatively to wants; spiritual, animal, and human.*

There is a double faculty of knowledge in the soul; the one inferior, and the other superior. The first embraces the representations of the senses and the imagination; and the second consists of that power which unites these representations among themselves, and forms reasonings and judgments from them.

EBERHARD.

The philosophical works of Eberhard are very numerous; but the following contain the greater part of what is interesting in his mental speculations. "Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens," 1786; "Kurzer Abriss der Metaphysik," 1794; "Sittenlehre der Vernunft," 1786. Eberhard was a man of a splendid mind, and great learning. He applied metaphysical subjects to the illustration of history and religion. His great aim was to make the science of mind popular, both to students and ordinary readers.

The *representative* power of Leibnitz plays an important part in the mental disquisitions of Eberhard. He makes it a living and vital principle.

* Aphorismen, §§ 38. 40. 42. Anthropologie, § 600.

Sensation and thought are two modifications of this power. The soul is passive when it feels; active when it thinks; unity appertains to thought, and variety to sentiment. Sensation and thought exercise a direct influence over the representation of objects. The image which sensation produces in us has its *sufficient reason*, partly in the nature of the object, and partly in the limits of the thinking subject; for the image varies according as the mind seizes more or less comprehensively the properties which belong to an object. The transference from a sensation to a thought, and from a thought to a sensation, is entirely regulated by the association of ideas. Sensation is intuitive, thought syncretical.*

Eberhard displays in all his writings an enlightened and liberal spirit. His *Apology for Socrates*, and his *Amyntor*, have obtained him distinguished reputation among many philosophers of eminence in his own country.

T. N. TETENS.

Tetens was a Professor at Kehl, and latterly at Copenhagen. His work, "*Philosophische Versuche über die Menschliche Natur*," etc., made its appearance in 1777. It is based upon Locke's views. At the same time Tetens fully admits that the method of this illustrious English philosopher is not without its serious difficulties. It is not so

* *Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens*, pp. 20. 36.

full and satisfactory as he could wish. Still, upon the whole, it is the most tenable and rational of any hypothesis of modern times.

Tetens manifests, in some of his psychological speculations, a leaning towards the opinions of Charles Bonnet, relative to the simple and uniform nature of the principle of thought; but the predilection for this notion is by no means very striking in Tetens' observations.*

C. GARVE.

Garve was an able metaphysician, but most of his speculations relate more directly to the science of morals. His "*Einige Betrachtungen über die Allgemeinsten Grundsätze der Sitten-Lehre*," &c. is considered a very useful philosophical treatise.

The author was a zealous advocate for giving all speculative opinions on human nature a practical and popular form. His maxim was that the more sound philosophy was cultivated, the more would all the institutions of society be improved and the human character elevated.†

Our limits will not enable us to notice, at any length, the writings of several other German authors, whose works appeared either immediately before or after Kant's "*Critique*," to the end of the century. We must confine ourselves, therefore,

* *Philosophische Versuche*, §§ 1. 2. 3.

† See Fulleborn, "*De Ratione Scribendi Historiam Philosophiæ*," lib. 2. pp. 88, 132.

to a simple enumeration of their names, and a few of the treatises connected with the science of mind, attributed to their pens.

J. G. H. FEDER.—“Lehrbuch über die gesammte theoretische und practische Philosophie,” 1760.

C. MEINERS.—“Revision der Philosophie,” 1772; “Abriss der Psychologie,” 1775; “Grundriss der Seelen-Lehre,” 1786; “Verm. Philosophische Schriften,” 1775.

J. H. CAMPE.—“Empfindungs und Erkenntniss-Kraft der Mensch. Seele,” 1776; “Ueber Empfindung und Empfindelei,” 1779.

C. W. SNELL.—“Abhandlungen Philosoph.” Leipzig, 1796; “Ueber etliche Hauptpunkte der Philosoph-Moral-Religionslehre,” 1798; “Philosoph. Lesebuch, aus Cicero's Schriften zusammen-getragen,” 1792.

F. W. SNELL.—“Ueber Philosoph. Criticismus, in Vergleichung mit Skepticismus und Dogmatismus,” 1802; “Kurze Darstellung und Erläuterung der Kantschen Kritik der Aesthet.” “Urtheilskraft,” 1791, 1792; “Menon, oder Versuch in Gesprächen die Vornehmsten Punkte aus der Kantschen Kritik der pract. Vernunft zu Erläutern,” 1796.

J. C. G. SCHAUMANN.—“Erklärung über Fichte's Appellation, und Ueber die Anklage gegen die Philosophie; Beilage zu Fichte's Schrift,” 1799; “Elemente der allgem. Logik, nebst einem kurzen Abriss der Metaphysik,” 1795; “Moral. Philosophie, zunächst für seine Zuhörer,” 1796; “Philosophie der Religion überhaupt, u. des Christl. Glaubens insbesondere,” 1792; “Psyche, oder Unterhaltungen über die Seele,” 1791; “Abhandlungen zur Philosoph. Rechtslehre,” 1795; “Ueber die Transcendentale Aesthetik, nebst einem Schreiben an Feder, über das Transcendentale Ideal,” 1789.

F. G. BORN.—“Neues Philosoph. Magazin, zur Erläuterung des Kantschen Systems,” 1789, 1791; “Versuch über die ersten Gründe den Sittenlehre, zur Prüfung der Weishaupt'schen Zweifel gegen Kant,” 1791.

C. F. SCHMIDT PHISELDECK. — “Philosophiæ Criticæ sec. Kantium expositio systematica,” 1796, 1798.

J. NEEB.—“System der Kritischen Philosophie, auf den Satz des Bewusstseyns gegründet,” 1795, 1796.

L. H. JACOB.—“Grundriss der Allgemeinen Logik und kritische Anfangsgründe der Metaphysik,” 1800; “Prüfung der Mendelsohnschen Morgenstunden; nebst einer Abhandlung von Kant,” 1786.

J. H. TIEFTRUNK.—“Philosoph. Untersuchungen über das Privat. u. Oeffentl. Recht, zur Erläuterung der metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre von Kant,” 1797, 1798; “Beurtheilung der metaphys. Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre von Kant,” 1798, 1805.

C. F. HUNGAR.—“Der Sohn der Natur, oder Briefe über Endämonismus und Menschl. Glückseligkeit, in Beziehung auf das Kritisch. Moral-System,” 1802.

K. G. FURSTENAU.—“Ideen zu einer gemeinfasslichen Metaphysik der Sitten,” 1799.

J. C. HOFFBAUER.—“Staatsrecht, mit beiläufigen Anmerkungen über Kants metaphysische Anfangsgründe des Rechts,” 1797.

T. G. E. MAASS.—“Grundriss der Naturrechts,” 1808; “Grundriss der Logik, zum Gebrauch bei Vorlesungen.”

H. KUNHARDT.—“Skeptische Fragmente, oder Zweifel an der Möglichkeit einer Vollendeten Philosophie,” 1806; “Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in einer fasslichen Sprache dargestellt,” 1808; “Ideen über den wesentlichen Character der Menschheit und über die Gränze der Philosoph. Erkenntniss,” 1813.

G. HUFELAND.—“Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts nebst einem Anhang,” 1785.

TH. SCHMALZ.—“Handbuch der Rechtsphilosophie,” 1807.

A. FEUERBACH.—“Kritik des Natürl. Rechts,” 1806.

K. S. ZACHARÆ.—“Anfangsgründe des Philosoph. Privatrechts,” 1804; “Anfangsgründe des Philosoph. Criminalrechts, nebst einem Anhang über jurist. Vertheidigungskunst,” 1805.

K. H. GROOS.—“Lehrbuch der Philosoph. Rechtswissenschaft, oder Naturrechts.”

T. H. G. HEUSINGER.—“Versuch einer Encyclopädie der Philosophie, verbunden mit einer pract. Anleitung zum Studium der Krit. Philosophie,” 1796; “Ueber Fichte's Idealistisch-Atheistisches System,” 1799.

F. J. NIETHAMMER.—“Philosoph. Journal, für 1795.”

F. H. C. SCHWARZ.—“Die Moral. Wissenschaften, ein Lehrbuch der Moralischen Religion u. Rechtslehre, nach den Gründen der Vernunft,” 1797.

K. P. MORITZ.—“Aussichten zu einer experimental Seelen-Lehre,” 1782; “Magazin zur Erfahrungen Seelen-Lehre,” 1793, 1795.*

* See Note H. at the End of the Volume.

CHAPTER XXI.

METAPHYSICAL AUTHORS OF FRANCE DURING THE
LATTER PART OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

IN casting a glance over the political, social, religious, and intellectual history of France, from the publication of the "Encyclopédie" to the termination of the last century, what a crowd of singular and important events transpired in that country. And when these events are viewed in conjunction with the history of metaphysical speculations, they assume a still more curious and interesting appearance. We find in every political epoch or crisis of the country, a corresponding change in the theoretical principles respecting the human mind. Politicians and metaphysicians, though commonly widely separated, have, nevertheless, in France been always bosom friends. They have acted and re-acted upon each other with surprising promptitude, sympathy, and power. Never in the history of mankind did purely abstract philosophical disquisitions exert so powerful

an influence over the every-day actions and feelings of great masses of people, as did the philosophy of the eighteenth century over the French nation. Here the mind of man became absolutely deified; it was transformed into a national *Goddess*, daily and hourly worshipped by enthusiastic but deluded admirers.

In the first indications of the national "movement" in France, we clearly perceive the influence of mental philosophy. It inspired, more or less, all the energetic and inquisitive minds of this eventful period. For the space of twenty years before the "new era" of 1789, France presents a long list of able men, who cultivated the science of mind, and based their social and political theories and movements upon their respective philosophical creeds. We have, as already noticed at some length, D'Alembert, Diderot, Voltaire, Turgot, Helvetius, &c., men of great influence, who were complete masters of the philosophy of the day, and who prided themselves not a little upon the extent of their speculative attainments. As political events hastened apace, the abstract doctrines of the learned were simplified and reduced to practice; they were pushed to their utmost logical limits; and formed at last the daily intellectual food of countless thousands of the people at the foot of the guillotine. Speculative frenzy, and reckless cruelty, became the order of the day. Every man had a ready apology or reason for his conduct, either for good or ill, in some philosophical theory, of which the deductions and

principles of his own mind formed the basis. Crowds were seen every day hurried to the place of execution, pluming themselves on the knowledge of some recondite metaphysical axiom, and supporting their hard and ignominious fate, with the consolatory anticipations of martyrdom to a philosophy which the world, at that moment, was unable to appreciate, and of which it was entirely unworthy. Thus every man set up the "Goddess of Reason" in his own mind, and worshipped her with the most frantic and abject submission.

The number of separate publications, great and small, which treated of sections of philosophical topics, during the first ten years after the commencement of the Revolution in 1789, was really prodigious. The Paris press literally teemed with them. They assumed all forms and shapes, from the halfpenny ballad to the imperial quarto. Every day issued in some new "theory of man," and of his intellectual powers and social relations. To give the names alone of this revolutionary brood, would fill a volume. We shall, therefore, pass them all over; contenting ourselves with giving in this chapter a brief sketch of some of the most distinguished writers of the period, whose works may fairly claim a suitable and respectful notice in any history of speculative opinions.

SAINT MARTIN.

The metaphysical works of this author are, "*Des Erreurs et de la Vérité*," Lyons, 1775, in 8vo.;

"Du Tableau Naturel;" "De l'Esprit de Choses;" "Du Crocodile;" "Du Ministère de l'Homme d'esprit;" "Eclair sur l'Association Humaine," Paris, 1797, in 8vo.

The Marquis Louis Claude de Saint Martin, called the Unknown Philosopher, was one of those singular men named mystics. He devoted his whole life, of no mean duration, and characterized by the most indefatigable perseverance, to the expounding of an abstruse and nearly unintelligible doctrine, founded upon a single abstract opinion or notion of his own. He fancied he saw obvious and forcible illustrations of his system in every operation of nature, whether physical, moral, or intellectual. He had but one idea; and to develop it, and exhibit it in all possible forms, was the great end and object of his existence. He reared a system of metaphysical freemasonry upon it, which was quite inexplicable to all but himself and the initiated.

He gave early indications of his peculiar disposition and habits of thinking. He entered into holy orders, but all his biographers affirm he was no Catholic; nay, they doubt whether he was even a Christian, according to the most liberal interpretation of that term. Certain it is, he propounded some opinions in theology of a very equivocal character. He travelled a great deal both on the Continent of Europe and in England, and cultivated an acquaintance with some of the most distinguished men of his day. In 1794 he was expelled from France. He considered the revolution there as a type of the day of judgment.

In many parts of his writings, Saint Martin attacks all those metaphysicians who have founded their systems upon the general doctrine of *sensations*; particularly as explained by the commentators and admirers of Condillac. The author endeavours to point out the great defects of all these systems, when applied to explain the nature and operations of the Deity, the principles and powers of the human mind, and the moral duties of men. He affirms that all these theories do virtually admit in the world only matter and its properties; they effectually exclude *power* and *mind*; and thereby, their advocates plunge themselves and their disciples into innumerable difficulties, in reference to the great and important doctrines connected with the creation and government of the universe.

The reader will find many curious opinions and observations in St. Martin's work, "*Des Erreurs et de la Vérité.*" In some places, when descanting on the nature of good and evil, he seems to manifest a decided leaning towards the doctrine of the Manicheans, or the two distinct and independent principles of good and evil. But then again, he qualifies this notion by maintaining a superiority of one principle above the other; that the principle of good is vastly superior to that of evil; and that the former is more influential than the latter. It is, therefore, difficult to determine what his own opinion precisely was, on this knotty and long contested doctrine.

Saint Martin considers man as belonging to the good principle. In his primitive simplicity and

innocence he knew no suffering, want, nor pain. But his will being weak, he separated himself from God, and in his fall became enervated and corrupted. But he can still wash himself from his impurities, and, by repentance, return to the source of all purity, light, and power.

The system of this author has for its object, the explanation of all things by his creature *man*. Man, according to his view of things, is the true key for the solution of all abstruse questions, and the image of all truth. Taking for the text the ancient command, *know thyself*, Saint Martin maintains, that to avoid all misconceptions as to the nature of the universe and its laws, it is only necessary to know oneself well ; because the human body is, in itself, an exact type of the whole visible creation, and that the human mind is, in like manner, a true type of all invisible things. The way, then, to study man properly is, to examine into all his physical faculties, dependent upon the organization of his body ; to investigate his intellectual powers, which are greatly influenced by his organs of sensation and by external things ; and to unfold his moral feelings, which presuppose a principle of free-agency within him. It is in this study that we shall be able to recognise truth, and will find within ourselves everything requisite for obtaining it. This system the author calls a *natural revelation*. For example, says he, the most careless attention is sufficient to convince us that we can make no communication to others, nor form to ourselves any idea, which has not been preceded by

a picture or image created by our inward principle of intelligence. It is only in this manner that we can devise the plan of an edifice, or a work of any kind. Our creative power is immense, active, and apparently inexhaustible; but if we examine it carefully, we shall perceive it is secondary, temporary, and dependent; that is to say, that it owes its origin to a superior, independent, and universal creative power, of which our mind is but a very faint copy. Man is then a type, and must consequently have a prototype; and that prototype is God.*

M. FABRE.

The author's "*Essai sur les Facultés de l'Ame*," was published in 1787. He belonged to the medical profession, and has investigated the faculties and powers of the mind relatively to their connexion with the physical organs of the body. He also examines the theory of Buffon, as to the nature of the organs of sense; and criticises at some length the mental speculations of Condillac, with whose leading views he seems to have coincided.

VOLNEY.

"*Principes physiques de la Morale*," Paris, 1790. This distinguished traveller, and French savant, cannot, strictly speaking, be included amongst the

* See Damiron, *Hist. de la Philosophie du 19me Siècle*, vol. 1, p. 93.

number of metaphysicians, by any treatise from his pen expressly bearing upon this branch of knowledge. But it is unquestionable that he did exercise over the general current of metaphysical knowledge in France, an indirect influence by no means inconsiderable. In all his writings we see scattered fragments of his mental creed ; and these collectively furnish the most incontestable evidence of their having proceeded from one source, the school of Helvetius and Diderot.

The small publication placed at the head of this notice, assumed various names or titles. It was called the "*Catéchisme du Citoyen*;" and then "*La Loi Naturelle*." There is scarcely an original thought on morals in it ; but the reader will find incorporated many of the peculiar opinions on the soul of man which belong to the philosophical school already alluded to.*

CONDORCET.

There has not, perhaps, been a single continental publication, of a philosophical character, more generally read in Great Britain, than the "*Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind*," 1793. It has, in the fullest sense of the term, been a popular work, both here, and in every other country of Europe. The acknowledged celebrity of its author, the po-

* "*Toute sagesse, toute perfection, toute loi, toute vertu, toute philosophie, consistent dans la pratique de ces axiomes fondés sur notre propre organisation :—*

"*Conserve-toi : Instruis-toi : Modère-toi : Vis pour tes semblables, afin qu'ils vivent pour toi.*"

pular nature of the production, the variety and importance of the topics discussed, the life and spirit thrown into every part of the work, and, above all, the misfortunes and fate of its illustrious author, awakened, and have kept alive for many years, a hallowed sympathy for this effusion of genius. It came into the hands of the public as a solemn testamentary grant; the last votive offering on the altar of philosophy. Great as are its defects in point of principle, they have been considered with a spirit of indulgence alike honourable to the dead and the living.

Condorcet had a mind admirably adapted for metaphysical speculations, as well as for other scientific pursuits. But he did not cultivate the former branch of human knowledge so exclusively as to produce any elaborate system of his own. He took the mental philosophy of the day just as he found it. The theories of Condillac and Locke were then the prevailing ones in France; and a particular interpretation of these theories, is the ground-work of all the metaphysical principles and observations contained in the "Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind."

It must be borne in mind that the great object the author had in view in this "Sketch" was, to establish the *perfectibility* of man, which was one of the favourite dogmas of the French Revolution. Condorcet's views in support of this doctrine may be classified under three heads; 1st, The destruction of all inequality between different nations; 2nd, The progress of equality in one and the same na-

tion; and 3rd, The individual improvement amongst all men. On this last head the author maintains that the progress of human knowledge will be so indefinitely increased and extended, and such improvements will be discovered in the modes of communicating that knowledge, as will place future generations vastly upon the vantage ground over the men of our own day. He maintains, also, the moral and physical perfectibility of man; and that his life will be immeasurably extended; though he will not be able to arrive at immortality.*

CABANIS.

The chief work of Cabanis, relative to mental

* "Livré aux mêmes travaux que D'Alembert, placé dans le même point de vue, professant les mêmes opinions, appelé à être son successeur, Condorcet, comme lui, embrassa le système général des connaissances humaines. Mais D'Alembert à surtout considéré ce système dans les rapports qui peuvent fonder un enchaînement solide et une classification méthodique des connaissances; Condorcet l'a plutôt considéré dans le développement successif que les connaissances ont reçu d'âge en âge. L'un en a étudié principalement la géographie, si l'on peut dire ainsi, et l'autre l'histoire. En interrogeant les siècles passés, Condorcet a cherché surtout des enseignements et des espérances pour l'avenir. Il a voulu retirer une instruction non-seulement de l'expérience des découvertes, mais aussi de celle des erreurs. L'esquisse qu'il a tracée, à la hâte, de cet immense tableau, n'est sans doute et ne pouvait être qu'une ébauche; les résultats sont indiqués, plutôt qu'ils ne sont mis au jour et appuyés sur les faits. Plusieurs propositions sont hasardees, d'autres portent l'empreinte des préventions dont Condorcet n'avait pas su assez se défendre. Mais, en même temps qu'en se rappelant les circonstances dans lesquelles elle fut exécutée, on admire dans cette esquisse la preuve d'une force d'esprit extraordinaire, on sent aussi, en la parcourant, que sans cesse elle excite à la méditation, qu'elle appelle les investigations utiles, lorsqu'elle n'y satisfait point elle-même."—(De Gerando, vol. 7, page 361.)

speculations, is "*Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*." The author followed the medical profession, and was an enthusiastic cultivator of philosophy in general. The works of Locke were great favourites with him, as well as those of his commentator, Condillac. Few men have exercised a greater influence over the speculative opinions of his countrymen than Cabanis. He lived on friendly terms with all the most distinguished philosophers of France. He was the bosom friend of Mirabeau, and brother-in-law to Condorcet. He became a member of the "Institute" in the third year of the Republic. The whole of the system of Cabanis is grounded on the views of Locke and Condillac, with the exception of those physiological speculations which he has engrafted upon the theory of ideas and sensations.

The author has made in particular the "*Traité des Sensations*" of Condillac the basis of his work. After laying down the general principles which appertain to the doctrine of sensations, as expounded by the learned Abbé, Cabanis commences his inquiries into the nature and influence of the nervous system. He thinks that in some of the lower orders of animated beings there may be sensation without a nervous apparatus; but in the more perfect and elevated ranks of animal life, and particularly in man, it is invariably found that there subsists a very close and necessary connection between the nervous organization of animals, and the degree of intelligence they respectively possess.*

* 2me Mémoire.

This opinion gives rise to many very ingenious speculations respecting the manner in which the nervous system acts upon our minds. But though ingenious, these speculations are not new ; neither do they seem to have appeared in the author's eyes as furnishing a satisfactory solution of the great problem he had undertaken to solve. He frequently expresses himself in the language of hesitation and doubt.

The general axiom, however, which he lays down, and endeavours to illustrate at great length, is, that sensibility resides in the nerves ; and, consequently, all our moral and intellectual faculties, as thought, will, &c., are only modifications of this nervous power. Man is a moral and intelligent creature only because he possesses sensibility ; and he possesses this sensibility only because he has nerves ; therefore the nerves are the foundation of the whole man.

Cabanis' metaphysical theory is the most material which has hitherto appeared in France, or indeed in any other country. He has thrown Priestley and Hartley into the shade. The French *savant* declares that "as the liver secretes bile, so does the human mind secrete thought." This is his general position ; but he modifies it a little by referring two very important branches of human knowledge, poetry and religion, to other parts or organs of the body, namely, "THE SMALLER INTES-TINES!!" These, he conceives, give rise to all practical and religious feelings, opinions, and sentiments. This is, in few words, the theory of Cabanis ; and it must be owned, that whether it has

anything worthy of admiration or not, it has at least *brevity* to recommend it.

These, we must own, are the extreme points of the theory; and we are bound in truth and candour to admit, that Cabanis did, particularly in after life, incorporate more spiritual notions into his mental hypothesis. He does allow that the principle of life is something *above* mere functional organization.*

Cabanis was a man of moral and religious sentiments, and invariably declaimed against any inference drawn from his system which might seem derogatory to the science of natural or revealed religion. In a small posthumous work, entitled "Lettre à M. F., sur les Causes Premières," he allows that the human soul cannot consist entirely of the nervous system, but that it must possess a separate and independent existence.

Theories such as this of Cabanis, in the hands of active and ingenious men, will always appear plausible, and even become, to some extent, popular. They suit the minds of a considerable class of philosophical readers. They require but little mental labour for their illustration and comprehension; thousands of facts lie scattered over the surface of things, to seize hold of when the theories are in danger; and to the minds of youth, in particular, they invariably appear under a seductive and engaging form. All these circumstances are

* "Quelque idée que l'on adopte sur la cause qui détermine l'organisation, on ne peut s'empêcher d'admettre un principe que la nature fixe ou répand dans les liqueurs séminales."—(Mémoire 4.)

sufficient to account for the popularity which attended the disquisitions of Cabanis, when they first made their appearance in Paris. They were published in 1798 and 1799, in the "*Mémoires de l'Institut*;" and from the clearness and elegance of their style, excited great attention among the learned and speculative men of France. They are now, however, comparatively forgotten.

GERAT.

M. Géraud was one of the most influential cultivators of mental philosophy in the latter period of the eighteenth century. He was a popular lecturer at the Normal Schools at Paris; and his metaphysical speculations were delivered to his pupils in these establishments. They excited great attention at the time of their delivery, and exercised a prodigious influence on the minds of the youth of France.

The author's theory was essentially that of Condillac. He maintains that the faculty or susceptibility of feeling is the sole foundation of all human knowledge. Our organs of sense constitute the medium or channel through which this sensibility manifests itself.

His opinions will be found in his "*Cours des Ecoles Normales*." They display great moderation and good sense. There is more healthiness in his interpretations and illustrations of Condillac's hypothesis, than we find in many other speculations of the Abbé's commentators.

DESTUTT-TRACY.

The writings of this French metaphysician are, "Projet d'Elemens d'Idéologie," and "Grammaire Raisonnée." He is well known to most readers of continental philosophy. He was an intimate acquaintance of Helvetius, Condorcet, Cabanis, and other distinguished men of letters, who figured before and at the Revolution. Destutt-Tracy was himself committed to prison, during the reign of terror, and owed the preservation of his life to mere accidental circumstances. Besides metaphysics, the author has cultivated ancient history, political economy, physiology, and anatomy.

His treatise on *Idéologie* is his principal work, and displays considerable ingenuity and research. The following topics are discussed in this publication:—1st, What is that which thinks? 2nd, On sensibility and sensations; 3rd, On memory; 4th, On judgment, and the sensations relative to it; 5th, The will, and our sensations of desire; 6th, The formation of our compound ideas; 7th, Of existence; 8th, On the manner in which our first intellectual faculties develop themselves; 9th, Of the properties of bodies, their relations and limits; 10th, Reflections upon these various interesting topics, and upon the manner in which Condillac has analysed the faculty of thinking; 11th, On the faculty of motion, and its connection with the powers of thinking; 12th, On the influence of our faculties of desire upon those of motion, and on

the influence of each on our trains of thought ; 13th, On the effects produced on our minds by the frequent repetition of the same actions ; 14th, On the gradual perfectibility of our mental powers ; 15th, On signs and ideas.

Destutt-Tracy takes Condillae's theory, in all its parts, for the foundation of his own. He amplifies, refines, and systematises all the leading principles of the Abbé ; and hence the French critics affirm that our author has *completed* the theory of sensation, and produced a species of transcendental materialism. It must be owned that, independent of his declaration, that *idéologie* must be considered only as a branch of *zoologie*, and of his famous maxim, *Penser, c'est toujours sentir, n'est rien que sentir* ; there are abundant manifestations, throughout the whole details of his system, to justify this opinion as to the material complexion of his views of mental philosophy.

The author's theory of thought is simply this :— There is nothing but sensation, or rather sensibility, which is sensation in a state of activity. This principle of sensibility is susceptible of various kinds of impressions : 1st, Those which result from the direct operation of external objects upon our organs of sensation ; 2nd, Those which result from their past exercise ; 3rd, Those which arise from objects which possess divers relationships or connexions with one another ; and 4th, Those which are connected with our wants, and which immediately prompt us to their gratification.

Now, according to Destutt-Tracy's opinions,

when we feel the first class of sensations, we are said to have a pure or simple perception ; when we feel the second, the sensation remains with us, and we remember ; in the third case, we feel or perceive certain relations amongst objects, and we judge or reason ; and in the fourth, we have certain desires, and we consequently exercise our will, or voluntary powers. Here the whole chain of thought is complete. These different modifications of the principle of sensibility, or sensation, give rise successively to perception, memory, judgment, and will ; and these constitute the sum and substance of the mind of man.

This is the theory of Destutt-Tracy in all its simplicity and nakedness. The illustration of it gives rise to many very acute observations and ingenious conjectures.

The whole of human nature the author arranges under three grand divisions ; *intelligence*, *passion*, and *will*. The first of these heads embraces the whole of his *idéologie* ; and he has touched upon the other two branches only in a very slight and superficial manner. Under the head of *passion*, we find some reflections on love ; but they are not worthy of any particular observations. On the subject of the *will*, the author maintains that man has the liberty of doing whatever is within the limits of his power. Some things he can do, and others he cannot do. He can stretch forth his arm, or climb a mountain ; but he cannot fly, nor take the moon in his grasp. But the liberty which the author contends for is not a rational

or intellectual liberty, in the fullest extent of the meaning of these words; but a kind of necessary and material liberty, which simply results from the organic mechanism of the human frame.*

* See Note I. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE CHIEF METAPHYSICAL WRITERS WHO
HAVE TREATED OF THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTI-
FUL; AND ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GUIDE
OUR JUDGMENT IN ALL MATTERS OF TASTE AND
SENTIMENT.

WE have hitherto [refrained from noticing, in this work, in any formal and lengthened manner, a numerous class of mental speculations, connected with our ideas of the sublime and beautiful. Our original design was to collect and discuss such speculations under one general head, that the reader might have a clear and concise idea of their nature and character, and the station they hold in the history of intellectual philosophy. This design we are now about to carry into execution. Every thing connected with the sublime and beautiful in nature and art, belongs to the science of mind; and when we look at the subject in all its extent, we cannot fail to perceive, that what is beautiful and sublime, agreeable and disagreeable, meritorious and blameable, form nine-tenths of the entire stock of ideas current among mankind. These

ideas differ essentially from those which constitute pure abstract principles, formal propositions, and long chains of deductive reasoning. Our pleasurable and painful sensations and emotions partake of the nature of sudden and instinctive impulses; they form the basis of numerous arts which minister to the embellishments and happiness of life; and, in fact, make up, as it were, a large proportion of what may be considered as the staple of human existence. They seem to the outward eye irregular, capricious, and infinitely diversified; but still a careful examination will show, that they are under the regulation and control of first principles, which act with all the steadiness and certainty which characterise the material laws of the universe, or the intellectual laws of intuition and abstract thought.

The operations of the human mind may be viewed under an almost endless variety of aspects; and all of them calculated to afford great pleasure and instruction. Those operations directly and indirectly connected with our ideas of the sublime and beautiful, have, in all ages of the world, been invested with a peculiar degree of interest. They have been especial objects of philosophical inquiry, and have exercised the talents of some of the ablest and wisest men who adorn the page of history.

The mental principles connected with objects of praise and censure, and sublimity and beauty, stand so prominently out in the intellectual landscape, that there are very few persons indeed who feel any pleasure at all in cultivating an acquaintance

with the nature of their own minds, but must have paid some attention to matters so obtrusively forced upon their observation. Besides, objects and qualities which become invested with the attributes of beauty and deformity, are not things of mere speculative curiosity, but possess an interest of a more homely and vital character. They are necessarily connected, through the instrumentality of human laws, institutions, and public sentiment, with rewards and punishments, both bodily and mental; and, on this account, they possess an interest altogether apart from their mere speculative nature or character.

Ideas of this kind have been often subjected to definition by various writers; but more definitions of this description must always be more or less inadequate. This arises from the nature of the mind itself. But to the ordinary mass of mankind these notions of the sublime and beautiful are sufficiently distinct and impressive, and no very great mistake or discrepancy of judgment is ever made concerning them. They perform their office in the intellectual and moral economy of the universe, with certainty, regularity, and effect.

The feeling, or notion, or idea of sublimity, call it by what name you will, fills the mind with admiration and a pleasing astonishment. When under its influence, we feel a species of mental elevation and expansion, a joyful glow of satisfaction, and a conscious effort to take a more comprehensive view of things in general, than under ordinary circumstances. This every one may experience by

reflecting on what passes in his own mind. Whenever this feeling is experienced, it is in connexion with certain things. These are principally magnitude, height, depth, and particular kinds and combinations of sounds. A lofty mountain, a large building, a broad river, loud sounds, like thunder, cannon, &c., earthquakes, volcanoes, a large and powerful organ in a cathedral, a great crowd of people, vast numbers of soldiers, battle ships, deep and large caverns, the starry heavens, over-hanging precipices, and a thousand other things, excite the feelings of sublimity in the mind of the spectator. But these are but the *exciting causes*, not the real ones, as we shall afterwards attempt to prove.

The feelings and emotions of beauty are of an agreeable and pleasing kind. They perhaps are of the same nature as those of the sublime, only softened down, mellowed, and subdued, by objects of lesser magnitude and interest. We speak of a beautiful lady, a beautiful rose, a beautiful language, and a beautiful poem. What is termed *visible* beauty seems to be excited by four things, *colours, figure, attitude or gesture, and motion*. The beautiful may be combined with the sublime; in which case our feelings and emotions are of a more pleasurable and intense description.

Colours are beautiful when they produce lively sensations in our minds. White and red create these. Green is soft and refreshing to the eye, being an organ of great delicacy and complexity. Pale red, and light blue, leave soft and gentle impressions. All those gradations of colours we see

in the heavens, in flowers, in the plumage of birds, the rainbow, &c., are productive of the most delightful and pleasant sensations. The extreme delicacy with which they are mixed and blended together, which far exceeds anything that man can do, is an additional ingredient in our pleasures derived from this source.

Particular figures and forms are beautiful, as circles, squares, ellipses, hexagons, &c. Irregularities in figures are not generally beautiful. There are, however, exceptions to this rule.

Attitudes and gestures of living things convey to us ideas of beauty, when they are suitable to the nature of the person or creature. They must be agreeable, natural, and easy, without constraint, affectation, or vulgarity.

Motion is productive of beauty in inanimate things. The motion of the clouds, smoke slowly ascending in the sky, the unbroken waves of the sea, and flags and streamers flying in the wind.

The sources of the sublime and beautiful we have just enumerated, may be termed the *external* sources, arising out of the particular confirmation of the material universe. But these are not the exclusive sources of beauty and sublimity. There are mental, moral, and religious sources, all of which are prolific, to an almost boundless extent, of notions and feelings of the grand and agreeable. From these fountains we have poetry, painting, sculpture, music, architecture, the drama, the intellectual endowments of men, their moral conduct and behaviour; religion, natural and revealed,

with all its important and sublime injunctions, commands, and prospects. These may be considered the *inward* sources of the beautiful and sublime, as they are based upon the spiritual and immaterial part of our constitution.

When we cast our eye over these numerous springs of our feelings and emotions, endeavour to trace out all their connections and bearings, and attempt to describe the offices they perform in the economy of human life, we cannot be surprised that so many speculative men have, from time to time, directed their attention to this extensive field of human inquiry, with a view of treating of the nature and principles which regulate this important class of our thoughts, feelings, and judgments. Such inquiries are natural in themselves, and generally produce a pleasing and useful effect.

We know of no department of human speculation, which has suffered so much from numerous and refined verbal distinctions, as inquiries respecting the sublime and beautiful. For popular use and effect, such distinctions as are implied in the terms beautiful, sublime, picturesque, the principles of taste, moral beauty, and the like, are almost of indispensable necessity. But philosophically speaking, these different terms only express one state or condition of the mind, that of *an agreeable or pleasing emotion*, of greater or less intensity. This feeling or emotion is excited by an immense variety of different objects, but still it preserves its unity of nature and appearance, throughout all these multifarious exciting causes. An intellectual

achievement, a noble action, a fine picture, a pretty garden, a terrific cavern, and a rugged precipice, all touch, so to speak, the same sympathetic chord of our nature, but which only produces vibrations more or less powerful and vivid.

SECTION 1.

Of the Principal Modern Theories of the Sublime and Beautiful.

We shall here furnish the reader with an outline of some of the chief theories of the Sublime and Beautiful, which have been propounded in modern times. We shall not enter into antiquated systems or notions ; for we are compelled to brevity and conciseness. No critical remarks will be made, *en passant*, because this would lead to an extended discussion and repetition of argument and illustration, incompatible with the principal object of this chapter.*

Dr. Hutchinson maintains that the word beauty signifies a certain idea excited in our minds, and a sense of beauty denotes our power of receiving this idea, which he denominates an *internal sense*. This writer considers beauty as original or absolute, and comparative or relative.

Mr. Price, in his inquiry into the origin of our ideas of beauty, says, that in contemplating such actions as call forth our admiration, we have both a perception of the understanding and a feeling of

* See Note J. at the end of this Volume.

the heart; and that the latter depends on two causes, namely, the constitution of our nature, and the essential congruity or incongruity between moral ideas and our intellectual faculties.

M. Crousaz, in his "*Traité du Beau*,"* says, that there are five conditions in which all beauty consists, these are, *unity, variety, order, proportion, and regularity*.

Diderot, in the article *Beau*, in the "*Encyclopédie*," gives the following account of the principles of beauty. "That beauty consists in relations. . . . Place beauty in the perception of *relations*, and you are furnished with the history of its progress from the infancy of the world to the present hour. On the other hand, choose for the distinguishing marks of the *beautiful in general*, any other quality you can possibly imagine, and you will immediately find your notion limited in its applications to modes of thinking prevalent in particular countries, or at particular periods of time. The *perception of relations is, therefore, the foundation of the beautiful*; and it is this perception which, in different languages, has been expressed by so many different names, all of them denoting different modifications of the same idea." The author defines beauty "to be the power of exciting in us the perception of *agreeable sensations*;" and he adds the following remark to this definition: "I have said *agreeable*, in order to adapt my language to the general and common accepta-

* 2 Vol. Amsterdam, 1715.

tion of the term Beauty; but I believe that, *philosophically speaking*, every object is beautiful which is fitted to excite in us the perception of *relations*."

Dr. Reid says, that all things which are beautiful agree in two things; first, when they are perceived they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and secondly, this emotion or feeling is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belonging to them.

Dr. Blair affirms that colours are considered beautiful on account of the peculiar construction of the eye; and that a certain regularity and symmetry of parts is requisite to constitute the beauty of forms.

Hogarth, in his "Analysis of Beauty," says, that the elements of all beautiful objects are fitness, variety, uniformity, simplicity, intricacy, and quantity. He considers the "waving line," like the figure of the letter S, which is found in shells, flowers, and decorative objects of art, to be the principle of beauty in these things. The "line of grace," as exhibited in twisted pillars, twisted horns, and curled objects, is another source of the beautiful.

Mr. Perrault distinguishes two kinds of beauty in architecture; *positive* and *convincing*; such as the richness of the materials, grandeur of the structure, neatness of workmanship, symmetry, &c. The other he terms *arbitrary*, depending upon the will, and which will admit having their properties and proportions changed without deformity.

Mr. Burke, in his "Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful," maintains that the elementary principles of beauty are smoothness of surface, gradual variation of outline, delicacy of make, soft and tender colouring, &c. The principal of these elements, however, he affirms to be *smoothness*. On this he lays great stress. He says it is "a quality so essential to beauty, that he cannot recollect any thing beautiful that is not smooth. In trees and flowers, smooth leaves are beautiful; smooth slopes of earth in gardens; smooth streams in landscapes; smooth coats of birds and beasts in animal beauty; in fine women, smooth skins; and, in several sorts of ornamental furniture, smooth and polished surfaces. A very considerable part of the effect of beauty is owing to this quality, indeed *the most considerable*. For take any beautiful object, and give it a broken and rugged surface, and however well formed it may be in other respects, it pleases no longer. Whereas, let it want ever so many of the other constituents, if it wants not this, it becomes more pleasing than almost all the others without it. This seems to me so evident, that I am a good deal surprised that none who have handled the subject have made any mention of the quality of smoothness, in the enumeration of those that go to the forming of beauty. For, indeed, any rugged, any sudden projection, any sharp angle, is, in the highest degree, contrary to that idea."

On the sublime he says, that "terror is, in all

cases whatsoever, either more openly, or latently, the ruling principle of the sublime.”*

Father Buffier's theory of beauty, as illustrated by Dr. Adam Smith, is contained in the following illustrations:—“A beautiful nose is one that is neither very long nor very short; neither very straight nor very crooked; but a sort of middle among all these extremes, and less different from any one of them, than all of them are from one another. It is the form which nature seems to have aimed at in them all; which, however, she deviates from in a variety of ways, and very rarely hits exactly, but to which all these deviations still bear a very strong resemblance.....In each species of creatures, what is most beautiful bears the

“La théorie du beau, cette portion brillante de la philosophie morale, cultivée aujourd'hui avec tant d'émulation en Allemagne, a vu éclore dernièrement en Angleterre un système nouveau. Burke, en essayant, sur les traces de Hogarth, de fixer les caractères des notions que nous attachons au sublime et à la beauté, a restreint les premiers à ce qui est terrible en soi, ou lié à des objets terribles; les seconds à ce qui excite, mais dans les limites étroites et dans de faibles proportions, des sensations agréables et des dispositions bienveillantes. Il fait naître le sublime et le beau de deux principes qui, suivant lui, servent d'objet à toutes nos passions, la conservation de nous-mêmes et de la société. M. Uvedale Price a cru rectifier ce que la seconde de ces deux analyses avait de trop incomplet, en introduisant un troisième caractère, auquel il a donné le nom de *pittoresque*, et qu'il fait consister dans la complication et la diversité. Cette théorie, dont le talent de Burke n'a pu déguiser la faiblesse, a été combattue avec succès, en particulier par Reynolds; mais elle a appelé des discussions utiles à la philosophie des beaux arts, et, quoique suivant une fausse route, son illustre auteur a fondé sur la connaissance du cœur humain, et les lois de l'imagination, ces maximes profondes qu'il avait su mettre en pratique d'une manière si brillante dans la carrière de l'éloquence.”—(Philosophical Report of the French Institute, 1808.)

strongest characters of the general fabric of the species, and has the strongest resemblance to the greater part of the individuals with which it is classed. Monsters, on the contrary, or what is perfectly deformed, are always most singular and odd, and have the least resemblance to the generality of that species to which they belong. And, thus, the beauty of each species, though, in one sense, the rarest of all things, because few individuals hit the middle form exactly, yet, in another, is the most common, because all the deviations from it resemble it more than they resemble one another."

The theory of the beautiful, developed by Sir Joshua Reynolds, may be illustrated from the following observations, taken from his works, published by Malone. "Every species," he remarks, "of the animal as well as the vegetable creation, may be said to have a fixed or determinate form, towards which nature is continually inclining, like various lines terminating in the centre; and, as these lines all cross the centre, though only one passes through any other point, so it will be found, that perfect beauty is oftener produced by nature than deformity; I do not mean deformity in general, but any one kind of deformity. To instance in the particular part of a feature, the line that forms the ridge of the nose is beautiful when it is straight. This, then, is the central form which is oftener found than either concave, convex, or any other irregular form that shall be proposed. As we are then more accustomed to beauty than to deformity,

we may conclude that to be the reason why we approve and admire it, as we approve and admire customs and fashions of dress, for no other reason than that we are used to them; so that, though habit and custom cannot be said to be the cause of beauty, it is certainly the cause of our liking it. And I have no doubt, but that if we were more used to deformity than beauty, deformity would then lose the idea now annexed to it, and take that of beauty; as, if the whole world should agree that *yes* and *no* should change their meaning, *yes* would then deny, and *no* would affirm.”*

Mr. Alison, in his “Essays on the nature and principles of Taste,” has entered very fully into the nature of the sublime and beautiful. His principle is the association of ideas. He maintains that a large proportion of those qualities of things which produce pleasurable ideas, though they cannot be considered beautiful when *immediately* affecting our organs of sense, yet enter largely into our notions of the beauty of the material creation, by means of the associating principle. And this is particularly the case with all those things which affect the organs of *touch* and *seeing*, between which there subsists such an intimate relationship.

Mr. Payne Knight maintains that the ideas of sublimity are indissolubly connected with *energy of action*. This is the leading principle in his theory. He also affirms that *pathetic emotions or feelings are always sublime*. He observes, “All

* 2nd Edition p. 237.

sympathies excited by just and appropriate expressions of energetic passions, whether they be of the tender or violent kind, are alike sublime, as they all tend to expand and elevate the mind, and fill it with those enthusiastic raptures, which Longinus justly states to be the true feelings of sublimity. Hence that author cites instances of the sublime from the tenderest odes of love, as well as from the most terrific images of war." The author also adds, in another part of his book, that "in all the fictions either of poetry or imitative art, there can be nothing truly pathetic, unless it be at the same time in some degree sublime."

M. Cousin, in his "*Cours de philosophie, sur le fondement des idées absolues du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien*," maintains that our ideas of beauty and sublimity arise from a fixed and determined relation established between physical sensibility and sensible intuition on the one hand, and reason and judgment on the other

Of the many modifications of Kant's theory of the sublime and beautiful, it is not necessary to say much in this sketch. They have all a striking affinity with one another; and are grounded upon those principles of metaphysical philosophy, which have, for the last half century, been so assiduously cultivated and discussed in Germany.*

A recent and ingenious Italian writer, M. Gioberti, in the "*Enciclopedia Italiana*," conceives

* See Keratry. *Examen philosophique des considérations sur le sentiment du sublime et du beau, dans le rapport des caractères, des tempéraments, &c., d'Emmanuel Kant.* Paris, 1823. 1 vol.

that experience and the comparison of ideas are not the sources of the beautiful and sublime, though necessary to their full and effective development. The real foundation of beauty, in all its forms and degrees, rests upon the vigour of the imagination, which has the innate power of transforming imaginary representations into intelligible types, and of giving life and vitality to every mental conception.

He maintains that the æsthetical imagination is that faculty which converts phantasms into intelligible types, and creates those living pictures or images in the mind which constitute the beautiful. This imaginative power is a creative one, and it is constantly renewing and moulding those representations of external objects of which our senses take cognizance. To these materials supplied from without, it adds many from its own inward sources; and it has three distinct modes of manifesting its power, combining, transforming, and producing. This imaginative part of the mind of man is that which throws an interest over every thing around us, and clothes with ideas of the sublime and beautiful a variety of objects both material and mental. All power is simple and indivisible, like substance and cause, but this power of the imagination is multiple in its attributes and properties.*

We shall here notice the opinions of the Abbé

* *Enciclopedia Italiana. Sul Bello*, vol. 4, p. 209. This article has been translated into French, under the title of "*Essai sur Le Beau*," Bruxelles, 1843. See also Note K. at the End of this Volume.

Lamennais on the nature of the sublime and beautiful, as he expounds them in his recent work, "*Esquisse d'une Philosophie*."

The author says, that "Beauty, as we shall afterwards explain more fully, embraces two things, truth and its manifestation, or the distinct expression of itself. The beautiful, we say, can be considered principally in either of the two terms; of which, nevertheless, it supposes the constant union.

"The first of these terms, or truth conceived in itself, is nothing else but the immutable, the necessary, or the absolute. The second is the variable, the contingent, or the relative, except in God, in whom the manifestation identifying itself with what is displayed, is, like Him, absolute, necessary, and immutable; and this is the reason why the Deity is the essential type of beauty.

"In the order of creation, the more beauty is elevated above, or approaches nearer to, this type, the more intelligence and love attach themselves to what it contains of the absolute, or truth in itself. On the contrary, the more we descend in the same order, the more intelligence and love attach themselves to what there is of the relative in beauty, or the manifestation of truth. Thus a common object, even hideous, represented by a verbal description, or a pencil, borrows its beauty not from truth in itself, but the truth of the expression, and this takes place in the physical order of things or of the moral.

"In proportion as we raise ourselves into a more elevated sphere, into the eternal essences of things,

pure truth becomes the principal element of beauty, because truth and its manifestation tend more and more to identify themselves with the Divine Being. We approach, so to speak, substantial beauty, and in all orders of beauty that is the most perfect and transcendent which contains within itself every possible form and expression of it.

"What we call the *beau idéal*, or the ideal of beauty, is nothing else, as we see, but pure truth, or the idea, the type, the eternal model subsisting in the Deity."*

Yves-Marie-André has given us a theory of the beautiful, in his "*Essai sur le Beau*," in which he attempts to show, that all our notions of the beautiful in nature and art arise from the constituted arrangement of things by a Divine Creator.

We must notice the theory of beauty by Lord Jeffrey; it is by far the most perfect and consistent which has appeared in recent times, connected with the opinions of Alison, Knight, Stewart, and others. His lordship thinks that the association of ideas has a great deal to do with all our opinions of the beautiful; but still that they ultimately rest upon certain emotions, feelings, and passions within our own breasts. "The interest," says he, "of material objects is always *the same*; and arises in every case, not from any physical qualities they may possess, but from their association with some idea of emotion. But, though the material objects have but one means of exciting emotion, the emotions they do excite

* Vol. 2, p. 311.

are infinite. They are mirrors that may reflect all shades and all colours, and, in point of fact, do seldom reflect the same hues twice. No two interesting objects, perhaps, whether known by the name of beautiful, sublime, or picturesque, ever produced exactly the same emotion in the beholder; and no one object, it is most probable, ever moved any two persons to the very same conceptions. As they may be associated with all the feelings and affections of which the human mind is susceptible, so they may suggest these feelings in all their variety, and, in fact, do daily excite all sorts of emotions, running through every gradation, from extreme gaiety and elevation to the borders of horror and disgust.*

The late Professor Stewart's opinions on the sublime and beautiful, do not vary essentially from those of the association school. He thinks that the term beauty first took its rise from colours; and that it has, through the lapse of time, and the various changes in human society, been applied, by associating principles, to other objects. He tells us that beauty is not one thing, but many; and is not confined to one emotion, but extended to an infinite variety of emotions.†

It may be noticed here, that in almost all the theories respecting the sublime and beautiful which we have just noticed, it has been generally allowed, to a certain extent, that there are particular things which depend upon organic struc-

* See Article "Beauty," in the 7th Edit. of the *Encyclo. Britannica*.

† See *Philosophical Essays*.

ture for producing ideas and emotions of a pleasurable description. The two prominent objects of this nature are *sounds* and *colours*.* It has often been maintained that musical concords are agreeable only to those persons who possess what is called

* "In the first place, we would ask, whether there is any colour that is beautiful in all situations? and in the next place, whether there is any colour that is not beautiful in some situations? With regard to the first, take the colours that are most commonly referred to as being intrinsically beautiful,—bright and soft green, clear blue, bright pink or vermilion. The first is unquestionably beautiful in vernal woods and summer meadows; and, we humbly conceive, is beautiful because it is the sign and concomitant of those scenes and seasons of enjoyment. Blue, again, is beautiful in the vernal sky; and, as we believe, for the sake of the pleasures of which such skies are prolific; and pink is beautiful on the cheeks of a young woman, or the leaves of a rose, for reasons too obvious to be stated. We have associations enough, therefore, to recommend all these colours, in the situations in which they are beautiful; but strong as these associations are, they are unable to make them universally beautiful,—or beautiful indeed in any other situations. Green would not be beautiful in the sky, nor blue on the cheek, nor vermilion on the grass. It may be said, indeed, that though they are always recognised as beautiful in themselves, their obvious unfitness in such situations counteracts the effect of their beauty, and makes an opposite impression, as if something monstrous and unnatural; and that, accordingly they are all beautiful in different situations, where there is no such antagonist principles,—in furniture, dress, and ornaments. Now, the fact, in the first place, is not so: these bright colours being but seldom and sparingly admitted in ornaments or works of art; and no man, for example, boasting to have a blue house, or a green ceiling, or a pink coat. But in the second place, if the facts were admitted, we think it obvious that the *general* beauty of these colours would be sufficiently accounted for by the very interesting associations under which all of them are so frequently presented by the hand of nature. The interest we take in female beauty; in vernal delights; in unclouded skies; is far too lively and too constantly recurring, not to stamp a kindred interest upon the colours that are naturally with such objects, and to make us regard with some affection and delight those hues that remind us of them, although we only meet with them upon a fan, or a dressing box, the lining of a curtain, or the back of a screen."—(Lord Jeffrey.)

a *musical ear*, and that this depends entirely upon our physical organization. And again, it has been asserted that certain colours, and certain combinations of them, are productive of pleasure, independently of any consideration save the peculiar construction of our bodily frames.

SECTION 2.

Of the true principles of our notions of the Sublime and Beautiful.

Having now given a short account of preceding theories of the sublime and beautiful, without making any observations on their respective merits, we come to lay down our own principles and views on this subject. This shall be done with all brevity consistent with clearness. But it is necessary to premise, that this part of our inquiry is subjected to great difficulties ; partly from the nature of the subject itself, and partly from the constituted imperfections of language. We have here to describe subtile and refined trains of thought, far removed, by the economy of our mental natures, from general observation. This demands a constant appeal to consciousness, which few readers have the requisite inclination or skill to make. Then we have to employ an instrument, language, which often possesses a double edge, and cuts both ways ; and sometimes again it is found completely inadequate to perform its office in any way whatever. Those who have been accustomed to mental

disquisitions will readily acknowledge, and duly appreciate, all these disadvantages; but to those to whom such disquisitions have not been familiar, little more can here be adduced to impress them with a deeper sense of the innate difficulties which lie at the very threshold of all such investigations as those into which we are about to enter. Under these circumstances, we must just leave the matter to the candid and dispassionate judgment of readers of this class.

There is, in our conception, a subtile analysis always going on in the mind of man, when he contemplates objects susceptible of impressing him with ideas of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity. This, in ordinary cases, is almost entirely hidden from view. The ultimate end of this analytical process brings us to a principle on which all such ideas rest as on a common centre; and this principle is, MIND ITSELF. *There can be nothing beautiful and sublime, that has not a reference to mind, either divine or human.* This is our proposition. This mind may be mixed up with our feelings and judgments in a thousand different forms, and may assume aspects more or less distinct or prominent; but it is, at bottom, the sole principle which inspires us with all those emotions, and feelings, and judgments, which call forth our praise or admiration, whether in reference to the works of nature and art, or to objects of an intellectual or a moral nature.

But some readers may here ask, Pray what do you mean by *mind*? Now this is a puzzling question, it must be acknowledged. But the difficulty

in giving a satisfactory answer to this interrogatory, does not press more heavily on the theory attempted now to be established, than on any other current amongst the learned. But we must grapple with the obstacle. Were it possible to put the question to ten thousand miscellaneous persons individually, What do you mean by *mind*? we should in all probability have ten thousand different answers given. And yet if we come to reflect upon all these, to analyze them completely, and enter fully into what is really meant by the parties; there would be a more perfect unanimity amongst them, than what would at first sight be anticipated. And if we wander from common life to philosophers themselves, we shall have the same results. The verbal definitions of mind have been as various amongst professed metaphysicians, as amongst any other class of speculators; and the fact can easily be established. Passing over the writings of the ancient philosophers, which abound with numerous attempts to define the intellectual principle, we shall confine our remarks, in the present instance, to a few of the most distinguished modern authors whose works are more generally known and appreciated. Father Malebranche says, the mind is an unextended, immaterial, and simple substance; possessing, however, two powers or faculties, the *understanding* and the *will*.^{*} In Leib-

* "L'esprit de l'homme n'étant point matériel ou étendu, est sans doute une substance simple, et sans aucune composition de parties: mais cependant on a coutume de distinguer en lui deux facultés, savoir l'entendement et la volonté." (Recherche de la Vérité, liv. 1, chap. 1.)

nitz's theory of the universe, he felt himself under the necessity to invest all his *monads** or ultimate atoms of things, both material and spiritual, with *perception* and *intelligence*. M. Wolff, his disciple, though he denied perception to the *monads* in general, did not deny that the *monads*, or atoms of the *soul* of man, were invested with that perception and intelligence.

Amongst the metaphysical writers of our own country we find nearly the same doctrines laid down; varying in little more than in modes of expression. Mr. Locke, like Malebranche, says the mind is composed of two distinct faculties or powers; the *understanding*, and the *will*; and in that part of his work where he treats of *power*, he maintains that the only correct ideas we can form to ourselves of *active power* are from our *spirit* or *mind*.† In subsequent discussions on the same subject by other writers, we find the same doctrine maintained. Reid's *ultimate principles or powers*, Stewart's *natural resources of the human mind*, and Dr. Brown's law of *suggestion*, are all founded upon the same principle; that the only notion we can possibly form to ourselves of *mind* is, that it is an *active power*; and that it contains within itself the power of *self-motion*.

The ingenious and learned Bishop Berkeley treats

* Il y a donc dans chaque monade une force qui est le principe de tous les changements qui lui arrivent, ou de toutes les perceptions qu'elle éprouve; et on peut définir la substance, ce qui a en soi le principe de ses changements." (Works, Paris Edition.)

† Essay on the Human Understanding, vol. 3.

of this subject in a very superior manner. He says, "But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which perceives them, and exerceises divers operations, as *willing, imagining, remembering* about them. This *perceiving, active being*, is what I call *mind, spirit, soul, myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but *a thing entirely distinct from them*, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived, for the existence of an idea consists in its being perceived." "A spirit is one simple, undivided *active being*; as it perceives ideas, it is called the *understanding*, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the *will*." "There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which *will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure*." "For by the word spirit we mean only that which *thinks, wills, and perceives*; and this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term." "But it will be objected, that if there is no idea signified by the term *soul, spirit, and substance*, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, these words do mean or signify a *real thing*, which is neither an idea, or like an idea, but that which *perceives ideas, and wills and reasons about them*."*

Now here we have a variety of verbal definitions, but yet the real abstract conception of the thing

* Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 24. 36. 40. 96.

attempted to be defined is the same in all its general and substantial attributes. We see that *active power, spontaneous motion*, a substance which *thinks, perceives, wills, and understands*, is that which is called *mind* or *spirit*. From the nature of that mind or spirit, and the imperfections of language, we are prevented from carrying our inquiry further, nor can we analyze its operations into any principle more comprehensive than this *inherent, self-contained motion or power*. But the analysis is sufficient for all the purposes of truth, and the ends of our being. The unanimity of men, in every age, who have brought their profound minds, and vast stores of acquired learning, to act upon this inquiry, is quite perfect; and in other parts of this work it will be fully shown, that throughout all classes of people, to whom abstract speculations are comparatively unknown, the same general notion prevails of what *mind* is; and upon this notion they place all their judgments and reasonings.

On the nature of the *Divine mind* we find the same opinions prevail, both amongst the learned and unlearned. The essence of the Divine Intellect is the same as the essence of the human mind; only the former is conceived to be infinitely more comprehensive, powerful, and exalted. In almost all the ancient systems of philosophy, we find the principle of a Supreme Being invested with the loftiest powers of mental intelligence, and the most perfect freedom of action. There were various curious and singular modes and metaphors used to

express the abstract nature or essence of that power, and to explain its laws of action; but still we can detect such a perfect harmony of opinion on this vital question, that the acquiescence in it comes nothing short of being universal. In modern times, and amongst modern philosophers, the same thing is found. Indeed, this is really so well known to all ordinary readers, that it cannot be necessary to dwell upon it. I cannot anticipate any objections from my taking the principle for granted, that the *Divine mind* presupposes the highest conceivable state of mental intelligence, and the most complete spontaneity of action. A man's love of paradox and quibbling must be of the most inveterate description, which should call in question the truth of the substantial accuracy or fulness of this definition.

The object of this inquiry is, therefore, to show that all our ideas of the beautiful and sublime, in nature and in art, rest upon this *active power*, which we call *mind*; that there can be nothing to call forth our praise or blame, which does not rest upon it; and that our admiration and mode of judging of all intellectual qualifications and acquirements take their rise from the same source. This is the object we aim at achieving. We shall proceed, then, to furnish the reader with illustrations from a variety of sources, to confirm this general principle, and to place it before his mind in as clear and satisfactory a light as we possibly can.

Before, however, entering upon these illustra-

tions, we may premise, that a certain indulgence must be extended for the frequent employment of the phrases, *spontaneity of mind*, *active power*, *mental intelligence*, and similar terms. All such combinations of words are meant to stand for *mind*, in its most common and general signification, whether in reference to the Deity or to man. It is impossible to prosecute an inquiry of this kind, without frequently repeating the same words; but it is important for the reader to bear in mind what is that general object or thing such often repeated phrases are meant to designate. All definitions of general terms are liable to objections; but we should guard against indulging a too captious or critical spirit; for this invariably leads to error and confusion in our speculative opinions and judgments.

SECTION 3.

Illustrations from moral actions, affections, passions, sympathies, &c. &c.

The various departments of human nature present us with innumerable illustrations of the principle we are endeavouring to establish. Every thing here is strikingly marked with its influence. There is no maxim so self-evident as that which declares that there can be no moral qualities, affections, emotions, feelings, or habits, unless these are under the complete and active controul of a *mind*, and have a *mind* for their cause. This posi-

tion lies at the root of all language and reasonings, relative to the diversified aspect of human affairs.

In respect to moral actions of all kinds, it is invariably assumed by mankind that they take their rise from *mind*; that the whole essence of human merit and accountability rests upon it; and that there can be no praise or blame, rewards or punishments, but in strict accordance with the degree of mental accountability which is incorporated into every particular action and duty. All this is grounded on the dictates of common sense, and the every-day experience and conduct of mankind. A moral action without a sentient principle, is a thing of which we can form no conception whatever.

All laws, whether relating to nations or individual countries, are viewed in conjunction with the free and spontaneous movements of mind. We regulate our portion of praise or admiration of them, in proportion as they demand, in their development and judicial consolidation, a greater or less portion of intellectual power and ability. The laws of nations require a more comprehensive grasp of mind, more varied reading, more profound reflection, and a more energetic power of general reasoning, than do the laws of any particular country or community; and these again, for precisely the same reasons, take precedence, in point of intellectual superiority, over those minor rules and enactments, necessary for the government of a private corporation or parochial district. Every

thing is regulated here, in reference to mental honour and renown, in scrupulous proportion to the mental ability called into requisition in these various spheres of legal culture, learning, and adroitness.

Beauty and sublimity belong to moral and intellectual qualifications and actions, as well as to material objects. It is true that our ordinary language is often varied a good deal, in reference to moral qualities ; and we employ a wider range of metaphor and expression in describing them, and in estimating their value. We often talk of a highly *creditable* conduct, very *beneficial* actions, very *graceful* behaviour, &c., and their opposites, *discreditable*, *injurious*, and *shameful*. But still the feelings are the same, whether the mind dwells upon moral actions and emotions, or upon a beautiful landscape, or piece of sculpture. There is a feeling or internal sensation of pleasure and delight in both cases, though the objects which excite it be different. There is unquestionably a circumstance of great importance, connected with all moral conduct and emotions, that of a sense of duty or obligation, which does not belong to a fine landscape ; but this circumstance is altogether detached from the sensations of pleasure or pain which certain moral qualities are fitted to create. In the theories of most philosophical moralists, this consciousness of duty is referred to another and higher source.

We see the principle that *mind* is necessarily involved in all moral distinctions and pleasing emo-

tions, strikingly exemplified in the ordinary classification of our moral powers, and in our common modes of speaking of their respective operations. In the first place, we have what are usually denominated the appetites, such as eating, drinking, and the like. These hold a subordinate station in our estimation, and are seldom allowed to form topics for demanding praise from our neighbours. The appetites are connected with a species of actions and feelings which require to be kept in the back ground; and, except under very special circumstances indeed, are never brought prominently forward in the ordinary intercourse of civilized life.

It is difficult to give a reason for this, upon the common theories of the sublime and beautiful in human conduct; for certainly, if utility and necessity, for example, were pleaded in favour of the appetites, there could be no strictly moral or tenable ground for this irreverent and contemptuous treatment of them. But the solution of the matter lies, I apprehend, in the following circumstances:—These appetites or desires have a mechanical complexion about them; they are considered to be essentially separated in nature from the mind itself, and to be less under its direct or immediate influence and control, than other desires and affections of our constitution. These animal propensities are common to us with the inferior orders of creation; their gratification is enforced by powerful and apparently overwhelming impulses; and their indulgence, in every case, is less under the guidance of intellectual principles. For these, and divers other

reasons, if their indulgence goes beyond a very circumscribed range, we term the behaviour of the individual rude and vulgar, words which characterize certain actions opposed in their natures to all that is refined, intellectual, and becoming.

But though our appetites are ranked as the causes of the lowest species of feelings and emotions, yet they can be greatly ennobled, both in our own and the world's estimation, by a connection with other more dignified and mental faculties, affections, and pursuits. This amalgamation constitutes the great distinction between savage and civilized life. The passions of the savage are gratified without an apparent intervention of his mind; he is scarcely, in this respect, distinguished from the beasts around him; and, therefore, all those considerations of refinement, decency, and expediency, which exercise so marked an influence over the members of civilized life, possess but a very feeble influence indeed over the wanderer of the desert. Luxury throws a halo around all the humbler duties and desires, mingles them with mind and sentiment, and throws into the back-ground of social existence what is material, rude, and boisterous. But the polish of courtly refinement has also its limits, and it can never so far ennoble the grosser portions of our natures, even under the most favourable circumstances, as to place them upon a level with the more elevated and intellectual principles and habits of human life. The utmost that extended civilization and social refinement can

effect, is to throw a decent veil over the indulgences of appetites necessarily connected with our preservation and well-being.

We come now to notice another class of our inward faculties which give rise to praise or animadversion, those which are placed more directly under the influence of the *mind*. All the benevolent affections, such as parental love, esteem of kindred, friendship, patriotism, universal philanthropy, gratitude, pity, &c. ; as well as the malevolent affections of hatred, jealousy, envy, revenge, and the like ; are invariably considered, by the bulk of mankind, as of a more elevated character, than the mere appetites, and as unfolding a wider range for praise or blame, esteem or censure.* The exercise of these various internal powers upon their respective objects, constitutes the fruitful source of nine-tenths of all the pleasures and pains of humanity, and of every thing which is embraced by the beautiful and sublime, or the hateful and terrible, in human conduct.

And when we come to analyze these moral affections, we shall perceive, in every step of our progress, that praise or censure is dealt out to each, in strict proportion to the amount of mind supposed to be thrown into every moral action or demonstration of moral feeling. We find in those affections of our nature which are grounded upon an almost instinctive feeling, and are supposed to be more nearly allied to those which even the inferior animals possess, a smaller portion of the beautiful in human conduct is recognised, than

when the moral actions of an individual are more distinctly removed from any supposed physical or mechanical influence, and in the discharge of his onerous duties, he is presumed to throw his whole mind and soul into his plans and projects. All this confers real beauty and interest upon every movement he makes. Were we to think for a single moment, that his actions were merely the result of chance, or of personal aggrandisement, and did not demand great mental superiority, we should cease from that time to award our praise to him; and his actions, instead of inspiring us with ideas of the sublime and beautiful, would only create those of aversion and loathing.

But let us cast a glance at another part of our nature, the love of country or patriotism. This is a powerful affection in some instances, but it is not by any means shared by the great mass of mankind. But a refined and elevated love of country, and a devotedness to its best interests, suppose the mind of the patriot to be removed above all selfish and personal gratifications and considerations; to love the patriotic deeds for their own sake; and to be for ever on his guard lest he sacrifice important interests from any private feeling of pique or resentment. He stands upon a more commanding vantage ground than ordinary men; and requires in the development of his energies a more rigorous exercise of the *mind itself*. The parental affections are just a case in point. What a powerful and universal feeling is a love of offspring, and what a host of the most delicious pleasures, and the most important duties, take

their rise from it ; but still there are moral actions which stand higher in our estimation than even this. The most worthless and insignificant of mankind often exhibit strong affections for their offspring, and the inferior creation all possess this feeling in a very lively and vehement degree. These considerations enter fully into all our estimates of the intrinsic worth of parental love. A person who would demand of his neighbours a considerable portion of praise for discharging creditably the duties of a parent, would find himself very churlishly dealt with. The world considers these affections to be pretty well secured by impulses and principles which do not depend so much upon the *mind* of the man himself. And hence but a small modicum of praise or beauty is evolved from the exercise of these affections of the love of offspring.

The same results will follow from an examination of all our other moral feelings, passions, desires, and affections. To evince love and esteem for those immediately connected with us by ties of blood, does not draw so liberally upon the praise of mankind, as to discharge the distinguished duties of friendship and humanity to those who are not related to us. The kindly emotions in the former case are secured by powerful impulses of nature, and their exercise is not an affair in which the vigorous effects of the mind of the individual have much concern. On the other hand, to relieve the distressed, to enter into their feelings, to sympathise with them, and to discharge duties of disinterested friendship, are all human actions requiring more mental

influence and vigour over the selfish class of affections, than the purely passive feelings, however ardent, of mere love and affection to kindred, and social connections.

The same phenomena as to the union of the sublime and beautiful with mental powers and acquisitions, may be observed by an examination of the workings of our own mind. We invariably estimate every thing intellectual by the portion of spontaneous or unfettered mind which we presume is involved in every one of its energies and movements. It is not of so much moment to what end or object such energies may be directed, whether for individual or general purposes: if they do not flow freely from the understanding, and are not the genuine offspring of its own internal resources, they can be productive of no result, either sublime, beautiful, or interesting.

In every important discovery of science, we invariably examine whether the thing discovered was the result of purely accidental circumstances, or of laborious mental application or suggestive sagacity. On ascertaining these points, the hold which any important or novel philosophical discovery has upon our esteem and admiration, is fully determined.

If we find the scientific truth, matter of fact, or invention, to be the mere result of accidental circumstances, or what is commonly called chance, and that no very laborious or active intellectual efforts were brought forward on the occasion, we give the discoverer little praise; but if, on the

contrary, we find his mind has had a large share in the discovery, we invest him with the attributes of mental grandeur and sublimity, and praise and admire him accordingly. This process goes on in every state of society and among all classes of men, and is regulated with surprising accuracy and judgment, throughout the whole range of ordinary knowledge, as well as philosophy. There is no instance of a mental act being awarded with approbation or praise, unless it be grounded on an analysis of this kind.

The Copernican theory of the universe, and Bacon's "*Novum Organum*," require intellectual qualifications of a higher grade than those which would be called into requisition for penning a paragraph in a newspaper, or settling a Churchwarden's yearly account. And accordingly we find a corresponding distinction made in point of honour and fame between the two cases, which is ratified by the unanimous judgment of mankind.

SECTION 4.

Illustrations from our intellectual estimate of the various ordinary trades and occupations of life.

The various offices, duties, pursuits, and occupations of life, give rise to a numerous class of feelings and opinions relative to what is considered praiseworthy, honourable, respectable, beautiful; or ignoble, low, and disgusting. These movements in ordinary life furnish by far the greatest majority

of our notions in which propriety, praise, commendation, and disapproval are involved. They form, in fact, the common staple of human conversation and social intercourse.

If we enter into a minute analysis of them, we shall invariably find, that the amount of commendation or praise we award to particular occupations and callings, in our every-day discourse or conversation respecting them, is apportioned and regulated, with the most surprising exactitude, to the *quantity of mind* which is conceived to enter into all such occupations and pursuits. This principle runs through the woof and the warp in the whole web of human intercourse and language. The end, or final cause of the pursuits of mankind, has but little to do with our intellectual appreciation of them; at least, the theory of utility is insufficient to account for the varied scale of commendation we adopt, in estimating the degree of honour and praise belonging to the vast multitude of professions and callings of life.

Let us take, for example, the rearing of a splendid and capacious mansion. There are here, we shall suppose, divers classes of persons engaged in the work; as an architect, a master builder, a foreman, masons, and labourers. We shall now see how our estimate of the dignity and honour due to these respective classes of individuals is regulated by the duties attached to each. First we have the labourers, who carry the stones, prepare the lime, and make themselves generally useful, in

other matters of drudgery and ordinary routine. They obtain but a small modicum of praise or commendation. The services they render must however be considered, in the eyes of all, as highly useful and important; because without their aid no mansion could ever be reared. But the reason for our comparatively low estimate of their occupation is, that there is *no mind involved in it*. They display little but mere physical and mechanical labour. Next in order is the foreman or mason, who regulates with line and plummet the placing of the stones, and sees that every thing is adjusted according to certain scientific principles. He stands a shade higher in the scale of praise. There is here more *mind* thrown into his duties and operations, than into those of the men who carry lime and bricks on their shoulders; and consequently we look upon a mason as a more intellectual man than a labourer. Stepping a little higher in the scale, we come to the master builder, who stands considerably above the preceding parties, because he is conceived to throw *more mind* into his movements and calling. We place him, in consequence, some degrees higher in our estimation. Now we arrive at the head of all,—the architect. He carries in his head the whole form, magnitude, proportions, and departments of the mansion, ere a single stone was laid, or a beam fixed. He stands before us as an embodiment of architectural skill and taste. We award him, therefore, a proportionable degree of commendation and re-

spect; and place him at the head of the other agents engaged in the building, by whose united exertions he establishes his own reputation.

Now let us reverse the picture, and let us suppose that information reaches us that the architect had often been obliged to the labourer, or the mason, for some of his best plans relative to the mansion. Here would immediately be a downward process. We should instantly, and with unerring impulse of mind, deduct largely from the dignity and consequence of the architect, and elevate the instrument who had made the communication to him. Mind is what we are always looking after; we are constantly hunting after it, in every movement in life, and making it the standard of whatever is submitted to the ordeal of our judgment and taste.

The attorney and the barrister stand in different relations to one another, and in reference to the share of public esteem they obtain from their respective vocations. The barrister is conversant with the great leading principles, maxims, and rules of legislation, law, and civil polity; he embraces a wide range of subjects; and is distantly removed, though not separated from, the mere practical application of legal rules and enactments. The attorney is doomed to plod amongst technical forms, cut and dried in many cases to his hand; and does not, in the ordinary routine of his calling, require those extended views as to the nature and application of abstract principles and truths which the barrister must always have at his com-

mand. The attorney requires the powers of quickness, indefatigable industry, a patient attention to minute matters of mechanical detail; but the barrister, in addition to these, must have many rare and valuable mental habits and qualifications, which to the attorney would be comparatively useless. The barrister has more mind thrown into all his ordinary duties and movements, than his fellow-labourer in the legal profession, the solicitor; and hence the greater portion of praise which he obtains from the world at large. Nothing can more pointedly manifest the refined and searching analysis which goes on in the minds of men, in reference to the value of different intellectual acquirements and talents; even in respect to those pursuits which are very distantly removed from the ordinary routine of the every-day occupations of life. In the legal profession, which we have just brought under the reader's attention, we find there are various degrees of dignity and worth, even above the barrister and attorney. There are the judges, who take their stand above both, because they embrace a still more comprehensive range of mental exertion, and bring into requisition many of the most elevated principles of human intelligence. And here again we find distinctions of rank and station, and a consequent distinction in public esteem and eulogy amongst them, arising from the same uniform principle; namely, the *portion of mind* which is conceived to be requisite in discharging these various judicial offices in a praiseworthy and satisfactory manner.

We see the principles which regulate our admiration and praise strikingly developed in a public address, embracing a judicial decision, affecting important interests, and embodying remote and abstract maxims and propositions of law and justice, far removed from ordinary consideration. When we perceive general principles of civil right and legal practice laid down with great force, clearness, and brevity; all the arguments on both sides of the question at issue clearly stated; all the facts arising out of its judicial investigation systematically arranged; and all the rational and legitimate inferences arising out of these various matters logically deduced; then we are constrained to confer the highest amount of praise upon the judge, and to characterise his address as a most masterly and beautiful exposition of the law, and the practice of the courts. And why this approbation of such a high order and character? Simply because here are brought into active exercise faculties and powers of the mind, of the highest order, and very far removed from anything which a mere commonplace or mechanical profession could call into exercise. That part of the public who are capable of duly appreciating an address of this nature, dwell upon the combination of such rare and varied intellectual endowments, and manifest their admiration and praise, in exact proportion to the quantity of mind, and its spontaneous action, embodied in all judicial displays of such an uncommon and important character.

The profession of a foreign merchant is several

degrees above that of a retail shop-keeper, in general estimation, merely because there is more mind supposed to be required in the former occupation than in the latter. The merchant must possess a more extended and diversified acquaintance with matters and things distantly removed from common observation; must conduct his speculations more from the native resources of his own mind; and must frequently be placed in such exigences, from the very nature of his calling, as to require a great deal of skill and prudence to conduct his affairs to a creditable and successful issue. All this is not supposed necessary in the trade of a retailer of sugar or cloth over a counter. Here the operations are almost purely mechanical; and little mind—and that of a subordinate character—is required to fill such common, but still very necessary occupations.

If we extend our inquiries and investigations throughout the whole frame-work of social existence, we shall perceive, at every step of our progress, that our praise and veneration for particular callings of life are invariably regulated by the portion of mind required for their effective prosecution. This principle governs us on all occasions, whether passing encomiums upon a judge, or the qualifications and abilities of a scavenger of the streets. All the intermediate occupations and trades of civilized life, take their respective stations in our esteem and commendation in a similar manner, and upon a similar principle.

SECTION 5.

Illustrations of the Sublime and Beautiful from Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Music, Architecture, Antiquities, the Drama, and Landscape Gardening.

The various subjects which are usually classed under the heads of the Fine Arts and the Belles Lettres, afford numerous and striking illustrations of the principle that *mind* is the real source of the pleasures we derive from what is beautiful, grand, and sublime.

There is no department of polite literature in which such constant reference is made to pure mental power or agency, as in that of poetry. Everything here, in order to confer pleasure and excite admiration, must be supposed to be the work of the poet's own mind. He is, as it were, placed in the great temple of the universe, and he clothes with life and vitality everything around him. Nothing of an earthly, material, dependent, mechanical, or compulsory complexion, must be brought before the reader's eye; for his office imperatively demands that he should touch everything with the wand of a magician. He holds a close intimacy, and keeps up a constant sympathy with all nature's works. The woods and the groves, the mountains and the valleys, the mighty waters and the rippling streams, the clouds and the air, and the splendid orbs which emblazon the canopy

of heaven, are, by him, endowed with speech and thought, and are made to see, to hear, to desire, to rejoice, to be grateful, and, in fact, to exercise all the functions of intellectual and active agents. It is to this principle, and to this alone, that poetry owes everything which can charm the ear and animate the bosom. It is the art of personification which furnishes the poet with all his splendid and gorgeous imagery and fascinating illustrations, by which he bewitches his readers with the smiles of the valleys, the blushes and whispers of the woods, and the transporting accents of love which drop from the waterfall. It is this art of clothing inanimate things with the powers of perception and intellectual agency, which chiefly furnishes the pleasure and delight we feel in perusing true poetry.

Were the finest poetry subjected to, or rather created by, purely mechanical rules and contrivances, it would be deprived of one of the principal sources of the pleasure we derive from it. If the lofty imaginations, the sublime ideas, and the smoothness and richness of the versification, did not pre-suppose a vigorous exercise of the intellectual powers of the poet, what is usually called poetry, no matter on what subject employed, would excite little or no attention among mankind. The rules of verse, or what are termed the mechanical part of poetry, though of the greatest use for enabling us to express our poetical ideas in an engaging and proper form, are nevertheless productive of little praise to the poet, merely because they are mechanical, and are not, on this account, sup-

posed to require any great effort of the understanding.*

The grand object of poetry, as an art, is to please, as well as to convey instruction; but the former object is the principal one. It is divided into many different sorts. The sublime represents great events, and lofty, dignified, and distinguished characters. The materials of this description of poetry must be of a kind to elevate the mind, to inspire it with feelings of grandeur and dignity, and to raise it as it were above the cares, troubles, and petty concerns of the world. It must have for its basis the most powerful passions, emotions, and sympathies of our nature; such as are involved in universal benevolence, devotion, valour, anger, rage, cruelty, hatred, &c. Everything here must be on a scale of grandeur and magnificence.

Sublime and elevated poetry requires the exercise of the highest intellectual powers, joined to a happy choice of subject. Whether the poetry be descriptive of the sublimities of external nature, of historical personages, or of pure fiction, the poet has still to support the whole with powerful invention, and to clothe the various scenes and characters with the most elevated sentiments and language. Every thing here must be perfect. *Mind* must be thrown into every movement, passion, circumstance, and event. Hence the great difficulties in the way of success in this kind of poetry. Homer, Shakspeare, and Milton, are three great and successful models in this line of poetic excellence; for they have admi-

* See Blakey's Essay on Free-will, Second Edit. 1847. Sanders, Charing Cross.

rably succeeded in the inventing and sustaining of characters, quite natural and perfect, and yet quite unique, and invested them with all those intellectual and moral qualities suited to the parts they have to represent on the stage of fiction.

In the Achilles of Homer we have the representation of the passion of anger. Every thing in the *Iliad* relates to the wrath of the hero. We see it in its commencement, progress, and termination by the death of Hector. But this wrath is not a blind, instinctive, or mechanical impulse; for if the poet had made it of this material, the whole poem would have been a complete failure. But Achilles is invested with the lofty attributes of intellectual greatness; and his wrath is always represented, and is so connected in the reader's mind, as being under the complete control of his own elevated intellect, and as only being a means for the attainment of an end. The hero is endowed with great courage, generosity, and contempt of death; with warmth of friendship, great affection for his parents, love of truth, and hatred of oppression; and is also represented as being gentle, hospitable, and compassionate, though by turns obstinate, implacable, and cruel. But still the whole character is that of elevated intellect; and this it is which makes him an interesting personage in sublime poetry, and sustains the immortality of the poem.

The magnanimity of Achilles is great, and he displays himself superior to every thing calculated to overawe and subdue the minds of ordinary mortals. In the miraculous incident about his

horse delivering a speech to him, when in a critical situation, and frantie with grief and revenge, the poet represents him struggling with the powerful elements of his destiny.

"Then ceas'd for ever, by the Furies tied,
His fateful voice. The intrepid chief replied,
With unabated rage: 'So let it be!
Portents and prodigies are lost on me.
I know my fate:—to die, to see no more
My much-loved parents, and my native shore—
Enough:—when heaven ordains, I sink in night,—
Now perish Troy:' he said, and rushed to fight."*

In Milton's "*Paradise Lost*" we have a number of eharacters brought before us, but they are all endowed with great intellectual qualifications. We have Satan introduced, vastly superior in mind to all the other demons, though amongst them there are different degrees of impiety and wikedness. Without the superior mental qualifications of the areh-fiend, the poem would have been supremely ridiculous; but he gives life and spirit to the whole performance, by the elevated tone of his satanic courage and ingenuity.†

In the dramatic works of Shakspeare we find more varied sources of the sublime in eharacter. We are presented with numerous forms of the heroic, but the principle which runs through them all is the same, namely, great mental and inde-

* Pope's Homer.

† There is a remarkable portrait of Satan in Lavater's *Physiognomy*, large edition, in which intelligence is marvellously combined with other evil passions.

pendent power. Hotspur, Henry Prince of Wales, Macbeth, and Othello, are heroes bearing little resemblance to each other, yet they are all well drawn and sustained. The predominating passions are all so finely developed, and so admirably placed under the most perfect control of the *mind* of each particular hero, that no suspicion can enter our heads that there is any trick, contrivance, or mechanical means, used to effect the intended purpose.

In the scripture of the Old Testament we have many splendid pieces of poetry, and many passages rendered remarkably sublime by the personification of material objects, and investing them with action, thought, and resolution. "The earth was full of the goodness of the Lord ; the sea roared, and the fullness thereof : the floods clapped their hands before the Lord, the mountains trembled at his presence." "The little hills rejoiced on every side." "The pastures shouted for joy." "The wilderness and the solitary place was glad : the desert rejoiced, and blossomed as the rose : it blossomed abundantly, and rejoiced with joy and singing." "The mountains saw thee, and they trembled : the overflowing of the waters passed by : the deep uttered his voice, and lifted up his hands on high." (Hab. iii. 10.) "O thou sword of the Lord, how long will it be ere thou be quiet ? put up thyself into thy scabbard, rest, and be still." (Jer. xlvii. 6.) David uses personification most effectively, when, on hearing of the death of Saul and Jonathan, he calls, in the height of his grief, for vengeance on the mountains of Gilboa. In the Book of Job, the

Psalms, and the Prophets, thousands of examples of the sublime in poetry may be found.

In the same way are we affected with the sublime, when attempting to describe and convey ideas of the personal nature of the Deity. "If I beheld the sun when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness; and my heart hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my hand: this also were an iniquity to be punished by the judge: for I should have denied the God that is above." "I am the high and lofty One, that inhabiteth eternity." "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts." Here we have the metaphors of great *height* and *distance*, as conveying to our minds the ideas of speculative grandeur and immensity.

The materials of poetical beauty in the Scriptures are the choicest plants, beautiful flowers, delicious fruits, the bloom and vigour of spring, the sweet verdure of the fields, fruitful vineyards, flourishing and well-watered gardens, pleasant streams, perennial fountains, precious stones, fragrant odours, sweet singing of birds, the soft voice of the turtle, milk and honey, the choicest wine, the vigour and gracefulness of the human form, the endearments, caresses, and delicacies of love; the awful sight of tremendous precipices, wild mountains, lofty trees; the haunts of lions, fire, wind, hail, lightning, and thunder.*

* See Dr. Beattie's *Elements of Moral Science*, *Dissertations*, and *Essays on Poetry*, &c.

These, it is quite obvious, are all indications of mental activity, skill, taste, power, in the Great Architect of the universe; and the mind naturally seizes upon them, as suitable emblems or impersonations of human thoughts, wishes, and emotions.

The same principles guide us in sitting in critical judgment on profane poetry.

"Thy spirit, Independence, let me share,
Lord of the Lion heart and Eagle eye."

This Ode of Smollett, "*On Independence*," has been often praised by critics, and these two lines in particular, as embodying two appropriate and noble images of the sublime. An analysis of this poetical beauty will show us the principle on which this critical decision rests. The metaphors of the *lion heart* and *eagle eye* are well chosen, and are the most expressive the poet could have selected, as descriptive of the spirit of real independence of mind and character. The lion is an animal which we invest with the qualities of dignified ferocity, boldness, and great strength; with a considerable portion of magnanimity of disposition; and with unlimited and undivided sway over the other animals of the forest. His authority is undisputed, his power and strength irresistible, and every movement manifests the existence of conscious superiority. He is comparatively free from habits of cunning and stratagem, which are allied with animal instincts of a low and mechanical kind. It is of little or no consequence here, whether all these qualities of this animal be strictly agree-

able to philosophical truth; it is sufficient for our purpose that they are entertained by a vast majority of mankind. The eagle eye is also, and for the very same reason, a happy metaphor in describing independence. This noble bird occupies the same relative situation among the feathered creation, that the lion does among the beasts of the African desert. The eagle possesses great power of wing and talons; an extensive and penetrating vision; and his ordinary movements and mode of life are characterised by all those circumstances which stamp his nature with unfettered and unbounded power over the winged tribes. The appropriate and beautiful application of these images of the lion heart and eagle eye, must appear obvious to every reader, and must be considered as strikingly illustrative of the principles attempted to be enforced in this essay.

The employment of these metaphors here, of the Eagle and Lion, cannot, however, be considered by any means original. They are used in Scripture to express the sublime in human character. In that fine passage in the Second Book of Samuel, when David hears of the death of Saul and Jonathan, he says, "Saul and Jonathan were lovely and pleasant in their lives, and in their deaths they were not divided; they were swifter than *eagles*, and stronger than *lions*." This is sublimely descriptive of the two heroes of antiquity; and for precisely the same reasons as the *lion heart* and *eagle eye* are expressive of the beau ideal of mental independence.

Our English poet, Akenside, mentions the eagle as an emblem of loftiness.

“ With slackened wings,
While now the solemn concert breathes around,
Incumbent o’er the sceptre of his lord,
Sleeps the stern eagle ; by the number’d notes
Possess’d, and satiate with the melting tone ;
Sovereign of birds.”

There is a very beautiful passage in Professor Stewart’s “*Philosophical Essays*,” on this employment of the eagle in lofty and sublime imagery.

“ I before took notice of the sublime flight of the eagle ; but what an accession of poetical sublimity has the eagle derived from the attributes ascribed to him in ancient mythology as the sovereign of all the other inhabitants of the air ; as the companion and favourite of Jupiter ; and as the bearer of his armour in the war against the giants. In that celebrated passage of Pindar (so nobly imitated by Gray and by Akenside) where he describes the power of music in soothing the angry passions of the gods ; the abruptness of the transition from the thunderbolt to the eagle, and the picturesque minuteness of the subsequent lines, sufficiently show what a rank was occupied by this bird in the warm imaginations of Grecian idolatry. Of the two English poets just mentioned, it is observable that the former has made no further reference to Jupiter than as carrying the feathered king on his ‘sceptred hand ;’ but in order to compensate for this omission, he has contrived, in his picture of

the eagle's sleep, by the magical charm of figurative language, to suggest, indirectly, the very same sublime image with which the description of Pindar commences :

“ Quench'd in *dark clouds* of slumber lie,
The *terror* of his beak, and *lightning* of his eye.”

Mental *creations* form the life and soul of the true poet. Without them he is nothing. No learning, no mere knowledge, no mechanical dexterity, can avail where this inventive power is defective or feeble. It is the creative faculty which raises him beyond time and space ; makes him live in bygone ages ; enables him to clothe with suitable attributes beings and existences different from himself ; to represent the thoughts, the words, the passions, the emotions of imaginary characters ; and to embody them in that concentrated form which mere philosophical deduction or narrative can but feebly and obscurely pourtray. All this it is his essential province to do. We thus have poetical characters full of the deepest interest, though they are such as perhaps never existed. A great number of Shakspeare's characters are of this stamp. It is here that the power of mental creation is so strikingly developed in the general characters, incidents, and scope of his dramatic pieces. Here the imaginative faculty displays itself in such concentrated energy, that the effect is quite magical, and we become spell-bound in astonishment, sublimity, and awe.

The description of a storm or tempest, in Virgil's *Georgics*, translated by Dryden, is very fine, as an instance of sublimity.

“The Father of the gods his glory shrouds,
Involved in tempests, and a night of clouds;
And from the middle darkness flashing out,
By fits he deals his fiery bolts about.
Earth feels the motion of her angry God,
Her entrails tremble, and her mountains nod;
And flying beasts in forests seek abode.
Deep horror seizes every human breast;
Their pride is humbled, and their fears confess'd;
While he from high his rolling thunders throws,
And fires the mountains with repeated blows;
The rocks are from their old foundations rent,
The winds redouble, and the rains augment.”

In the subordinate kinds of poetry, productive of the beautiful rather than the sublime, we find the same principles running through the whole of them. Great pains must be taken to preserve the mind's influence and activity; to avoid all that has the appearance of mechanism; and to throw an easiness and grace over the whole composition.

It would be in complete opposition to the whole frame-work of a poet's mind, ever to consider the works of nature under an atheistical or material aspect. Hence it is that the greater number of poets have manifested strong religious feelings, though their conduct might not altogether correspond with their abstract principles of belief. In modern times we have undoubtedly witnessed

great poetic genius allied with infidelity; as for instance, with Byron, Shelley, and Burns. But still this was more of the heart than the head; and displayed itself more in violent fits of passion and discontent, than in calm and settled scepticism. Indeed, no one could have given birth to the lofty and noble thoughts which they have left behind them, under the deadening load of absolute atheism or fatality. The thing is impossible.*

Painting, though more confined in its range, is founded upon the same principles as poetry—the representation of nature. In painting, as in poetry,

* As a proof that poetic infidelity is more affected than real, we shall note a remark or two of Burns, in his private letters. Writing to Mrs. Dunlop, he says:

“If religion is a mere phantom, existing only in the heated imagination of enthusiasm,

‘What truth on earth so precious as the lie!’

My idle reasonings sometimes make me a little sceptical; hut the necessities of my heart always give the cold philosophizings the lie.”

Again, when writing to Mr. Cunningham, in a state of distress, he thus expresses himself—“There are two great pillars that bear us up amid the wreck of misfortune and misery. The *ONE* is composed of the different modifications of a certain noble, stubborn something in man; known by the names of courage, fortitude, and magnanimity. The *OTHER* is made up of those feelings and sentiments which, however the sceptic may deny them, or the enthusiast disfigure them, are yet, I am convinced, original and component parts of the human soul; those *senses of the mind*, if I may be allowed the expression, which connect us with, and link us to, those awful obscure realities—an all-powerful and equally beneficent God, and a world to come beyond death and the grave.”

Again, Byron says, “I am not an enemy to religion;” and his last words were, “God’s will be done, and not mine.” (*Moore’s Life of Byron.*)

we have the satirical, the comic, the pastoral, the didactic, the pathetic, the dramatic, and heroic or grand style; and the same rules and principles which regulate this classification, form the ground work of both arts. The great object in painting, as well as poetry, is to convey instruction, to rouse the passions, and excite inward feelings of delight or aversion, by the representation of some circumstance or appearance in nature calculated to effect the end proposed.

The grand style of painting has for its object things of a lofty and ennobling nature, and requires in its execution a genius of the first order. There must be great manifestations of creative and intelligent power in the objects represented, and also fruitful powers of invention in the artist. Hence it is, that religious topics have always been found to afford the grandest displays of this description of painting; because they possess an innate sublimity and grandeur. Take for example the allegorical style of Michael Angelo, as displayed in the *Capella Sistina*. Here we have a representation of all the leading manifestations of divine power, as narrated in the Holy Scriptures. We have the creation; the transgression of man, and the origin of evil; his expulsion from Paradise; the deluge, and the covenant made with Noah; the imposing congregation of prophets as heralds of our Saviour; the brazen serpent in the wilderness; the fall of Haman; Goliath slain by David; and the last judgment-day, when the Saviour of

men shall appear upon earth to award to every man according to his deeds.

Now the pleasure derived by the spectator from all this, arises from the personal display of divine power. There could be no interest whatever in the picture, were any thing it represented considered as the work of mere chance, or the result of an eternal succession of events. There must be mind,—and free and creative mind too,—otherwise the thing would fall dead and powerless upon our eyes.

And we may remark here, in passing, that though there must, to a certain extent, be individuality given to the First Cause, yet it is a curious principle in our nature, that this liberty must not be pushed too far, otherwise it will produce a contrary effect from what is intended. The Divine nature, in his displays of power, will not bear personal form or description. Hence it is, that all representations of the personality of the Deity are repugnant to good taste. They never can inspire feelings of sublimity and grandeur. To bring eternity, immensity, and spirituality within the confines of form and material shape, outrages all our feelings; because it is an application of mechanism to an object infinitely removed from all constraint and foreign influence over its nature and movements. The only thing which can be tolerated in a representation of Divinity, is the figure of an eye; the most palpable physical symbol of intelligence and wisdom. And we find that figure is often introduced with a good effect into pictures of great

sublimity and power. But all attempts to clothe the Almighty in the bodily organs and members of the human frame, however perfectly arranged in themselves according to anatomical correctness and beauty, are miserable perversions of taste, and are never viewed, by a well regulated mind, but with the deepest feelings of disgust and contempt.*

Our praise is meted out to such artists as M. Angelo, and Raphael, who belongs to the same school, upon the principle of the measure of mind thrown into their respective works. This ideal or grand style of painting requires the exercise and cultivation of extraordinary powers. There must here be a constant attention to the works of nature; there must be great skill in selecting, digesting, and arranging them in the mind's eye; there must be a readiness in detecting all that is merely local, common, formal, and particular; the beautiful in form must be perpetually before the artist's mind; and he must add to all these the power of invention in a high degree. Every thing like stiffness, formality, or mechanical contrivance, must be sedulously kept from view; and all works of this

* Perhaps the only figure of Deity, by any means passable, is that of M. Angelo, in Rome. It is as grand in conception as any thing heavenly, clothed with tangible attributes, can be. Those paintings in the Antwerp Museum, and other places on the Continent, respecting Deity, are ridiculous both in conception and execution. The reader who is curious on this subject, will find a very full account of all the representations of the Deity, and the Godhead generally, in the "*Histoire de Dieu*," by Diron, Paris, 1843; a work full of interesting matter having a direct bearing on the subject in the text.

class must be executed with great boldness and gracefulness.

The art of painting differs from poetry, inasmuch as the former has to make an appeal to the mind through the medium of the sense of sight. Form, colour, and light and shade, are the mechanical contrivances, so to speak, which the artist has to use to address the imagination and the heart. These formal rules and principles are indispensably necessary for the consummation of his art; but all artists and critics will readily allow, that they hold a subordinate station, in our estimation of the artist's abilities and powers, to that higher object, the attainment of the poetic feeling and sentiment of art which is the creative energy of true genius, and the grand end or object which all pictorial works aim to accomplish.

Painting makes an instantaneous appeal to the passions and sympathies of mankind. The most animated narrative in prose, or the highest dramatic efforts in poetry, require a certain lapse of time before the feelings are wound up to their culminating point; but the moment a fine picture is presented before the eye, the mind sees at a glance the whole import of the tale it purports to tell, and its attention is rivetted with an intensity which no mere description can possibly effect. To produce this instantaneous feeling; to impart to the spectator the whole narrative of the story at once; to rouse all his sympathies instantaneously, and combine them into one whole; are the great objects which a painter aims to accomplish. A broken or dis-

jointed effect of the ideal presence, at once mars the best directed efforts of the artist.

There is nothing so necessary to the successful career of an artist, as a happy union of taste or judgment with imaginative or creative power. Imagination by itself runs into wild and unnatural excesses; while, on the other hand, taste or judgment, when not seconded by invention, becomes a mere formal and lifeless thing. The whole history of painting abounds with striking instances where these two opposite qualities have been irregularly possessed and cultivated; and the various criticisms we find upon the merits of respective schools of art, and of distinguished artists, proceed upon a principle of pointing out the different modes in which a superior mental power deals with what is merely formal detail, and what is creative energy. To produce a happy union of both is the grand object in view, and this is only effected by appealing to the principles of mind, taken in their widest and most comprehensive sense and application.

In those pictures in which objects are represented which are not of themselves pleasing, we invariably withdraw the mind from the objects themselves, to the skill and genius which the artist has displayed in the management of his materials. Hence it is that we are never tired in witnessing some of the exquisite gems of the Dutch school, though the objects delineated are often low public-house brawls, or the very humble and common incidents in a farm-yard or out-house. Still we feel a lively interest in such productions; not, indeed,

for the objects painted, but for the skill and cleverness of the artist in throwing so much real life into the canvass, and presenting everything in such a highly polished and finished state. When the subjects treated of by a painter are not those with which we can sympathize, we transfer our praise and admiration to the artist, and he enjoys a complete monopoly of them.*

The *ideal* in form is what all painters must carefully study; but there is no department of the artistic profession so difficult to excel in as this. The great danger is formalism. Figures may be anatomically correct; may be models of symmetry; and yet, after all, they may only be *chiselled* beauties. Expression must be given. The mind and heart must speak and give utterance; otherwise there is neither sublimity nor beauty. The fine traits of feeling and emotion must strike the eye, ere the meed of praise is awarded to the artist.†

The highest qualification of a painter is invention. The way in which he tells his story on

* "Some critics have gone further than Reynolds, and in a sweeping way have denounced all the varied excellencies of the Dutch and Flemish schools, as the language only of art. To this, however, I will not waste a word in answer; for I cannot think it needs a reply before such an audience as I am now addressing. Writers who have no practical knowledge of painting may thus condemn what they do not comprehend; but should any artist be disposed to listen to them, I would advise him to try to paint the commonest object as the Dutch painters would have painted it, and I am much mistaken if he will not soon acknowledge their transcendent excellence."—(Leslie's Lectures on Painting, to the Royal Academy, 1848.)

† See Note L. at the end of this Volume.

canvass, and arouses the passions, is everything to him. He is constantly observing nature in all her modes and phases; and it is this vigilant attention to what passes around him, joined to his inward imaginative creations, which leads him to all the great and mighty effects of his pencil. He must always, however, be a painter of nature in its most comprehensive sense; not a mere matter-of-fact man. He must deal in generalities, but they must not be vague; and with particulars, but they must not be unimportant or trifling. The balancing all these primary matters, according to the principles of art, requires mental talents of the first order of genius. Raphael and Hogarth were distinguished for inexhaustible invention, though their labours took a very opposite direction; but they both laid the foundation for their fame deep "in nature's recesses," and they will live as long as art shall endure.

Music is a different art from painting and poetry. Musical sounds owe much of their interest to a nervous feeling; and there is, both in the invention and application of the principles of harmony, which is called composition, and the mechanical part of the art, less of mind than in poetry or painting. Men who devote themselves to music as a profession, seldom display even an average degree of intellectual ability; and this has been so often noticed, that a philosopher (Dr. Hartley) affirms that he never knew a person devoted exclusively to music, that was not a fool! But this will undoubtedly be considered by many as a harsh and

rude censure. Still the fact is unquestionable, that music, in all forms of excellency, is a department of the fine arts where the human mind is less exercised as a *whole*, than in almost any other in this general division of knowledge. The reason of this is obvious. There is no dispute about the principles of music, in their ordinary application; nothing on which to exercise the important faculties of the mind. All is referable to *feeling*; and this, of course, is transitory and variable, depending upon a multitude of local and incidental circumstances of which the mind takes little or no cognizance. Music is, properly speaking, more an *art* than either poetry or painting; and on this account obtains only a subordinate share of approbation. Mozart and Handel will never be considered such great men as Homer and Milton, nor can Paganini be compared with Michael Angelo.

As far, however, as music can be considered a mental science, we follow the same mode of awarding praise as in poetry, painting, and sculpture. Wherever *mind* is conspicuous, either in composition or over the powers or capabilities of an instrument, there we confer honour and praise upon the artist. And this rule is most accurately applied, by all mankind, to every degree of musical excellency, from the first-rate performer, who collects around him the *élite* of wealth and fashion in a metropolitan city, to the boy with a hurdy-gurdy in the streets.

Variety, when kept within proper bounds, is an element of musical beauty and sublimity; because

it is opposed to mere formalism and repetition, and refreshes the ear with novelty. The musical composer must avoid monotony, and diversify his melodies by a change in his keys and an interruption in his cadences; and thus the harmony of the whole is varied by the judicious arrangement of concords and discords. All this creative energy and taste constitute the essence of his profession.

Simplicity is also a deeply sympathetic element in music. No music is pleasing unless the mind can enter into its nature and purpose. Old national and popular airs move by enchantment, because they take firm hold of our minds and sympathies. Variety, without simplicity, only confounds judgment, and bewilders the ear.

To a mind imbued with genuine ideas of music, there is nothing so offensive as a mere formal exhibition of mechanical skill. There must be what a musician terms *soul* or *life* in the performance, or it can have no pleasure for him. His sentiments are all in favour of invention with ease, and execution with gracefulness. He revolts from every thing like constraint and habitual formalism. Mere execution may surprise, but it can never move, his "inner man;" the spirit of genius must breathe on the dry bones, or there is no delight.

Sculpture is much more confined in its range, in giving a representation of nature, than painting; but as far as it goes, it is grounded upon the same principles; and we confer honour and praise upon the "marble artist," for the same reasons as we do upon the painter.

The great defect in all sculptural figures is the want of the EYE. Could this have been supplied, a much wider scope would have been given to the art. It is to the want of this "window of the mind," that we may attribute that diminished interest mankind in general take in objects of sculpture, compared to those of painting. The different degrees of *mind* thrown into the respective arts, are the cause of the different degrees of praise we award to each.

Various theories have been framed to account for the origin of sculptural representations. The ox is the Scythian emblem of the generation of animal existence, and from this cause the Arabians worshipped it as a divinity. The serpent is also considered the source of intellectual existence; and we find innumerable instances in ancient mythology in which it was invariably coupled with the communicative power of mind. In Egypt the serpent surrounded Isis and Osiris, and the diadems of the princes, and the heads of their priests. The fable of Echidna, the common mother of the Scythians, is the foundation of those emblems of a woman terminating with a serpent, adopted by the early founders of the Grecian States, and which the sculptors of that country embodied in the formal representation of the Titan princes, Cærops, Draco, and Eriethonius. Phidias made a serpent on the spear, in the image of Minerva, to show that she was protected from all danger. The sphinxes, and all the sculptured figures representing the animal

creation, arose from the common notions of the mother of the Scythians, who gave birth to an offspring half woman and half serpent. The obelisks and pyramids were erected to give the idea of flame, which was considered as the supreme and creative principle of life.*

There can be little doubt but that architecture, as an art, had a symbolical origin. The priests were the first architects; and the colossal monuments of antiquity, many of which are still in existence, were raised as types of the immensity, power, and intelligence of the Deity. These grand and primitive edifices, the creations of the imaginative faculty, had a direct effect in pointing men's thoughts to the seat of all mind,—the source of all creation, sublimity, and grandeur.

Though it must be admitted as quite certain that man, in the early ages of his existence, would build something to shelter himself from "the peltings of the pitiless storm," yet it is also quite certain that temples to the divinity are among the oldest records of our race. In Egypt and India, in Greece and Italy, in Gaul and Britain, in Mexico and Peru, we find edifices connected with the devotional feelings and worship of the Divinity; and as far back as chronological information can carry us, we have incontestable evidence that architectural science arose from conceptions of the attributes of intelligence and power, which centred in the Crea-

* Bromley's History of the Fine Arts; *Recherches sur l'Origine, l'Esprit, et les Progrès, des Arts de la Grèce*, par M. D. Ancerville.

tor of the universe; a type of which we bear in our own minds, and inward feelings and emotions.*

Simplicity and harmony are the essential ingredients of all architectural beauty and sublimity; because mind and its movements are here shadowed forth and delineated. This simplicity and harmony have always, in all styles of architecture, an especial reference to magnitude, strength, decoration, disposition, and proportion; and these rest upon certain elementary principles in our conceptions of the nature and operations of mind, both human and divine. These elements of the beautiful, sublime, and picturesque, are combined in a thousand different forms and proportions, but the primitive and radical mental ingredients for ever remain the same.

The proportion of beauty derived from the application of certain figures in ordinary buildings, or in public edifices, is difficult to ascertain, even by theoretical and practical architects. Fashion and custom have a great deal to do with our ideas of beauty from this source. There is, however, a distinct principle involved in the application of all simple figures to architectural pursuits. The rectangle, for instance, seems for streets and detached buildings to be a figure of general application; but the angular proportions are variously applied. The square gives us the idea of strength, but not of

* See K. O. Müller, "Proleg. zu einer Wissenschaftl. Mythologie," Götting. 1825; Guignault, "Relig. de l'Antiquité," tome 1.; Porter's Travels; Champolion, Panth. Egypt.; Veytia, "Historia Antigua de Mejico," lib. 2. 3.

beauty. A square edifice, a square window, a square door, is offensive to the eye; on the other hand, very narrow buildings, doors, and windows, are unpleasant things also; the true taste lies in a medium; and for this reason, I apprehend, that such places are made for the use of man, and the form of his body is taken as the standard of beauty in such cases.

Nothing is so hateful to the picturesque eye of an artist, as monotony in buildings or in public streets. Variety of figure and outline is here indispensable for producing the beautiful and interesting. Hence it is that continental cities and towns are so far superior, in artistic excellence, to the cities and towns of our own country. Paris is infinitely superior in this respect to London, and the cities of Amsterdam and Antwerp to those of Glasgow and Liverpool. The mind cannot dwell with satisfaction upon mere uniformity; it sickens and dies at the sight. It must have novelty at any price. When we throw a glance down a street, where the dwellings are of various sizes and shapes, we conceive the builders of them enjoyed the liberty of following their own fancies and tastes. Mental freedom is here dwelt upon; and we give it the credit for charming us so exquisitely. On the contrary, when we look along such a street as Harley Street, in London, it appears like the valley of the shadow of death; and it is a difficult thing for us to conceive how human beings could be immured in such a locality, in whose minds the ideas of the sublime and beautiful had ever once penetrated.

One of the principal elements in all our emotions, in gazing upon works of antiquity, of whatever nature, is, that the mind connects them with the intelligent movements of human creatures like ourselves; possessing the same passions, feelings, wants, desires, modes of thinking and reasoning. This is the grand vivifying principle in all antiquarian researches. The mere *age* of the objects is but a secondary ingredient in our contemplation, and does not, of *itself*, inspire any feelings of interest whatever; for the hills and grounds about Rome are infinitely more antiquated than the Coliseum and the Amphitheatre; but then the latter are the representatives of by-gone intellects, passions, and feelings. They are the still living personifications of the joys and sorrows, the hopes and fears, the skill and labour, of countless thousands of our fellow-creatures. Here the imagination conjures up before it the vast assemblage, and enters into all their sayings and doings, as if they were invested with a really veritable existence.

The study of antiquities opens out to the intelligent and cultivated mind a vast field of pure and rational delight. There is scarcely any thing, in the whole range of science and learning, more deeply interesting, and more calculated to absorb the whole man in serious and yet interesting trains of thought. The quality or nature of the antiquated objects, is not so much dwelt upon by the mind, as the circumstances of their era, and their complete identification with human events, conduct, and movements. A small brass cup, for

example, ascertained to have been the identical one which Julius Cæsar usually drank out of during his military campaigns, would, to every mind, be invested with as lively and intense an interest, as any stupendous temple reared in his own time. *Personality* is a very essential element in all antiquarian feelings, opinions, and judgments.

The Drama is regulated by the same principles as poetry and painting. It substantially consists in a representation of nature; and has the human passions, thoughts, and emotions for its basis. Every thing connected with the personation of fictitious character, must be guided and regulated by maxims of ease, gracefulness, life, and natural expression in action. Awkwardness, restraint, pedantry, affectation, and a rigorous observance of mere formal attitudes and gestures, must be avoided by all professional men; and the contrary qualities cultivated and adopted. There must be *mind* thrown into every dramatic exhibition; and that mind must develop itself according to certain established rules of criticism, which have spontaneous intellectuality for their foundation.

Dramatic representations are designed for producing powerful emotions; and this is the final end or object of all the various branches of the fine arts. Different organs are made the channels through which this effect is produced. The painter appeals to the eye, the orator to the ear, and the poet rouses the imaginative faculty by his written descriptions. They all, however, aim at one common object, of exciting in the hearers, or spectators,

a class of feelings and emotions similar to those which the actor or artist represents as existing in his own bosom. The professional dramatist stands, however, upon a somewhat different ground from the mere poet or painter, inasmuch as his art combines poetry, oratory, and even in some measure painting; and thus he can make a more direct and formidable assault upon the imagination, by the united power of those several instruments. He is enabled, by well-studied and arranged costumes, dresses, and scenic representations, to produce something almost approaching to the reality of life. By these means the theatre has always been considered the most direct and powerful instrument for immediately rousing the sluggish and inactive fancies of the mass of mankind.

The principles which regulate our ideas of the picturesque and beautiful in landscape-gardening, are nearly the same as those of painting and sculpture. Pope has comprehended these objects of the art of ornamental gardening under three heads; the study and display of natural beauties, the concealment of defects, and the suggestions of common sense or reason. The principle of *design* in landscape-gardening, involves two things, nature and art. There must not be too much of the former, nor too much of the latter; they must be judiciously amalgamated or blended together. *Design* pre-supposes a *designer*, and that designer is *man*. There must be *art*, therefore, or there can be no beauty from the disposition of pleasure grounds or plots of earth. Symmetrical figures, trees planted in straight

lines, artificial basons of water, or fountains, well-gravelled walks, with neat uniform edgings, are all objects which display the skill and taste of man, and which form a striking contrast to the wilds and wildernesses of nature. Gardening is an imitative art; and, though on this very account the beauties to which it gives rise are of a more humble and subordinate kind, than others where greater mental qualities are called into requisition, yet they form an important element in the innocent and peaceful pleasures of social and suburban life.

All landscape-gardening rests on three leading principles; unity of expression, a strict adherence to nature, and a tasteful disposition of forms.*

All artistic imitations give us little pleasure. They are the result of mechanism, contrivance, and dexterity. No ideas of intellectual greatness and power are connected with them; and we are apt to imagine that the artist employs jugglery and deception in his representations. Mere imitative productions, whether arising from poetry, painting, sculpture, or music, seldom raise our ideas of beauty above the degree of surprise or agreeable complacency.

It may be affirmed of every branch of art, that its essence consists in giving life and spirituality to material objects. A tangible and visible form

- * "To make the landscape grateful to the sight,
Three points of distance always should unite;
And howsoe'er the view may be confined,
Three marked divisions we shall always find."

(The Landscape, by P. R. Knight.)

is created by the imagination, by which certain feelings and emotions of the soul are conveyed to those around us. The artistic representations of these emotions, whether made through the medium of poetic language, painting, sculpture, or music, must be made in conformity to certain internal laws of mind, which the artist must study and accurately develop, otherwise he will fail in the grand object he has in view. These laws unfold certain notions of proportion, fitness, suitableness, and congruity between objects of the senses and the internal movements of the soul; and the chief aim of the artist must always be to produce a harmonious *unity* or whole out of these rough and separate materials. There must be nothing indefinite, doubtful, or discordant. The organic forms of life, and the internal indications of passion and sentiment, are the two great sources from which the *ideal* of the arts takes its rise. To blend and amalgamate the two classes of ideas from these sources, to the several branches of the fine arts, constitute the sum and substance of all artistic philosophy and skill.

SECTION 6.

Illustrations of the Sublime and Beautiful, from a survey of the works of Nature.

The beauties from a survey of external nature are almost infinite in number and variety. They form a great portion of our direct enjoyments, as

well as reflex ones, by constituting the basis of many branches of the fine arts. In general it may be laid down as a common principle or axiom, that the more cultivated the mind, and the more decided and ardent the genius, the more numerous and intense are our feelings and emotions of what is grand or beautiful in natural scenery. Many extraneous elements may enter into the taste of nations and individuals, which may greatly modify the practical application or bearings of this maxim; but on the whole it will be found to be tolerably correct, when considered in reference to the opinions and judgments of mankind, in all states and conditions of life.

Various kinds of landscapes call forth various kinds of feelings and emotions. A common English landscape, taken from some of the inland counties of the kingdom, where we meet with green meadows, well-built farm houses, rich corn-fields, fat cattle, a neat church and trim burial ground, a few scattered cottages with the woodbine or the ivy running up the fronts, good fences and hedge-rows, and a still flowing stream or canal meandering through the whole, presents us with many ideas of the beautiful. But they all rest upon, and have a direct reference to, human nature. We think of the health, and comfort, and plenty, which must be found amongst the inhabitants of such a district. We enter into their houses and homesteads, and hold imaginary conversations with their inmates, sympathize with them in all their daily toils, their homely and simple comforts, and

their rustic amusements and games. We make ourselves, for the time being, of the rural community, and feel the hopes of seed-time and the joys of harvest. It is this identification with man which gives rise to all the pleasures which the survey of such a landscape can afford. True, it is called *tame*, because it is the offspring of humble toils and unambitious aspirations, of comparatively but little intellectual cultivation or activity, and abounds with that simplicity and uniformity which bespeak the absence of the more lofty stirrings and movements of the soul.

Let us take another view of natural scenery. Let us wander into the mountainous and desert solitudes of the Alps or the Andes, or wind our path among the less lofty mountains of Wales and the Highlands; we here see nature under another aspect, but still full of interest and beauty. In the deep solitudes, and on the rocky promontories where the eagle soars in safety, we still fall back on human passions, emotions, and sympathies. Our ideas of the sublime and beautiful seem constituted of negative qualities; for we here chiefly dwell on those ills and inconveniences which necessarily flow from crowded cities and densely populated districts. The still and tranquil pleasures of retirement and solitude have a peculiar charm on many minds, particularly of an intellectual and reflective cast. We insensibly, as it were, people the wild and romantic regions with sentimental lovers, rural poets, and those enthusiastic admirers of the picturesque and awful in nature, whose chief

pleasure lies in the contemplation of sequestered scenes, far removed from the strife, turmoil, and confusion of crowded and luxurious societies. We enter by imagination into all the feelings which such personages must have in such localities ; and fancy that here at least we gain a considerable start of the common ills and miseries of life.

In considering the works of nature upon a grand and magnificent scale, feelings and emotions of another description occupy the mind. We look upon what lies before us as the result of ONE whose *mind* is completely unbounded and free, far removed from the trammels of art, who requires no aid from any power external to the act of His own mind, and who does not execute His works through the means of contrivances and expedients of any sort. Power, free-will, and infinite intelligence, are the sources of all we behold. These are the general notions which float in the mind of all those who have any active belief in a superintending and creative power, when the grand and the awful realities of nature are displayed before them.

Nor is this principle of dwelling upon the primary or first cause of all things, peculiar to the man of civilized life. We find it at the bottom of the admiration and notions of beauty and magnificence, which the untutored savage of the wilderness feels. Unquestionably, such emotions are more lofty and lively in the bosom of him whose faith and religious principles are grounded upon a sound and enlightened theology ; but beyond this

there is no essential difference in the two cases. It is the simple exercise of boundless and superior mental power which gives rise to the ideas of sublimity in both parties, from a survey of external objects around them. The man of civilized life experiences pleasures of a more intense and varied character, than the mere naked and houseless wanderer of the desert; but both drink from the same fountain.

Let us attempt to delineate the converse of this, and enter into the feelings of a person who has no belief in, nor conception of, a supreme intelligent cause of the phenomena of the universe. And by the way, it may be mentioned, that it is impossible for us, from the peculiar constitution of our minds, to form any thing like an adequate idea of a being of this kind. We cannot realize a mental abstraction of such a negative description. Power of some kind or other is so blended and mixed with every human thought, that we find, from an appeal to our own consciousness, that it is impossible to institute any comparison, or enter into any reasoning, where it is not present. But still we can make an approximation towards ascertaining what would be the result of a total deprivation of this notion of intelligent power acting upon the course of nature; and with this general result, we must content ourselves in the present instance.

We shall find, I think, upon consideration, that a person who has no notion of a Supreme Cause, would view the whole phenomena of the material world, with a very benumbed, cold, and apathetic

feeling. No mind being blended or mixed with the works before him ; no active power or agency displaying its influence ; and no idea pervading his mind, that the scene he now witnesses could ever have been any otherwise than what he sees it ; we are irresistibly led to conclude that such a being must be denuded of every thing which could form an element on which to erect one single fleeting emotion or feeling of the sublime or beautiful. To talk of his conceptions or ideas in such a case, is delusive ; there can be nothing here but the naked possession of that degree of animal existence, conferred upon the limpet on the rock, or the oyster in its bed.

Now we find this conclusion, which we arrive at by reasonings *à priori*, fully and amply confirmed from a survey of the human race, in all the varied states of civilization and barbarism. Universal history declares, in a language which cannot be controverted, that where a very low, or scarcely perceptible notion of a superior architect of nature prevails in the minds of any set of people, in exact proportion is there witnessed amongst them a corresponding mental depression, and nearly a total absence of those intellectual and social indications, with which ideas of beauty and order are necessarily connected. Everything is, in such a state of being, very little removed indeed from the brute creation. On the other hand, we find that wherever this notion of a supreme intelligent Cause exists, we perceive a mental susceptibility to be affected with what is orderly, beautiful, and

sublime, more manifest and striking ; and a greater advancement is made in all those arts and professions of life which multiply our ideas of pleasure and pain, our duties and obligations, and our praise and blame.

Nor is the general argument weakened by any considerations arising from the superstitious and barbarous modes of idolatry practised amongst nations who possess a lively but erroneous notion as to the nature and attributes of a Divine Mind. On the contrary, the immense variety of religious observances among heathen nations, affords us additional and forcible illustrations of the truth and soundness of our views. We must all agree that those people who have temples and gods, and rites and ceremonies, of all imaginable kinds, are more susceptible of social improvement ; have more intelligence and mind about them ; and exhibit a better material on which to erect a rational system of theology, than those who are sunk into such a state of existence as scarcely to give the tokens of intellectual life. The former class of persons are as much superior to the latter in the scale of human existence, as the upgrown and muscular man, who may, notwithstanding, make an improper and degrading exhibition of his strength and power, is to the helpless babe in its mother's arms. We can recognize the same mental analogies and principles running through superstitious observances of all kinds, as we do in rational and divine systems of religious instruction and worship. The Indian who cheerfully lays his body on the burning pile,

to appease the wrath of *his* offended Deity, gives rise, in the bosoms of his countrymen, to those feelings of the sublime and heroic in character, which display themselves in our minds when we are led to witness the martyr voluntarily going to the stake, to seal with his blood a more lofty and ennobling truth. There is a mistaken view in the one case, and a correct one in the other; but all the intervening mental and moral phenomena are precisely of the same character in both.

The ancient Mexicans were a superstitious race of people, having a complicated form of idolatry, with temples, rites, and ceremonies, of a curious nature; yet no one would deny but that their sense of the beautiful, grand, and sublime in nature, would be a vast deal more vivid, intellectual, and varied, than that of the poor, shrivelled, lifeless being who strolled about the shores of Tierra del Fuego, eating sea worms, and living a life of the most disgusting wretchedness.

SECTION 7.

Application of the foregoing principles to Theology, natural and revealed.

The general principles of natural and revealed religion are productive of an immense number of ideas of the grand and sublime. Everything here is of an ennobling and lofty nature, yet everything rests upon the principle of spontaneous mental intelligence. There must be wisdom and perfect

freedom of action in the Divine Lawgiver, and there must be wisdom and perfect freedom of action in the subject. Without these ingredients, no system of theology is conceivable.

In all demonstrations of a Deity which theologians and philosophers have instituted, whether of an *à priori* or an *à posteriori* kind, the grand principle they aim at is to show such a portion of wisdom and unfettered intelligence, in the constitution and government of the universe, as will justify them in coming to the conclusion that a Supreme Being exists, who is invested with all the necessary attributes for the creation and government of those great works we see stretched out before our eyes. It is not a *blind* or *mechanical* power they are in search of; on the contrary, they sedulously avoid all reasonings, inferences, and conclusions which savour, in the most distant degree, of anything having the appearance of fatality, or destiny, or inevitable necessity. In the *à posteriori* argument for the existence of a God, the theologian goes on to point out, step by step in the vast chain of universal nature, that such and such things, and such and such arrangements and laws, must be the exponents of an intelligent and active principle. This is not a dependent or derivative principle; but constitutes the individuality, so to speak, of the Deity himself, and cannot be conceived to exist apart from his divine nature or existence.

In that beautiful and sublime passage in Genesis, where the creation of the world is announced, we see the influence of this principle of spontaneous

mental action. "And God said, Let there be light; and there was light." The sublimity which fills a contemplative mind on the consideration of this brief announcement, rests in a great measure upon the simple exercise of Divine power. There were no elaborate means adopted; no secondary causes brought into operation; no contrivances of any kind used to attain the magnificent object; but the divine order is given, and immediately the most wonderful effects are produced. This fills the human mind with astonishment, awe, and sublimity. And there can be no doubt but this instantaneous act of creation is productive of all those elevated feelings solely by being viewed as a single act of the Divine Mind, without any circumstances or appliances whatever coming in between that act and the end or effect produced.*

Nor has the mode of reasoning followed by philosophers been essentially at variance with that pursued by theologians. Both proceed upon the same grounds. In all the systems of abstract philosophy embracing theories which have for their object the accounting for the phenomena of the universe, we invariably perceive, that a *moving and*

* The description of the act of creation, given by Milton, is tame and insipid compared to the Scripture account:—

"Let there be light, God said; and forthwith light
Ethereal, first of things, quintessence pure,
Sprung from the deep, and from her native east
To journey through the very gloom began,
Sphered in a radiant cloud; for yet the sun
Was not: she in a cloudy tabernacle
Sojourn'd the while."—(Parad. Lost, 7.)

vital principle forms an indispensable ingredient. No progress can be made in speculative *world-making*, without this. Thousands of instances might be adduced, from the history of philosophy, both ancient and modern, to establish this fact.

Religion, in its plain and obvious meaning, is, strictly speaking, a demand upon a being endowed with a perfect power of intellectual liberty to choose or reject, to obey a certain code of laws made by a supremely intelligent Cause, who is also endowed, in the highest degree, with this same liberty of intellectual action. These are the elemental notions involved in all the general principles of both natural and revealed religion, taken unitedly. There must be mind and spontaneity in the law-giver; and there must be mind and spontaneity in the subject to whom the law is promulgated. No matter about the metaphysical and subtile difficulties which may be deduced from the consideration of these points; the plain truth is, that let these elementary notions be twisted and tortured as they may, still they keep a firm hold of the mind of man in every stage of his existence. They form the vital or living principle of his mental, moral, and religious nature. They are ever present to his intellectual vision, ever active and influential in his conduct, and the prolific source of all his pleasures and pains, joys and sorrows, hopes and fears.

In proportion as we unfold the doctrines of revealed religion, we multiply in the same degree

our ideas of grandeur, beauty, and sublimity. We have, in the first place, man's creation and fall. Here the mind dwells, as it were, on the origin of mental existence, on the beginning of time, and the first movements of primeval intellects. The poet calls upon us to contemplate our first parents, invested with the most perfect liberty of action,* offering up their morning hymn of thanksgiving to the Almighty; and calling upon the sun, the moon, the stars, the elements, the exhalations, the plants, the winds, and the fountains, to join their voices to swell the note of praise. Then we have the sudden reverse of the picture; the flaming cherubims at the gates of Paradise; the remorseless pangs of violated liberty; and the exhibition of the influence of Satan calling upon the fallen host to rally round his standard, and by dint of that

———“*unconquerable will,*
And study of revenge, immortal hate,
And courage never to submit or yield,”

to effect the object of man's everlasting destruction. What ideas of grandeur and sublimity fill the mind when all these thoughts and personifications of the powers of nature are brought before it! And yet how impossible it would be, to derive pleasure or interest from them, were *mind* and *its unfettered exercise* excluded from them. Intelligence, in its

* ————“I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, but free to fall.”—(Paradise Lost, book 1st.)

loftiest meaning, is here the active and creative principle of all our imaginative pleasures and feelings.

The same observations may be applied to all the other important facts mentioned in Scripture, on which essential theological doctrines are grounded. The giving of the law from Mount Sinai, the birth of our Saviour, his crucifixion, his resurrection, and the announcement of the last judgment ; are all matters which have been, and will still continue to be, fruitful sources for attempts at description and delineation by the theologian, the poet, and the painter. But a rigid analysis of all their combined labours would infallibly produce this result, that it is only the *mind*, divine and human, which is infused into these wonderful events, that gives rise to and supports these notions of the grand, sublime, and interesting.

The principal doctrines of the Christian dispensation might furnish us with innumerable arguments and illustrations in proof of the theory we are desirous of establishing ; but we shall refrain from entering into them at the present moment. On one only we shall make a few observations. This relates to the fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith ; the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ. Here we have conclusive evidence that a spontaneous mental intelligence is indispensable to all correct conceptions and applications of this essential part of our religion. Divines tell us we are not, for a moment, to imagine that the sacrifice of our Lord was to *make* or to *force* the Al-

mighty to forgive us our sins ; but that this sacrifice was only the *means* through or by which he was induced to exercise his *free* and *spontaneous* bounty to Adam's fallen race. Every thing like constraint, compulsion, or contrivance of any kind, in the procedure of the Divine Being with regard to our acceptance to his favour and friendship, is utterly destructive of all enlightened or orthodox opinions of this part of the Almighty's arrangements with man.

In the same way do we reason when we descant upon the merits of our Saviour. We hold that he was possessed of the highest degree of intelligence and wisdom ; that this intelligence and wisdom were freely and voluntarily exercised ; that they were not directly or indirectly under the influence or dominion of any external power whatever ; but that his sacrifice was, in the most comprehensive meaning of the word, a free-will offering. There must be no positive obligation in the way ; it must be an act of pure and unsophisticated benevolence. And hence it is that we are called upon to view with admiration and gratitude, this stupendous work of atonement ; which was *spontaneously* undertaken, *spontaneously* executed, and *spontaneously* accepted by his heavenly Father. Sound divines, in all ages, have taken infinite pains to counteract any notions people might entertain that this doctrine of atonement might arise from *compulsion* of any kind ; because it was clearly perceived that, if we took away the Almighty's perfect freedom of intelligence in accepting, and

our Saviour's perfect freedom of intelligence in offering, his life as a ransom for us ; there could not be the slightest ground for investing either the one act or the other with any portion of merit, grandeur, or admiration whatever.

And it may here be incidentally mentioned, in passing, that so obnoxious is the very notion of any thing approaching to a denial or doubt of the spontaneous freedom of all parties in this work of redemption, that the late Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Magee, in his Sermons on the Doctrine of Atonement, observes, that in his opinion Dr. Clarke was very imprudent in making use of the word *necessary* when speaking on the obligation to vindicate the honour of God ; though this word *necessary* was not used by the Doctor in its absolute sense, but only as synonymous with *fit* or *proper*. Dr. Magee thought the terms *necessary*, *necessity*, &c., conveyed the idea that the sacrifice of Christ was a *debt* paid to Divine justice ; and therefore these terms carried with them a notion of obligation and compulsion, which was altogether incompatible with the canons of Scripture, and the suggestions of common sense.

The same remarks may be applied to the doctrine of grace, or the operations of the Holy Spirit. No divine would ever think of maintaining that heavenly influence is a blind or capricious sort of thing. To all mortal eyes, the mode of its operation is unquestionably shrouded in impenetrable and inscrutable mystery ; but still we can never lose sight of the mind or intelligent principle which

rules and guides all its applications. All notions of constraint or foreign influence must be banished from our thoughts, when contemplating or speaking of the third Person of the Trinity.

Now in looking back at the ground we have just passed hastily over, in reference to the sublime and beautiful in nature and art, we may clearly perceive one grand and comprehensive principle running through the whole of our illustrations;—that principle is *mind*. It is the active and living being we are constantly looking to and searching after. In thinking, or speaking, or reasoning on the causes and effects of things around us; of what interests or what troubles us; to mind we turn the inward eye, and acknowledge it as our common parent, our preserver, our light, our guide. The whole universe would be a sad and frightful chaos without it. Were it not for her vivifying influence and energy, philosophers might construct their systems and theories in vain; theologians would have no basis for their doctrines or hopes; the poet would tune his lyre to no purpose; the artist might display on his canvass the gayest colourings and the most perfect proportions, but there would be none to admire; and even the mechanic and ploughman would be stripped of the elementary sustenance for their humble ambition and laudable rivalry. All would be still, unaccountable, lifeless.

But matters are otherwise ordered. We can no more divest ourselves of ideas of mind, than we can of body. They constitute the two great pillars of existence or being. Mankind have taken mind

as their beacon since the first dawn of the world. They have always pointed to it; always recognised it; and have always been in search of its developments and laws. We trace it legibly in every speculative system, ancient and modern. It has assumed various names, but its reality has never been disputed or lost sight of for a single moment. We find it in the Sacred Writings, the earliest records of the human family; we find it among all the philosophical sects of Greece; we find it in India; at Alexandria, on the banks of the Nile; in Rome, in Constantinople; in the Church in every age of its history, and in the modern philosophy of every civilized nation. We find it embodied in every language, dialect, and tongue; and in every art, profession, and calling. It is the source of all life, the standard of all excellence, and the real measure of value of everything, natural or artificial, which falls under the notice of the senses and understanding. In one word, without mind nothing exists.

There are, in every department of human knowledge and art, what are termed first principles or elements. These are the foundations on which all profession, science, and practical skill rest. They can never be dispensed with. Mere rules and forms are but the instruments or tools which are employed to elicit and unfold these elementary principles. Unless a man knows the elements of an art or science, he may be said to know nothing. Now these elements all centre in MIND. In every science, profession, or art, we find converging

rays directed to the ethereal regions of intelligence and power.

And we perceive here a wise and wonderful provision. There lie at the root of every branch of science and art certain principles which distinctly point beyond man himself. Whether the matter which engrosses his thoughts relates to his *duty*, to his *pleasures*, or to his social *calling*; there is still a voice which speaks to his understanding, and directs his thoughts to something which lies beyond his own feelings and emotions. This is the link which connects him with a spiritual world. It has been his light for all generations, and will be such to the end of time. It has sometimes shed a greater, and sometimes a less effulgence on his path; but it has always been visible and enlightening. The phenomena of nature are never considered simply as phenomena; there is invariably another element blended with them; and that element is the *notion of power*. There must be two things involved in every idea of what we see around us; a something which *creates*, and a something which *is created*; and from these two parallel points we take our departure in all searches after knowledge. Every thought and every action of man has a reference to these two principles or conditions of universal being or existence.

Before taking leave of this subject, we shall make an observation or two on the doctrine of association of ideas. In most of the modern theories of the beautiful and sublime, we find this mental faculty holding a conspicuous station as one of the

chief sources of all that interests us in nature and in art. We cannot enter into the discussion on this ground; but we shall endeavour to show, in few words, the peculiar manner in which association is considered as a productive cause of our sentiments and feelings of the beautiful. A single quotation from the pages of a theoretical writer, who is unquestionably the most able and eloquent supporter of this hypothesis, will as amply and fully answer the purpose, as a thousand illustrations could possibly do.

Mr. Alison observes, "There is no man who has not some interesting associations with particular scenes, or airs, or books, and who does not feel their beauty or sublimity enhanced to him by such connections. The view of the house where one was born, of the school where one was educated, and where the gay years of infancy were passed, is indifferent to no man. They recal so many images of past happiness and past affections—they are connected with so many strong or valued emotions, and lead altogether to so long a train of feelings and recollections, that there is hardly any scene which one ever beholds with so much rapture. There are songs, also, that we have heard in infancy, which, when brought to our remembrance in after years, raise emotions for which we cannot well account; and which, though perhaps very indifferent in themselves, still continue, from their association, and from the variety of conceptions which they kindle in our minds, to be our favourites through life. The scenes which have been

distinguished by the residence of any person whose memory we admire, produce a similar effect. *Movemur enim, nescio quo pacto, locis ipsis, in quibus eorum, quos diligimus aut admiramur, adsunt vestigia.* The scenes themselves may be little beautiful; but the delight with which we recollect the traces of their lives blends itself insensibly with the emotions which the scenery excites; and the admiration which these recollections afford seems to give a kind of sanctity to the place where they dwelt, and converts everything into beauty which appears to have been connected with them."

Now we think the doctrine of association does not meet the question fairly. It is not equal to the philosophical exigencies of the case. Association is a *condition* of thought, and nothing more. The mind rests upon the ideas themselves which are bound together, but not upon the principle which binds them. We look beyond this. When the mind dwells upon the recollection of past events, it is because the events themselves were interesting to us; but the mere tie that connects them together, or which may suggest them to our remembrance, is not the *cause* why they are interesting to us. It tends, therefore, to perplex and bewilder, instead of to enlighten and explain—to consider the mere fact of remembrance as an efficient cause, instead of phenomena themselves.

From the quotation we have just inserted from Mr. Alison's valuable work, we may clearly see that he is only describing the offices of simple memory, instead of the modern mental faculty of as-

sociation. When we state that we were deeply moved on witnessing, after a lapse of time, the localities of our younger years, we only give utterance to a fact which has been noticed by all mankind since the creation, and which is as fully expressed by the terms memory, remembrance, recollection, and the like, as by the phrase, association of ideas. It is, therefore, contrary to the principles of all sound philosophy, to invent new faculties or powers, to account for phenomena, which are as completely understood by previously recognised modes of discussion and reasoning, as they can possibly be.

We shall, before concluding this chapter, make an observation or two on what has been denominated the *absolute* of beauty, in the works of several distinguished German and French writers. This word *absolute* is not a happy one; it is apt to lead an English reader astray. It conveys to his mind a strong tinge of necessity or fatality; and, when it is viewed in conjunction with some continental speculations, it has scarcely any other meaning. Now, necessity, in every shape and form, is inimical to the ideas of the sublime and beautiful, both in nature and art. These ideas rest on *mind*; but that mind must be free to act. The slightest fragment of constraint or necessity is hostile to our praise or admiration. There must be the most perfect spontaneity, or there is nothing. A middle course is impossible. And this applies both to the Divine, as well as the human mind. The universe, as we behold it, must be considered

as the offspring of a Divine mind free to act. If we make that mind a fixed or necessary existence in its mode of action, and the world a mere result of this irrevocable and absolute condition, we destroy at one blow every thing on which the naturally grand and interesting can rest. Let us consider everything we see as being the result of a fixed and eternal determination, (if such a thing is not a contradiction in terms) and if we think or reason at all on the matter, a single idea or notion of the grand or beautiful could never enter the human mind. We admire external nature, because *it was made*. By whom? By a MIND of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; and above all, possessing the most perfect spontaneity of action. We must consider the universe as an act of the Divine will; and that it might have been quite differently constructed, had that Divine will thought proper. The same observations apply to the mind of man in works of art. We admire the paintings of Hogarth and M. Angelo, because these were the fruits of their individual minds. Impair or destroy this spontaneous mental power in their respective natures, and what would there remain to be considered beautiful or sublime in the productions of their pencils? Nothing. Mind is every thing; we dwell upon its movements, as exemplified in nature's works; and in works of art we invariably look at them through the medium of the mental agents who made them. The divine mind must be free to act; and the human mind must be also unfettered; these are the two indispensable condi-

tions on which all beauty, grandeur, and sublimity rest. The two minds are connected by a similarity of nature ; the human is the true type of the Divine mind.*

Before closing this volume, it will prove of advantage to the student and general reader, to cast a momentary glance over its contents, from the time of Locke to the close of the eighteenth century. This period constitutes an important era in the history of mental science.

Every attentive reader must have observed the great influence of the writings of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Locke, in all speculative opinions of this period. The views of these distinguished men were in some measure entirely original, and yet they all made a close approximation to each other. They all viewed man psychologically; they analysed his powers and faculties, and upon the facts which personal consciousness elicited they reared certain speculations and theories of an ontological com-

* Sir Harry Beaumont, *Crito, a Dialogue on Beauty*, London, 1752; *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, London, 1759; William Thompson, *An Inquiry into the Elementary Principles of Beauty in the works of Nature and Art*, London, 1800; Schimmelpennick, *Theory of the Classification of Beauty and Deformity*, London, 1815; Mendelsohn, *Letters on the Sensation of the Beautiful*; S. J. Pratt, *The Sublime and Beautiful of Scripture*, 1777; Rev. George Miller, *An Essay on the Origin and Nature of Our Ideas of the Sublime*, *Trans. Irish Academ.*, 1793; Lambert Hermanson, *Ten-Kate, The Beau-Ideal*, translated from the French, by J. C. Le Blon, London, 1732.

plexion. They all respectively aimed at furnishing us with a complete chart of the knowledge of human nature, and at probing to the bottom every profound and subtle question which had previously occupied the attention of philosophers. Their writings collectively may be considered, therefore, as the common store-house out of which almost all the speculations of the eighteenth century derived their materials.

Gassendi, Malebranche, and Arnauld, were the three great continental apostles of the philosophy of consciousness. They had many points of difference, but embraced the new system as a whole. In our own country Locke's views excited considerable discussion; and in spite of many misrepresentations and misapprehensions of his real opinions, his doctrines steadily extended themselves among all sound and speculative minds. His critics were pretty numerous, and some rather virulent; but none were of such philosophical calibre as to make any inroad on the main principles of his system.

Out of the school of individual consciousness arose the pantheistical, sceptical, and material speculators of the latter part of the seventeenth and the whole of the eighteenth century. These displayed themselves both on the Continent and in Great Britain. Their disquisitions were generally characterised by great talent, subtlety, and logical skill; and many of them took up philosophical positions from which it became no easy matter to dislodge them.

These peculiar views of mental phenomena gave rise to two other important and antagonistic systems; that of "Common Sense," by Reid, and the theory of "Pure Reason," by Kant. Both these writers strenuously laboured to bring the philosophy of mind back again to first principles, and to place human knowledge upon what they considered a solid foundation. They were directly and sincerely opposed to scepticism and materialism in every shape.

From the publication of Locke's "Essay," to the termination of the eighteenth century, mental philosophy exercised a more powerful influence over other branches of knowledge than for many centuries previously. We can distinctly trace its effects in the whole range of European literature; but its manifestations were more direct and palpable in France, Germany, and Great Britain, than elsewhere. In these countries metaphysical science raised the tone of almost every branch of human knowledge; gave a more logical and philosophical arrangement to disquisitions of theology, morals, and politics; and even in the belles-lettres and the fine arts, no inconsiderable benefits were derived from the general current of mental speculation during this period. Indeed, never did philosophy more powerfully come "home to men's business and bosoms."



NOTES
AND
ILLUSTRATIONS.



NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A.—Page 45.

THE following considerations may perhaps be of use, as materials of thought, in the consideration of the intricate doctrines of Liberty and Necessity.

There may be two different powers which influence human action; the one voluntary, and the other mechanical. The power of the will always remains the same, and does not, as some necessitarians affirm, assume the character of automatic motion. This is a distinction necessary to be kept in view in all speculations on this subject. There is also a unity of nature in mechanical power; it never assumes a voluntary character.

That man is subject to the influence of a double power, is almost a matter of demonstration. We find some parts of our bodily frames under the control of the will; but this voluntary power is only observable to a certain extent. It seems to cease, and certain functions are carried on to their farther progress by purely mechanical action. Many of the secretory organs of the body exhibit the influence of this dual power. And we may state, for example, that when a person is trembling with cold, if it be not very severe he has it in his power, by an exercise of his will, to lessen it, or make it cease altogether; but when it arrives at a certain point of intensity, the influence of the will is superseded, the trembling continues, and mechanical action takes the place of voluntary power.

In the passions and affections of the mind, we find the influence of this double action; voluntary and mechanical power. Some passions assume the appearance of blind impulses, and are little, if at all, under the control of the will. We again find others that are more manageable. The mode and degree in which these two

separate powers are blended with or incorporated into human nature, may give rise to that endless variety of character and temper which we observe among the mass of mankind.

There is no more difficulty in supposing the existence of two independent powers of action, than in maintaining one. Archbishop King remarks, "But to confess the truth, it is no less difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another than itself; but as we are accustomed to material agents, all which are passive in their operations, we are certain of the fact, and not at all solicitous about the manner of it; whereas if we consider the thing thoroughly, we shall find ourselves as far from apprehending how motion is communicated from one body to another, as how the will can move itself; but there seems nothing wonderful in the one, because it is observed to happen at all times, and in every action; whereas the other is looked upon as incredible, since it is seldom performed by the will alone."—(King's *Origin of Evil*, p. 100.)

There are some sensible and ingenious remarks in a small work published by Mr. Pickering (1845), entitled "*Philosophical Theories and Philosophical Experience*," which have a direct bearing on the great influence which the will exercises over the intellectual faculties. We have room only for one short extract:—"Spiritual or unchanging functions.—These appear to be two: i. e. the intelligent will, and that species of memory which forms the consciousness of identity; and which—however ordinary recollections may be impaired by the injury or disease of the brain—never suffers any change from infancy to death, and even in sleep remains unaltered.

"We have as yet considered man as an animal only, and have seen all parts of his frame acting harmoniously together; the appetites, and the involuntary or instinctive emotions, by turns stimulating the faculties to provide for the needs of the body; these faculties being operations of the brain, and therefore coming within reach of the mechanical action of the system. But another power now enters upon the scene, and, for good or for evil, not unfrequently thwarts and disorders the whole. The instinctive emotions, which in themselves are evanescent, are wrought up by this untiring energy into permanent affections. The faculties, which naturally only act under the stimulus of bodily wants,—that is to say, under the impulses mechanically conveyed to the brain,—are now seized upon by this restless inquisitive power, and compelled, in

spite of fatigue, and even utter derangement of health in consequence, to minister to its requisitions, and supply it with the information it wants; untired, unchanging, it drags on its weary slave with immitigable determination, till at last it scornfully casts it into the grave as no longer fit for its purpose, and asks for other worlds, and ages yet to come, to satisfy its impatient longings for wisdom or for enjoyment. But though, when speaking of functions, I have divided them into two, as manifesting themselves differently, it is clear that they proceed from one principle; it is the conscious individual essence which pours itself forth in this energetic and unwearied activity, and is able, when it knows its powers, to appropriate to its own purposes the whole of the unrivalled machinery placed within its reach.

"But though this nice mechanism be capable of responding to the touch of that power within, which makes man so godlike when his nature has its full play, it is too frequently left at the mercy of outward impressions, and remains the mere animal to the last; for we have already seen that the exertion of the intelligent will over the bodily functions, is not requisite to their performance so as to preserve life. Man may exist as an animal, or at least very little removed from that state, and when the brain has never been exercised in those nicer operations which the individual essence can at its choice require from it, it becomes as unfit for use as the hands of a Hindoo devotee when he has resolutely kept them shut for ten years together. Active use is the necessary condition for keeping any bodily fibre in a healthy and serviceable state; and we see that this active use is stimulated by the sensations from without, which at our first entrance into the world are so abundant in all directions. The first impulse of the child is a restless curiosity, and at the same time to endeavour to combine and arrange ideas from what he sees and hears. Sensation has done its work; the brain has perceived; the individual is beginning to discover the organ he has at his command, and he is already directing it to the inquiries; he gets weary of useless question, or is reproved for it; the brain consequently becomes inactive as to all its higher functions, and no further progress is made. The will is either not exerted at all,—for the mere action of nerves of voluntary motion, stimulated by sensation, must not be confounded with the ruling individual will,—or if it be exerted, having no longer power over the faculties to

acquire useful information, its whole energy is devoted to the giving force and permanence to the instinctive emotions, which being involuntary, never can slumber as the faculties are wont to do. The man becomes thus the creature of passion, and that immaterial essence which should have been the guide to all that is excellent and noble in knowledge and in feeling, panders only to the impulses of the body, and degrades itself from its high dignity merely to sink both below the level of the brute; for the brute, when the appetite is satisfied, goes no further; but bring the intelligent will once to aid, and the jaded appetite is pampered and stimulated; fresh excitement is sought, and the body is at last worn out by the endeavours of its unwearied ally to minister to its gratification."

NOTE B.—Page 59.

"Le scepticisme relatif de Bayle avait, sous quelques rapports, un but et une tendance utiles. Il contraignait à justifier ses affirmations ou à les modifier. Non-seulement il dissipait un grand nombre d'erreurs, et par cela seul ouvrait déjà un accès plus libre à un grand nombre de vérités; mais il prévenait pour l'avenir de nombreux écarts, commandait plus de défiance et de réserve. Il tourmentait la raison, mais pour la redresser. Il devait même contribuer à faire acquérir à la philosophie de nouvelles richesses, tout en paraissant la dépouiller; à affermir définitivement, après l'avoir momentanément ébranlée; car les lacunes qu'il découvrait dans la science étaient autant de problèmes proposés. Montrer l'insuffisance des idées reçues, c'était exciter à pénétrer plus avant, et provoquer des investigations plus profondes. Les convictions obtenues à la suite d'une épreuve aussi sévère seraient devenues plus solides. Toutefois, un tel service ne pouvait guère être pleinement accepté que par des esprits distingués. Il fallait, pour en profiter dans toute son étendue, un degré d'énergie qui semblait avoir manqué à Bayle lui-même. Mais les esprits vulgaires ne comprirent pas l'appel que le scepticisme de Bayle faisait à la raison; les esprits lâches et énervés ne songèrent pas à y répondre; pour les uns et les autres, ce scepticisme ne fut pas un passage, mais le terme des efforts, ou plutôt un abîme. Pendant que les dog-

matistes, qu'il avait tant harcelés, fatigués, contrariés, le poursuivaient, suivant leur usage, d'inculpations injustes ; de vrais sceptiques se prévalaient de son autorité, s'emparaient des armes qu'il avait fournies.

"Le scepticisme de Bayle fut contagieux, séduisant, plus funeste peut-être qu'aucun autre, précisément parce que, dépourvu de tout appareil didactique, il se présentait sous des formes agréables, piquantes, variées. Le penchant au doute, nous dirons presque le besoin du doute, naissait en partie, chez Bayle, d'une disposition d'esprit à voir les choses sous une face détachée, à parcourir une foule d'objets sans en approfondir aucun ; disposition qu'il favorise chez son lecteur. Bayle manquait de cette énergie intellectuelle qui rassemble, rapproche et résume pour conclure ; il manquait aussi, il faut le dire, de ce profond sentiment moral si nécessaire pour alimenter l'énergie intellectuelle. Il ne saisissait que des prémisses ; il n'apercevait que des détails ; il touchait à tout, mais sans ordre ; il semblait se rire de la science humaine.

"On ne saurait reconnaître dans Bayle, lorsqu'il traite des questions métaphysiques, cette profondeur que lui ont attribuée quelques historiens de la philosophie ; mais on ne peut lui refuser en même temps une rare pénétration, une lucidité singulière, et un talent extraordinaire pour la dialectique. Il a offert des modèles d'une discussion méthodique, lumineuse, sincère, pleine de modération et d'urbanité, exempte de toute prévention, de toute amertume ; exemples jusqu'alors presque inconnus, et qu'il était si nécessaire de donner. Le premier il a plaidé ouvertement la cause de la tolérance ; il l'a plaidée avec un courage, une constance, qui, à l'époque où il écrivait, étaient fort méritoires ; il a dévoué sa vie entière à cette cause, sans que son siècle lui en ait pu savoir assez de gré. Enfin, et c'est un dernier service, un service considérable dont lui sont redevables les sciences philosophiques, il est un de ceux qui ont le plus contribué à transporter la science au milieu de la société, à la populariser, à la ramener sous l'empire du sens commun. En foudrant, par la publication de ses *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, la première application de la presse périodique à la littérature, il a donné une rapidité et une activité toute nouvelles au commerce des idées ; par là, il a concouru essentiellement à former cette opinion publique qui accueille, encourage, récompense et juge quelquefois les travaux des penseurs. Sous tous ces rapports divers

il a coopéré puissamment à la grande révolution que la philosophie a éprouvée de son temps, et dont nous traçons ici le tableau.

“ Il n’y a rien de plus diamétralement opposé, en apparence, que la disposition d’esprit qui porte à anéantir le droit de la raison au nom de la foi religieuse, et celle qui porte à rejeter la foi religieuse au nom de la raison naturelle ; et cependant le passage de l’un de ces extrêmes à l’autre est très-facile ; il s’opère d’une manière immédiate. La première de ces deux dispositions provoque la seconde, et y conduit. Au moment où une rupture absolue a été ainsi prononcée entre les convictions de l’esprit et les croyances révélées, où l’on a eu l’imprudence de les déclarer incompatibles, où l’on a introduit une opposition ouverte entre la raison et la foi, on a mis les hommes dans la nécessité d’opter entre l’une et l’autre. Ceux chez lesquels les croyances religieuses conservent une grande vivacité, ou sont confirmées par une longue habitude, peuvent ne pas apercevoir ce danger, ou n’en pas soupçonner du moins toute l’étendue ; ils peuvent même se faire illusion jusqu’au point de se persuader qu’ils ont mis pour toujours en sûreté le trésor qui leur est cher. On put mépriser ce danger, lorsque la philosophie devint une chose sincère, sérieuse, lorsqu’elle pénétra profondément dans les intérêts de la vie sociale et individuelle, lorsque la raison eut aussi sa conscience et porta dans la recherche du vrai une probité, une bonne foi, qui lui donnèrent un caractère moral ; en lui donnant un principe indépendant et réfléchi, il en fut tout autrement. Alors la croyance religieuse trouva en face d’elle une autorité rivale ; la raison, en recouvrant le sentiment de sa dignité et de ses droits, devint hostile, parce qu’elle se trouvait proscrite ; elle prit acte de l’incompatibilité qui avait été prononcée, pour prétendre à un empire exclusif. Tel est le phénomène que nous présente l’histoire de l’esprit humain, lorsque la philosophie de Descartes eut si profondément éveillé, si éloquemment invoqué la conscience de la raison. Déjà, par un effet bien remarquable, cette influence se dévoile tout entière dans Bayle, et, ce qu’il y a de singulier, les deux dispositions d’esprit dont nous parlons, malgré leur opposition apparente, s’y rencontrent à la fois ; elles s’y produisent ou du moins en dérivent si bien toutes deux, qu’on hésite à savoir laquelle des deux a prévalu en lui, doit prévaloir sur ceux qui le lisent. Disons mieux ; Bayle établit expressément la supériorité de la foi sur la raison ; il se réfugie lui-même au sein de la foi, poursuivi qu’il est par les in-

certitudes de la raison ; et l'on est fondé à penser que cet homme de bien, dont la vie tout entière mérita l'estime, est en cela pleinement sincère. Et cependant la contradiction qu'il a établie sur tant de points entre les lumières de la raison naturelle et celles de la révélation chrétienne, l'ont rendu réellement, contre sa volonté, le chef des écrivains qui ont rejeté plus ou moins ouvertement l'autorité de la révélation ; ses ouvrages sont devenus pour eux une sorte d'arsenal ; c'est à lui que commence cette grave controverse qui a occupé la fin du xvii^e siècle et le xviii^e, et qui a agité la société tout entière."—(De Gerando, *Histoire Comparée*, vol. 8.)

"Without a country, or a patron, or a prejudice, he (Bayle) claimed the liberty, and subsisted by the labours, of his pen. The inequality of his voluminous works is explained and excused by his alternately writing for himself, for the booksellers, and for posterity ; and if a severe critic would reduce him to a single folio, that relic, like the books of the Sibyl, would become still more valuable. A calm and a lofty spectator of the religious tempest, the philosopher of Rotterdam condemned, with equal firmness, the persecution of Louis XIV., and the republican maxims of the Calvinists, their vain prophecies, and the intolerant bigotry which sometimes vexed his solitary retreat. In reviewing the controversies of the times, he turned against each other the arguments of the disputants ; successively wielding the arms of the Catholics and the Protestants, he proves that neither the way of authority, nor the way of examination, can afford the multitude any test of religious truth ; and dexterously concludes that custom and education must be the sole ground of popular belief. The ancient paradox of Plutarch, that atheism is less pernicious than superstition, acquires a tenfold vigour when it is adorned with the colours of his wit, and pointed with the acuteness of his logic. His *Critical Dictionary* is a vast repository of facts and opinions ; and he balances the *false* religious in his sceptical scales, till the opposite quantities (if I may use the language of algebra) annihilate each other. The wonderful power which he so boldly exercised of assembling doubts and objections, had tempted him jocosely to assume the title of the *νεφελιγγερτα Ζευς*, the cloud-compelling Jove ; and, in a conversation with the ingenious Abbé (afterwards Cardinal) de Polignac, he freely disclosed his universal Pyrrhonism. 'I am most truly,' said Bayle, 'a Protestant ; for I protest indiffe-

rently against all systems and all sects.'"—(Memoirs of the Life of Edward Gibbon.)

NOTE C.—Page 99.

"La philosophie à idées était encore dominante et même unique, lorsque Hemsterhuis écrivait; l'origine et la valeur de ces idées était la question capitale de cette philosophie; et l'on croyait ne pouvoir opter qu'entre les idées innées et les idées acquises par les sens. L'origine des idées reconnue, leur valeur consistait dans leur convenance ou leur disconvenance avec leurs objets, qui n'étant eux-mêmes saisissables que par leur idée, ramenaient forcément aux idées encore. Or comment reconnaissait-on cette convenance ou cette disconvenance? Par la comparaison des idées. Le dogmatisme matérialiste le plus complet se liait ainsi à l'idéalisme le plus absolu. Mais les idées ont-elles autre chose qu'une existence logique et purement verbale? Sont-elles l'origine ou le premier élément de nos connaissances, comme on le supposait, ou bien ne sont-elles pas plutôt le résultat d'une analyse de ce que nous connaissons au moyen du langage dans lequel nous exprimons nos jugemens?

"L'homme *sente, juge, et veut*; et ces trois actes, logiquement distingués dans notre science, se confondent en réalité dans notre ame. Sentir sans juger, sans vouloir; juger sans sentir et sans vouloir; vouloir sans sentir et sans juger, sont de purs êtres de raison. Qu'est-ce donc que percevoir? Un nouvel être de raison déduit des premiers. Quelle réalité propre la perception a-t-elle? Aucune, si ce n'est purement logique dans notre esprit, et purement verbale dans le langage. C'est le langage qui a fait illusion. Le langage décompose la pensée, et lui fait subir une double analyse. D'abord, la réflexion sépare l'élément logique de nos pensées (le jugement) de l'élément sensitif et volitif (du sentiment et de l'acte de volonté) qu'il renferme; puis le langage décompose le jugement en trois élémens, le sujet de l'affirmation, l'affirmation, et la chose affirmée de ce sujet, c'est à-dire, l'attribut. Ainsi, les philosophes idéalistes ont pris pour des matériaux primitifs de la pensée dans notre esprit, les derniers élémens de sa double décomposition par la réflexion et par le langage. De ce que nous avons des sujets de

nos jugemens distincts du verbe substantif et de l'attribut dans le langage, ils ont conclu sans examen qu'ils s'étaient trouvés originellement également distincts et isolés dans notre esprit ; et ils les ont appelés *idées*, d'un nom employé par Platon dans un tout autre sens. Mais avions-nous aussi des idées correspondantes aux ad-
verbes, aux prépositions même ? Et si c'était l'analyse logique et verbale qui nous les avait fournies, pourquoi ne nous en aurait-elle pas fourni pareillement les substantifs ? D'un autre côté, si quelques jugemens s'énoncent en un seul mot, si les conjonctions ont toutes ce caractère, pourquoi supposer dans l'esprit une réalité d'existence isolée et distincte, à ce qui n'en a pas nécessairement, même dans l'analyse du langage ?

“ Que penser d'une théorie qui fait des idées les *conditions sine quâ non*, ou les *matériaux nécessaires* de toute connaissance, et qui cependant, ou bien confond, sous le même nom d'*idée*, les actes de l'esprit exprimés par le substantif-*sujet*, par l'adjectif-*attribut*, et par le verbe, *mot lien* de la proposition ; ou bien exclut l'*attribut* et le *lien* du rang des idées pour n'en douer que le *sujet*. Si nous avons également des idées-sujets, des idées-attributs et des idées-liens, qu'on nous dise ce qui les caractérise dans leur nature et dans leur origine. Si nous n'avons que des *idées-sujets*, qu'on nous dise donc à quoi correspond dans notre esprit ce qui existe dans le langage sous forme d'attribut et de lien ? tout ce qu'on peut dire de plus raisonnable, c'est que l'*attribut* représente une partie, un rapport, ou une modification du sujet ; et que le *verbe* représente l'action de l'esprit qui affirme, et constitue l'acte fondamental du jugement.

“ Le système à idées domine donc toute la philosophie d'Hemsterhuis. Ainsi, pour lui le jugement n'est qu'une comparaison d'idées, c'est-à-dire la chose la plus bizarre, lorsqu'on l'examine bien, qu'on puisse attribuer à l'esprit, et en même temps celle qui est la plus généralement et la plus légèrement admise comme une vérité incontestable. L'ame, dit-on, reçoit des idées et, pour les juger, elle les compare ; mais avec quoi ? est-ce avec une seule des idées qu'elle a déjà reçues, ou avec plusieurs de ces idées, ou avec toutes ? Il faut, pour que le jugement qu'elle va porter soit juste, qu'elle compare la nouvelle idée avec toutes celles qu'elle a déjà. L'ame fait donc instantanément, et avec la plus étonnante rapidité, l'opération la plus longue et la plus compliquée ? Or, pour peu que l'on

réfléchisse à la multiplicité de nos jugemens, à l'étonnante célérité avec laquelle nous les formons, à la nécessité où nous sommes d'en porter à toute heure, à tout moment ; pour peu que l'on rentre en soi-même, que l'on s'examine, et que l'on assiste, pour ainsi parler, à la formation de ses jugemens, on s'apercevra aisément qu'il ne se passe dans l'ame rien qui ressemble à une comparaison d'idées, et l'on sentira combien un semblable système, en opposition avec l'expérience journalière, serait encore incompatible non-seulement avec la faiblesse d'intelligence du commun des hommes, mais encore avec les facultés les plus parfaites et les plus fortes. La comparaison d'une nouvelle idée avec la masse d'idées que renferme un esprit ordinaire, serait, même pour la tête la mieux organisée, et la plus habituée aux opérations de l'intelligence, le tour de force le plus inconcevable.

"Ainsi, pour en revenir à la philosophie à idées d'Hemsterhuis, la supériorité de l'homme sur les animaux réside à ses yeux, dans la faculté qu'il a de faire co-exister, au moyen des signes, un plus grand nombre d'idées ; ainsi encore la supériorité d'une intelligence sur une autre consiste dans la quantité d'idées qu'elle pourra faire co-exister ; ainsi enfin le sentiment du beau n'est dans l'ame que la volonté et le désir qu'elle a naturellement d'avoir le plus grand nombre d'idées dans le plus petit espace de temps possible ; ce désir est tout-à-la fois la source du beau et du plaisir que nous goûtons à voir des ornemens."—(Coup-d'Œil sur la Philosophie d'Hemsterhuis, par M. Sylvain Van de Weyer, Louvain, 1825.)

In addition to these able and ingenious remarks from the Editor of Hemsterhuis's works, I would beg the reader's attention to the work of M. Gruyer, entitled "*Méditations Critiques, ou Examens Approfondis de Plusieurs Doctrines, sur l'Homme et sur Dieu,*" 1847 ; wherein he will find, from page 456 to 487, some remarks on the philosophy of Hemsterhuis. With all due deference to M. Gruyer, I do not conceive that he has essentially weakened the leading arguments of Hemsterhuis, on the necessity of a Deity, and the nature of His attributes. M. Gruyer's critiques on Hemsterhuis's ideas of the beautiful, and the immateriality of the human soul, are acute and ingenious, but I do not see that they materially affect the general scope or import of Hemsterhuis's speculations on these interesting topics.

The philosophy of Hemsterhuis has excited the attention of many

distinguished German, Belgian, and French authors. In addition to the quotation we have just given from M. Van der Weyer, we shall notice the dissertation of M. Chr. Gtte. Hermann, entitled "Kant und Hemsterhuis, Rücksicht ihrer Definition der Schönheit," published at Erfurt in 1791. M. J. H. Defooz, of Liege, is also the author of a Dissertation, crowned by the Institute of that city, in which the definition of the beautiful, as given by Hemsterhuis, is compared with those promulgated by many other eminent writers. M. Dandelin, a Member of the Academy of Brussels, and one of the most profound mathematicians of Belgium, is the author of a remarkable tract upon the writings of Hemsterhuis, published in 1823, in the "Annals of Science." This same Academy awarded a silver medal to M. Hippolyte Guillery, author of an "Eloge" of our philosopher. In 1827, M. J. G. Ottema, at the suggestion of the University of Louvain, published, in 1 vol. 4to, a lengthened examination of the writings of Hemsterhuis, under the title of "Commentatio ad questionem Literariam, propositam ab ordine Philos. in Acad. Lovaniensi. Exponatur, Quenam fuerint in tractanda philosophia Francisci Hemsterhuisii merita." M. Ottema remarks, with justice, that Hemsterhuis never dreamt of founding, by his writings, a complete system of philosophy. We also find a Mémoire, crowned by the Academy, in which an able and ingenious comparison is instituted between Hemsterhuis and Plato. There are in the "Etudes Philosophiques et Historiques" of M. T. H. Halbertsma, two unedited fragments of the Philosopher of Holland, containing "Réflexions sur la République des Provinces Unies."

We are surprised to see that none of the works of this writer are enumerated in the "Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques," Paris, 1847. In the article *Hemsterhuis*, evidently written with care and by an experienced pen, this omission forcibly strikes the eye. The author of it reproaches Hemsterhuis with a want of precision, and with not rigorously classifying the faculties of the soul, and sums up his critique in the following observations. "Si nous cherchons à le classer comme philosophe, c'est à l'école sentimentale qu'il appartient, par ses doctrines, par sa direction morale, et par les sujets qu'il a traités. . . . Avec un certain vague dans l'expression qui ne laisse pas aux idées toute la netteté désirable, il a une originalité, sinon très-frappante, du moins attrayante par de

nobles instincts, par une certaine grâce candide, et surtout par un sens moral très-délicat. Il y joint d'ailleurs une grande liberté d'esprit et une absence de préjugés rare en tout temps. Il est plus psychologue que métaphysicien, et plus moraliste que psychologue : lui-même il se rattachait volontiers à l'école Socratique," &c.

The works of Hemsterhuis have scarcely excited any attention among philosophical writers in England. The reader will find, however, a pretty lengthened notice of the French edition of them, of 1793, in the Monthly Review, Vol. 10. of that year. I conceive the writer laboured under a mistake as to the general merits of Hemsterhuis, and the peculiar nature of his speculations ; but there are, nevertheless, a good many critical observations worthy of attention.

NOTE D.—Page 119.

"What then is the precise position in which he has left the question respecting man and the material universe? He maintains, as we have said, that matter depends entirely for its existence upon mind. And in this opinion we cordially agree with him. But we must be allowed to widen very amply the basis of his principle ; otherwise, on account of the doctrine thus professed, we feel well assured that our friends would be disposed to call our sanity in question. Berkeley's doctrine amounts to this, that there are trees, for instance, and houses in the world, because they are either seen, and so forth, or thought of *as seen*, and so forth. But here his groundwork is far too narrow, for it seems to imply this, that there would be no trees and no houses *unless* they were seen, or thought of as seen. It is therefore exposed to strong objections and misconstructions. The realist may laugh it to scorn by saying, 'Then I suppose there are no trees and no houses when there is no man's mind either seeing or thinking of them!' But broaden the basis of the idealistic principle, and see how innocuous this objection falls to the ground ; affirm that in the case of *every* phenomenon, that is, even in the case of the *phenomenon of the absence of all phenomena*, a subject-mind must be thought of as incarnated with the phenomenon, and the cavil is at once obviated and disarmed. The realist expects the idealist, in virtue of his principle,

taken in its narrower significance, to admit that when the percipient neither sees, nor thinks of seeing, trees and houses, there would be no such thing as these objects. But the idealist, instructed by his principle in its wider significance, replies, 'No, my good sir; no-trees and no-houses, *i. e.* space empty of trees and houses, is a phenomenon, just as much as trees and houses themselves are phenomena; and as such it can no more exist without being seen or thought of as seen, than any other phenomenon can. Therefore, if I were to admit that, in the total absence and oblivion of the percipient, there would be no trees and no houses in a particular place, I should be guilty of the very error I am most anxious to avoid, and which it is the aim of my whole system to guard people against committing. I should merely be substituting other phenomena in lieu of those which had disappeared. I should merely be placing the phenomenon of no-object in the room of the phenomenon of object; and, in maintaining (as you seem to expect I should) that the former might exist without being seen or thought of as seen, while the latter might not so exist, I should give a direct contradiction to my whole speculation, I should be chargeable with holding that *some* phenomena are independent and irrespective of a percipient mind either really or ideally present to them, and that others are not; whereas my great doctrine is, that no phenomena, not even, as I have said, the phenomenon of the absence of all phenomena, are thus independent or irrespective.' It appears to us that Berkeley's principle requires to be enlarged in some such terms as these; and being so, we think it is then proof against all cavils and objections whatsoever. It is perfectly true that the existence of matter depends entirely on the presence, that is, either the real or the ideal presence, of a conscious mind. But it does not follow from this that there would be *no-matter*, if no such conscious mind were present, or thought of as present, because *no-matter* depends just as much upon the real or the ideal presence of a conscious mind. Thus are spiked all the cannon of false realism; thus all her trenches are obliterated, all her supplies cut off, and all her services rendered unserviceable. Thus, too, we may add, is the flank of false idealism turned, and her forces driven from their ground; while absolute real idealism, or the complete reconciliation of common-sense and philosophy, remains in triumphant possession of the field.

"Now we think that this mode of meeting the question respecting mind and matter, and of clearing its difficulties, is infinitely preferable to that resorted to by some philosophers, in which they make a distinction between what they call the *primary*, and what they call the secondary qualities of matter: holding that the latter are purely objective elements, constituting the very existence of things. As this is a very prevalent and powerfully supported opinion, we cannot pass it by without some notice. But in our exposure of its futility, we shall be very brief. All the secondary qualities, colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat, hardness, everything, in short, which is an *affection of sense*, may be generalized at one sweep into *our mere* knowledge of things. But the primary qualities which are usually restricted to extension and figure, and which constitute, it is said, the objective or real essence of things, and which are entirely independent of us, into what shall they be generalized? Into what but into this?—Into the *knowledge* of something which exists in things over and above *our mere* knowledge of things. It is plain enough that we cannot generalize them into pure objective existence in itself; we can only generalize them into a knowledge of pure objective existence. But such a knowledge, that is to say a knowledge of something existing in things, over and above *our mere* knowledge of them, is not one whit less our knowledge, and is not one whit more *their* existence, than the other more subjective knowledge designated by the word *mere*. Our knowledge of extension and figure is just as little as these little qualities themselves, as our affection of colour is objective colour itself, just as little, and just as much. You, (we suppose ourselves addressing an imaginary antagonist), you hold that our knowledge of the secondary qualities is not those qualities themselves; but we ask you, Is then our knowledge of the primary qualities those qualities themselves? This you will scarcely maintain; but perhaps you will say, Take away the affection of colour, and the colour no longer exists; and we retort upon you, Take away the knowledge of extension, and the extension no longer exists. This you will peremptorily deny, and we deny it just as peremptorily; but why do both of us deny it? Just because both of us have surreptitiously restored the knowledge of extension, in denying that extension itself would be annihilated. The knowledge of extension is extension, and extension is the knowledge of extension. Perhaps, in continua-

tion, you will say, We have our own ideas, but that besides these we have an idea of something existing externally to us which is *not an idea*, and that this something forms the aggregate of the primary qualities. Admitted. But is this idea of something which is not an idea in any degree *less an idea* than the other ideas spoken of? We should like to be informed in what respect it is so. Depend upon it the primary qualities must be held to stand on precisely the same footing as the secondary, in so far as they give us any information respecting real objective existence. In accepting the one class the mind may be passive, and in accepting the other class she may be active; but that distinction will not bring us one hair's breadth nearer to our mark. If the one class is subjective, so is the other; and the conciliating truth is that both classes are at once subjective and objective. In fine, we thus break the neck of distinction. There is a world as it exists in relation to us: true. And there is the same world as it exists *in itself*, and in non-relation to us: true also. But the world as it exists in relation to us, is just one relation in which the world exists in relation to us; and the world as it exists in itself and in non-relation to us, is just *another* relation in which the world exists in relation to us."—(Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. 51, p. 819.)

NOTE E.—Page 208.

"It is, no doubt, perfectly true that we all believe in the existence of matter, and that we all act up to this belief. But surely that statement is not a thing to be put into a book and *sold*. It is not even a thing which one man is entitled to tell gratuitously to another man who knows it just as well as he does. It must be admitted, upon a moment's reflection, that to communicate such information is to trifle with people's patience in an intolerable degree,—is to trespass most abominably upon public or upon private indulgence. What, then, shall we say when we find this kind of truth not only gravely imparted, but vehemently reiterated and enforced by scientific men, as it is in the pages of Dr. Reid and other celebrated expounders of the philosophy of the human mind? We shall only say that the economy of science is less understood than that of commerce; and that while material articles, such as air and sunshine, which are accessible to all, are for that reason excluded from the

market of trade, many intellectual wares, which are at least equally accessible, are most preposterously permitted to have a place in the market of science. Such wares are the instinctive principles of Dr. Reid. To inform a man that the material world exists, and that he believes in its existence, is to take for granted that he is an idiot."—(Blackwood's Mag. Ang. 1847.)

Professor Stewart has the following remarks on Dr. Reid's writings: "His acquaintance with the metaphysical doctrines of his predecessors does not appear to have been very extensive; with those of his own contemporaries it was remarkably deficient. I do not recollect that he has any where mentioned the names either of Condillac or of D'Alembert. It is impossible not to regret this, not only as it has deprived us of his critical judgment on some celebrated theories, but as it has prevented him from enlivening his works with that variety of historical discussion so peculiarly agreeable in those abstract researches.

"In comparing Dr. Reid's publications at different periods of his life, it is interesting to observe his growing partiality for the aphoristical style. Some of his 'Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man' are little more than a series of detached paragraphs, consisting of leading thoughts, of which the reader is left to trace the connection by his own sagacity. To this aphoristical style it is not improbable that he was partly led by the indolence incident to advanced years, as it relieved him from what Boileau justly considered as the most difficult task of an author, the skilful management of transitions. In consequence of this want of continuity in his compositions, a good deal of popular effect is unavoidably lost; but on the other hand, to the few who have a taste for such inquiries, and who value books chiefly as they furnish exercise to their own thoughts, (a class of readers who are alone competent to pronounce a judgment on metaphysical questions), there is a peculiar charm in a mode of writing so admirably calculated to give relief to the author's ideas, and to awaken, at every sentence, the reflections of his readers."

"La philosophie de Reid et de l'école écossaise est une *philosophie du sens commun*; elle n'est susceptible d'aucune autre définition: elle n'est ni sensualiste, ni réfléchie, ni rationaliste; elle participe de chacun de ces systèmes pour autant qu'ils s'accordent avec le sens commun, mais elle-même forme moins un système, dont toutes les parties soient liées par un principe organique, qu'un ensemble

de vérités détachées dont toute la liaison consiste dans leur conformité aux décrets du bon sens.

" Cette philosophie a d'incontestables mérites ; elle a reconnu un grand nombre de vérités premières qui avaient été trop souvent niées ou absorbées dans les vues systématiques des doctrines antérieures ; telles sont, par exemple, la distinction réelle de l'esprit et du corps, l'activité de l'âme à tous les degrés de la connaissance, la nature diverse de la connaissance sensible ou contingente et de la connaissance rationnelle ou nécessaire, et les principes ou les axiomes de la philosophie. Reid a ainsi sanctionné, par l'opinion commune, la vérité relative du sensualisme et du rationalisme pur, en se gardant de leurs tendances et de leurs caractères exclusifs. Mais, au lieu de s'élever à un point de vue supérieur qui domine à la fois le sensualisme et le rationalisme pur, qui les complète l'un et l'autre et les transforme dans la doctrine harmonique de la science, il se place à un point de vue inférieur, où ces doctrines opposées se rencontrent également, mais sans se pénétrer et s'unir ; il se place au point de vue, non de la raison absolue, mais du sens commun."—(Essai Théorique et Historique sur la Génération des Connaissances Humaines, par Tiberghien, Bruxelles, 1844.)

NOTE F.—Page 231.

" The easiest method of solving all the difficulties attending the subject of the *subtlety of light*, and of answering Mr. Euler's objections to its materiality, is to adopt the hypothesis of M. Bosovich, who supposes that matter is not *impenetrable*, as before him it had been universally taken for granted ; but that it consists of *physical points* only, endued with powers of attraction and repulsion, taking place at different distances, that is, surrounded with various spheres of attraction and repulsion, in the same manner as solid matter is generally supposed to be. Provided, therefore, that any body move with a sufficient degree of velocity, or have sufficient momentum to overcome any powers of repulsion that it may meet with, it will find no difficulty in making its way through any body whatever, for no things will interfere with, or penetrate one another, but *powers* such as we know do in fact exist in the same place, and counterbalance or overrule one another ; a circumstance which never had the appearance of a contradiction, or even of a difficulty.

"If the momentum of such a body in motion be sufficiently great, M. Boscovich demonstrates that the particles of any body, through which it passes, will not even be moved out of their place by it. With a degree of velocity something less than this they will be considerably agitated, and ignition might perhaps be the consequence, though the progress of the body in motion would not be sensibly interrupted; and with a still less momentum it might not pass at all.

"This theory Mr. Boscovich has taken a great deal of pains to draw out at full length and illustrate; shewing that it is by no means inconsistent with any thing that we know concerning the laws of mechanics, or our discoveries in natural philosophy; and that a great variety of phenomena, particularly those which relate to *light*, admit of a much easier solution upon this hypothesis than upon any other.

"The most obvious difficulty, and indeed the only one that attends this hypothesis, as it supposes the *mutual penetrability of matter*, arises from the difficulty we meet with in attempting to force two bodies into the same place. But it is demonstrable, that the first obstruction arises from no actual contact of matter, but from mere powers of repulsion. This difficulty we can overcome; and having got within one sphere, we fancy that we are now impeded by the solid matter itself. But the very same is the apprehension of the generality of mankind with respect to the first obstruction. Why, therefore, may not the next resistance be only another sphere of repulsion, which may only require a greater force than we can apply to overcome it, without disordering the arrangement of the constituent particles; but which may be overcome by a body moving with the amazing velocity of light?

"This scheme of the *mutual penetration of matter*, first occurred to Mr. Michell on reading *Baxter on the Immateriality of the Soul*. He found that this author's idea of matter was, that it was constituted, as it were, of bricks cemented together by an immaterial mortar. These bricks, if he would be consistent in his own reasoning, were again composed of less bricks, cemented likewise by an immaterial mortar, and so on *ad infinitum*. This putting Mr. Michell upon the consideration of the appearances of nature, he began to perceive that the bricks were so covered with this immaterial mortar, that, if they had any existence at all, it could not possibly be *perceived*; every *effect* being produced, at least in nine

cases out of ten certainly, and probably in the tenth also, by this immaterial, spiritual, and penetrable mortar.

"Instead therefore of placing the world upon the giant, the giant upon the tortoise, and the tortoise upon he could not tell what, he placed the world at once upon itself; and finding it still necessary, in order to solve the appearances of nature, to admit of extended and penetrable immaterial substance, if he maintained the impenetrability of matter; and observing farther, that all we perceive by contact, &c. is this penetrable immaterial substance, and not the impenetrable one; he began to think that he might as well admit of *penetrable material* as penetrable immaterial substance; especially as we know nothing more of the nature of substance than that it supports properties; which properties may be whatever we please, provided they be not inconsistent with each other, that is, do not imply the absence of each other.

"This by no means seemed to be the case in supposing two substances to be in the same place, at the same time, without excluding each other; the objection to which is only derived from the resistance we meet with to the touch, and is a prejudice that has taken its rise from that circumstance; and is not unlike the prejudice against the antipodes, derived from the constant experience of bodies falling, as we account it, downwards.

"I hope I shall be excused dwelling so long on this hypothesis, on account both of the novelty and importance of it, especially with respect to the phenomena of light. If I were to make any alteration in it, it would be to suppose the force of the sphere of repulsion next to any of the *indivisible points*, which constitute what we call solid bodies, not to be absolutely *infinite*, but such as may be overcome by the momentum of light; which will obviate the objection of Mr. Melville. If, however, we consider that M. Boscovich makes this nearest power of repulsion not to extend to any *real space*, but to be confined to the indivisible point itself, it may appear to be sufficient for the purpose; since the chance of such points impinging upon one another is so little, that it needs not to be considered at all."—(Priestley's History of Vision.)

NOTE G.—Page 358.

M. Cousin has the following remarks on the general nature and

scope of the philosophy of Kant. " Il était réservé à l'Allemagne, à ce pays sérieux et méditatif qui avait déjà produit Leibnitz et Wolf, de donner à l'idéalisme son véritable représentant au dix-huitième siècle ; ce représentant est l'illustre Kant. Kant est un élève de Descartes comme Locke ; il a le même caractère général, la même méthode que Locke, car ce caractère et cette méthode sont à jamais la méthode et le caractère de la philosophie moderne. Kant sépare d'une main ferme la philosophie de la théologie ; il part de l'analyse de la conscience ; seulement il s'attache à l'élément opposé à celui de Locke. Toute la différence est là. La grande entreprise de Kant est une *Critique* de la pensée indépendante et de ses lois en toutes choses ; sa gloire est une statistique complète des lois intérieures de la pensée. Il ne se contente pas d'indiquer ces lois, il les approfondit, il les poursuit dans toutes les sphères de la pensée, les énumère, les décrit, les classe.

" Kant est le véritable fondateur de la psychologie rationnelle ; mais il n'était pas homme à s'arrêter là. Les lois de la pensée énumérées, décrites et classées, Kant se demande, Comment de ces lois qui sont propres à la pensée on peut arriver légitimement au monde extérieur, à Dieu, à tout ce qui n'est pas le sujet pensant ? et là, dans sa sévérité logique, il lui semble que ces lois étant propres au sujet de la pensée, c'est-à-dire étant purement subjectives, il est illogique de tirer de lois subjectives aucune conséquence objective et ontologique. Sans doute c'est un fait, un fait de conscience, que nous croyons au monde extérieur, à Dieu, à des existences autres que la nôtre, à des objets réels ; mais nous n'y croyons que sur la foi de nos propres lois : ainsi ces croyances, nécessaires dans la sphère psychologique, reposant sur une base toute subjective, renferment, quand on veut les tirer des limites de la conscience et les appliquer à des objets externes, un paralogisme, un cercle vicieux. Kant a presque retranché l'ontologie de la philosophie ; à force d'avoir habité dans les profondeurs de la pensée, il l'a prise pour le seul monde réel ; il a agrandi la psychologie, mais il en a presque fait la philosophie tout entière. De là, une théodicée sublime, mais dont le seul fondement est une foi toute subjective et par conséquent personnelle ; en jurisprudence le droit des personnes plus solidement établi que le droit réel ; en esthétique le beau et le sublime considérés presque exclusivement dans leurs rapports avec l'homme, centre et mesure de toutes choses ; enfin une cosmologie, une philosophie de la nature qui

n'est autre chose que l'induction des lois subjectives de la pensée transportées dans la nature extérieure."—(Cours de philosophie, Leçon 12.)

"Kant has himself acknowledged that his whole theory of the percipient and intellectual faculty was intended to protect the first principles of human knowledge against the assaults of Hume. In like manner his ethical system is evidently framed for the purpose of guarding certain principles, either directly governing, or powerfully affecting practice, which seemed to him to have been placed on unsafe foundations by their advocates, and which were involved in perplexity and confusion, especially by those who adopted the results of various and sometimes contradictory systems to the taste of multitudes, more eager to know than prepared to be taught. To the theoretical reason he superadded the practical reason, which had peculiar laws and principles of its own, from which all the rules of morals may be deduced. The practical reason cannot be conceived without these laws; therefore they are *inherent*. It perceives them to be *necessary* and *universal*. Hence, by a process not altogether dissimilar, at least in its gross results, to that which was employed for the like purpose by Cudworth and Clarke, by Price and in some degree by Stewart, he raises the social affections, and still more the moral sentiments, above the sphere of enjoyment, and beyond that series of enjoyments which is called happiness. The performance of duty, not the pursuit of happiness, is in this system the chief end of man. By the same intuition we discover that virtue deserves happiness; and as this desert is not uniformly so requited in the present state of existence, it compels us to believe a moral government of the world, and a future state of existence, in which all the conditions of the practical reason will be realized;—truths, of which, in the opinion of Kant, the argumentative proofs were at least very defective, but of which the revelations of the practical reason afforded a more conclusive demonstration than any process of reasoning could supply." "The understanding, he owned, saw nothing in the connection of motive with *volition*, different from what it discovered in every other uniform sequence of a cause and an effect. But as the moral law delivered by the practical reason issues peremptory and inflexible commands, the power of always obeying them is implied in their very nature. All individual objects, all outward things, must indeed be viewed in the relation of

cause and effect. They are necessary conditions of all reasoning. But the acts of the faculty which *wills*, of which we are immediately conscious, belong to another province of mind, and are not subject to these laws of the theoretical reason. The mere intellect must still regard them as necessarily connected; but the practical reason distinguishes its own *liberty* from the *necessity* of nature, conceives volition without at the same time conceiving an antecedent to it, and regards all moral beings as the original authors of their own actions."—(Stewart's Dissertation.)

"The aim of Kant's Critique," says the Rev. John Schulze, of Königsberg, "is no less than to lead reason to the true knowledge of itself; to examine the titles upon which it founds the supposed possession of its metaphysical knowledge; and, by means of this examination, to mark the true limit beyond which it cannot venture to speculate, without wandering into the empty regions of fancy.

"The whole *Critique of Pure Reason* is established upon this principle, that *there is a free reason, independent of all experience and sensation.*"

Madame de Staël maintains that Kant's work gave an impulse to all the subsequent literary efforts of Germany. She observes further, "At the epoch when this work was published, there existed among thinking men only two systems concerning the human understanding: the one, that of Locke, which ascribed all our ideas to our sensations; the other, that of Descartes and Leibnitz, which had for its chief objects to demonstrate the spirituality and activity of the soul, the freedom of the will, and, in short, the whole doctrine of the Idealists. Between those extremes reason continued to wander, till Kant undertook to trace the limits of the two empires, of the senses and of the soul, of the external and of the internal worlds. The force of meditation and of sagacity, with which he marked these limits, had not perhaps any example among his predecessors."—(Allemagne, vol. 3. pp. 70. 72.)

"Kant a-t-il donc trouvé, entre les trois genres d'écarts opposés, la route moyenne par laquelle il espérait de leur échapper? On peut en juger. Le moyen qu'il a pris pour éviter également chacun d'eux, c'est de se jeter successivement dans chacun d'eux. Le moyen qu'il a pris pour concilier les six principaux systèmes

dont les erreurs dénaturaient le caractère de la philosophie, c'est de donner à la fois complètement gain de cause à chacun de ces systèmes. Au lieu de tracer une ligne directe entre les exagérations contraires, il a fait tous les contours nécessaires pour envelopper ces exagérations dans son système ; en un mot, le moyen qu'il prend pour s'affranchir de toutes les erreurs, c'est d'admettre toutes les contradictions.

“ De là vient qu'un système destiné, ainsi que l'annonçaient ses auteurs, à réunir toutes les sectes par une éternelle pacification, dès qu'il a eu attiré l'attention publique et acquis un certain nombre de partisans, il a immédiatement engendré, entre ses partisans eux-mêmes, une nouvelle division, un nouveau partage de sectes, non moins animées dans leurs contestations mutuelles que celles dont il devait opérer la réunion. C'est que ce système n'était, en effet, qu'un amalgame d'éléments incompatibles, dont la lutte nécessaire et éternelle a dû se manifester de nouveau dès le premier développement qu'ils ont reçu.

“ Cette incompatibilité des éléments réunis à la fois dans le criticisme, s'y trouve déguisée par la multitude de divisions, de classifications, de définitions, de distinctions, de commentaires de toute espèce interposés entre eux. L'attention de l'esprit, absorbée, captivée par ce nombre prodigieux de notions intermédiaires, perd de vue la contradiction des termes extrêmes entre lesquels elles sont placées. En parcourant cette immense chaîne, la raison n'est plus révoltée, parce que les idées opposées sont séparées par un trop grand intervalle pour être simultanément aperçues ; on admire l'art qui a présidé à ces vastes combinaisons, mais on perd de vue les principes qui y sont entrés. Frappé de la richesse de la broderie, on n'aperçoit pas les défauts du fond.

“ L'épreuve à laquelle le criticisme doit être soumis pour être bien apprécié, c'est donc d'essayer de le résumer par des rapprochements sommaires, après l'avoir fidèlement suivi dans tous ses détails. Dès que vous vous arrêtez à discuter ses propositions une à une, l'opposition même des éléments dont il se compose fournit en apparence un moyen de repousser vos objections ; car, quelle que soit la conséquence qu'on veuille tirer contre lui de cette proposition, il a une déclaration contraire toute prête pour vous démentir ; il vous dit que vous ne l'avez pas compris, et pour vous le prouver, il vous rengage dans la série des intermédiaires, qui, de

distinctions en distinctions, doivent, si vous n'y prenez garde, vous faire oublier le point dont vous étiez parti et celui auquel vous croyez tendre.

" Au reste, il n'est point d'erreurs, ainsi qu'on ne saurait trop le répéter, il n'est point d'erreurs qui ne renferment le germe de quelque vérité. On ne se trompe point parce qu'on voit ce qui n'est pas, mais parce qu'on accorde à ce qu'on a vu une extension trop rapide et trop absolue. Le criticisme renferme des vérités précieuses, mais dont il a porté trop loin les conséquences.

" Il est vrai, par exemple, que l'esprit humain porte en lui-même certaines conditions et certaines lois qui lui sont propres, qui dérivent de sa nature, et qui s'appliquent aux objets de ses connaissances. Mais ces conditions, ce sont les facultés dont il est doué; ces lois, ce sont les méthodes nécessaires à l'exercice des facultés. Le criticisme a été plus loin; il a supposé que ces conditions sont des *imitations*, des *notions*, des *idées*, des *formes*, en un mot, et non simplement des *puissances*; il a supposé que ces lois sont des *principes*; cette extension a formé sa première erreur.

" Il est vrai encore que, dans les notions de *l'espace*, du *temps*, dans les notions de *l'unité*, de la *pluralité*, dans toutes les catégories, en un mot, dans toutes les *idées de la raison pure*, notre esprit a une très-grande part, qu'il y met beaucoup du sien, que ces idées n'ont point au-dehors de type qui leur corresponde *exactement*; et la raison en est simple: c'est que toutes ces *intuitions*, *notions*, *idées*, sont ce que nous appelons des *idées de relation* ou de *réflexion*, qui supposent une vue de l'esprit, une intervention de l'esprit. Mais il y a aussi en elles quelque chose de réel et d'indépendant de notre esprit; ce sont les *termes* de la relation, ce sont les *faits* qui servent d'objet à la réflexion. Le criticisme, par une seconde extension, a supposé que ces *perceptions*, ces *idées*, sont entièrement et exclusivement l'ouvrage de notre esprit seul, qu'il n'en a tiré les éléments que de lui seul. C'est la seconde erreur du criticisme, et, quoiqu'il s'en défende, ce sont là de véritables *idées innées*, dans le sens de Descartes et Leibnitz. Car si Leibnitz, ni Descartes, n'ont prétendu que ces idées fussent *actuellement*, mais bien *virtuellement* innées, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ont leur principe en nous, et se manifestent ensuite à l'occasion des impressions externes.

" Enfin, il est vrai que la génération de nos connaissances *selon l'ordre des temps*, et leur génération *selon l'ordre des déductions*,

ne sont point en tout la même chose ; il est vrai qu'en nous formant certaines idées archétypes, nous pouvons tirer des rapports de ces idées des vérités qui sont *à priori*, c'est-à-dire qui vont au-devant de l'expérience, la précèdent ; mais il s'ensuit seulement qu'une somme d'expérience étant donnée, ces *vérités à priori* pourront nous servir à prévoir d'autres expériences, par le rapport qu'elles établiront entre les premières et les secondes. Il ne s'ensuit point que de semblables *vérités à priori* pourront servir, ni de principe, ni de garantie, ni d'appui, aux premières vérités expérimentales ; cependant Kant, par une nouvelle extension, en a conclu que *la philosophie a besoin d'une science qui détermine à priori la possibilité, les principes de toute expérience*. Dès lors, bannissant l'expérience du nombre des données élémentaires et primitives de l'esprit, il s'est mis dans la nécessité de recomposer, comme on dit, des pièces et des morceaux, la réalité des choses ; il s'est mis dans la nécessité d'expliquer, de prouver le grand mystère de la *connaissance*, et d'attribuer aux simples conceptions de l'esprit, aux *vérités à priori*, une valeur, une fécondité, qui n'appartiennent point à leur nature, et c'est, à ce qu'il nous semble, la troisième erreur fondamentale.

“ Concluons que le criticisme a achevé de manifester les vrais besoins de la philosophie, soit par la lumière qu'il a répandue sur les problèmes essentiels, soit par la nouvelle preuve qu'il a donnée de l'insuffisance attachée aux solutions offertes par les systèmes que nous avons passés en revue jusqu'à ce moment. Les efforts mêmes du criticisme ont été utiles en ce qu'ils ont achevé de montrer l'unique voie sur laquelle ces solutions puissent être obtenues, c'est-à-dire la philosophie qui mérite proprement le nom de *philosophie de l'expérience*. (De Gerando, Histoire Comparée, vol. 8. p. 300.)

NOTE H.—Page 400.

“ Quoique les systèmes de Kant se soient décrédités eux-mêmes par les caractères de ceux qu'ils ont engendrés, par l'esprit de parti et les débats quelquefois scandaleux qu'ils ont fait naître, par une influence, défavorable à quelques égards, sur le goût et les mœurs, on doit cette justice cependant aux véritables disciples de ce philo-

sophe, que, demeurés fidèles à ses intentions, ils ont désavoué de tels écarts. Les efforts de plusieurs d'entre eux n'auront point été inutiles à la morale publique, à l'étude de l'histoire, et à la discussion de plusieurs points fondamentaux de la philosophie : il en est du moins résulté cet effet utile, que l'émulation des penseurs s'est généralement portée sur la détermination des principes qui fondent la certitude et la réalité des connaissances humaines, sur la classification des phénomènes de l'entendement, et par conséquent sur la recherche des facultés premières et fondamentales, seule base d'une bonne classification pour les actes qui en émanent. L'école de Leibnitz et les sectateurs que Locke avait trouvés en Allemagne, ont été conduits à modifier ou à compléter leurs théories. Quelques censeurs originaux se sont formés au milieu de ces controverses ; d'autres, par un éclecticisme éclairé, ont su emprunter librement aux maximes des diverses écoles les éléments qu'ils ont réunis et conciliés avec succès.

“ Parmi ces hommes recommandables, nous devons indiquer Tetens, l'auteur des ‘Recherches philosophiques sur la nature humaine et son développement,’ écrivain profond, qui de la simplicité du principe pensant fait dériver l'unité qui préside au système de ses facultés ; Feder, l'auteur du ‘Nouvel Emile,’ partisan de Locke, mais avec indépendance, et qui, sans demeurer étranger aux progrès de la philosophie, a tâché d'en simplifier et d'en populariser les préceptes ; Platner, l'auteur de ‘l'Anthropologie et des Aphorismes philosophiques,’ qui se distingue par la rigueur de sa méthode, les savantes recherches et la sagacité de ses analyses ; le sage et judicieux Eberhard, qui a particulièrement éclairé la théorie de l'imagination et de l'association des idées ; Jacobi, que les Kantiens eux-mêmes regardent comme leur plus dangereux adversaire, et qui en servant la cause de la philosophie, sait aussi la faire aimer ; Mérian, mort depuis peu, après avoir honorablement rempli pendant un grand nombre d'années une des places de Secrétaire de l'Académie de Berlin ; Ancillon, qui continue, dans cette illustre société, la chaîne dont le premier anneau se rattache à Leibnitz. Digne héritier d'un si grand homme, il montre, par son exemple, que le but de la vraie philosophie est de multiplier et non de détruire les vérités, qu'elle tire sa principale force de l'alliance des sentiments avec les principes, et que c'est parmi les âmes élevées qu'elle aime à chercher ses premiers adeptes.

“ L'Académie que nous venons de citer, la seule de l'Europe qui consacre expressément à la philosophie une portion spéciale de ses travaux, a puissamment concouru par ses exemples et ses conseils à retenir le plus grand nombre des écrivains dans une utile direction ; elle a opposé son autorité à l'influence de l'esprit de secte ; le choix des problèmes qu'elle a posés a valu à la philosophie des solutions importantes, et ses mémoires éclairaient la science par d'utiles observations, pendant que ses concours en indiquaient les besoins.

“ Un mérite qui appartient aux philosophes éclectiques de l'Allemagne, c'est d'avoir, en cherchant à simplifier le système de facultés humaines et à lui donner un caractère d'unité, distingué cependant avec soin les facultés passives et les facultés actives, et mis en opposition les caractères qui les distinguent, de la manière la plus lumineuse. Ils y ont trouvé le moyen d'unir fortement les idées morales avec l'étude de l'entendement, de mettre dans tout son jour l'immortalité du principe pensant et la liberté de nos déterminations. En vain chercherait-on dans leurs travaux un prétexte à ces déplorables abus qui ont ailleurs affligé les amis du bien, lorsqu'on a vu ou attaquer la religion au nom de la philosophie, ou proscrire la philosophie au nom de la religion. Ils n'ont point séparé les intérêts des mœurs publiques, des intérêts des lumières ; ils ont fourni un nouvel appui à ces nobles titres de la dignité de notre nature, à ces sublimes garanties du bonheur des hommes ; et l'art de penser, dans leurs leçons, n'a été, pour ainsi dire, qu'une grande introduction à la science de la morale. Nous comptons avec une sorte d'orgueil au nombre des philosophes qui ont également servi cette cause, un prince qui les éclaire par ses écrits, en même temps qu'il les encourage par ses bienfaits ; qui, guidant par son exemple sur la route de la vérité et sur celle du bien, fait également chérir l'un et l'autre, et que nous nous honorons de compter au rang de nos confrères.

“ L'Allemagne conservera également avec reconnaissance et respect la mémoire de deux moralistes qu'elle a perdus dans ces dernières années, Garve et Herder : Garve, l'apôtre et le héros de la patience, Garve, qui en observant le monde avec pénétration, ne l'étudia que pour l'améliorer ; Herder, cet ami du bien, appelé le *Fénélon de l'Allemagne*, qui mérite une si honorable comparaison

par l'élévation de ses sentiments, son amour pour l'humanité, et le caractère généreux, serein et pur, qui respire dans sa doctrine.

"L'étude des facultés humaines n'a point d'application plus utile que l'éducation de l'homme. L'Allemagne est riche à cet égard : craignant de sortir du cercle qui nous est tracé, nous nous bornerons à indiquer les écrits de Gedike, de Seehale ; les principes de l'éducation de Schwartz et de Hermann-Niemeyer ; l'estimable traité publié sans nom d'auteur, en 1795, à Frankfort sur l'Oder, sur la culture de l'esprit, les moyens de l'entretenir, de la perfectionner, de la répandre. Nous acquitterons aussi la dette des amis de la jeunesse et de l'enfance envers Campe, dont les efforts soutenus ont donné d'utiles manuels pour toutes les méthodes de l'éducation, comme pour toutes les branches de l'enseignement.

"On est généralement porté à croire que l'attention du public éclairé de l'Allemagne et les efforts de ses écrivains sont exclusivement concentrés dans les doctrines spéculatives, et la multitude des systèmes philosophiques dont elle a été en quelque sorte inondée, a pu fournir un prétexte à ces préventions ; mais dans un compte aussi solennel que celui dont nous nous occupons, nous saurons rendre plus de justice à cette nation, et aux hommes distingués qu'elle renferme. Cette obligation pour nous est d'autant plus sacrée, que la liaison des études philosophiques aux travaux de l'érudition rentre plus particulièrement dans notre domaine. Si la philosophie est aussi une science expérimentale (et elle a sans doute ce caractère), l'histoire doit être sa première école ; l'histoire des opinions l'éclaire sur la marche de l'esprit humain ; l'histoire des mœurs l'éclaire sur la théorie des passions et des devoirs ; l'histoire, étudiée sous ce point de vue, doit aux Allemands, depuis vingt ans, les plus nombreuses et les plus profondes recherches.

"Il n'est d'abord aucune nation de l'Europe qui ait réuni en ensemble aussi complet de travaux sur l'histoire de la philosophie. Les services que lui ont rendus les écrivains Allemands ne se bornent point à une critique savante et approfondie des écrits de l'antiquité, à une analyse sévère et judicieuse des systèmes et des doctrines qui ont vu le jour dans les divers âges : leurs travaux se recommandent encore par le soin avec lequel ces matériaux ont été classés et mis en ordre, par les efforts qui ont été faits pour développer et l'origine et l'influence des divers systèmes, les

caractères distinctifs de chacun d'eux, leur enchaînement ou leurs contrastes. Nous placerons au premier rang l'histoire générale de Tiedemann, dont le mérite est encore relevé par des rapprochements lumineux entre les tableaux des institutions, des mœurs, et celui des opinions philosophiques ; celle de Tennemann, où les doctrines de l'antiquité se trouvent développées d'une manière plus complète et plus méthodique que dans aucune autre ; l'Histoire plus abrégée, mais sage, impartiale et judicieuse, dont Eberhard est l'auteur ; les *Mélanges* de Fülleborn, remplis d'aperçus neufs et profonds, qui font vivement regretter la perte prématurée d'un écrivain aussi distingué ; les *Recherches* de Platner, où les opinions anciennes sont comparées d'une manière sommaire, mais avec la sagacité la plus remarquable ; les ouvrages de Buhle, estimable par la méthode et par le soin que l'auteur a eu d'indiquer fidèlement les sources ; ceux de Bardili, de Gurlitt, et parmi les travaux partiels, les savantes dissertations de Heyne, l'Histoire du Scepticisme de Standling, les dissertations contenues dans le *Magazin de Hismann*, enfin, les *Sommaires* de Meiners, guides précieux pour ceux qui se livrent à ces recherches.

" S'élevant ensuite à un point de vue plus étendu, et saisissant la vaste chaîne qui unit l'état des mœurs avec le développement des idées au sein des nations, les écrivains allemands ont traité l'histoire générale des sciences, des arts, des mœurs, des institutions et des langues, dans les rapports qui les unissent ; en un mot, comme ils l'ont dit eux-mêmes, l'histoire de l'humanité. Si ce sujet ne leur appartient pas exclusivement, du moins l'ont ils traité d'une manière qui leur est propre, l'ont-ils embrassé avec une émulation dont l'exemple à été donné par leurs écrivains les plus distingués, — Herder, si justement honoré et regretté en Allemagne, Meiners, Reinhard, Mayer, Jenisch, Eichhorn, Iselin, Tetens, Tiedemann, etc. Une Société qui jouit dans toute l'Europe d'une juste et noble réputation, la Société Royale de Göttingue, s'est réunie presque entière pour tracer l'histoire universelle des sciences et des arts, espèce d'encyclopédie qui suivra progressivement, dans tous les temps, le recensement des connaissances, ainsi que nous en formons le tableau pour une époque déterminée." — (Extract of a Report on the State of Philosophy, presented by the French Institute, in 1808.)

NOTE I.—Page 418.

“ L'Ecole française, au milieu de la diversité des doctrines, présente un caractère propre et distinctif : c'est le prix éminent qu'elle attache au mérite de la clarté, et la préférence qu'elle donne aux méthodes d'analyse. Ce caractère a été fixé par Descartes ; il est, pour ainsi dire, l'essence de sa philosophie, et il nous explique l'influence prodigieuse et trop peu connue que cette philosophie a exercé sur notre langue et sur notre littérature. Elle retirait de ce principe de clarté, et de l'appel qu'elle avait fait à la réflexion, l'avantage de renfermer en elle-même le germe de son propre perfectionnement. Cherchant la source de la vérité dans le compte que la pensée se rend à elle-même, dans la conscience intime de l'esprit, elle tenait constamment la raison en éveil, et l'invitait à revoir, à corriger, à compléter ses premiers essais. Aussi, l'esprit de Descartes, cet esprit actif et investigateur, revit encore dans Condillac, et s'y montre dans la critique même des opinions dogmatiques de son prédécesseur. Le disciple de Locke a été plus cartésien qu'il ne croyait l'être. Les écrits de Condillac, à leur tour, ont conduit ses successeurs à rectifier quelques maximes trop vagues ou inexactes de sa doctrine. Telle était, par exemple, celle qui réduit toutes les opérations de l'esprit à la sensation transformée ; maxime qui a séduit son auteur par son apparente simplicité et par sa forme absolue, mais qui, soumise à une analyse sévère, a paru ne présenter aucun sens. Telle était encore sa définition de jugement, qui, ne le faisant consister que dans la simple comparaison ou dans une double attention, ne s'applique effectivement qu'aux jugements abstraits ou d'identité, et ne peut s'étendre aux jugements de fait ou d'observation, les plus importants de tous. Telle est cette règle, conséquence naturelle de la précédente, qui réduit la science à n'être qu'une langue bien faite, ce qui ne peut s'entendre que de la partie rationnelle de chaque science. On a redressé la doctrine de Condillac sur ces divers points ; on a montré qu'il avait été en opposition avec ses propres maximes, lorsqu'il avait supposé que toutes les connaissances humaines peuvent dériver d'un principe identique, que toutes les classes de nos idées sont susceptibles de recevoir des signes rigoureusement analogues, et qu'ainsi les vérités morales et méta-

physiques peuvent être soumises à l'empire des démonstrations géométriques. On a montré que sa théorie de la sensation était incomplète ; qu'il avait trop peu distingué la sensation, proprement dite, de la perception, qui seule donne un caractère intellectuel à l'impression sensible ; que dans ses opérations délicates, il avait en général trop peu tenu compte de ce qui appartient à l'activité propre de l'esprit humain. On a fait voir que la nomenclature des cinq sens, adoptée par Condillac d'après les anciens, est insuffisante ; qu'il est un ordre de sensations importantes et très-variées auquel elle n'assigne aucune place, sensations qu'on peut appeler internes, et qui exercent en particulier une influence si active sur les passions. On a présenté des explications ou des hypothèses ingénieuses sur ces mystérieuses perceptions qui nous introduisent à la connaissance des objets extérieurs. La théorie de la réflexion, si heureusement commencée par Locke, trop négligée par Condillac, a été reprise avec succès ; elle a prêté des vues fécondes à la philosophie morale ; elle a fourni la solution du problème difficile auquel donnent lieu l'origine et la formation du langage ; elle a fait découvrir la source de la prééminence intellectuelle de l'homme sur les animaux ; elle seule a pu expliquer la véritable nature de la science humaine. Une judicieuse analyse a fixé les lois de l'attention, de l'imagination, des souvenirs. On a dévoilé les secrets ressorts du mécanisme des habitudes ; une loi simple a rendu compte des effets contraires qu'il produit sur les impressions passives et sur les opérations actives de l'entendement, facilitant certains actes et paraissant nous enchaîner dans quelques autres. L'art des méthodes, mettant à profit les brillants exemples que lui offrent aujourd'hui les sciences physiques et mathématiques, a été rappelé à des principes plus sages et plus sévères ; le calcul des probabilités et la théorie des vraisemblances ont acquis une nouvelle étendue. Enfin, on a perfectionné la classification et la nomenclature des opérations de l'esprit humain, des facultés qui s'y appliquent, et des idées qui en sont le produit. On a établi l'ordre dans ce règne mystérieux qui compose le domaine de la pensée, et qui, pour nous, représente tout l'univers.

“ Nous avons vu que le caractère distinctif qu'a reçu dès l'origine la philosophie dans l'école française, lui donne des rapports plus étroits avec la culture des lettres et avec les principes de la langue. La clarté ne dépend pas seulement de l'ordre des idées ; elle dépend

aussi du choix de l'expression. De là vient sans doute qu'une des applications de l'étude de l'esprit humain qui semble avoir été parmi nous plus particulièrement cultivée, est celle qui embrasse la grammaire générale et les principes du langage. Il est à remarquer que les premiers auteurs d'une véritable logique française, les illustres écrivains de Port-Royal, ont aussi donné les premiers une grammaire générale et raisonnée. A mesure qu'on a mieux saisi les rapports et les propriétés des notions de l'esprit, on a mieux démêlé aussi les fonctions des signes qui les représentent, et réciproquement on a observé les caractères des idées dans les éléments du langage, comme on étudie un type dans son empreinte. La grammaire générale a fait depuis peu, au milieu de nous, des progrès sensibles, et la France est peut-être le pays de l'Europe où cette science se trouve éclairée aujourd'hui par de plus nombreux et de plus utiles travaux." (Report of the French Institute, 1808.)

NOTE J.—Page 425.

The most ancient account of our notions of beauty, is that contained in the dialogues of Plato; but what his precise ideas were on the subject it is difficult to divine. One thing is stated, that *mind* is the foundation of the beautiful. The dialogue of "The Greater Hippias," is devoted to the inquiry. Hippias is a sophist, and makes some statements as to his own views of the beautiful and sublime; and then Socrates joins him in the discussion. The latter suggests that our notions of beauty may be derived from ideas of fitness, or suitableness, or utility, or from the organic construction of the eye and the ear. But after a long and tedious argument, nothing is concluded; save that beauty is something which has a real existence, and that it cannot, therefore, be merely dependent upon the organic structure of our senses.

In the works of Xenophon and Cicero, there are some observations on the sublime and beautiful; but they are of little moment. St. Augustine wrote a work on the subject, but it has not come down to our day. From slight notices of it in his other writings we find that he conceived beauty to depend on *unity*, or the perception of the various relations of parts among objects, and that the mind formed them into one harmonious whole.

Longinus' work on the "Sublime," has an almost especial reference to oratory; and can readily be consulted by the English reader.

NOTE K.—Page 433.

"La fantasia e immaginazione estetica è la facoltà che trasformando in fantasmi i tipi intelligibili, e dando alle immagini concepite una vita mentale, crea il Bello. Essa è riproduttiva, in quanto rinnova le impressioni e le specie delle cose tramandate dai sensi; combinatrice, in quanto le unisce fra loro variamente . . . trasformatrice e produttiva, in quanto le modifica, e aggiunge loro certe specialità sue, proprio ch'ella non recava altronde che dalla propria natura. Dicesi estetica rispetto alle tre ultime doti per cui si distingue dalla immaginazione largamente considerata, e quale si trova in tutti gli uomini eziandio destituiti di ogni attitudine a creare e a sentir la bellezza. La fantasia è un ramo speciale di quella attività o forza in cui risiede la natura intima ed essenziale dello spirito umano. Ogni forza, semplice e indivisa come sostanza e come causa, è moltiplice per li suoi attributi; così le facoltà dell'animo sono quasi una prima irradiazione della sua unità sostanziale, e formano per così dire lo strato più interno e la prima corteccia che riveste il nocciolo fondamentale di esso animo. La facoltà d'intendere e quella di sentire apprendono i primi elementi delle cose, cioè gl'intelligibili e i sensibili, correlativa agli estremi della formola ideale; i quali elementi ricevuti greggi dalla percezione sensitiva e dall'intuito sono poscia lavorati e trasformati dalla riflessione. Ma il lavoro riflessivo, in quanto procede dalla ragione, non esce dai termini del semplice conoscimento. La fantasia pigliando i materiali somministrati dalla sensibilità e dalla cognizione intuitiva, già elaborati più o meno dalla riflessione, gli trasfigura di nuovo, recando a compimento il processo dinamico incominciato dalle potenze anteriori. Il che ella fa spiritualizzando da un lato i sensibili, e porgendo dall'altro lato un corpo agl'intelligibili, per guisa che gli uni e gli altri, rimossi alquanto dalla propria e accostati alla natura contraria, possano unirsi insieme nella individualità estetica divisata di sopra. Mediante questa ope-

razione, i sensibili vengono spiecati mentalmente dalla materia a cui aderiscono, e tirati quasi per filiera sino a divenire, per dir così, una foglia o pelle sottilissima e delicatissima, spogliata di grossezza come la superficie dei matematici, ma non astratta come essa, e serbante le conformazioni, i colori, le altre estrinseche e concrete apparenze, aggiuntovi un non so che di vago, d'indefinito, di mobile, di misterioso, che appartiene più proprio alla facoltà fantastica. All'incontro gl'intelligibili pigliano un corpo, perdendo le doti di eternità, universalità, necessità, che nel giro della ragione gli accompagnano, entrando in un luogo e tempo circoscritto, restando finite sembianze come le cose reali, e diventando quasi esseri animati forniti d'ossa e di polpe, che vivono, muovonsi, respirano, parlano, operano nella mente del poeta e dell'artista, come gl'individui vivi e reali nel mondo della natura. In questa doppia fattura si esercita la virtù della fantasia; e quanto meglio ella ci riesce, tanto è maggiore e più squisita l'eccellenza delle sue opere. Ridotti gl'intelligibili e i sensibili a condizione di fantasmi, perdendo da un lato e acquistando dall'altro qualcosa, e così doppiamente tramutandosi dal loro primo essere, è facile ad intendersi la loro composizione, in quanto quella prima pelle che è come il residuo della sottrazione fatta sui sensibili, serve di veste e di aggiunta agl'intelligibili spogliati pure di una parte delle proprietà loro, e arricchiti in compenso di una porzione delle aliene, tanto che ne emerge il fantasma in cui alberga la bellezza." (Enciclopedia Italiana, Sul Bello, vol. 4, p. 209.)

"Nell'intelletto ogni cosa è quantità. La proporzione delle quantità fra loro è l'ordine e il bello.

"La bellezza è un vestigio della forza infinita nel finito, cioè l'uno nel vario.

"Il bello è la forma algebrica dell'utile.

"Il bello è più necessario dell'utile.

"La generalità è il carattere del vero bello; l'universalità, del bello supremo: l'universalità somma è nei libri ispirati.

"Studiate le varietà ch'ebbe la medesima verità o forma d'arte in vari tempi, e quelle che ad essa vennero da vari paesi. Così conoscerete la parte eterna ed essenziale delle istituzioni, l'accessoria e mutabile. Applicate tal norma alle religioni.

"In ogni specie di cose le forme del bello variano: e l'uomo vorrebbe nell'opere dell'intelligenza una forma sola di bello?

"La bellezza non è solo la veste ma la pelle della verità.

"Oggigiorno ce la danuo a vagheggiare scorticata.

"Chi cerca non altro che il bello nell'arte, diventa non pastore ma pecora arcadica.

"Non cercate mai la bellezza; ma quella che si rincontra, vagheggiate con umile affetto.

"Altri colgono il bello lineario; altri il bello di superficie: il solido, pochi."—(N. Tommaseo, *Studii Filosofi*, vol 2, p. 237.)

"Quelqu'un me dira peut-être : Faut-il donc aller si loin pour trouver du beau ? Ouvrez les yeux ; voilà une belle campagne : écoutez ; voilà un bel air. Mais il est évident que ce serait là sortir de la question. Je ne vous demande pas *ce qui est beau*, disait autrefois un philosophe à un sophiste, qui, sur le même sujet, lui faisait à peu près la même réponse. Je vous demande *ce que c'est que le beau* ? Les deux questions sont bien différentes. Vous répondez suivant le style ordinaire, parfaitement juste à celle que je ne vous fais pas, mais vous ne répondez point du tout à celle que je vous fais. Je vous demande, encore un coup : qu'est ce que le beau ? le beau, qui rend tel tout ce qui est beau dans le physique, dans le moral, dans les ouvrages de la nature, dans les productions de l'art, en quelque genre de beauté que ce puisse être ?

"Je sais qu'il y a des philosophes par le monde qui m'auraient bientôt répondu. Après avoir épuisé sur le beau tous les lieux communs de l'éloquence pyrrhonienne, qui se réduit à prouver aux hommes qu'ils ne savent rien, parce qu'ils ne savent pas tout, ils concluraient sans façon à le mettre au rang des êtres de pure opinion. Mais si ces grands philosophes ne veulent point passer pour des extravagants qui parlent du beau sans savoir ce qu'ils disent, il faut du moins qu'ils en admettent l'idée, qui est en effet très-constante. Je veux dire, pour ne rien supposer que d'indubitable, qu'il y a dans tous les esprits une idée du beau ; que cette idée se dit excellence, agrément, perfection ; qu'elle nous représente le beau comme une qualité avantageuse que nous estimons dans les autres et que nous aimerions dans nous-mêmes. La question est de la développer, en sorte qu'elle devienne manifeste à tous les esprits attentifs ; c'est le dessein que je me propose." (*Œuvres du Père André*.)

In the "Mémoires" of the "Société Littéraire de L'Université Catholique," of Louvain, for 1845, we have the following observations on a communication read before the Society by M. De Loose. "M. De Loose vous a donné lecture d'un mémoire intitulé : *Considérations philosophiques sur le Beau dans la nature et dans les arts*. Après avoir signalé l'opportunité des recherches métaphysiques sur le Beau, l'auteur s'attache à prouver d'abord que l'existence, la nature et la fin du Beau seraient incompréhensibles sans la création substantielle. Puis passant en revue les théories esthétiques modernes qui sont pour la plupart exclusives ou incomplètes, il croit pouvoir établir : Que le Beau est distinct du vrai et du bien métaphysiques, qu'il ne consiste pas seulement dans l'unité, que la perception esthétique s'opère par l'action simultanée de l'imagination, de l'intelligence, et du sentiment ou du cœur, enfin que le Beau réalisé doit réunir, comme conditions indispensables, la vérité, la bonté, et l'unité. Dans la deuxième partie de son travail, l'auteur considère l'origine, la nature et la fin de la réalisation du Beau par les arts et par la littérature. Pour lui, l'art dérive à la fois de l'imperfection actuelle des choses créées et de la nature de l'homme, qui tend incessamment vers le parfait, et il peut être défini en général : *l'imitation de la création divine*. En partant de ces idées, l'auteur rejette, comme contraires à l'essence de l'art et à l'unité de nos facultés intellectuelles et morales, le système de *l'art pour l'art*, et celui qui est uniquement basé sur *l'imitation de ce qui est*."

NOTE L.—Page 479.

"The *Ideal* is properly a judicious choice only, and an ingenious representation of objects in order to have every thing excellent in its kind, and so chosen from entire nature, as to attract the eyes and captivate the attention of connoisseurs ; the whole nevertheless different throughout, according to the exigence of the case and the subject. This *ideality* is extended through all the principal parts of art, not only in the different choice of *ordonnance* or disposition of the whole *chiaro oscuro*, the *coloretto*, the *draperies*,

the *attitudes*, the *characters* of personages; hut also through the subjects of pleasant *landscapes*, of fine *flowers*, and of exquisite *fruits*; in such a manner that in every composition a particular *harmony* reigns, and a certain union of the whole; just as in a fine piece of music the *key* or *tone* reigns upon which the music is composed."—(Lambt. Hermanson, Ten-Kate, "The Ideal Beauty," p. 2.)

"En quoi consiste précisément le beau idéal? Doit-on dans les arts ne suivre que la nature, ou faut-il chercher à l'embellir? questions importantes et qui tiennent à la théorie du beau. Dans la peinture et dans la sculpture se montre le beau idéal physique; c'est-à-dire, que l'artiste, dans ses groupes ou dans ses tableaux, ne se borne pas à enlquer la vie réelle, mais il choisit d'abord un sujet propre à intéresser; ensuite, s'il veut atteindre aux limites de son art, il donnera à ses figures quelque chose qui n'est pas dans la nature, mais qui est propre à faire paraître vivant le marbre et la toile, ou bien à indiquer des qualités au-dessus de la nature humaine."—(Encyclopédie Catholique, Paris, 1841, Art. Beau.)

"Ideal Beauty, then, is evolved from real Beauty by an immediate abstraction which perceives the one in the other. The operation is two-fold; if it were not, we should obtain the individual by itself, or the absolute by itself; that is to say, Life without the Ideal, or the Ideal without Life. Art must devote itself to the production of the Ideal and of Nature equally.

"The ideally Beautiful having been distinguished from natural Beauty, we ask, what is Ideal Beauty? The Beautiful is identical with the good and the true: there are not many truths, but one truth. Give me a truth, and I engage to find another more sublime and vast. Give me a good action, and I will find a better one. So is it with Ideal Beauty, it remains undetermined, it is a point which is for ever shifting, it is ever tending towards the Infinite. Every work of Art, however ideal, is still individual. The Apollo affects certain forms, presents such or such an attitude: it is determined, it is not then in itself the ideal: otherwise there would be only one kind of the Ideal, and then all statues ought to be cast in the same mould. Every work of Art is therefore only an approximation; the last term of the ideal is in the Infinite, is in God. Between the point where human efforts expire, and God, there is a chasm which cannot be filled up. It is thus with the

true, you can never obtain the true in itself: and it is thus with the good. We have to purify the real, to raise it to a lofty height; still the Absolute Good is more pure and more lofty, and we can never attain unto it. The Infinite is the origin and the foundation of all that is. It reveals itself to us in the true, the Beautiful, and the good: in descending from this supreme Existence, we arrive at supreme Beauty, which is the least distant from the infinite type, yet which is ever afar off; and thence step by step we descend to real Beauty: we traverse a multitude of intermediate stages as we descend; we meet art and all degrees of art, the Apollo, the Venus, the Jupiter &c., and lower still, beneath art, nature and all degrees of natural Beauty. Remember, that all these different domains touch and penetrate each other, as it were. Beneath the Beautiful you find that the agreeable, though different, may be sometimes simultaneous, and that, in that case, the judgment and the sensation accompany each other.”—(“The Philosophy of the Beautiful,” by Victor Cousin, translated by Jesse Cato Daniel, of Cheshnut College; Pickering, 1848.)

The disquisitions of Hemsterhuis are well entitled to special notice, on the nature of the *Ideal* in beauty. We quote here a few observations from his work. “Il y a d’abord une observation à faire, qui est assez humiliante, à la vérité, mais qui prouve incontestablement que le beau n’a aucune réalité dans soi-même. Qu’on prenne d’un côté un groupe ou un vase qui ait, autant que possible, tous les principes de la laideur: qu’on en prenne un autre qui ait tous les principes de la beauté: qu’on les observe de tous les côtés journellement pendant plusieurs heures de suite. Le premier effet de cette pénible expérience sera le dégoût: mais lorsqu’on verra de nouveau comparer ces deux objets, on sera étonné de voir que la sensibilité de la différence de leur degré de beauté sera diminuée extrêmement, et paraîtra même avoir changé de nature: on se trouvera, en quelque façon, indécis sur le choix à faire entre ces deux objets, qui pourtant en effet diffèrent totalement l’un de l’autre. La raison de ce dégoût dérive d’une propriété de l’âme, dont je parlerai tout à l’heure; mais celle de ce changement dans notre jugement consiste en ce que l’œil, pendant l’expérience, s’est tellement exercé à se promener le long des contours du groupe dont la composition était mauvaise, qu’il achève sa course presque dans le même espace de temps que

demande l'autre objet pour qu'on en ait une idée distincte (*car l'âme juge le plus beau ce dont elle peut se faire une idée dans le plus petit espace de temps*) ; et au contraire, en parcourant un si grand nombre de fois le bel objet, l'œil y a découvert des coins et des recoins sur lesquels il avait glissé avec facilité au premier aspect, et qui maintenant le font heurter dans sa marche." (M. Sylvain Van de Weyer's Edition of the Works of Hemsterhuis.)

" En effet, le beau n'a aucune réalité hors de nous, et n'existe pas plus dans les objets qui font naître en nous le *sentiment* du beau, que les couleurs et les sons n'existent dans les corps. Il n'y a donc point de beauté objective, mais seulement une beauté subjective : ce qui n'a rien d'humiliant ; car cette beauté subjective, ou le *sens* du beau, quoique relatif et sujet au changement, est peut-être le plus sublime des attributs de l'âme." (" Méditations Critiques, ou Examen Approfondi de Plusieurs Doctrines sur l'Homme et sur Dieu," par L. A. Gruyer, Paris, 1847.)



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